Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner Tables 2025-2026 Annual Report.

Check out the OIPC’s new resource Steps to Processing an Access to Information Request

OPC examines websites and apps used by children as part of global privacy sweep

Statement on proposed changes to Ontario’s FIPPA stemming from the production order issued by Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner which was upheld by the Divisional Court.

New podcast episode out now Un-redacted, The Sask IPC Podcast | IPC

New Report Posted: Read Snooping in a Police Database for more information

Check out this new resource that explains the interaction between LA FOIP and The Municipalities Act in the province of Saskatchewan and as it pertains to personal information.

Guides - IPC Guide to FOIP

IPC Guide to FOIP

This guide is a comprehensive reference tool for the application of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP). It is designed to assist government institutions that are subject to FOIP. The guidance is non-binding and every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

To access each chapter of the IPC Guide to FOIP, please click on show chapter to expand the Chapter below.

FOIP Guide Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Purposes and Scope of FOIP

Guide to FOIP-Chapter 1

Guide to FOIP

The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Chapter 1

Purposes and Scope of FOIP

Table of Contents

Overview 1

Quasi-Constitutional Status 1

The Purposes of FOIP 2

Object or Purpose Clause 2

The Scope of FOIP 6

Government Institutions 6

Subsection 2(1)(d): Definition of a government institution 7

Subsection 2(2): Bodies Not Included 8

FOIP Applies 9

Section 5: Possession or control 9

Section 24: Personal Information 15

FOIP Does Not Apply 15

Subsection 3(1)(a) 16

Information Services Corporation (ISC) 17

Subsection 3(1)(b) 20

Subsection 3(1)(c) 22

Subsection 3(3) 24

Subsection 3(4) 24

Subsection 24(1.1) 25

Section 23 26

Subsection 23(1) 27

Subsection 23(2) 29

Subsection 23(3) 29

Section 4: Existing Rights Preserved 32

Subsection 4(a) 34

Subsection 4(b) 36

Subsection 4(c) 36

Subsection 4(d) 38

Subsection 4(e) 39

Subsection 4(f) 39

‌Overview

This Chapter explains the purposes and scope of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP).

What follows is non-binding guidance. Every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is not intended to be an exhaustive authority on the interpretation of these provisions. Government institutions may wish to seek legal advice when deciding on how to interpret the Act. Government institutions should keep section 61 of FOIP in mind.

Section 61 places the burden of proof for establishing that access to a record may or must be refused on the government institution. For more on the burden of proof, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP”This is a guide.

The tests, criteria and interpretations established in this Chapter reflect the precedents set by the current and/or former Information and Privacy Commissioners in Saskatchewan through the issuing of Review Reports. Court decisions from Saskatchewan affecting The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) will be followed. Where this office has not previously considered a section of FOIP, the Commissioner looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. This includes other Information and Privacy Commissioners’ Orders, Reports and/or other relevant resources. In addition, court decisions from across the country are relied upon where appropriate.

This Chapter will be updated regularly to reflect any changes in precedent. This office will update the footer to reflect the last update. Using the electronic version directly from our website will ensure you are always using the most current version.

‌Quasi-Constitutional Status

In 1992, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) was proclaimed. FOIP applies to “government institutions”. This captures all Ministries of the Saskatchewan Government plus Crown corporations, Boards, Commissions and Agencies prescribed in the Appendix at Part I of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted Acts, such as FOIP, as quasi-constitutional legislation. It follows that as fundamental rights, the rights to access and to privacy are interpreted generously, while the exceptions to these rights must be understood strictly.1

The phrase quasi-constitutional implies that certain rights, such as the right to access information held by government institutions, are fundamentally important in their nature because they reflect primary assumptions about the relationship between citizen and state. Though the right to access information is not entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, this quasi-constitutional right is protected by legislation such as FOIP.2

A privileged status is afforded access and privacy legislation wherein it is typically paramount to other legislation. The importance of the rights protected by this legislation must always be borne in mind whenever considering any decisions which impact upon these rights. As the Privy Council has stated about quasi-constitutional Acts:

Whether the quasi-constitutional status of these Acts derives from one of their provisions or from court decisions, the justification for it is the same. These Acts express values that are very important in Canada. Any derogation from them must be explicit.

The requirement of explicit derogation protects the values expressed in those Acts to the maximum extent possible, short of entrenching those values in the Constitution. It also ensures accountability to the public for any decision to derogate.3

The Purposes of FOIP

‌Object or Purpose Clause

FOIP does not have an object or purpose clause.

In the absence of an explicit purpose clause in FOIP, the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) is required to infer the Legislative Assembly’s purpose in designing such an instrument.

Both FOIP and The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act started out as consecutive Bills receiving first reading in the Legislative Assembly on April 19, 1991.4 On June 18, 1991, the Lieutenant Governor spoke to prorogation and stated:

Widespread consultations also revealed a significant element of demand for a less partisan government, the protection of democratic rights, and the accountability of elected governments. This spring the rules of the Legislative Assembly were changed, and the first Speaker elected, to respond to the first of these concerns. The government’s comprehensive package of legislation, including The Referendum and Plebiscite Act, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, are reforms introduced to make government more open and allow people to play a more direct role in the government Finally, the two freedom of information Acts provide the public with the right to know the activities of government as it touches their personal lives 5

The IPC has, in the past, also been guided by decisions of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench. In Amendt v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 1999 CanLII 12560 (SK KB) at [43], Goldenberg J. observed:

The right of persons to apply for access to information in the hands of a government agency has no basis in common law. It is purely statutory. The Act is a code unto itself. The code sets out a detailed method for applications, reviews, and ultimately for appeals to the Court of Queen’s Bench. Absent compliance with the process contained therein, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter.6

In General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 9128 (SK CA) at [11], the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated:

The Act’s basic purpose reflects a general philosophy of full disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language. There are specific exemptions from disclosure set forth in the Act, but these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy is the dominant objective of the Act. That is not to say that the statutory exemptions are of little or no significance. We recognize that they are intended to have a meaningful reach and application. The Act provides for specific exemptions to take care of potential abuses. There are legitimate privacy interests that could be harmed by release of certain types of information. Accordingly, specific exemptions have been delineated to achieve a workable balance between the competing interests. The Act’s broad provisions for disclosure, coupled with specific exemptions, prescribe the “balance” struck between an individual’s right to privacy and the basic policy of opening agency records and action to public scrutiny.7

FOIP closely corresponds to provisions in the federal Access to Information Act. The purpose of the Access to Information Act is described as follows:

2(1) The purpose of this Act is to enhance the accountability and transparency of federal institutions in order to promote an open and democratic society and to enable public debate on the conduct of those institutions.8

As stated by Mr. Justice La Forest in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 1997 CanLII 358 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at [61]:

The overarching purpose of access to information legislation, then, is to facilitate democracy. It does so in two related ways. It helps to ensure first, that citizens have the information required to participate meaningfully in the democratic process, and secondly, that politicians and bureaucrats remain accountable to the citizenry. As Professor Donald C. Rowat explains in his classic article, “How Much Administrative Secrecy?” (1965), 31 Can. J. of Econ. and Pol Sci. 479, at p. 480:

Parliament and the public cannot hope to call the Government to account without an adequate knowledge of what is going on; nor can they hope to participate in the decision-making process and contribute their talents to the formation of policy and legislation if that process is hidden from view.9

In Legislation on Public Access to Government Documents, the reasons for access to information legislation are discussed. The author, Honourable John Roberts, Secretary of State, concluded that the reasons for such legislation include:

  • Effective accountability – the public’s judgment of choices taken by government – depends on knowing the information and options available to the decision-makers.
  • Government documents often contain information vital to the effective participation of citizens and organizations in government decision-making.
  • (As) government has become the single most important storehouse of information about our society, information that is developed at public expense so should be publicly available wherever possible.10

Since the Access to Information Act came into force, provincial and territorial governments have enacted their own access to information and protection of privacy legislation. Many of those provincial instruments have included a more comprehensive purpose clause. Those purpose clauses tend to reflect and reinforce the approach taken by the federal Information Commissioner and numerous decisions of superior courts in Canada. A good example is section 2 of the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act:

2(1) The purposes of this Act are to make public bodies more accountable to the public and to protect personal privacy by

(a) giving the public a right of access to records,

(b) giving individuals a right of access to, and a right to request corrections of, personal information about themselves,

(c) specifying limited exceptions to the rights of access,

(d) preventing the unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal information by public bodies, and

(e) providing for an independent review of decisions made under this Act.11

This summarizes and clearly identifies the purpose of legislation such as FOIP. The Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC) deals with requests for review and privacy breach complaints by reference to these same five purposes, which are outlined below.12

1. The Right of Access to Records

     FOIP establishes a right of access by any person to records in the possession or control of a government institution.

     See Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” for more information about the right of access.

2. Access to an Individual’s Own Personal Information

     FOIP provides individuals with the right to access their own personal information.

     See Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” for more information on what section 31 of FOIP requires.

3. Right to Request Correction of Personal Information

     FOIP provides an individual with the right to request a government institution correct the individual’s personal information where the individual believes there is an       error or omission.

     See Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy” for more information on the right of correction.

4. Protection of Personal Privacy

     FOIP provides individuals with the right to privacy of their personal information held by government institutions. This includes restrictions on the collection, use           and/or disclosure of the individual’s personal information.

     See Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy” for more information on the protection of privacy.

5. Independent Review of Decisions

     FOIP provides for the independent review of decisions made by government institutions with respect to access and protection of privacy. Independent review is           provided by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

     See Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP” for more information on the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s role and responsibilities under FOIP.

‌The Scope of FOIP

Government Institutions

FOIP applies to all government institutions as defined by subsection 2(1)(d) of FOIP and includes government institutions prescribed in the Appendix at Part I of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. All government institutions subject to FOIP have statutory duties with regard to providing access to information and protecting personal information that is in the possession or control of the government institution.

Subsection 2(1)(d): Definition of a government institution

Interpretation 2(1) In this Act:

(d) “government institution” means, subject to subsection (2):

(i) the office of Executive Council or any department, secretariat or other similar agency of the executive government of Saskatchewan; or

(ii) any prescribed board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, or any prescribed portion of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, whose members or directors are appointed, in whole or in part:

(A) by the Lieutenant Governor in Council;

(B) by a member of the Executive Council; or

(C) in the case of:

(I) a board, commission or other body, by a Crown corporation; or

(II) a Crown corporation, by another Crown corporation;

Subsection 2(1)(d) of FOIP defines a government institution. Any body or organization that fits under this definition is subject to FOIP.

Subsection 2(1)(d)(ii) of FOIP uses the phrase “any prescribed board…”. The meaning of this can be found at subsection 2(1)(h) of FOIP which provides:

2(1) In this Act:

(h) “prescribed” means prescribed in the regulations;

Therefore, for subsection 2(1)(d)(ii) of FOIP, a body that is “prescribed” means any body listed in Part I of the Appendix of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

To further this, subsection 3(a) of the FOIP Regulations indicates bodies listed in Part I of the Appendix are prescribed as government institutions.

Subsection 2(2): Bodies Not Included

Interpretation

2(2) “Government institution” does not include:

(a) a corporation the share capital of which is owned in whole or in part by a person other than the Government of Saskatchewan or an agency of it;

(b) the Legislative Assembly Service or, subject to subsections 3(3) and (4), offices of members of the Assembly or members of the Executive Council; or

(c) the Court of Appeal, Her Majesty’s Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan or the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan.

Bodies that are excluded from the definition of a government institution include those outlined at subsection 2(2) of FOIP. This includes:

  • Courts such as the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan.13
  • The Legislative Assembly Service and offices of members of the Legislative Assembly.
  • Members of Executive Council such as ministers’ offices.

This means records held by any of these bodies are not subject to the access provisions and, in some instances, the privacy provisions set out in FOIP. However, see Subsection 3(3) and Subsection 3(4), later in this Chapter for more on the privacy provisions that apply to the Legislative Assembly Service and offices of members of the Assembly or members of the Executive Council.

FOIP Applies

Section 5: Possession or control

Right of access

Subject to this Act and the regulations, every person has a right to and, on an application made in accordance with this Part, shall be permitted access to records that are in the possession or under the control of a government institution.

[emphasis added]

FOIP applies to any records in the “possession or under the control of a government institution”.

Section 5 of FOIP provides that every person has a right to request access to records that are in the possession or under the control of a government institution. Therefore, FOIP only applies to records that are in a government institution’s possession or control.

record is defined at subsection 2(1)(i) of FOIP as “a record of information in any form and includes information that is written, photographed, recorded or stored in any manner, but does not include computer programs or other mechanisms that produce records”.

There are times when possession or control of records is not easily established. For that reason, the following terms, factors, and two-part test have been established.

Possession is physical possession plus a measure of control over the record.14

The mere possession of a record is not enough, there must be some right to deal with the records and some responsibility for their care and protection. For this reason, the definition for “possession” includes a “measure of control”. This originates from the Office of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner Order P-239 at paragraph [4] and is also followed by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia in several Orders including Order 309-1999 in which the following is stated at paragraph [50]:

Custody [possession] of records requires more than that the records be located on particular premises.

In order for a public body to have custody [possession] of records, the public body must have immediate charge and control of these records, including some legal responsibility for their safekeeping, care, protection, or preservation.

Control connotes authority. A record is under the control of a government institution when the government institution has the authority to manage the record including restricting, regulating, and administering its use, disclosure, or disposition.15

Possession and control are different things. It is conceivable that a government institution might have possession but not control of a record or that it might have control but not possession.16 Section 5 uses the word, “or” which indicates that only one of “possession” or “control” is required. If a government institution has either possession or control of a record, FOIP applies to that record.17

To determine whether a government institution has a measure of control over a record(s), both parts of the following two-part test must be met:

1. Do the contents of the document relate to a government institution matter?

The first question acts as a useful screening device. If the answer is no that ends the inquiry.

If the answer is yes, the inquiry into control continues.18 Continue to the second part of the test.

Unsolicited Information 19

An individual may submit personal information on their own initiative without the information being requested by a government institution. Receipt of this information is not considered a collection unless the government institution keeps or uses the information.20 In other words, if the government institution keeps it, it should ensure it has authority to do so under section 25 of FOIP. If not, return it or safely destroy it. In addition, keeping it means the government institution has possession and/or control of the personal information.

If a government institution does not have specific authority to collect unsolicited personal information and the information is not necessary for an operating program or activity of the government institution, it is not an authorized collection. The government institution should adopt a policy of either returning the unsolicited information or destroying it in accordance with a transitory records schedule.21

Personal emails of employees 22

When a government employee uses their workplace email address to send and receive personal emails completely unrelated to their work, those emails are not subject to disclosure to members of the public who request them under FOIP. The terms “possession” and “control” do not include private communications of employees unrelated to government business.

It can be confidently predicted that any government employee who works in an office setting will have stored, somewhere in that office, documents that have nothing whatsoever to do with their job, but which are purely personal in nature. Such documents can range from the most intimately personal documents (such as medical records) to the most mundane (such as a list of household chores). It cannot be suggested that employees of an institution governed by FOIP are themselves subject to that legislation in respect of any piece of personal material they happen to have in their offices at any given time. That would clearly not be contemplated as being within the intent and purpose of FOIP.23

While the expectation of privacy may be somewhat circumscribed, there is still both a right to and a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to certain personal information contained on or in government owned equipment and accounts.24

2. Can the government institution reasonably expect to obtain a copy of the document upon request?25

All factors must be considered when determining the second question. These factors include:

  • The substantive content of the record.
  • The circumstances in which it was created.
  • The legal relationship between the government institution and the record holder.26

The reasonable expectation test is objective. If a senior official of the government institution, based on all relevant factors, reasonably should be able to obtain a copy of the record, the test is met.27

If both test questions are answered in the affirmative, the document is under the control of the government institution.

The following factors may also be considered if it is still unclear whether the government institution has “control” of the records at issue:

  • The record was created by a staff member, an officer, or a member of the government institution in the course of his or her duties performed for the government institution.
  • The record was created by an outside consultant for the government institution.
  • The government institution possesses the record, either because it has been voluntarily provided by the creator or pursuant to a mandatory, statutory or employment requirement.
  • An employee of the government institution possesses the record for the purposes of his or her duties performed for the government institution.
  • The record is specified in a contract as being under the control of a government institution and there is no understanding or agreement that the records are not to be disclosed.
  • The content of the record relates to the government institution’s mandate and core, central or basic functions.
  • The government institution has a right of possession of the record.
  • The government institution has the authority to regulate the record’s use and disposition.
  • The government institution paid for the creation of the records.
  • The government institution has relied upon the record to a substantial extent.
  • The record is closely integrated with other records held by the government institution.
  • A contract permits the government institution to inspect, review and/or possess copies of the records the contractor produced, received, or acquired.
  • The government institution’s customary practice in relation to possession or control of records of this nature in similar circumstances.
  • The customary practice of other bodies in a similar trade, calling or profession in relation to possession or control of records of this nature in similar circumstances; and
  • The owner of the records.28

More than one agency may have control of the same record at the same time. The control exercised by two different organizations need not be co-extensive and may be uneven between the two organizations. Any analysis of possession and control needs to ensure that the words have different meanings.29

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2014-007, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the Ministry of Justice (Justice). An applicant had requested any records containing the name of an individual written, processed or possessed by a specific government employee. Justice responded to the request indicating that it did not have any responsive records in its possession or control and that any records were the personal records of the government employee which it described as emails. The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon review, the Commissioner applied the 15 factors noted in this Chapter (this was prior to the two-part Supreme Court of Canada test). The Commissioner found that Justice had possession of the records as the emails exist on the government email server. When considering “control”, the Commissioner noted that in support of its position that the emails were of a personal nature and not government business, Justice provided a sample email which was a letter sent from a family member to the government employee at his work address and the contents was of a personal nature. After considering the 15 factors, the Commissioner determined that Justice did not have a measure of control over the records. This finding was consistent with City of Ottawa v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 6835 which also dealt with personal emails in the possession of an employer.

In Review Report 007-2019, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the former Ministry of Central Services (Central Services). An applicant had requested access to personal emails sent and received from the applicant’s (a former employee) Government of Saskatchewan email account. Central Services responded to the request indicating that any responsive records were personal emails that were outside the scope of FOIP and not in the possession or control of Central Services. Upon review, the Commissioner found that any emails sent or received by the applicant constituting their personal emails, that were retained on the backup tapes, were not in the possession or control of Central Services for the purposes of FOIP.

In Review Report 297-2021, the Commissioner found that a portion of an applicant’s access to information request sent to the Ministry of Justice involved information maintained by ISC in the public registry. The Commissioner found the Ministry of Justice still maintained control of the information. As a result, the Ministry of Justice directed ISC to conduct an additional search for responsive records. ISC located an additional email chain.

Section 24: Personal Information

FOIP applies to personal information recorded in any form in the possession or control of a government institution. To qualify as personal information, two elements must exist:

  1. An identifiable individual
  2. Information that is personal in nature

Some examples of what could constitute personal information include:

  • The individual’s race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religious or political beliefs or associations.
  • The individual’s age, sex, marital status or family status.
  • Information about the individual’s educational, financial, employment or criminal history, including criminal records, whether or not a pardon has been given.
  • An identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual.
  • Anyone else’s opinions about the individual.
  • The individual’s name, home or business address or home or business telephone number.
  • The individual’s personal views or opinions, except if they are about someone else.30

For more information about what constitutes personal information, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

FOIP Does Not Apply

Application

3(1) This Act does not apply to:

(a) published material or material that is available for purchase by the public;

(b) material that is a matter of public record; or

(c) material that is placed in the custody of the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan by or on behalf of persons or organizations other than government institutions.

Subsection 3(1) of FOIP provides that certain information and records in the possession or control of a government institution are excluded from the application of FOIP. In some cases, another process is available to obtain access to these records. See Section 4: Existing Rights Preserved, later in this Chapter.

Subsection 3(1)(a)

Application

3(1) This Act does not apply to:

(a) published material or material that is available for purchase by the public;

FOIP does not apply to published material or material that is available for purchase by the public.

Published means to make known to people in general…an advising of the public or making known of something to the public for a purpose.31

When considering whether a record or information is published, the government institution should confirm that:

  • The specific information or record requested is published (what data elements are actually published).32
  • There is a way for the public to access the published record or information.

Where FOIP does not apply to a public record, it would still apply to all actions related to collection or use of data. Government institutions are best served by determining what data elements are published or made part of a public record. Best practice when publishing information or putting it in a public record, would be to include the least amount of personal information. This is particularly relevant when posting to the internet where the public record is in fact online and searchable. Publishing online means the information is potentially available to six to nine billion people at any given time.33

Material that is available to purchase means that a pricing structure is in place for all who wish to obtain the information or record.34

When considering whether a record or information is available to purchase, the government institution should confirm that:

  • The specific information or record requested is available for purchase.
  • There is a way for the public to purchase the record or information (i.e., website, office to attend).
  • A pricing structure exists for all who wish to obtain the information or record.

In some circumstances, information or records are available through a public registry. A registry means a registry established or continued pursuant to a public registry statute and includes information provided to, and the data created or maintained in the operation of, a public registry statute.35 It can also be an electronic registry. Examples include the Information Services Corporation (ISC) land titles registry and the corporate registry. These registries provide information or records. Purchases can be made by attending ISC or through its website. There is also a fee structure in place for anyone wishing to purchase certain registry information. Some information is available free of charge.

When relying on this provision, the government institution should ensure the publicly available record is the record or information being requested by an applicant. Further, applicants should not be required to compile small pieces of information from a variety of sources to obtain a complete version of a record that could be disclosed.36

Information Services Corporation (ISC)

Information Services Corporation (ISC) oversees several public registries for the Government of Saskatchewan.

Subsection 2(1)(a) of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act establishes the relationship between the Government of Saskatchewan and a “contractor”:

2(1) In this Act:

(a) “contractor” means, with respect to a public registry statute, a person with whom the minister has entered into a service agreement;

ISC is a “contractor” as defined above. However, ownership of the information in the registries remains with the Government of Saskatchewan as per subsection 11(1) of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act which provides:

11(1) All information and records in the registries are the property of the Government of Saskatchewan.

The Ministry of Justice is the administrator of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act and has established the Office of Public Registry Administration within the ministry. A summary of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act is as follows:

The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act:

  • Created the Office of Public Registry Administration.
  • Allowed the Government of Saskatchewan to enter into a service agreement with a business corporation, Information Services Corporation (ISC), to operate and manage the public registries on behalf of the Government.
  • Maintained Government ownership of all registry data.
  • Continued Government guarantee of title and assurance coverage for certain errors on title.
  • Maintained the quasi-judicial decision-making within Government by requiring the registry officers (Registrar of Titles, Controller of Surveys, Director of Corporations, Registrar of Cooperatives, and Registrar of Personal Property Security) to be employed by the Government

.…

The service agreement with ISC covers the Land Registry, the Land Surveys Directory, the Personal Property Registry, the Corporate Registry, and the Common Business Identifiers Program (CBI).

The Public can access these registries through ISC, but Government retains ultimate responsibility for the registries. The procedures for registering or searching documents in the public registries and the legal rights of people using public registries remain unchanged.37

In Review Report 297-2021, the Commissioner found that a portion of an applicant’s access to information request sent to the Ministry of Justice involved information maintained by ISC in the public registry. The Commissioner found the Ministry of Justice still maintained control of the information. This was a result of the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and ISC that is established in The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act.38

IPC Findings

In Review Report 235-2016, the Commissioner found that FOIP did not apply to records stored within a registry that any person may search provided they pay a fee. The registry was the Mineral Administration Registry System Saskatchewan (MARS).

In Review Report 277-2016, the Commissioner considered the Ministry of Economy’s (Economy) application of subsection 29(1) of FOIP to a map identifying parcels of land owned by individuals. The Commissioner found that the information on the map was publicly available through ISC at no cost and recommended release of the map.

In Review Report LA-2007-001, the Commissioner found that a tax certificate enabled by section 395 of The Rural Municipalities Act (RMA) qualified as “material available for purchase by the public”. If the applicant wanted the data elements included in the tax certificate, it would be excluded by virtue of the equivalent subsection 3(1)(a) of (LA FOIP). The applicant’s remedy would be to pay the appropriate fee and purchase the relevant tax certificates. The Commissioner also determined that subsection 3(1)(a) of LA FOIP had no requirement that information already available to anyone as “published material” within the meaning of subsection 3(1)(a) of LA FOIP need all be contained in a single document or format. All of the applicant’s requested information could be purchased through a combination of tax certificates and title searches from ISC.

In Review Report 297-2021, the Commissioner found that a portion of an applicant’s access to information request sent to the Ministry of Justice involved information maintained by ISC in the public registry. The Commissioner found the Ministry of Justice still maintained control of the information. As a result, the Ministry of Justice directed ISC to conduct an additional search for responsive records. ISC located an email chain.

Subsection 3(1)(b)

Application

3(1) This Act does not apply to:

(b) material that is a matter of public record; or

FOIP does not apply to material that is a “matter of public record”. No definition of the term “matter of public record” appears in FOIP and there has not been a great deal of judicial comment on that term, especially in the context of similar “access to information” statutes.39

A matter of public record is defined as documents that one would typically find in a public register that the members of the public have ready access to.40

A “matter of public record” would be information collected and maintained specifically for the purpose of creating a record available to the general public. A good example would be the land titles registry operated by ISC.41

The only other province with freedom of information legislation that appears to contain the same “matter of public record” exemption provision as set out in subsection 3(1)(b) of FOIP is Nova Scotia. Subsection 4(2)(b) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5, reads identically to subsection 3(1)(b) of FOIP. Courts in that province have endorsed the same definitions of “matter of public record” as were endorsed in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII).42

To be a “matter of public record” two characteristics must be present:

i. The record is held by a government institution that is under a duty to keep or collect it.

ii. The record is information that members of the public have a right to access.43

Registry means a registry established or continued pursuant to a public registry statute and includes information provided to, and the data created or maintained in the operation of, a public registry statute.44 It can also be an electronic registry. Examples include the Information Services Corporation land titles registry and the corporate registry.

Public record is defined as a record that a government unit is required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse. Public records are generally open to view by the public.45

IPC Findings

In Review Report 235-2016, the Commissioner found that FOIP did not apply to records stored within a registry that any person may search provided they pay a fee.

In Review Report 277-2016, the Commissioner recommended release of a map that showed parcels of land and their owners because they were publicly available using the ISC website. The information was accessed free of charge.

In 605499 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Rifle Shot Oil Corp., 2019 SKCA 133 (CanLII) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal determined that agreements regarding compensation for surface rights were not excluded from access under subsection 3(1)(b) of FOIP.

Subsection 3(1)(c)

Application

3(1) This Act does not apply to:

(c) material that is placed in the custody of the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan by or on behalf of persons or organizations other than government institutions.

Although the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan (formerly the Saskatchewan Archives Board) is a government institution, FOIP does not apply to material that is placed in the custody of the Provincial Archives by or on behalf of persons or organizations other than government institutions.

The acquisition of private records from individuals and organizations is a core object and function of the mandate of the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan under The Archives and Public Records Management Act (APRMA) (See subsection 4(a) and section 8). Under the APRMA, the general powers include the ability to “enter into agreements with any person, body or organization within or outside Saskatchewan that the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan considers necessary to fulfill its objects and to carry out its functions.” (See subsection 6(1)) This includes the transfer of private records. Records are not ‘on deposit’ with the Archives but involve a formal transfer of ownership. Approximately 40% of the Permanent Collection is from the records of individuals and organizations. The records of individuals can include the political and personal records of MLAs and Ministers of the Crown. The latter are required to follow the APRMA for the transfer of the public portfolio record.

There are many reasons why individuals and organizations turn over their records to the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan. For example, it is a means of sharing records with the broader community or for leaving a legacy. Records of individuals can come over time, as careers develop, or through the executors of estates. The records of organizations include businesses, associations, church groups, architectural firms, political associations etc. and cover every aspect of the history of the province. The Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan have produced a guide for organizations, both in terms of managing records and what to keep over the long term. (See A Guide to Maintaining Records and Identifying Archival Material for Societies and Organizations)

Records offered to the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan from individuals and organizations are appraised by archivists to determine whether they hold long-term historical significance. Overall, these records complement the government record and provide insight into what has shaped the province over time. The transfer occurs through an agreement between the individual or organization and the Archives. Some agreements also include restrictions on access to the record and/or use.46

For subsection 3(1)(c) of FOIP, the following three-part test can be applied:

1. Was the record placed in the Provincial Archives by or on behalf of persons or organizations other than a government institution?

The records must have been placed in the Provincial Archives by a third person or organization separate from a government institution.

2. Is the record now located in the Provincial Archives?

One factor that must be met is the record(s) must have been physically transferred to the custody of the Provincial Archives. A written agreement can be evidence that ownership of the record and the physical record have been transferred to the Provincial Archives.

3. If there is no agreement in place, is there correspondence that documents the transfer of the record(s) to the custody of the Provincial Archives?

For some earlier private record donations, paper trails may exist but no formal agreement. The key is to document that the record is a private record from an individual or organization and that the Provincial Archives has ownership of the record in its Collection.47

Subsection 3(3)

Application

3(3) Subject to the regulations, the following sections apply, with any necessary modification, to offices of members of the Assembly and their employees as if the members and their offices were government institutions:

(a) sections 24 to 30;

(b) section 33.

The access provisions of FOIP do not apply to the Legislative Assembly Services or offices of members of the Legislative Assembly as defined at subsection 2(2)(b) of FOIP. However, the privacy provisions in Part IV of FOIP do apply. This includes the duty to protect personal information as it is defined at section 24 of FOIP.

The IPC has a resource to assist with subsection 3(3) of FOIP. It is intended to assist Members of the Legislative Assembly and their offices with protecting personal information. It is titled, MLA Guide to Protecting Personal Information.

Subsection 3(4)

Application

3(4) Subject to the regulations, the following sections apply, with any necessary modification, to offices of members of the Executive Council and their employees as if the members and their offices were part of the government institution for which the member of the Executive Council serves as the head:

(a) sections 24 and 24.1;

(b) sections 25 to 30;

(c) section 33.

The access provisions of FOIP do not apply to members of the Executive Council and their employees as defined at subsections 2(2)(b) and 2(1)(b.1) of FOIP. However, the privacy provisions in Part IV of FOIP do apply. This includes the duty to protect personal information as it is defined at section 24 of FOIP.

The IPC has issued a resource to assist with subsection 3(4) of FOIP. It is intended to assist members of the Executive Council (Ministers) and their offices with protection of personal information. It is titled, A Minister’s Guide to Protecting Personal Information.

Subsection 24(1.1)

Interpretation

24(1.1) Subject to subsection (1.2), “personal information” does not include information that constitutes personal health information as defined in The Health Information Protection Act.

Subsection 24(1.1) of FOIP simply clarifies that FOIP does not apply to personal health information. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that two different laws do not apply to the same information at the same time.48

The practical effect of subsection 24(1.1) is that if personal health information is in the custody or control of a trustee and therefore subject to The Health Information Protection Act (HIPA), it cannot simultaneously be personal information subject to FOIP. The purpose of the Legislative Assembly in enacting subsection 24(1.1) was presumably to avoid duplication in legislative coverage.49

Government institutions should be aware that two acts could apply to the same records (not information) at the same time. For example, if a record contains both personal information and personal health information, FOIP and HIPA could both be engaged.50

If records in the possession or control of a government institution contain what appears to be personal health information, the test is to first see if the information fits within the definition of personal health information at subsection 2(m) of The Health Information Protection Act (HIPA).

If the information qualifies as personal health information under subsection 2(m) of HIPA, then HIPA applies to that information and not FOIP.

The practical effect of subsection 24(1.1) of FOIP is that if personal health information is in the custody or control of a trustee and therefore subject to HIPA, it cannot simultaneously be personal information subject to FOIP. The purpose of the Legislative Assembly in enacting subsection 24(1.1) of FOIP was presumably to avoid duplication in legislative coverage, not to create a void where no privacy law applied to the information collected, used and/or disclosed.51

IPC Findings

In Investigation Report 293-2016, the Commissioner found that the information at issue was personal health information and that FOIP did not apply to the information pursuant to subsection 24(1.1) of FOIP. Rather, The Health Information Protection Act applied to the information.

In Investigation Report 179-2019, the Commissioner found that, as FOIP did not apply to personal health information, FOIP was not engaged in the circumstances of the case.

Section 23

Confidentiality provisions in other enactments 23(1) Where a provision of:

(a) any other Act; or

(b) a regulation made pursuant to any other Act;

that restricts or prohibits access by any person to a record or information in the possession or under the control of a government institution conflicts with this Act or the regulations made pursuant to it, the provisions of this Act and the regulations made pursuant to it shall prevail.

2. Subject to subsection (3), subsection (1) applies notwithstanding any provision in the other Act or regulation that states that the provision is to apply notwithstanding any other Act or law.

3. Subsection (1) does not apply to:

(a) The Adoption Act, 1998;

(b) section 31 of The Archives and Public Records Management Act;

(c) section 74 of The Child and Family Services Act;

(d) section 14 of The Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, 1997;

(e) The Health Information Protection Act;

(f) section 91.1 of The Police Act, 1990;

(g) section 11 of The Proceedings against the Crown Act, 2019;

(h) section 15 of The Securities Act, 1988;

(i) sections 40.1, 97 and 283 of The Traffic Safety Act;

(j) section 61 of The Trust and Loan Corporations Act, 1997;

(k) Part VIII of The Vital Statistics Act, 2009;

(l) Repealed. 2019, c28, s. 12.

(m) any prescribed Act or prescribed provisions of an Act; or

(n) any prescribed regulation or prescribed provisions of a regulation.

Primacy clauses are clauses in a statute that define how a statute is interpreted if its provisions are inconsistent with another statute in the same jurisdiction. Primacy means the state or position of being first in order, importance, or authority.52

If engaging subsections 23(1), (2) or (3), the government institution should be able to demonstrate that the record or information in question falls within the statutory provision that is not subject to FOIP. It should be noted that section 23 of FOIP only applies to portions of Parts II and III of FOIP which refer to access to records. All the other provisions of FOIP would fully apply such as the protection of privacy provisions in Part IV and the review and appeal provisions in Part VII.

Subsection 23(1)

Subsection 23(1) of FOIP provides that where there is a conflict between FOIP and any other Act or regulation, FOIP will prevail. FOIP prevails even where another Act or regulation restricts or prohibits access.

Prevail means a provision of one Act having priority over a conflicting provision in another Act.53 The ordinary meaning of the word means to be superior in strength or influence.54

The Supreme Court of Canada in Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., 2007 SCC 14 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 591 stated:

The starting point in any analysis of legislative conflict is that legislative coherence is presumed, and an interpretation which results in conflict should be eschewed unless it is unavoidable. The test for determining whether an unavoidable conflict exists is well stated by Professor Cote in his treatise on statutory interpretation:

According to case law, two statutes are not repugnant simply because they deal with the same subject: application of one must implicitly or explicitly preclude application of the other.

(P.-A. Cote, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 350)55

Section 23 of FOIP ensures that the fundamental rights enshrined in FOIP are given proper deference when interpreting legislative intent as to its application in conjunction with other statutes. This primacy clause is a strong expression of legislative intent and a tool for ensuring public policy objectives are met. In the event of a contest between two statutes, the legislature is presumed to not intend conflict between the statutes. Therefore, if an interpretation allows concurrent application, that interpretation should be adopted.56

The following three-part test can be used to determine whether two laws can coexist or are in conflict:

1. Does compliance with one law involve the breach of the other?

The first test is one of pure conflict.

2. Does one law supplement the other?

The second test is whether one law is supplemental to the other by adding something. If the law is supplemental, then it will be valid concurrently with the other law.

3. Does one law duplicate the other?

The third test involves whether one law duplicates another such that there is not an actual conflict or contradiction. Mere duplication without actual conflict or contradiction is normally not sufficient to invalidate a law. It would simply mean that the government institution would be held to the higher standard of the competing statutes.57

Subsection 23(2)

Subsection 23(2) builds on subsection 23(1) of FOIP and provides that FOIP will still prevail even if the other Acts or regulations state that its provisions prevail over other Acts or laws.

Prevail means a provision of one Act having priority over a conflicting provision in another Act.58 The ordinary meaning of the word means to be superior in strength or influence.59

Subsection 23(3)

Subsection 23(3) of FOIP provides a list of provisions where FOIP does not prevail. Additional provisions that FOIP does not prevail over are also prescribed in section 12 of the FOIP Regulations.

Confidentiality provisions in other enactments (FOIP Regulations)

12 For the purposes of clauses 23(3)(l) and (m) of the Act, the following provisions are prescribed as provisions to which subsection 23(1) of the Act does not apply:

(a) section 178 of The Election Act, 1996;

(b) Repealed. 15 Dec 2017 SR 124/2017 s6.

(c) section 3-51 of The Saskatchewan Employment Act;

(d) Part III of The Revenue and Financial Services Act;

(e) all of The Income Tax Act and The Income Tax Act, 2000;

(f) section 32 of The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Act;

(g) Repealed. 15 Dec 2017 SR 124/2017 s6.

(h) section 415 of The Credit Union Act, 1998;

(i) section 85 of The Real Estate Act;

(j) section 10.40 of The Insurance Act;

(k) Repealed. 15 Dec 2017 SR 124/2017 s6.

(l) section 61 of The Mortgage Brokerages and Mortgage Administrators Act;

(m) section 61 of The Payday Loans Act;

(n) sections 32, 34, 36 and 62 of The Coroners Act, 1999;

(o) section 12.1 of The Coroners Regulations, 2000;

(p) section 22 of The Witness Protection Act;

(q) subsections 39(5) and (6) and subsection 56(9.2) of The Police Act, 1990;

(r) Part IV of The Police Act, 1990 as it relates to a complaint concerning the actions of a member;

(s) section 17-4 of The Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan Act, 2016;

(t) section 12.1 of The Saskatchewan Small Business Emergency Payment Regulations;

(u) section 14 of The Saskatchewan Small Business Emergency Payment Regulations, 2020 (No. 2);

(v) section 11.1 of The Saskatchewan Temporary Wage Supplement Program Regulations;

(w) section13 of The Saskatchewan Temporary Wage Supplement (Seniors Care Workers) Program Regulations;

(x) section 13.1 of The Saskatchewan Tourism Sector Support Program Regulations;

(y) section 14 of The Saskatchewan Tourism Sector Support Program Regulations (No. 2);

(z) section 10.1 of The Self-isolation Support Program Regulations; (aa) section 14 of The Strong Recovery Adaptation Rebate Regulations.

Prevail means a provision of one Act having priority over a conflicting provision in another Act.60 The ordinary meaning of the word means to be superior in strength or influence.61

For subsection 23(3) of FOIP, the Legislative Assembly recognized that FOIP and some other provisions would be in conflict and provided the mechanism for resolving that by expressly stating that the provisions listed at subsection 23(3) of FOIP and section 12 of the FOIP Regulations would prevail over FOIP.62

If engaging subsection 23(3), the government institution should be able to demonstrate that the record or information in question falls within the statutory provision that is not subject to FOIP. It should be noted that section 23 of FOIP only applies to portions of Parts II and III of FOIP which refer to access to records. All the other provisions of FOIP would fully apply such as the protection of privacy provisions in Part IV and the review and appeal provisions in Part VII.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2014-001, the Commissioner considered subsection 23(3)(h) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that section 15 of The Securities Act, 1988 prevailed and as such, that Parts II and III of FOIP did not apply to the records at issue.

In Review Report 088-2014, the Commissioner considered subsection 23(3)(m) of FOIP and subsection 12(l) of the FOIP Regulations. The Commissioner determined that subsection 61 of The Mortgage Brokerages and Mortgage Administrators Act prevailed and as such, that Parts II and III of FOIP did not apply to the records at issue.

In Review Report 149-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 23(3)(c) of FOIP. The Commissioner determined that the Commissioner has authority to conduct a review of records that may be subject to section 74 of The Child and Family Services Act.

In Review Report 254-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 23(3)(c) of FOIP. The Commissioner determined that the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services) failed to demonstrate that section 74 of The Child and Family Services Act applied to the records. The Commissioner also found that Social Services did not cooperate with the IPC during the review. The Commissioner made several recommendations including that the Ministry of Social Services work with the IPC and the Ministry of Justice to amend FOIP by repealing subsection 23(3)(c) of FOIP.

Section 4: Existing Rights Preserved

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(a) complements and does not replace exiting procedures for access to government information or records;

(b) does not in any way limit access to the type of government information or records that is normally available to the public;

(c) does not limit the information otherwise available by law to a party to litigation;

(d) does not affect the power of any court or tribunal to compel a witness to testify or to compel the production of documents;

(e) does not prohibit the transfer, storage or destruction of any record in accordance with any other Act or any regulation;

(f) does not prevent access to a registry operated by a government institution where access to the registry is normally allowed to the public.

Section 4 of FOIP was considered by the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench in City Collection Co. v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 8956 (SK KB) and General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 8794 (SK KB). In the latter decision, Malone, J. determined that the clear intent of section 4 of FOIP was to ensure that information available to the public prior to FOIP would remain available after its coming into effect. In his judgement, he stated as follows:

[8] In my opinion, s. 4 of the Act is determinative of the issue. The clear intent of this section is to provide that information available to the public prior to the passage of the Act shall remain available after its coming into effect. To interpret this section any other way would result in a restriction on the right of the public to obtain information which it previously had access to. This surely was not the intention of the Legislature. The provisions of the Act following s. 4 must be interpreted as applying to only information which is requested by the public which was not available to it prior to the passage of the Act. It is these provisions that attempt to balance the right of privacy of individuals with the desire of the public to obtain more information concerning the operation of

Government, its Crown corporations and agencies. This it does by setting out the procedures to be followed and the guidelines to be applied. In my opinion, however, s. 4 makes it clear the procedures and guidelines are not to be applied retrospectively so as to restrict access to information the public was previously entitled to.

In the City Collection decision, the Court observed that:

[8] Prior to the passage of the Act, SGI [Saskatchewan Government Insurance] routinely provided the appellants with vehicle registration information, and in particular, the names and addresses of the registered owners of vehicles which were parked in facilities operated by Imperial. This was in keeping with the then existing policy and procedure of SGI to make this information available to members of the public who had a genuine interest in this information.

Section 4 of FOIP was also considered by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 9128 (SK CA). In this decision, the Court noted that:

[4] The evidence clearly established that this practice prevailed before proclamation of the Act. Before enactment of The Vehicle Administration Act, SS. 1986, c. V-2.1, the Highway Traffic Board performed a similar function under The Vehicles Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. V-3 (REPEALED). When records of registration were under the control of the Highway Traffic Board, members of the public enjoyed access to its records for the type of information sought in this case.

[10] …The Act does not limit or reduce the rights of access existing at the time of proclamation.

It is important whether access to information or records antedated the proclamation of FOIP. The approach the Court of Appeal has taken in the past is to view this provision as a kind of grandfathering provision.

Subsection 4(a)

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(a) complements and does not replace exiting procedures for access to government information or records;

FOIP is in addition to and does not replace existing procedures for obtaining access to information or records held by government institutions.

However, the existence of other processes where an applicant may be able to obtain records does not replace an applicant’s right to make an access to information request.

In Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII), Justice Gabrielson confirmed that subsection 4(a) of FOIP was not intended to limit or reduce the rights of access existing at the time of FOIP’s proclamation but only to complement existing rights:

[21] Counsel for the Ministry submits that the Stinchcombe procedure takes precedence over the Act and cannot be replaced by the Act. However, such a position ignores the basic premise referred to by the Court in the General Motors Acceptance case, supra – that s. 4 was intended not to limit or reduce the rights of access existing at the time of proclamation but only to complement such existing rights. In this case, the Ministry is suggesting that rather than contemplating existing procedures, the Act is limited by the existing criminal law procedures. In my opinion, that runs contrary to the Court of Appeal’s statement that there should be full disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language. Accordingly, unless a specific exemption from disclosure is found in the Act, I would apply the general philosophy of full disclosure.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 153-2015, the University of Saskatchewan requested the Commissioner exercise the authority to dismiss a request for review, “and allow the normal course of exchanging documents to take place in due course, and pursuant to the many legal regimes [the applicant] has already engaged.” The Commissioner found that the existence of other processes where the applicant may be able to obtain the record, he was seeking did not replace the applicant’s right to request access to records in the possession or control of the University of Saskatchewan. The Commissioner did not dismiss the request for review

In Review Report 150-2014, the Commissioner considered the equivalent subsection 4(a) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The Commissioner noted that the City of Saskatoon was correct that there were processes through the court to gain access to records, however the process of accessing records in a court proceeding was independent of LA FOIP. Further, the Commissioner determined that subsection 4(a) of LA FOIP provided that LA FOIP complemented and did not replace existing procedures for obtaining access to information.

In Investigation Report LA-2012-001, the Commissioner considered a privacy complaint involving the publishing of employee salaries by the City of Moose Jaw in its annual public accounts. The City invoked the equivalent subsections 4(a), (b) and (e) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) for authority to publish the employee’s salaries. The Commissioner determined that to successfully invoke subsections 4(a), (b), or (e) of LA FOIP, the City would have needed to show that the salary information of the employees had routinely been publicly available prior to the enactment of LA FOIP in 1993. As the City had not demonstrated this, the Commissioner found that subsections 4(a),(b) and (e) of LA FOIP would not apply.

In Investigation Report LA-2005-003, the Commissioner considered a privacy complaint involving an individual who had applied to the City of Saskatoon for a building permit. The individual learned that personal information from the permit application form appeared to have been sold to contractors and suppliers. In support of this practice, the City invoked the equivalent subsections 4(a) and (d) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The City asserted that the personal information had been available for purchase via a Bylaw prior to LA FOIP coming into force on July 1, 1993. The Commissioner found that based on the material provided by the City that personal information disclosed by means of an external weekly building permit report was part of a practice of disclosure that existed prior to the proclamation of LA FOIP. As such, the Commissioner found that the City properly invoked subsections 4(a) and (b) of LA FOIP.

Subsection 4(b)

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(b) does not in any way limit access to the type of government information or records that is normally available to the public;

FOIP does not limit access to information or records that the public would normally have access to.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 122-2014, the Commissioner considered the Village of Lebret’s application of subsection 18(1)(c) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) to deny access to records. The Commissioner determined that if the Village could rely on subsection 18(1)(c) of LA FOIP it would be preventing access to information that would normally be available to the public pursuant to subsection 117(1)(a) of The Municipalities Act. Further, this would be contrary to subsection 4(b) of LA FOIP.

Subsection 4(c)

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(c) does not limit the information otherwise available by law to a party to litigation;

FOIP does not limit access to information otherwise available by law to parties to litigation.

Litigation is the process of carrying on a lawsuit.63

It is relatively common for persons involved in a criminal or civil legal action to make an access to information request under FOIP for records relating to the case. Such requests should be processed like any other request.64

It is also relatively common to have both discovery processes and access to information processes going on at the same time.65 What can be accessed in a court proceeding is often less constrained than what is accessible under FOIP legislation.66

Government institutions sometimes argue that applicants cannot get information or records because of subsection 4(c) of FOIP. However, this is incorrect. The disclosure process works parallel to FOIP. FOIP does not limit what would normally be made available through disclosure.

In Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII), Justice Gabrielson confirmed that disclosure should not be narrowed or broadened based upon procedures found in other processes:

[23] In accordance with the above comments, in my opinion, and even though in this case there has not been a judge’s ruling in respect to the disclosure provided in the criminal proceedings, that does not mean that in other proceedings there could not be a conflict between disclosure provided pursuant to the principles set out in R. v. Stinchcombe and the disclosure sought under the Act. They are two separate processes and for two separate purposes. Accordingly, in my opinion, a court should consider only the Act and the jurisprudence guiding its interpretation and not narrow or broaden the scope of the disclosure required by the Act based upon the procedure found in other processes such as the Stinchcombe disclosure process.

In Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner Order H2004-005, the Commissioner stated the following about the equivalent provision in Alberta’s Health Information Act:

Section 3(a) of the Act expressly recognizes that information is otherwise available by law, and other procedures that enable parties to legal proceedings to obtain information outside the Act continue to exist. Although legislation is usually presumed to override the common law, this presumption is rebutted where the legislature clearly intends to preserve the common law. Read in its ordinary and grammatical sense, this section means that in the sphere of the “information otherwise available by law to a party to legal proceedings,” the Act is not intended to change or alter the information available to parties to legal proceedings. In my view, the Act is intended to co-exist along with other laws such as the common law that previously governed the information available by law to a party to legal proceedings.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 145-2015, the Commissioner considered SaskPower’s application of subsection 15(1)(d) of FOIP to deny access to an investigation report. SaskPower argued that “disclosure of the Investigation Report is likely to occur once proceedings have been commenced…” The Commissioner determined that discovery and disclosure provisions of the Rules of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan operate independent of any process under FOIP. Further, that subsection 4(c) of FOIP established that FOIP did not limit access to information otherwise available by law to parties to litigation.

Subsection 4(d)

Existing rights preserved

This Act:

(d) does not affect the power of any court or tribunal to compel a witness to testify or to compel the production of documents;

FOIP does not override the power of any court or tribunal to compel a witness to testify or to compel the production of documents.

Tribunal is a body or person that exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function outside the regular court system.67

Subsection 4(e)

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(e) does not prohibit the transfer, storage or destruction of any record in accordance with any other Act or any regulation;

FOIP does not prohibit the transfer, storage or destruction of any record in accordance with any other Act or any regulation.

This provision permits the orderly disposition of records by government institutions in accordance with records retention and disposition schedules.68

The Archives and Public Records Management Act (APRMA) sets out obligations for government institutions to manage records in their possession or control. In order to comply with the APRMA, government institutions must establish a records management program.

For more information, see the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan.

Subsection 4(f)

Existing rights preserved

4 This Act:

(f) does not prevent access to a registry operated by a government institution where access to the registry is normally allowed to the public.

FOIP does not prevent access to a registry operated by a government institution where access to the registry is normally allowed to the public.

Registry means a registry established or continued pursuant to a public registry statute and includes information provided to, and the data created or maintained in the operation of, a public registry statute.69 It can also be an electronic registry. Examples include the Information Services Corporation land titles registry and the corporate registry.

 


Office of the Saskatchewan Information And Privacy Commissioner

503 – 1801 Hamilton Street

Regina SK S4P 4B4 306-787-8350

www.oipc.sk.ca


 

‌1 Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy in Canadian Democracy, May 5, 2009, also cited in Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC) Review Report F-2010-002 at [44].

‌2 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [45].

‌3 Privy Council Office, Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, 2nd Ed., modified: 2017.

‌4 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [47].

Saskatchewan Hansard, June 18, 1991, available at http://docs.legassembly.sk.ca/legdocs/Legislative%20Assembly/Hansard/21L4S/910618e.PDF. See also SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [47] and LA-2012-003 at [27].

‌6 Amendt v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 1999 CanLII 12560 (SK KB) at [43]. See also SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-003 at [7].

‌7 General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 9128 (SK CA) at [11]. See also SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-003 at [8].

‌8 Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1 at subsection 2(1).

‌9 Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 1997 CanLII 358 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at [61].

‌10 Roberts, Honourable John. Secretary of State. June 1977. Legislation on Public Access to Government Documents, Government of Canada, Ministry of Supply and Services Canada at pp. 1 and 3. See also SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-003 at [9]. There is a typo in the report “1997” should be “1977”.

‌11 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165 at subsection 2(1).

‌12 SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-003 at [9].

‌13 FOIP still refers to the Court of Queen’s Bench at subsection 2(2)(c) but this changed in 2022 to the Court of King’s Bench. Future amendments to FOIP will likely capture and reflect this.

‌14 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2014-007 at [10] and LA-2010-002 at [93]. The mere possession is not enough, there must be some right to deal with the records and some responsibility for their care and protection. This definition that includes a “measure of control” originates from the Office of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (ON IPC) Order P-239 at [4].

‌15 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-002 at [35].

‌16 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-002 at [22].

‌17 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-002 at [43].

‌18 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306 at [55].

19 From Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6: “Protection of Privacy” at Section 25, Unsolicited Information.

20 Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, Information, Privacy and Archives, Freedom of Ontario Information and Protection of Privacy Manual at p. 140. Available at https://files.ontario.ca/books/foi_privacy_manual_-_final-v02-2018-03-08-en-accessible.pdf. Accessed December 1, 2022. See also SK OIPC Investigation Reports F-2012-002 at [61] and F-2012-004 at [77]. 21 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 7, p. 239. See also SK OIPC Investigation Report F-2012-002 at [60].

‌22 The issue of possession & control can come up when it involves the personal emails or records of employees. In addition to the references noted in this section below, see also Saskatchewan Government and General Employees Union v Unifor Local 481, 2015 CanLII 28482 (SK LA).

‌23 See City of Ottawa v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 6835 (CanLII) at [37]. See also SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-007.

‌24 Office of the Northwest Territories Information and Privacy Commissioner (NWT IPC) Review Report 20-247 at [37].

25 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306 at [55] and [56].

‌26 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306 at [56].

‌27 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306 at [56].

‌28 The possession/control test has evolved over the years in SK OIPC Review Reports. Earlier SK OIPC Review Reports relied on five factors. The first SK OIPC Review Report to list the five factors was F-2008-002 at [27]. This changed to 15 factors in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-002 at [60] and [61]. The 15 factors originate from the Office of the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BC IPC) Order F10-01. Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306, SK OIPC Review Reports shifted to the two-part test from this decision. The 15 factors are used to supplement the test and assist with determining possession and/or control. They are not intended to replace the two-part test.

‌29 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-002 at [55].

‌30 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at subsection 24(1).

31 Originated from Black, Henry Campbell, 1979. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. Adopted by the ON IPC in Order P-204 at p. 4. Adopted by SK OIPC in Review Report 249-2017 at [7].

‌32 SK OIPC Investigation Report 249-2017 at [22].

‌33 SK OIPC Investigation Report 249-2017 at [22].

‌34 Adapted from ON IPC Order MO-1693 at p.16.

35 Subsection 2(1)(i) of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act, SS 2013, c O-4.2. Subsection 2(1)(h) of this Act also defines “public registry statute” as an Act designated by subsection (2) with respect to a service agreement that has been entered into and includes regulations or an Act for which a contractor is authorized to exercise powers or fulfill duties in accordance with subsection 10(1) and includes regulations.

‌36 ON IPC Order MO-3191-F at [86], [87] and [88].

37 Government of Saskatchewan, Publications, Summary – the Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act, available at https://publications.saskatchewan.ca/#/products/114854. Accessed February 27, 2023.

‌38 SK OIPC Review Report 297-2021 at [24]. The Commissioner considered the relationship between ISC and the Government of Saskatchewan for the first time.

‌39 605499 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Rifle Shot Oil Corp., 2019 SKCA 133 at [67].

‌40 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-002 at [28] and 249-2017 at [8].

‌41 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-002 at [28]. Also cited in 605499 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Rifle Shot Oil Corp., 2019 SKCA 133 (CanLII) at [65].

‌42 605499 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Rifle Shot Oil Corp., 2019 SKCA 133 (CanLII) at [66].

‌43 605499 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Rifle Shot Oil Corp., 2019 SKCA 133 (CanLII) at [67].

‌44 Subsection 2(1)(i) of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act, SS 2013, c O-4.2. Subsection 2(1)(h) of this Act also defines “public registry statute” as an Act designated by subsection (2) with respect to a service agreement that has been entered into and includes regulations or an Act for which a contractor is authorized to exercise powers or fulfill duties in accordance with subsection 10(1) and includes regulations.

45 Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1301, relied on in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKKB 106 (CanLII) at [69] and [72]. Also cited in SK OIPC Investigation Report LA-2012-001 at [14] to [17].

‌46 The three preceding paragraphs were provided by the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan on April 20, 2018.

‌47 Test established with assistance from the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan on April 30, 2018 and modified from SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-002 at [135] to [153].

‌48 SK OIPC Investigation Report F-2010-001 at [31].

‌49 SK OIPC Investigation Report F-2010-001 at [31].

‌50 For an example of this, see SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-006 at [162] to [178].

‌51 SK OIPC Investigation Report F-2010-001 at [31].

‌52 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2344.

‌53 SK OIPC Review Report 149-2017 at [50].

‌54 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2340.

‌55 Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., 2007 SCC 14 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 591 at [47]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 149-2017 at [52].

‌56 SK OIPC Review Report F-2009-001 at [39].

‌57 Test first used in SK OIPC Review Report F-2009-001 at [40]. See also SK OIPC Submission to the Workers Compensation Act Committee of Review, April 29, 2011 at pp.10, 14 and 15; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2014-001 at [86] to [117], 276-2017 at [16] to [20] and 088-2014 at [8] to [25].

‌58 SK OIPC Review Report 149-2017 at [50].

‌59 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2340.

‌60 SK OIPC Review Report 149-2017 at [50].

‌61 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2340.

‌62 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin Number 11 – Paramountcy, March 2009.

63 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1075.

‌64 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 1 at p. 5.

‌65 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 1 at p. 6.

‌66 Office of the Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner Review Report 16-108 at p. 6.

67 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

68 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 1 at p. 6.

‌69 Subsection 2(1)(i) of The Operation of Public Registry Statutes Act, SS 2013, c O-4.2. Subsection 2(1)(h) of this Act also defines “public registry statute” as an Act designated by subsection (2) with respect to a service agreement that has been entered into and includes regulations or an Act for which a contractor is authorized to exercise powers or fulfill duties in accordance with subsection 10(1) and includes regulations.

Chapter 2: Administration of FOIP

Guide to FOIP: Chapter 2

Guide to FOIP

The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Chapter 2

Administration of FOIP

Table of Contents

Overview 1

Minister of Justice and Attorney General – Roles & Responsibilities 2

Minister’s Annual Report 2

Ministry of Justice and Attorney General 4

Government Institutions – Roles & Responsibilities 4

Head of a Government Institution 6

The FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer 7

Section 60: Delegation 9

Notices Required by FOIP 12

Routine Disclosure & Active Dissemination 14

Proactive Reporting of Privacy Breaches 15

Information & Privacy Commissioner – Roles & Responsibilities 17

Section 33: Privacy Powers 18

Section 38: Appointment 20

Section 44: Oath or Affirmation 21

Section 46: Confidentiality 22

Section 45: General Powers of Commissioner 24

Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests 25

Section 47: Non-compellability 26

Section 50: Refusal to Review 27

Section 53: Conduct of Review 28

Section 54: Powers of Commissioner 30

Section 55: Report of Commissioner 31

Section 62: Annual Report 33

Procedural Fairness 33

Court of King’s Bench – Roles & Responsibilities 35

Section 57: Appeal to Court 35

Section 58: Powers of Court on Appeal 37

Section 61: Burden of Proof 42

Standard Required to Meet Burden of Proof 42

Who has the Burden of Proof 45

Affidavit Evidence 47

Offences & Penalties 48

Section 66: Proceedings Prohibited 48

Section 67: Immunity from Prosecution 49

Section 68: Summary Offences 50

Privacy and Access Offences 53

Not Cooperating with the Commissioner 54

Overview

This Chapter explains the administration of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP). This includes the roles and responsibilities of various bodies including the Ministry of Justice, government institutions and the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

What follows is non-binding guidance. Every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is not intended to be an exhaustive authority on the interpretation of these provisions. Government institutions may wish to seek legal advice when deciding on how to interpret the Act. Government institutions should keep section 61 of FOIP in mind.

The tests, criteria and interpretations established in this Chapter reflect the precedents set by the current and/or former Information and Privacy Commissioners in Saskatchewan through the issuing of Review Reports. Court decisions from Saskatchewan affecting The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) will be followed. Where this office has not previously considered a section of FOIP, the Commissioner looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. This includes other Information and Privacy Commissioners’ Orders, Reports and/or other relevant resources. In addition, court decisions from across the country are relied upon where appropriate.

This Chapter will be updated regularly to reflect any changes in precedent. This office will update the footer to reflect the last update. Using the electronic version directly from our website will ensure you are always using the most current version.

Section 61 places the burden of proof for establishing that access to a record may or must be refused on the government institution. For more on the burden of proof, see Section 61: Burden of Proof later in this ChapterThis is a guide.

Minister of Justice and Attorney General – Roles & Responsibilities

The Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan designates the Minister responsible for the administration of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) by Order in Council. This responsibility has been given to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General.

While the nature of FOIP requires that decisions with respect to access to records and the management of personal information be made within each government institution, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General retains overall responsibility for its administration.1

The Minister is required by FOIP to prepare and submit an Annual Report to the Speaker of the Assembly on the administration of FOIP and The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

Minister’s Annual Report

Minister’s report

63(1) The minister shall prepare and submit an annual report to the Speaker of the Assembly on the administration of this Act and the regulations within each government institution during the year, and the Speaker shall cause the report to be laid before the Assembly in accordance with section 13 of The Executive Government Administration Act.

(2) The annual report of the minister is to provide details of:

(a) the number of applications received by each government institution during the year;

(b) the number of times during the year that the head of each government institution refused an application for access to a record, and the specific provisions of this Act or the regulations on which the refusals were based; and

(c) the fees charged and collected by each government institution for access to records during the year.

(3) The minister may require government institutions to produce the information or records that, in the opinion of the minister, are necessary to enable the minister to fulfil the requirements of this section.

The Minister of Justice and Attorney General transmits to the Speaker of the Assembly an Annual Report on the administration of FOIP and The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

The Annual Report breaks down the administration of FOIP and the FOIP Regulations for each government institution. The requirement for an Annual Report and its contents is outlined at section 63 of FOIP.

Each year, the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General collects and reports statistical information regarding the exercise of and compliance with access rights under FOIP. The reports provide statistical information both by individual government institutions and by the total provincial government administration.2 The reports are divided into two categories: general and personal.

Applications for general information refer to records in the possession or under the control of a government institution other than those described as personal information in section 24 of FOIP.

Applications for personal information refer to records in the possession or under the control of a government institution described in section 24 of FOIP.

The Minister’s Annual Report breaks down:

  • The number of applications received government-wide, their status, the processing time in completing the applications, the fees estimated and collected.
  • Exemptions applied to deny access.
  • The number of general information requests received by each government institution, action taken, and fees estimated and collected.
  • The number of personal information requests received by each government institution, action taken, and fees estimated and collected.3

Ministry of Justice and Attorney General

On an ongoing basis, the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General provides direction and support to government institutions as it relates to FOIP. The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General:

  • Provides legal advice to government institutions.
  • Plays a leadership role on access and privacy issues, including the collection of statistical information related to access to information requests and the preparation of the annual report.
  • Prepares and maintains access and privacy tools, such as guidelines, checklists and administrative procedures.
  • Provides and supports training and awareness regarding access and privacy.
  • Through its website, provides information to the public, government institutions and local authorities to help with understanding both the access to information and the privacy components of the legislation.4

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General collects statistical information regarding the exercise of and compliance with access rights under FOIP. The reports provide statistical information both by individual government institutions and by the total provincial government administration. This statistical information is reported in the Minister’s Annual Report.5

Government Institutions – Roles & Responsibilities

Interpretation 2(1) In this Act:

(d) “government institution” means, subject to subsection (2):

(i) the office of Executive Council or any department, secretariat or other similar agency of the executive government of Saskatchewan; or

(ii) any prescribed board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, or any prescribed portion of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, whose members or directors are appointed, in whole or in part:

(A) by the Lieutenant Governor in Council;

(B) by a member of the Executive Council; or

(C) in the case of:

(I) a board, commission or other body, by a Crown corporation; or

(II) a Crown corporation, by another Crown corporation;

FOIP applies to all “government institutions” as defined by subsection 2(1)(d) of FOIP. This includes ministries, boards, commissions, Crown corporations and other bodies as prescribed in the Appendix, Part I of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

See the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” for more on the definition of a government institution.

A government institution that is subject to FOIP has statutory duties with regard to providing access to information and protecting personal information in its possession or control.

The head of a particular government institution may claim that the government institution is not covered by FOIP6 and consequently refuse a request for information on that basis. Such a refusal will likely be subject to review, at the request of the applicant, in the same way as a refusal based on a disclosure exemption. The applicability of FOIP to particular agencies may be resolved in this manner or through ultimate resort by the courts.7

FOIP states explicitly that the courts are not government institutions for the purposes of FOIP.8

IPC Findings

In Review Report 056-2014, the Commissioner considered whether the Office of the Chief Coroner (OCC) was a government institution pursuant to subsection 2(d) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the OCC was not a government institution and recommended that the Ministry of Justice take steps to amend section 3 of the Appendix, Part I of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations to include the OCC as a prescribed government institution. An amendment was made in 2016 adding the Office of the Chief Coroner to the list of government institutions in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.9

Head of a Government Institution

Interpretation 2(1) In this Act:

(e) “head” means:

(i) in the case of an agency mentioned in subclause d(i), the member of the Executive Council responsible for the administration of the agency; and

(ii) in the case of a board, commission, Crown corporation or body mentioned in subsection (d)(ii), the prescribed person;

The head of each government institution is responsible for all decisions made under FOIP that relate to the government institution. It would be difficult and perhaps ineffective to have an entire government institution accountable. Therefore, accountability rests with the “head” of the government institution.

Subsection 2(1)(e) of FOIP defines the “head” of a government institution. In most circumstances, the head is generally the minister, chief executive officer or chair of a government institution.

Minister is a member of the Executive Council appointed to head a ministry of the Government of Saskatchewan.10

Section 4 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides further definitions as follows:

Heads prescribed

4(1) For the purpose of subclause 2(1)(e)(ii) of the Act:

(a) the chief executive officers of Crown corporations that are prescribed as government institutions pursuant to clause 3(a) are prescribed as the heads of their respective Crown corporations;

(b) the chief executive officers of Crown corporations that are the parent corporations of subsidiaries that are prescribed as government institutions pursuant to clause 3(b) are prescribed as the heads of the respective subsidiaries;

(b.1) the Chief Coroner for Saskatchewan is prescribed as the head of the Office of the Chief Coroner;

(c) the chairpersons of all other bodies that are prescribed as government institutions pursuant to clause 3(a) or the chairpersons of the boards of those bodies, as the case may be, are prescribed as the heads of their respective government institutions; and

(d) in the case of a corporation sole prescribed as a government institution pursuant to clause 3(a), the individual that constitutes the corporation sole is prescribed as the head of that government institution.

The head of a government institution can delegate some or all of the responsibilities to another individual. In most cases, it is the deputy minister or another senior official who will be delegated this authority. Such delegation should be done in compliance with section 60 of FOIP. For more on delegation, see Section 60: Delegation, later in this Chapter.

The FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer

Probably the most important person in managing access and privacy issues in any government institution is the designated FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer. The FOIP Coordinator may have different titles such as an Access Coordinator. It is also possible the title does not appear to relate to access and privacy, yet the individual also carries these duties.

The roles of the FOIP Coordinator and Privacy Officer might be combined and handled by one individual in the organization or the roles might be separated and handled by two. The duties and roles of each in an organization are very different but also very interrelated.

FOIP places responsibility on the “head” or Minister of a government institution. That head, however, may delegate some or all of those powers to someone else in the organization, such as the FOIP Coordinator and/or Privacy Officer, pursuant to section 60 of FOIP.

The FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer is responsible for the overall management of access to information and protection of personal information within the organization.11

So, what exactly does a FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer do? FOIP Coordinators and Privacy Officers assist departments to meet their statutory responsibilities, promoting open government and fostering “an organizational culture” that advances four fundamental principles:

  1. Information (general records should be available to the public).
  2. Individuals should have access to their own personal information.
  3. Exemptions to access should be limited and specific.
  4. Institutions should protect the privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information.12

A FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer should:

  • Respond to access requests and privacy complaints.
  • Raise awareness of access and privacy issues on a regular and proactive basis within their organization.
  • Be aware of operations of the organization, the types of records and record-management systems in the department.
  • Quickly identify what units within the department are likely to have the records responsive to an access request and which employees should be consulted.
  • Be senior enough to be able to provide access and privacy advice to the Deputy Minister or head of the organization on a regular basis.
  • Monitor decisions and recommendations of the IPC and ensure those decisions are integrated into the orientation and in-service training of staff in the department.
  • Be involved in the design of new programs that may impact access or privacy rights.
  • Provide timely advice to the department to ensure that FOIP will be complied with.
  • Improve general awareness about the legislation through training sessions and materials within the department. In large organizations, newsletters, notices, FAQs or a column in an intradepartmental bulletin may be helpful. The FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer may undertake internal audits to identify areas where more work is required to ensure full compliance.13

FOIP Coordinators and Privacy Officers may meet from time to time to discuss common problems or share knowledge and experience.

Section 60: Delegation

Delegation

60(1) A head may delegate to one or more officers or employees of the government institution a power granted to the head or a duty vested in the head.

(2) A delegation pursuant to subsection (1):

(a) is to be in writing; and

(b) may contain any limitations, restrictions, conditions or requirements that the head considers necessary.

Delegation means entrusting someone else to act in one’s place.14

Only the head of a government institution has the power to delegate some or all of the head’s powers under FOIP to one or more officers or employees of the government institution. The delegation should:

  • Be in writing.
  • Contain any limitations, restrictions, conditions or requirements the head considers necessary.15

The head, for purposes of FOIP, includes the member of the Executive Council responsible for the administration of the agency (i.e., Minister, President/CEO).16

Here are some important things regarding a delegation:

  • The delegation should identify the position, not the individual, to which the powers are delegated. When delegation is to the position, a new delegation is not required when a new appointee assumes the position.
  • The delegation can cover a wide variety of duties, powers and functions;
  • It remains in effect until replaced by an updated version.
  • It is important to review the delegation periodically for any changes that may be needed, especially if the government institution is restructured or part of the government institution is transferred to another government institution.
  • The delegation should specifically refer to handling access to information requests including the processing of requests and the power to make decisions whether or not to disclose all or part of a record.
  • A delegation relating to the handling of privacy can be more general and center on the delegated responsibility for collection, handling and protection of personal information.
  • Delegated authority empowers certain officials and employees to make decisions or act.
  • In general, delegation should be considered for all provisions of FOIP that state that the head may or must do something.17
  • The person delegating the authority remains responsible and accountable for all actions and decisions made under that delegation.18

The FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer normally prepares the delegation and submits it to the head for approval.19

It is important that all delegated officers or employees know and understand their delegated responsibilities. It is also important that others in the organization understand that only those with delegated responsibilities under FOIP should be carrying out those duties and functions.20

If the individual with delegated authority is not actually making the decisions that they were delegated to make, the delegation is not being properly utilized.21 In other words, in order to be a true delegation, the individual needs to actually be given the authority to make the decisions as per the delegation.

As noted earlier, the head of a government institution may delegate some or all of the head’s powers under FOIP. Even with a delegation, the head may retain certain powers and make certain decisions.

There may be instances where there is no written delegation, but another Minister or Deputy Minister could act on behalf of the Minister (the head). The Legislation Act provides:

2-34(1) If an enactment directs or empowers a minister of the Crown to do an act or thing, or otherwise applies to the minister by the minister’s name of office, a reference in that enactment to the minister includes:

(a) another minister acting for the minister;

(b) if the office of the minister is vacant, a minister designated to act in the office;

(c) the successor in the office of the minister; and

(d) the minister’s deputy minister or a person acting as deputy minister.22

For more assistance on the delegation of powers, see Guidance for Delegation Powers, issued by the former Access and Privacy Branch with the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General.

Notices Required by FOIP

FOIP contains requirements that government institutions give various types of notices to persons. For example, section 7 of FOIP provides that the head of the government institution shall give written notice to an applicant of its decision regarding access within 30 days after an application is made. The following are notices required to be provided by government institutions. This list does not include other obligations to inform:

  • Section 7 notice of the head’s decision regarding access is to be provided to an applicant within 30 days after an application is received by the government institution.
  • Subsection 7.1(2) notice is to be provided to applicants when applications are deemed abandoned.
  • Subsection 11(1)(b) notice is to be provided to applicants when a record responsive to an access request is transferred to another government institution for processing.
  • Subsections 12(2) and (3) requires a notice to be provided to applicants when the head extends the 30-day response time. Notice of the extension is to be given within the first 30 days after an application is made. Within the period of extension, the head shall give notice in accordance with section 7.
  • Subsection 26(2) requires the government institution to inform an individual of the purpose for the direct collection of the individual’s personal information unless the FOIP Regulations exempts the information from this notice.
  • Section 34 notice is to be given to third parties where a head intends to give access to third party information (see section 19 of FOIP) or personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP. This notice requirement can be waived by the third party (see section 35 of FOIP).
  • Section 37 notice of the head’s decision regarding whether access to the third party information will be given is to be provided to the third party and applicant within 30 days after the third party was provided notice pursuant to section 34 of FOIP.
  • Section 52 notice is to be given to third parties that a review by the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) is occurring. The head shall provide this notice to any third party that was or would have been given notice under section 34 of FOIP. This notice shall be given immediately upon learning of the IPC’s review. The head must also immediately provide notice of a review to an applicant where the review is requested by the third party.
  • Section 56 notice of the head’s decision regarding the Commissioner’s report must be given to the Commissioner, applicant or individual and third party within 30 days of receiving the Commissioner’s report.
  • Subsections 57(2) and (3) requires notice to be given to any third party that was or would have been given notice under section 34 advising them that an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench has been made by an applicant. If it is the third party that is appealing to the Court of King’s Bench, then the head must give notice to the applicant.

Subsection 66(1)(c) of FOIP provides that no proceeding lies or shall be instituted against the Government of Saskatchewan, a government institution, a head or other officer or employee of a government institution if it fails to give any notice required under FOIP provided reasonable care was taken to give the notice.

Subsection 66(2) of FOIP provides that reasonable care is deemed to have been taken if the notice was sent to the applicant’s address that was provided on the access to information form.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 110-2014, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) did not provide its section 7 notice within the legislated timeline. The Commissioner noted that 114 days had elapsed between when Health received the access request and when it provided its section 7 notice to the applicant. The Commissioner recommended that Health remain committed to the changes it is making to its processes by regularly evaluating whether it is achieving timelier responses and searches that are more comprehensive. Further, it should continue to make necessary changes until both are achieved.

In Review Report 209-2015 to 213-2015 (five files in one report), the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) did not respond to five access requests within the legislated timelines. The timelines were 81 to 107 days for the five access requests. The Commissioner noted that in 2015, the Commissioner issued 10 reports addressing 24 access requests to which Health had not responded within the legislated timelines. The Commissioner recommended Health change its processes so that responses to access requests go through a consistent streamlined process with no more than two or three approvers.

In Review Report 311-2017, 312-2017, 313-2017, 316-2017, 340-2017, 341-2017 and 342-

2017 (seven files in one report), the Commissioner found that the Global Transportation Hub’s (GTH) responses to the applicant were inadequate in terms of what is required by subsections 12(3) and 7(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner also found that GTH did not provide notice to the third party pursuant to subsection 52(1) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended that GTH amend its procedures so that when it is extending the initial 30 days to respond pursuant to section 12, it provides the necessary notices to third parties pursuant to Part V of FOIP no later than the 30th day after it received an access request.

Routine Disclosure & Active Dissemination

In addition to providing access to records and information in response to access requests, government institutions may provide access to information and records through two other processes:

  1. Routine disclosure in response to inquiries and requests for information.
  2. Active dissemination of information.23

Routine disclosure and active dissemination will likely satisfy many of the information needs of members of the public. There are numerous advantages of using routine disclosure and active dissemination processes. The public will be better served and better informed through the planned and targeted release of information in support of overall program objectives. As well, making information available outside the FOIP process can promote cost-effective management of public information resources.24

Personal information and personal health information must be handled differently. For more on handling personal information, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”. For more on handling personal health information, see the IPC Guide to HIPA.

For more on routine disclosure and active dissemination, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” at Section 65: Access to Manuals and Section 65.1: Records Available Without an Application.

Proactive Reporting of Privacy Breaches

privacy breach occurs when there is an unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal information.25

For more on what constitutes a privacy breach see Chapter 6, Protection of Privacy.

When a government institution believes that a privacy breach may have occurred, it has the option to proactively report the matter to the IPC rather than wait for the IPC to learn about the breach through other sources such as the media or affected individuals. The IPC has a form titled, Proactively Reported Breach of Privacy Reporting Form: for Public Bodies.

Government institutions should complete this form and submit it to intake@oipc.sk.ca. Some of the benefits of proactively reporting privacy breaches include:

  • May reduce the need for the IPC to issue a public report on the matter.
  • Receive timely, expert advice from the IPC – the IPC can help guide the government institution on what to consider, what questions to ask and what parts of FOIP or The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations may be applicable.

  • Should the media contact the government institution, the government institution can advise it has notified the IPC of the privacy breach and will seek assistance from the IPC with handling it.
  • Should affected individuals contact the IPC, the IPC can assure the individuals that the IPC is aware of the breach which may prevent a formal complaint to the IPC.26

When a government institution proactively reports a privacy breach to the IPC, a file will be opened.

The government institution will be asked to complete and provide the IPC’s Privacy Breach Investigation Questionnaire (Questionnaire) and any other relevant material within 30 days.

The Questionnaire takes government institutions through the four best practice steps of responding to a breach (see four steps below). The completed Questionnaire should provide the IPC with what is required to conduct an investigation. If further information is required, the IPC will advise.

Upon receipt, the focus of the IPC is on whether the government institution appropriately handled the breach. This is based on whether the government institution adequately addressed each of the four best practice steps recommended by the IPC. The four best practice steps include:

  1. Contain the breach
  2. Notify affected individuals and/or appropriate organizations
  3. Investigate the breach
  4. Plan for prevention27

Once the IPC receives the relevant material, it will review the file and make a decision. The possible outcomes are as follows:

  • If the Commissioner is satisfied with the government institution’s overall response to the breach, the file will be closed informally without a public report. This process may include some informal recommendations from the IPC.
  • If the breach is egregious or it involves a large number of affected individuals, the Commissioner may determine that a report will be issued.
  • If an affected individual makes a formal complaint, the Commissioner may determine that a report will be issued.
  • If the Commissioner is not satisfied with the government institution’s response or handling of the breach, the IPC will issue a report.

Once the IPC has made a decision, the government institution will be advised if a report will be issued or not. The government institution will also be notified if an affected individual makes a formal complaint, which may also result in a public report.28

If you have questions or need further guidance, contact the SK OIPC at intake@oipc.sk.ca.

Government institutions should be aware of section 29.1 of FOIP. It requires government institutions to notify an individual of an unauthorized use or disclosure of the individual’s personal information by the government institution if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the incident creates a real risk of significant harm to the individual. For more on this, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy” at Section 29.1.

Information & Privacy Commissioner – Roles & Responsibilities

The Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner is an independent Officer of the Legislative Assembly.

Commencing November 1, 2003, the Commissioner became a full-time position and resources were provided to enable a stand-alone office. Prior to this, the Commissioner was a part-time position and there was no office.29

The enabling statute creates the powers of the Commissioner. In this case, that statute is FOIP. Under FOIP, the Commissioner has oversight over compliance with the Act by all government institutions in Saskatchewan that are subject to it.

FOIP provides for independent reviews of decisions made by government institutions under FOIP and the resolution of privacy complaints. There are four elements in the Commissioner’s mandate:

  1. The Commissioner responds to requests for review of decisions made by government institutions in response to access requests and makes recommendations to government institutions.
  2. The Commissioner responds to complaints from individuals who believe their privacy has not been respected by government institutions and makes recommendations to those government institutions.
  3. The Commissioner provides advice to government institutions on legislation, policies or practices that may impact access or privacy rights.
  4. The Commissioner undertakes public education with respect to information rights including both access to information and protection of privacy.30

The Commissioner prepares a report on the completion of a review or investigation that includes findings and recommendations for the government institution. The government institution has a responsibility to respond to the Commissioner’s report under section 56 of FOIP indicating whether it will comply with the recommendations.

If not satisfied with the section 56 response from the government institution, an applicant can pursue an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. The Court of King’s Bench will determine the matter de novo.

A hearing de novo means a review of a matter anew, as if the original hearing had not taken place.31

The Commissioner is neutral and does not represent a government institution or an applicant in a review or investigation.

In January 2018, the Commissioner wrote a blog about the Commissioner’s office and when the roles of collaborator and neutral objective decision-maker come into play. For more see, So, Do We Collaborate?

Section 33: Privacy Powers

Privacy powers of commissioner 33 The commissioner may:

(a) offer comment on the implications for privacy protection of proposed legislative schemes or government programs;

(b) after hearing the head, recommend that a government institution:

(i) cease or modify a specified practice of collecting, using or disclosing information that contravenes this Act; and

(ii) destroy collections of personal information that is collected in contravention of this Act;

(c) in appropriate circumstances, authorize the collection of personal information in a manner other than directly from the individual to whom it relates;

(d) from time to time, carry out investigations with respect to personal information in the possession or under the control of government institutions to ensure compliance with this Part.

Section 33 of FOIP enables the Commissioner to monitor compliance with FOIP and carry out investigations with respect to the handling of personal information in the possession or under the control of government institutions.

The Commissioner may:

  • Offer comment on the implications for privacy protection of proposed legislative schemes or government programs [s. 33(a) of FOIP].
  • Make recommendations to government institutions:
    • to cease or modify certain practices for collecting, using or disclosing personal information that contravenes FOIP.
    • to destroy collections of personal information that are collected in contravention of FOIP [s. 33(b) of FOIP].
  • Where appropriate, authorize a government institution to collect personal information in a manner other than directly from the individual to whom it relates [s. 33(c) of FOIP].
  • Carry out investigations with respect to personal information in the possession or under the control of government institutions to ensure compliance with FOIP [s. 33(d) of FOIP].

privacy breach happens when there is an unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal information, regardless of whether the personal information ends up in a third party’s possession.32

Generally, privacy breaches are investigated by the Commissioner in one of three ways:

  • A complaint is received from an individual.
  • A government institution proactively reports a privacy breach to the Commissioner.
  • A privacy matter comes to the attention of the Commissioner and the Commissioner initiates an investigation.

For more on privacy, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

For more on the Commissioner’s procedures during an investigation, see The Rules of Procedure.

Section 38: Appointment

Appointment of commissioner

38(1) The office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner is continued.

(2) The commissioner is an Officer of the Legislative Assembly.

(3) The commissioner shall be appointed by order of the Legislative Assembly.

(4) Subject to sections 39 and 40, unless he or she resigns, dies or is removed from office, the commissioner holds office for a term of five years.

(5) The commissioner may be reappointed for one additional term of five years.

(6) The commissioner may resign the office at any time by giving written notice to the Speaker.

The Commissioner is an Officer of the Legislature and is independent of government. Section 38 of FOIP provides in part that the Commissioner:

  • Is appointed by order of the Legislative Assembly.
  • Is appointed for a term of five years.
  • Can be extended an additional term of five years.

Sections 38, 39 and 40 of FOIP also provide that the Commissioner may resign or may be removed or suspended for cause, incapacity to act, neglect of duty or misconduct.

The Commissioner’s office is made up of employees appointed by the Commissioner in order to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the commissioner effectively. Employees of the Commissioner’s office are employees of the Legislative Assembly.

Section 44: Oath or Affirmation

Oath or affirmation

44(1) Before entering on the duties of office, the commissioner shall take and subscribe the prescribed oath or affirmation before the Speaker of the Assembly or the Clerk of the Assembly.

(2) Before entering on the duties of office, every member of the staff of the commissioner shall take and subscribe the prescribed oath or affirmation before the commissioner.

Before entering the duties of office, the Commissioner takes an oath of office before the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or the Clerk of the Assembly (see section 44(1) of FOIP).

All staff of the Commissioner sign an oath of office on an annual basis. This oath is sworn before the Commissioner affirming that, except as provided for under FOIP, staff will not divulge any information received in the exercise of their powers or performance of their duties and functions at the IPC (see section 44(2) of FOIP).

Section 19 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides the language for those oaths as follows:

Oath of office

19(1) For the purposes of subsection 44(1) of the Act, the following oath or affirmation is prescribed for the commissioner:

I, …………….. do swear/solemnly affirm that I will faithfully and impartially perform and discharge the duties and functions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner and that I will not, except as provided in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act or in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, divulge any information received by me in the exercise of my powers or the performance of my duties and functions under those Acts.

(2) For purposes of subsection 44(2) of the Act, the following oath or affirmation is prescribed for the members of the staff of the commissioner:

I, ………………do swear/solemnly affirm that I will faithfully and impartially perform and discharge the duties and functions of my office as an employee of the Information and Privacy Commissioner and that I will not, except as provided in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act or in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, divulge any information received by me in the exercise of my powers or the performance of my duties and functions under those Acts.

Section 46: Confidentiality

Confidentiality

46(1) Subject to clause 45(2)(e), the commissioner shall not disclose any information that comes to the knowledge of the commissioner in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or carrying out of the functions of the commissioner pursuant to this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) applies, with any necessary modification, to the staff of the commissioner and any contractors employed by the commissioner.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the commissioner may disclose:

(a) in the course of a review pursuant to section 49, any matter that the commissioner considers necessary to disclose to facilitate the review; and

(b) in a report prepared pursuant to this Act, any matter that the commissioner considers necessary to disclose to establish grounds for the findings and recommendations in the report.

(4) When making a disclosure pursuant to subsection (3), the commissioner shall take every reasonable precaution to avoid disclosure, and shall not disclose:

(a) any information or other material if the nature of the information or material could justify a refusal by a head to give access to a record or part of a record; or

(b) any information as to whether a record exists if the head, in refusing to give access, does not indicate whether the record exists.

(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the commissioner may disclose to the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or the Attorney General of Canada information that relates to the commission of an offence against:

(a) an Act or a regulation; or

(b) an Act of the Parliament of Canada or a regulation made pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada;

by an officer or employee of a government institution if, in the opinion of the commissioner, there is evidence of the commission of the offence.

Subsection 46(1) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner shall not disclose any information that comes to the knowledge of the Commissioner in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or carrying out of the functions of the Commissioner under FOIP. This also applies to the staff of the Commissioner (s.46(2) of FOIP).

However, the Commissioner may disclose:

  • In the course of a review – any matter the Commissioner considers necessary to facilitate a review [s. 46(3)(a) of FOIP].
  • In the Commissioner’s report – any matter the Commissioner considers necessary to establish grounds for the findings and recommendations [s. 46(3)(b) of FOIP].

Relying on subsection 46(3)(b) of FOIP, the Commissioner will exercise discretion and may quote portions of a party’s representations (submission) when issuing a report. This may include quotes from a government institution, applicant or third party’s submission.

Representation means the documents, other evidence and/statements or affidavits provided by a party setting out its position with respect to the information at issue and often referred to as a submission.33

When making a disclosure, the Commissioner shall take every reasonable precaution to avoid disclosure and shall not disclose:

  • Information or material which could justify a refusal by a head to give access to a record or part of a record.
  • Any information as to whether a record exists where the head has applied subsection 7(4) of FOIP.

The Commissioner and the Commissioner’s staff do not release records to applicants that have been withheld by a government institution. Decisions to release are made by the head under FOIP. The Commissioner may recommend release of certain records or information, however, that release must be done by the government institution.

During the course of a review, all parties will be asked if they agree to sharing their representations (submissions) with the other parties. If any party wishes to have its submission remain in-camera, it should indicate that to the IPC and it will remain so.

In camera, in this context, means only the Information and Privacy Commissioner (and necessary staff of the Commissioner) will see the submission and it will not be shared with the other parties to the review.

If the parties’ consent, then submissions will be shared. Otherwise, they will not be.

Section 45: General Powers of Commissioner

General powers of commissioner

45(1) In this section, “extraprovincial, territorial or federal commissioner” means a person who, with respect to Canada or with respect to another province or territory of Canada, has duties, powers and functions similar to those of the commissioner.

(2) The commissioner may:

(a) engage in or commission research into matters affecting the carrying out of the purposes of this Act;

(b) conduct public education programs and provide information concerning this Act and the commissioner’s role and activities;

(c) receive representations concerning the operation of this Act;

(d) determine the procedure to be followed in the exercise of the powers or performance of any duties of the commissioner pursuant to this Act; and

(e) exchange personal information with an extraprovincial, territorial or federal commissioner for the purpose of carrying out investigations with respect to personal information in the possession or under the control of government institutions or to conduct a review involving a government institution and at least one other jurisdiction.

FOIP establishes the position of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, the supporting office and the general powers of the Commissioner. The general powers of the Commissioner are listed at section 45 of FOIP.

The Commissioner has general responsibility for monitoring how the legislation is administered to ensure that its purposes are achieved. Specifically, the Commissioner may:

  • Engage in or commission research into matters affecting the carrying out of the purposes of FOIP [s. 45(2)(a) of FOIP].
  • Conduct public education programs and provide information concerning FOIP and the Commissioner’s role and activities [s. 45(2)(b) of FOIP].
  • Receive representations concerning the operation of FOIP [s. 45(2)(c) of FOIP].
  • Determine the procedures to be followed in the exercise of the powers or performance of any duties the Commissioner has under FOIP [s. 45(2)(d) of FOIP].
  • Exchange personal information with other information and privacy commissioners in Canada for the purpose of conducting investigations with respect to personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution or to conduct a review involving a government institution and at least one other jurisdiction [s. 45(2)(e) of FOIP].

Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests

Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

45.1 (1) The head may apply to the commissioner to disregard one or more applications pursuant to section 6 or requests pursuant to section 32.

(2) In determining whether to grant an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner shall consider whether the application or request:

(a) would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request;

(b) would amount to an abuse of the right of access or right of correction because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request; or

(c) is frivolous or vexatious, not in good faith or concerns a trivial matter.

(3) The application pursuant to subsection 6(1) or the request pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) is suspended until the commissioner notifies the head of the commissioner’s decision with respect to an application or request mentioned in subsection (1).

(4) If the commissioner grants an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the application pursuant to subsection 6(1) or the request pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) is deemed to not have been made.

(5) If the commissioner refuses an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the 30-day period mentioned in subsection 7(2) or subsection 32(2) resumes.

Section 45.1 of FOIP provides government institutions the ability to apply to the Commissioner requesting authorization to disregard an access request (section 6 application) or a correction request (section 32 request) made by an applicant.

Subsection 45.1(1) of FOIP requires a government institution to make an application to the Commissioner. Details of how to make an application are contained in The Rules of Procedure.

Additional guidance is available in IPC resource, Application to Disregard an Access to Information Request or Request for Correction.

A request to disregard is a serious matter as it could have the effect of removing an applicant’s express right to seek access to information in a particular case. It is important for a government institution to remember that a request to disregard must present a sound basis for consideration and should be prepared with this in mind.34 The Commissioner sets a high standard when considering applications to disregard.

IPC Findings

In Disregard Decision 343-2019, 352-2019 the Commissioner considered sections 45.1 and 45.2 for the first time. The Saskatchewan Worker’s Compensation Board (WCB) applied to the Commissioner for authorization to disregard two access to information requests that an applicant had made to the WCB. The Commissioner found that the applicant’s two requests were repetitious and an abuse of the right of access. As such, the Commissioner authorized the WCB to disregard the access to information requests.

For more on disregarding applications or requests, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” at Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests.

Section 47: Non-compellability

Non-compellability

47(1) The commissioner is not compellable to give evidence in a court or in a proceeding of a judicial nature concerning any information that comes to the knowledge of the commissioner in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or carrying out of the functions of the commissioner pursuant to this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) applies, with any necessary modification, to the staff of the commissioner and any contractors employed by the commissioner.

(3) The commissioner, staff of the commissioner or any contractors employed by the commissioner may be a witness in or produce any documents relevant to the prosecution of an offence against this Act.

In any court or judicial proceeding, the Commissioner and the staff of the Commissioner cannot be compelled to give evidence about anything that comes to their knowledge in fulfilling their duties. As noted earlier, the Commissioner and the Commissioner’s staff are bound by confidentiality provisions at section 46 of FOIP.

However, in cases where there is a prosecution under FOIP pursuant to section 68 of FOIP, the Commissioner, the Commissioner’s staff or contracted employees of the Commissioner may participate in the proceeding as a witness or may produce documents relevant to the prosecution [s. 47(3) of FOIP].

Section 50: Refusal to Review

Refusal to review

50(1) Where the commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to review any matter set out in an application pursuant to section 49, the commissioner shall review the matter.

(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

(a) is frivolous or vexatious;

(a.1) does not affect the applicant or individual personally;

(a.2) has not moved forward as the applicant or individual has failed to respond to the requests of the commissioner;

(a.3) concerns a government institution that has an internal review process that has not been used;

(a.4) concerns a professional who is governed by a professional body that regulates its members pursuant to an Act, and a complaints procedure available through the professional body has not been used;

(a.5) may be considered pursuant to another Act that provides a review or other mechanism to challenge a government institution’s decision with respect to the collection, amendment, use or disclosure of personal information and that review or mechanism has not been used;

(a.6) does not contain sufficient evidence;

(a.7) has already been the subject of a report pursuant to section 55 by the commissioner;

(b) is not made in good faith; or

(c) concerns a trivial matter.

Subsection 50(2) of FOIP permits the Commissioner to dismiss or discontinue a review under certain circumstances.

A government institution can request the Commissioner dismiss or discontinue a review based on subsection 50(2) of FOIP. The government institution should provide its arguments in support of its position to the Commissioner.

For more on dismissing or discontinuing reviews, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” at Section 50: Review or Refusal to Review.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2010-002, the Commissioner considered subsections 50(2)(a) and (b) of FOIP. A series of access to information requests were repeatedly submitted by an applicant to six separate government institutions. Requests for review were submitted to the Commissioner on the grounds that the six government institutions failed to meet their obligations under section 7 of FOIP. Through the course of the reviews, the government institutions raised the issue that the requests for review were frivolous, vexatious and not in good faith pursuant to subsection 50(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner considered the actions of the applicant and agreed the applicant was engaging in a pattern of conduct that was vexatious and not in good faith. The Commissioner discontinued the reviews pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (b) of FOIP.

In Review Report 053-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 50(2)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Justice (Justice). Justice responded to the applicant providing partial access to a report. The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon review, Justice requested the Commissioner dismiss the review as frivolous and vexatious pursuant to subsection 50(2)(a) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the circumstances of the case did not meet the threshold to support a finding that the request for review was frivolous or vexatious. The review continued.

Section 53: Conduct of Review

Conduct of review

53(1) The commissioner shall conduct every review in private.

(2) The:

(a) person who applies for a review;

(b) third party or applicant who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 52; and

(c) head whose decision is the subject of a review;

are entitled to make representations to the commissioner in the course of the review.

(3) No one is entitled as of right:

(a) to be present during a review; or

(b) before or after a review:

(i) to have access to; or

(ii) to comment on;

representations made to the commissioner by any other person.

Subsection 53(1) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner shall “conduct every review in private.” However, the Commissioner also has some discretion to disclose what the Commissioner deems necessary pursuant to subsection 46(3) of FOIP. For more on this, see Section 44: Confidentiality earlier in this Chapter. Further, the Commissioner has the authority to determine the procedure to be followed for reviews pursuant to subsection 45(2)(d) of FOIP.

Subsection 53(2) of FOIP provides that applicants, government institutions and third parties (given notice under section 52) are entitled to make submissions to the Commissioner in the course of a review.

Subsection 53(3) of FOIP provides that no person is entitled to be present during a review. Further, no person is entitled to have access to or comment on submissions made to the Commissioner before or after a review.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Agriculture failed to provide notice to the third party and as such, the burden of proof was not met for third party exemptions. The Commissioner noted that by not providing notice to the third party, the rights of both the third party and the applicant were prejudiced. The third party was not afforded the opportunity to make submissions to the Commissioner. Further, if the third party did not actually oppose release of the information, the applicant was prejudiced by the Ministry’s failure to notify as this would not be communicated.

Section 54: Powers of Commissioner

Powers of commissioner

54(1) Notwithstanding any other Act or any privilege that is available at law, the commissioner may, in a review:

(a) require to be produced and examine any record that is in the possession or under the control of a government institution; and

(b) enter and inspect any premises occupied by a government institution.

(2) For the purposes of conducting a review, the commissioner may summon and enforce the appearance of persons before the commissioner and compel them:

(a) to give oral or written evidence on oath or affirmation; and

(b) to produce any documents or things;

that the commissioner considers necessary for a full review, in the same manner and to the same extent as the court.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the commissioner may administer an oath or affirmation.

Section 54 of FOIP also lays out other powers the Commissioner has including in the course of a review:

  • The power to compel a government institution to produce records in its possession or control and examine them [s. 54(1)(a) of FOIP].
  • The power to enter and inspect any premises occupied by a government institution [s. 54(1)(b) of FOIP].
  • The power to summon and enforce the appearance of persons before the Commissioner and compel them to:
    • Give oral or written evidence on oath or affirmation.
    • To produce any documents or things [s. 54(2) of FOIP].

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2013-001, when records were not forthcoming, the Commissioner warned the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) that if the records were not provided quickly that the Commissioner would resort to a subpoena duce tecum to obtain the records in question. Further, that the Commissioner was prepared to require the attendance of key officials in WCB who had some responsibility for the type of records in question to be examined under oath. Fortunately, the Commissioner did not have to take these steps as the WCB cooperated with the Commissioner’s requests.

Section 55: Report of Commissioner

Report of commissioner

55(1) On completing a review or investigation, the commissioner may prepare a written report setting out the commissioner’s recommendations with respect to the matter and the reasons for those recommendations.

(2) If a report is prepared pursuant to subsection (1), the commissioner shall forward a copy of the report to the head and, if the matter was referred to the commissioner by:

(a) an applicant or individual, to the applicant or individual and to any third party notified by the head pursuant to section 52; and

(b) a third party, to the third party and to the applicant.

(3)In the report mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner may make any recommendations with respect to the matter under review or investigation that the commissioner considers appropriate.

Upon completion of a review or an investigation, the Commissioner may issue a report. The report will include the Commissioner’s findings and recommendations.

If the Commissioner completes a report, it is provided to each party to the review or investigation prior to the report becoming publicly available via posting to the Commissioner’s website.

All reports are generally posted to the Commissioner’s website seven days after the report is provided to the parties. Reports may be posted to the website sooner where the Commissioner considers it appropriate. For example, where media coverage is going to occur before the report is generally made available to the public on the website. There are also limited circumstances where the Commissioner will not post a report to the website. For example, where the matters are extremely sensitive, an individual may be identified or where the circumstances of a case require additional measures be taken to protect individuals.

Government institutions are required, pursuant to section 56 of FOIP, to respond to a report of the Commissioner within 30 days indicating whether it will comply with the Commissioner’s recommendations or any other decision the head considers appropriate. The head’s response should be provided to the other parties to the review or investigation and to the Commissioner. The response should be in writing.

Once an applicant, individual or third party receives the head’s section 56 response, it has 30 days to make an application to the Court of King’s Bench if not satisfied pursuant to section 57 of FOIP. For more information on the Court of King’s Bench see Courts of Saskatchewan. See also Court of King’s Bench – Roles & Responsibilities, later in this Chapter.

In the recent Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), the court clarified the de novo nature of an appeal pursuant to 57 of FOIP. Part VII of FOIP does not in any way contemplate that, on an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, parties can raise any and all provisions of the Act that bear on the question of whether the record in issue may be released. The system of the Act offers no room for a direct appeal to the Court of King’s Bench from the decision of a head, i.e., an appeal that circumvents the application to the Commissioner for a review.35

For more on the Commissioner’s procedures for reviews, investigations and issuing reports, see The Rules of Procedure.

Section 62: Annual Report

Annual report

62(1) Within three months after the end of each fiscal year, the commissioner shall prepare and submit an annual report to the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Speaker shall cause the report to be laid before the Assembly in accordance with section 13 of The Executive Government Administration Act.

(2) The annual report of the commissioner is to provide details of the activities of the office in relation to the commissioner’s responsibilities pursuant to this Act during that fiscal year and, in particular, concerning any instances where the commissioner’s recommendations made after a review have not been complied with.

As an independent Officer of the Legislature, the Commissioner reports annually to the Legislative Assembly, describing the work of the Commissioner’s office and any instances where the Commissioner’s recommendations to government institutions were not complied with. This annual report is required pursuant to section 62 of FOIP.

All of the Commissioner’s annual reports dating back to 2003 are posted on the Commissioner’s website.

Procedural Fairness

Procedural fairness is concerned with the procedures used by a decision-maker, rather than the actual outcome reached. It requires a fair and proper procedure be used when making a decision. It is highly likely that a decision-maker who follows a fair procedure will reach a fair and correct decision.36

Procedural fairness involves decision-makers:

  • Informing parties of the case against them.
  • Giving parties the opportunity to be heard.
  • Remaining neutral.
  • Acting only on the basis of logically probative evidence.37

The important purpose of having procedural fairness is to ensure that, in the end, the result of an investigation or review can be fairly relied upon with confidence.

The courts have held on a considerable number of occasions that a proceeding before an administrative decision maker need not be absolutely perfect in order for it to comply with the duty of substantive or procedural fairness. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 SCR 562 at paragraph 45, observed in a general sense that:

A fair trial must not…be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused.38

The duty of procedural fairness is flexible and variable and depends on an appreciation of the context of the particular statute and the rights affected in a given set of circumstances (i.e., “the specific context of each case”).39

The Commissioner conducts reviews and investigations following the principles of procedural fairness within the limits of FOIP. For example, while sharing submissions amongst parties is procedurally fair, sections 46 and 53 of FOIP limit what the Commissioner can share with other parties during a review. Further, while FOIP provides the opportunity to make submissions to the Commissioner, it specifically limits the “right to be present during a review” or to have access to submissions by other parties made to the Commissioner before or after a review.40

All parties to a review or investigation are given the opportunity to provide representations (submissions) to the Commissioner.

Representation means the documents, other evidence and/statements or affidavits provided by a party setting out its position with respect to the information at issue and often referred to as a submission.41

The Commissioner considers those representations in a neutral non-biased manner and makes decisions based on a balance of probabilities or a preponderance of the evidence presented by the parties.

The process, because of the legislative requirements, is not like a trial in a court or a hearing by a tribunal. The legislation in effect requires the review to occur in private. It is within these limits that the Commissioner and staff attempt to be procedurally fair.

To assist parties in understanding the procedures used by the Commissioner’s office, the Commissioner issued, The Rules of Procedure.

Court of King’s Bench – Roles & Responsibilities

Section 57: Appeal to Court

Appeal to court

57(1) Within 30 days after receiving a decision of the head pursuant to section 56, an applicant or individual or a third party may appeal that decision to the court.

(2) A head who has refused an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by an applicant, give written notice of the appeal to any third party that the head:

(a) has notified pursuant to subsection 34(1); or

(b) would have notified pursuant to subsection 34(1) if the head had intended to give access to the record or part of the record.

(3) A head who has granted an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by a third party, give written notice of the appeal to the applicant.

(4) A third party who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (2) or an applicant or individual who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (3) may appear as a party to the appeal.

(5) The commissioner shall not be a party to an appeal.

A person or party who is dissatisfied with the head’s decision following the Commissioner’s review or investigation under FOIP, may pursue an appeal of the decision to the court.

An appeal to the court begins with an application to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan and may be appealed further by any party. For more on the process of appealing to the Court of King’s Bench see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” or IPC resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee.

The levels of an appeal follow a hierarchical model as follows:

  1. Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan
  2. Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
  3. Supreme Court of Canada42

Judges are required to give reasons for their decisions. These reasons may be contained in a written judgement of the court or may be given orally in court. Sometimes judges may do both – giving their decision orally in court with written reasons for the decision following at a later date.43 These judgments or orders are binding on the parties. The Queen’s Bench Rules, Part 10: Judgments and Orders at section 10-22 states:

10-22 Every order of the Court in any cause or matter may be enforced against all persons bound by the order in the same manner as a judgement to the same effect.

The Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan consists of a Chief Justice, an Associate Chief Justice, and currently 3644 other judges. Each King’s Bench judge is assigned to a specific judicial centre, but because the Court is an itinerant45 court, the judges also travel to and sit in other judicial centres.46

In Saskatchewan, there are court locations in:

  • Battleford
  • Estevan
  • La Ronge
  • Meadow Lake
  • Melfort
  • Moose Jaw
  • Prince Albert
  • Regina
  • Saskatoon
  • Swift Current
  • Weyburn
  • Yorkton

Section 58: Powers of Court on Appeal

Powers of court on appeal 58(1) On an appeal, the court:

(a) shall determine the matter de novo; and

(b) may examine any record in camera in order to determine on the merits whether the information in the record may be withheld pursuant to this Act.

(2) Notwithstanding any other Act or any privilege that is available at law, the court may, on an appeal, examine any record in the possession or under the control of a government institution, and no information shall be withheld from the court on any grounds.

(3) The court shall take every reasonable precaution, including, where appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and conducting hearings in camera, to avoid disclosure by the court or any person of:

(a) any information or other material if the nature of the information or material could justify a refusal by a head to give access to a record or part of a record; or

(b) any information as to whether a record exists if the head, in refusing to give access, does not indicate whether the record exists.

(4) The court may disclose to the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or the Attorney General of Canada information that relates to the commission of an offence against:

(a) an Act or a regulation; or

(b) an Act of the Parliament of Canada or a regulation made pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada;

by an officer or employee of a government institution if, in the opinion of the court, there is evidence of the commission of the offence.

(5) Where a head has refused to give access to a record or part of it, the court, if it determines that the head is not authorized to refuse to give access to the record or part of it, shall:

(a) order the head to give the applicant access to the record or part of it, subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate; or

(b) make any other order that the court considers appropriate.

(6) Where the court finds that a record falls within an exemption, the court shall not order the head to give the applicant access to the record, regardless of whether the exemption requires or merely authorizes the head to refuse to give access to the record.

(7) If, with respect to an appeal of a decision of the head regarding the matters mentioned in clauses 49(1)(a.1) to (a.4), the court determines that the decision of the head was not authorized pursuant to this Act, the court may:

(a) order the head to reconsider the decision and proceed in accordance with this Act, subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate; or

(b) make any other order that the court considers appropriate.

(8) If, with respect to an appeal mentioned in subsection (7), the court finds that the head had authority pursuant to this Act to make the decision that is the subject of the appeal, the court shall not order the head to reconsider the decision.

The court’s function is to consider the matter de novo, including, if necessary, a detailed review of the records in issue document by document. The review of records would be in camera.47

De novo means a review of a matter anew, as if the original hearing had not taken place.48

On an appeal de novo, the court is not constrained by the standard of review. It finds the facts and the law.49

In the recent Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), the court clarified the de novo nature of an appeal pursuant to section 57 of FOIP. Part VII of FOIP does not in any way contemplate that, on an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, parties can raise any and all provisions of the Act that bear on the question of whether the record in issue may be released. The system of the Act offers no room for a direct appeal to the Court of King’s Bench from the decision of a head, i.e., an appeal that circumvents the application to the Commissioner for a review.50

In camera, in this context, means in the judge’s private chambers.51 In general terms, it means in private (not open to the public). For a case involving both the examination of records in camera by the judge and an in camera hearing, see Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2018 SKKB 323 (CanLII).

In order to avoid disclosure of withheld information or the existence of records (i.e., where subsection 7(2)(f) of FOIP has been applied), the court will take every reasonable precaution including, where appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and/or conducting hearings in camera.52

Ex parte, in this context, means receiving representations from one party only, usually without notice to or argument from the adverse party.53

The Information and Privacy Commissioner cannot be a party to an appeal.54 Further, the Commissioner and the staff of the Commissioner are not compellable to give evidence in a court.

Where the court finds evidence of an offence by an officer or employee of a government institution under section 68 of FOIP or any Act or regulation provincially or federally, the court may disclose information to the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or the Attorney General of Canada.55

Unlike the review of many other government institution actions that must generally be upheld if supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious, the burden rests on the government institution to justify its action. Section 61 of FOIP provides:

61 In any proceeding pursuant to this Act, the burden of establishing that access to the record applied for may or must be refused or granted is on the head concerned.56

For more on section 61 of FOIP and the burden of proof, see Section 61: Burden of Proof later in this Chapter.

The court is required to determine whether the government institution was authorized to refuse access. Where its refusal was not authorized, the court is given the authority to order a government institution to give an applicant access to a record, subject to any conditions the court considers appropriate. Alternatively, the court may make any other order it considers appropriate.57

If the court finds that refusal was authorized (i.e., an exemption under FOIP applies), the court will not order the government institution to provide access regardless of whether the exemption was a mandatory or discretionary exemption. To elaborate further, this means that the court will not exercise the heads discretion for any applicable discretionary exemptions.58 For more on mandatory and discretionary exemptions, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4, “Exemptions from the Right of Access”.

For appeals of fee estimates, fee waivers, transfers of requests and privacy matters, if the court determines that the decision made by the government institution was not authorized under FOIP, the court may order the government institution to reconsider its decision and proceed in accordance with FOIP, subject to any conditions the court considers appropriate.

The court may also make any order the court considers appropriate.59 Alternatively, if the court finds the decision made by the government institution was authorized, it will not order the government institution to reconsider.60

Several access to information and privacy matters have been appealed to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. Some cases have gone further to the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan. However, to date, no Saskatchewan access to information or privacy matter has reached the Supreme Court of Canada. Some notable cases in Saskatchewan are as follows:

Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan:

Liick v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Health), 1994 CanLII 4934 (SK KB) Weidlich v. Saskatchewan Power Corp., 1998 CanLII 14047 (SK KB) Fogal v. Regina School Division No. 4, 2002 SKKB 92 (CanLII)

Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKKB 106 (CanLII) Evenson v Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority, 2012 SKKB 382 (CanLII) Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKKB 296 (CanLII)

Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII)

Consumers’ Co-operative Refineries Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SKKB 335 (CanLII) Shook Legal, Ltd v Saskatchewan (Government Insurance), 2018 SKKB 238 (CanLII) D’Arcy Hande v University of Saskatchewan, KBG 1222 of 2018 (unreported)

Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKKB 92 (CanLII)

Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2018 SKKB 323 (CanLII)

Leo v. Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKKB 150 (CanLII)

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan:

City Collection Co. Ltd. et al v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 6654 (SK CA) General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 9128 (SK CA)

University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII)

Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII)

Section 61: Burden of Proof

Burden of proof

61 In any proceeding pursuant to this Act, the burden of establishing that access to the record applied for may or must be refused or granted is on the head concerned.

Section 61 of FOIP provides that the government institution has the burden of proof if it claims that access should or must be refused under FOIP. The burden is not on the applicant to establish that an exemption does not apply.

Burden of proof is the obligation of one of the parties in a review to persuade the Commissioner to decide an issue in its favour.61

When it is said that a party has the “burden of proof”, what is meant is that one party has a duty in law first to bring forward evidence that a particular fact or situation exists, and then to persuade the Commissioner that the evidence meets the necessary standard of proof.62

Standard Required to Meet Burden of Proof

In law there are different standards that must be met in order to satisfy the burden of proof. These standards are applied in different situations. The one most people are familiar with is the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This standard applies in criminal cases. civil cases, such as cases involving contractual disputes, have a lesser standard. That standard is proof “on a balance of probabilities” or “on a preponderance of evidence.” For matters before the Commissioner, this lesser standard applies.63

The term balance of probabilities is difficult to define, but it is more than a mere possibility. It has been taken to mean that the person deciding a case must find that it is more probable than not that a contested fact exists. In the FOIP context, a party will have proven its case on a balance of probabilities if the Commissioner can say “I think it is more likely, or more probable, than not.”64

The term preponderance of evidence means the same thing as “balance of probabilities.” If the Commissioner reaches a conclusion based on a preponderance of evidence, this means that the Commissioner has considered and weighed the evidence presented by both parties and the Commissioner is convinced by the persuasiveness or accuracy of one party’s evidence over the other party’s evidence. A party to a matter before the Commissioner is only required to prove something on a balance of probabilities when the party has the burden of proof.65

Evidence is the material that parties must submit in reviews/investigations to establish the facts on which they are relying.66 Something (including testimony, documents and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.67

Evidence, broadly defined, is the means from which an inference may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact; that which makes evident or plain. Evidence is the demonstration of a fact; it signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the other. In legal acceptation, the term ‘evidence’ includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved. ‘Evidence’ has also been defined to mean any species of proof legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects and the like.68

Speculation is the practice or an instance of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge.69

Arguments are the reasons why a party thinks that the evidence shows certain facts to be true, or why the Commissioner should interpret the law in a particular way, so as to make the decision that the party wants the Commissioner to make.70

Parties may not succeed in a review or investigation if they do not provide evidence to support their arguments. If the success of an argument depends on underlying facts, providing the argument alone is not sufficient.71 Examples of evidence include affidavits, expert reports, news articles, meeting minutes, policy documents or contracts. In a review, the records at issue are treated as evidence.72 Although news articles are not generally thought of as reliable evidence, they may be relevant in cases such as where a party is trying to demonstrate that something is publicly available, or where personal information has been disclosed without authority.

It would not be sufficient to provide the Commissioner with records and leave it up to the Commissioner to draw from the records the facts on which the decisions will be based.73

It would not be sufficient to simply state “access is denied because of section 19.” It is up to the government institution to ‘make the case’ that a particular exemption applies. That means presenting reasons why the exemption is appropriate for the part of the record that has been withheld. This is usually done in the form of written representations, commonly called a submission.74

Representation means the documents, other evidence and/statements or affidavits provided by a party to the commissioner’s office setting out its position with respect to a review or investigation and often referred to as a submission.75

The Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4, “Exemptions from the Right of Access” lays out all of the exemptions under Part III of FOIP along with tests that are relied on by the Commissioner to determine if an exemption has been appropriately applied by a government institution. These tests reflect the precedents set by the current and former Commissioners in Saskatchewan, Commissioners in other jurisdictions and court decisions in Saskatchewan and across Canada. The Commissioner shares these tests to assist government institutions, third parties and applicants with preparing persuasive representations (submissions) for the Commissioner. For more on preparing a persuasive submission see IPC blogs, Tips for a Good Submission, What Makes a Good Submission and Preparing and writing a submission. There is also additional guidance on preparing a submission, record and index in IPC resource, What to Expect during a Review with the IPC. Finally, the IPC has also issued a resource titled, A Guide to Submissions that offers guidance and templates for applicants, government institutions, local authorities and third parties to assist in preparing and writing a submission for the Commissioner.

Applicants are not required to submit evidence or arguments in the form of written representations (submission) in a review because the Commissioner can decide as to whether the government institution correctly applied FOIP without an applicant’s submission.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2006-005, the Commissioner considered a submission from SaskTel and found that SaskTel had not met the burden of proof in demonstrating that subsection 12(1)(b) of FOIP applied. The Commissioner determined that a restatement of SaskTel’s decision and paraphrasing the statutory provision was insufficient for the Commissioner to assess the appropriateness of the decision. The Commissioner found that without particularizing the reasons for the decision SaskTel failed to discharge the burden of proof.

However, applicants are always invited to provide submissions. There may be circumstances where the Commissioner may need an applicant to provide evidence or argument such as where an applicant claims a party has waived legal privilege, that information should be disclosed in the public interest or that an applicant is unable to pay a fee. For more on the applicant’s submission see IPC blog, But I’m the Applicant – how can my submission help?

Who has the Burden of Proof

Where FOIP does not explicitly state which party has the burden of proof, the Commissioner will determine where the burden lies. When making that determination, the Commissioner will consider:

  • Who raised the issue.
  • Who is in the best position to meet the burden of proof.76

Privacy breaches: FOIP does not define burden of proof in a breach of privacy investigation. Since a complainant raises the issue, the complainant has the initial burden to establish that a privacy breach has occurred involving the complainant’s personal information. If a collection, use or disclosure is proven, the burden then shifts to the government institution to justify its authority under FOIP for the data transaction.77 Only the government institution would have intimate knowledge of the circumstances surrounding a breach. The burden of proof is assessed on a balance of probabilities.78

Fees: FOIP does not define burden of proof in a review of a fee estimate. However, having regard for the purpose of the Act and the practice in other Canadian jurisdictions, the head of the government institution should also bear the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fee under the Act.79

Transfers: FOIP does not define burden of proof in a review of a transfer of an access request (section 11). However, the government institution that transfers the request is in the best position to explain why it transferred it.80

Extensions: FOIP does not define burden of proof in a review involving an extension of time (section 12). However, the burden of proof of establishing an appropriate basis to extend the time to respond to an applicant under FOIP should be borne by the government institution.81

Corrections: FOIP does not define burden of proof in a review of a request for correction (section 32). However, the applicant has the initial burden to establish that there are errors or omissions in the personal information that are subject to correction.82 For example, where an applicant is asserting a birthdate or name is incorrect, an applicant can provide supporting documentation such as a copy of a driver’s license or birth certificate. Once an error or omission is established, the burden of proof shifts to the government institution to justify its decision to not correct the personal information.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2013-005, the Commissioner considered which party had the burden of proof in supporting the decision of the Ministry of Health (Health) to transfer two access requests to the Ministry of Justice. The Commissioner found that since Health was in the best position to explain why it transferred the requests to Justice, it bore the burden of proof. The Commissioner further found that Health did not meet the burden of proof in demonstrating that the transfer was proper under FOIP.

Affidavit Evidence

An affidavit is a declaration of facts written down and sworn or affirmed to be true by a party who has personal knowledge of the records or matters at issue in a review or investigation.83

An affidavit should be sworn or affirmed before a Commissioner for Oaths or a Notary Public. There are serious legal consequences for a person who swears a false affidavit.84

Affidavits may be desirable because, unlike other statements made to the Commissioner, an affidavit is evidence given under oath and makes a stronger case.

A party is free to submit affidavit evidence in a review or investigation. In some circumstances, the Commissioner may request an affidavit to assist in determining factual issues in a review or investigation. For example, the Commissioner may request an affidavit where there is a question as to whether a reasonable or adequate search was undertaken for responsive records or where facts asserted by the government institution are contradictory or inconsistent with other material.

Following the decision of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner, (2018), the Commissioner is requiring an affidavit from the head where the government institution is claiming solicitor-client privilege over information or records. See The Rules of Procedure for more assistance with the process when claiming solicitor-client privilege over information or records.

For further guidance on using affidavits and for a sample format that can be used, see IPC resource, Using Affidavits in a Review with the IPC and The Rules of Procedure.

Offences & Penalties

Section 66: Proceedings Prohibited

Proceedings prohibited

66(1) No proceeding lies or shall be instituted against the Government of Saskatchewan, a government institution, a head or other officer or employee of a government institution for:

(a) the giving or withholding in good faith of access to any record pursuant to this Act;

(b) any consequences that flow from the giving or withholding of access mentioned in clause (a); or

(c) the failure to give any notice required pursuant to this Act, if reasonable care is taken to give the required notice.

(2) For the purposes of clause (1)(c), reasonable care is deemed to have been taken if notice required to be sent to an applicant is sent to the address of the applicant given on the prescribed application form.

(3) No proceeding lies or shall be instituted against the commissioner or any employee or agent of the commissioner, where the commissioner, employee or agent is acting pursuant to the authority of this Act or the regulations made pursuant to this Act, for any loss or damage suffered by a person by reason of anything in good faith done, caused, permitted or authorized to be done, attempted to be done or omitted to be done, by any of them, pursuant to or in the exercise of or supposed exercise of any power conferred by this Act or the regulations or in the carrying out or supposed carrying out of any order made pursuant to this Act or any duty imposed by this Act or the regulations.

There will undoubtedly be instances in which government institutions release information that is protected from disclosure by a mandatory exemption under FOIP. This is likely to be the result of a misinterpretation or misapplication of the statute or simply inadvertence. A person who is injured by such action may well look to the government for recovery of the amount of any damages suffered.85 It is also possible that injury could occur from a decision to withhold a record. However, subsections 66(1)(a) and (b) of FOIP protect the government and its officials from civil liability in these circumstances, if the decision to disclose or withhold was made in good faith.

Good faith means that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. Good faith is an intangible quality encompassing honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or take advantage of something.86

Subsection 66(1)(c) of FOIP also confers immunity from suit for failure to give any notice required under FOIP, if reasonable care was taken to give the notice. Reasonable care means the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.87 Subsection 66(2) of FOIP provides that reasonable care is deemed to have taken place if the notice required to be sent to an applicant is sent to the address of the applicant given on the access to information form.88

An injured party will usually find it extremely difficult to mount a successful case against the government or its agents in the face of these provisions.89

Subsection 66(3) of FOIP provides that the Information and Privacy Commissioner and staff of the Commissioner are also protected from civil liability when acting in good faith pursuant to any authority granted under FOIP or The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.90

Section 67: Immunity from Prosecution

Immunity from prosecution

67 No person is liable to prosecution for an offence against any Act or regulation by reason of that person’s compliance with a requirement of the commissioner pursuant to this Act.

As the provision below states, no person is liable to prosecution for an offence against any Act or regulation where the person was following a requirement of the Commissioner under FOIP.

Section 68: Summary Offences

Offence

68(1) Every person who knowingly collects, uses or discloses personal information in contravention of this Act or the regulations is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $50,000, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both.

(2) No proceeding shall be instituted pursuant to this section except with the consent of the Attorney General.

(3) Any person who:

(a) without lawful justification or excuse wilfully obstructs, hinders or resists the commissioner or any other person in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or the carrying out of the functions of the commissioner or other person pursuant to this Act;

(b) without lawful justification or excuse, refuses or wilfully fails to comply with any lawful requirement of the commissioner or any other person pursuant to this Act;

(c) wilfully makes any false statement to, or misleads or attempts to mislead, the commissioner or any other person in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or carrying out of the functions of the commissioner or other person pursuant to this Act; or

(d) wilfully destroys any record that is governed by this Act with the intent to evade a request for access to the record;

is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $50,000, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both.

(4) No employee of a government institution or of an information management service provider shall knowingly disclose or direct another person to disclose personal information in circumstances that would constitute an offence by the government institution or an information management service provider pursuant to this Act.

(5) Every employee of a government institution or of an information management service provider who contravenes subsection (4) is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $50,000, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both, whether or not the government institution or information management service provider has been prosecuted or convicted.

(6) No employee of a government institution shall wilfully access or use or direct another person to access or use personal information that is not reasonably required by that individual to carry out a purpose authorized pursuant to this Act.

(7) Every employee of a government institution who contravenes subsection (6) is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $50,000, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both, whether or not the government institution has been prosecuted or convicted.

(8) No employee of an information management service provider shall wilfully access or use or direct another person to access or use personal information for a purpose that is not authorized by subsection 24.2(1).

(9) Every employee of an information management service provider who contravenes subsection (8) is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $50,000, to imprisonment for not more than one year or to both, whether or not the information management service provider has been prosecuted or convicted.

(10) No prosecution shall be commenced pursuant to this section after the expiration of two years from the date of the discovery of the alleged offence

Section 68 of FOIP lists a number of contraventions, which may give rise to criminal liability.

Offences under section 68 of FOIP are summary offences. The Summary Offences Procedures Act, 1990 gives jurisdiction to the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan to decide whether a person has committed an offence under section 68 of FOIP and to assess an appropriate penalty.91 Subsections 4(1) and (2) of The Summary Offences Procedures Act, 1990 provides that:

4(1) Subject to this Act, any other Act or any regulation, proceedings to enforce an Act, regulation or bylaw by fine, penalty or imprisonment may be brought summarily before a justice under the summary conviction provisions of the Criminal Code.

(2) In an Act or regulation, the words “on summary conviction” mean under and by virtue of the summary conviction provisions mentioned in subsection (1).

A prosecution may only be commenced under FOIP with the consent of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan.92

Attorney General, in this context, is the chief law officer of Saskatchewan responsible for advising the government on legal matters and representing it in litigation.93

The Commissioner does not determine guilt or innocence, convict persons for offences or assess penalties under FOIP. The Commissioner can make a recommendation to the Attorney General for Saskatchewan that a prosecution be considered.

Possible penalties for an offence under section 68 of FOIP include:

  • A fine of not more than $50,000.
  • Imprisonment for not more than 1 year.
  • Both fine and imprisonment.94

A prosecution cannot be commenced pursuant to section 68 of FOIP after two years from the date of the discovery of the alleged offence.95 Discovery is the act or process of finding or learning something that was previously unknown.96

Summary offences begin with an appearance in the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan. The Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan hears appeals of summary conviction matters that have been dealt with at Provincial Court. Matters that have been decided at the Court of King’s Bench may be appealed to the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.97

To date, there have been no prosecutions in Saskatchewan for offences pursuant to section 68 of FOIP.

There are two categories of possible offences:

  1. Privacy and access related offences.
  2. Offences arising from not cooperating with the Commissioner or another person performing the duties of the Commissioner.
Privacy and Access Offences

Section 68 of FOIP provides that it is an offence:

  • To knowingly collect, use or disclose personal information in contravention of FOIP or The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations [s. 68(1) of FOIP].
  • To willfully destroy any record that is governed by FOIP with the intent to evade a request for access to the record [s. 68(3)(d) of FOIP].
  • For an employee of either a government institution or an information management service provider to knowingly disclose or direct another person to disclose personal information in contravention of FOIP or The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations [s. 68(4) of FOIP].

  • For an employee of a government institution to willfully access, use or direct another person to access or use personal information that is not reasonably required to carry out a purpose authorized under FOIP. In other words, if it is not needed to do your job it is likely snooping, and snooping is an offence [s. 68(6) of FOIP].
  • For an employee of an information management service provider to willfully access, use or direct another person to access or use personal information in contravention of subsection 24.2(1) of FOIP. In other words, if it is not needed to do the job of an information service provider as outlined at subsection 24.2(1) of FOIP, it is likely snooping, and snooping is an offence [s. 68(8) of FOIP].

The penalties for doing any of the above is a fine of up to $50,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.98

Subsections 68(5), 68(7) and 68(9) of FOIP provide that an employee who contravenes subsections 68(4), 68(6) and 68(8) of FOIP is liable on summary conviction to the above fine or imprisonment even where the government institution or information service provider has not been prosecuted or convicted under FOIP. In other words, employees of government institutions or information service providers can be prosecuted independently from their employers.

IPC Findings

In Investigation Report 228-2015, the Commissioner investigated a breach of privacy involving a SaskPower employee inappropriately accessing the personal information of 4,382 current and former SaskPower employees and copying two files from the data. Due to the number of records the employee snooped into, the Commissioner recommended that SaskPower send its final investigation report to the Ministry of Justice, Public Prosecutions Division. That was to allow prosecutors to further consider whether an offence had been committed and if charges should be laid under FOIP or any other statute.

Not Cooperating with the Commissioner

Subsections 68(3)(a) through (c) of FOIP set out other offences and require individuals to cooperate with the Commissioner or any other person performing the duties of the Commissioner.

Subsections 68(3)(a) through (c) of FOIP provide that it is an offence to:

  • Willfully obstruct, hinder or resist the Commissioner or another person (such as the Commissioner’s staff) in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or functions of the Commissioner or other person under FOIP without lawful justification or excuse.
  • Refuse or willfully fail to comply with any lawful requirement of the Commissioner or any other person under FOIP without lawful justification or excuse.
  • Willfully make false statements, mislead or attempt to mislead the Commissioner or any other person in the exercise of the powers, performance of the duties or functions of the Commissioner or other person under FOIP.

The powers, duties and functions of the Commissioner are laid out in FOIP. The penalties for doing any of the above is a fine of up to $50,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.99

IPC Findings

In Review Report LA-2013-004, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision of FOIP’s subsection 68(3) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). After considering the actions of the Northern Village of Pinehouse, the Commissioner recommended the Minister of Justice and Attorney General consider prosecution pursuant to subsection 56(3) of LA FOIP.

In Review Report LA-2014-001, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision of FOIP’s subsection 68(3) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). After considering the actions of the Village of Killaly, the Commissioner recommended the Minister of Justice and Attorney General consider prosecution pursuant to subsection 56(3) of LA FOIP.

 


Office of the Saskatchewan Information And Privacy Commissioner

503 – 1801 Hamilton Street

Regina SK S4P 4B4 306-787-8350

www.oipc.sk.ca


‌1 Ministry of Justice, Annual Report 2001-2002, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act at p. 4.

‌2 Ministry of Justice, Annual Report 2016-2017, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at p. 6.

‌3 Ministry of Justice, Annual Report 2016-2017, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at p. 6.

‌4 Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Annual Report 2021-22, at p. 5.

Ministry of Justice, Annual Report 2016-2017The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at p. 6.

‌6 Government institutions should consider the definition of a “government institution” at subsection 2(1)(d) of FOIP and the Appendix, Part I of the FOIP Regulations for additional prescribed “government institutions”.

‌7 Adapted from McNairn and Woodbury, Government Information: Access and Privacy, (2009), Carswell: Toronto at p. 2-7.

‌8 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, at subsection 2(2)(c).

‌9 Publications Saskatchewan, OC 134/2016 – The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy (Designation) Amendment Regulations, 2016 (Minister of Justice and Attorney General). See https://publications.saskatchewan.ca/#/products/78543.

‌10 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-

‌11 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 24.

‌12 Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC), FOIP FOLIO, January

‌13 SK OIPC, FOIP FOLIO, January 2004 at pp. 3-4.

14 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-

‌15 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 19901-91, c. F-22.01 at s. 60(2)(a) and (b).

‌16 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 19901-91, c. F-22.01 at s. 2(1)(e).

‌17 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 27.

18 “Delegate” British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-

‌19 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 27.

20 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 28.

‌21 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 29.

‌22 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-34.

‌23 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, p. 31.

24 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 31.

‌25 SK OIPC Dictionary available at https://oipc.sk.ca/resources/dictionary/.

‌26 SK OIPC Resource, Privacy Breach Guidelines for Government Institutions and Local Authorities at p. 11.

‌27 SK OIPC Resource, Privacy Breach Guidelines for Government Institutions and Local Authorities at pp. 6 to 9.

‌28 For more, see SK OIPC resource, Privacy Breach Guidelines for Government Institutions and Local Authorities. Available at Privacy Breach Guidelines (oipc.sk.ca).

‌29 SK OIPC Annual Report – 2003-2004 at p. 7.

‌30 SK OIPC Annual Report – 2003-2004 at p. 7.

31 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 837.

‌32 SK OIPC Annual Report – 2012-2013 at Appendix 3.

‌33 SK OIPC Rules of Procedure at p. 3.

‌34 Office of the New Brunswick Information and Privacy Commissioner (NB IPC), Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

‌35 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [41] and [47].

‌36 Ombudsman Western Australia, Guidelines, Procedural Fairness (natural justice), May 2009.

‌37 SK OIPC, Presentation, Procedural Fairness: Factors that contribute to making an administratively fair decision.

38 R. v. Harrer, 1995 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1995] 3 SCR 562 at [45]. Also cited in Edmonton Police Service v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2012 ABKB 595 (CanLII) at [57].

‌39 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at

[21] and [22]. Also cited in Edmonton Police Service v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2012 ABKB 595 (CanLII) at [59].

‌40 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 53(3).

‌41 SK OIPC Rules of Procedure at p. 3.

‌42 Courts of Saskatchewan, Resources, Court Structure. Available at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/resources/learn-about-the-courts-resources/court-structure.

‌43 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/decisions.

44 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. Accessed February 4, 2020.

45 Itinerate” (of a judge) means to travel on a circuit for the purpose of holding court – Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 997.

46 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. See also The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, RSS c Q-1.01 at s. 4.

‌47 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(1)(b).

48 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 837.

‌49 Gordon v Regina Qu’Appelle Regional Health Authority, 2017 SKKB 291 (CanLII) at [37].

‌50 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [41] and [47].

51 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 909.

‌52 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(3).

53 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 722.

‌54 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 57(5).

‌55 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(4).

‌56 General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 1993 CanLII 9128 (SK CA) at [12].

57 Evenson v Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority, 2012 SKKB 382 (CanLII) at [6]. See also, The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(5).

58 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(6).

‌59 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(7).

‌60 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at s. 58(8).

‌61 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practice: 2009 Edition, Appendix 1, Definitions.

62 SK OIPC Review Report F-2013-005 at [20].

‌63 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 2.

‌64 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 2.

‌65 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 2.

‌66 Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta (AB IPC) Adjudication Practice Note 2, Evidence and Arguments for Inquiries at p. 1.

67 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 697 to 698.

68 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 698.

69 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1687.

‌70 AB IPC Adjudication Practice Note 2, Evidence and Arguments for Inquiries at p. 1.

‌71 AB IPC Adjudication Practice Note 2, Evidence and Arguments for Inquiries at p. 1.

‌72 Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia (BC IPC), Instructions for Written Inquiries, May 2017 at p. 6.

73 AB IPC Adjudication Practice Note 2, Evidence and Arguments for Inquiries at p. 1.

‌74 SK OIPC Review Report F-2013-005 at [20].

‌75 SK OIPC Rules of Procedure at p. 3.

‌76 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 4.

‌77 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 4.

‌78 SK OIPC Investigation Report LA-2010-001 at [26]. This is also consistent with Alberta – see Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 4.

‌79 SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-005 at [29]. This is also consistent with Alberta – see Service Alberta,

‌FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 4.

80 SK OIPC Review Report F-2013-005 at [21].

‌81 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [14] and F-2006-005 at [27].

‌82 SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-004 at [21].

‌83 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 9.

‌84 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 9, Burden of Proof, November 2009 at p. 9.

‌85 McNairn and Woodbury, Government Information: Access and Privacy, (2009), Carswell: Toronto at p. 6-34.

86 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

87 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 263.

‌88 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at s. 66(2).

89 McNairn and Woodbury, Government Information: Access and Privacy, (2009), Carswell: Toronto at p. 6-34.

‌90 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at s. 66(3).

‌91 Adapted from Alberta IPC Order P2006-005 at [100].

92 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 68(2).

93 Modified from Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 154.

‌94 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 68(1), (3), (9).

‌95 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 68(10).

96 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 584.

‌97 Courts of Saskatchewan available at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/criminal.

‌98 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 68(1), (3), (9).

‌99 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 68(3).

 

Chapter 3: Access to Records

Guide to FOIP: Chapter 3

Guide to FOIP

The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Chapter 3

Access to Records

Table of Contents

Overview 1

Who Has The Right of Access 2

Section 5: Right of Access 3

Processing Access to Information Requests 5

Name of Applicant is Personal Information 6

Reason for Request Not Relevant 7

Questions in Access to Information Requests 7

Verifying Identity 8

Requests Not on “Form A” 10

Search for Records 12

IPC Review of Search Efforts 13

Searching Records of Employees 17

Government Records in Personal Email Accounts 17

Personal Records in Government Email Accounts 21

Records Not Responsive 26

Creating Records 28

Section 5.1: Duty to Assist 30

Subsection 5.1(1) 30

Subsection 5.1(2) 34

Section 6: Application 35

Subsection 6(1)(a) 35

Subsection 6(1)(b) 37

Clarifying vs Narrowing 38

Subsection 6(2) 42

Subsection 6(3) 42

Clarifying vs Narrowing 43

Subsection 6(4) 46

Section 7: Response Required 46

Subsection 7(1) 48

Subsection 7(2) 48

Calculating 30 Days 49

Subsection 7(2)(a) 51

Subsection 7(2)(b) 52

Subsection 7(2)(c) 53

Subsection 7(2)(d) 54

Subsection 7(2)(e) 56

Subsection 7(2)(f) 57

Subsection 7(2)(g) 58

Subsection 7(3) 59

Subsection 7(4) 59

Subsection 7(5) 62

Section 7.1: Applications Deemed Abandoned 63

Subsection 7.1(1) 64

Subsection 7.1(2) 65

Subsection 7.1(3) 66

Section 8: Severability 67

Section 9: Fee 71

Subsection 9(1) 71

Subsection 9(2) 72

Creating a Fee Estimate 72

Subsection 9(3) 78

Subsection 9(4) 78

Subsection 9(5) 79

Fee Waivers 79

Section 10: Manner of Access 87

Subsection 10(1) 88

Subsection 10(2) 88

Subsection 10(3) 90

Subsection 10(4) 92

Section 11: Transfer of Application 93

Subsection 11(1) 94

Subsection 11(2) 95

Subsection 11(3) 96

Section 12: Extension of Time 97

Subsection 12(1)(a) 98

Subsection 12(1)(a)(i) 99

Subsection 12(1)(a)(ii) 101

Subsection 12(1)(b) 104

Subsection 12(1)(c) 107

Subsection 12(2) 108

Subsection 12(3) 109

Section 31: Individual’s Access to Personal Information 111

Subsection 31(1) 111

Subsection 31(2) 112

Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests 118

Subsection 45.1(1) 119

Subsection 45.1(2)(a) 120

Subsection 45.1(2)(b) 124

Subsection 45.1(2)(c) 128

Section 49: Application for Review 133

Subsection 49(1)(a) 135

Subsection 49(1)(a.1) 137

Subsection 49(1)(a.2) 138

Subsection 49(1)(a.3) 139

Subsection 49(1)(a.4) 139

Subsection 49(1)(b) 142

Subsection 49(1)(c) 142

Subsection 49(2) 143

Subsection 49(3) 144

Subsection 49(4) 145

Section 50: Review or Refusal to Review 146

Subsection 50(1) 147

Subsection 50(2) 148

Subsection 50(2)(a) 149

Subsection 50(2)(a.1) 152

Subsection 50(2)(a.2) 152

Subsection 50(2)(a.3) 152

Subsection 50(2)(a.4) 153

Subsection 50(2)(a.5) 153

Subsection 50(2)(a.6) 154

Subsection 50(2)(a.7) 155

Subsection 50(2)(b) 155

Subsection 50(2)(c) 157

Section 57: Appeal to the Court 158

Section 59: Exercise of Rights by Other Persons 161

Subsection 59(a) 162

Subsection 59(b) 164

Subsection 59(c) 166

Subsection 59(d) 168

Subsection 59(e) 171

Section 65: Access to Manuals 174

Subsection 65(1) 174

Subsection 65(2) 176

Section 65.1: Records Available Without an Application 177

Routine Disclosure 177

Active Dissemination 178

Overview

This Chapter explains access to records under The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP).

What follows is non-binding guidance. Every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is not intended to be an exhaustive authority on the interpretation of these provisions. Government institutions may wish to seek legal advice when deciding on how to interpret the Act. Government institutions should keep section 61 of FOIP in mind.

The tests, criteria and interpretations established in this Chapter reflect the precedents set by the current and/or former Information and Privacy Commissioners in Saskatchewan through the issuing of Review Reports. Court decisions from Saskatchewan affecting The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) will be followed. Where this office has not previously considered a section of FOIP, the Commissioner looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. This includes other Information and Privacy Commissioners’ Orders, Reports and/or other relevant resources. In addition, court decisions from across the country are relied upon where appropriate.

This Chapter will be updated regularly to reflect any changes in precedent. This office will update the footer to reflect the last update. Using the electronic version directly from our website will ensure you are always using the most current version.

Section 61 places the burden of proof for establishing that access to a record may or must be refused on the government institution. For more on the burden of proof, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP”. This is a guide.

Who Has The Right of Access

Any person has a right of access to any records in the possession or control of a government institution. There are no limits on who can make an access to information request

An applicant means a person who makes a written request for access to information under section 6 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP). 1

Government institutions should be aware of section 59 of FOIP which authorizes other individuals to exercise the rights of applicants under FOIP in specific circumstances. This includes making an access to information request and receiving access to information (including the applicant’s personal information) and addressing privacy matters on behalf of the applicant. These circumstances are outlined at subsections 59(a) through (e) of FOIP. For example, where a power of attorney has been granted, the power of attorney may exercise the rights of the individual under FOIP if the exercise of the right or power relates to the powers and duties of the power of attorney. For more on section 59, see Section 59: Exercise of Rights by Other Persons later in this Chapter.

For more on making an access to information request, see Section 6: Application later in this Chapter.

The applicant can be any person including individuals residing inside or outside of Saskatchewan, media outlets, corporations, political parties, etc. In addition, FOIP does not specify a minimum age, which means that minors may also make an access request.

IPC Findings

In Disregard Decision 285-2020, 286-2020, 287-2020, 288-2020, 289-2020, the Commissioner considered an application to disregard five access to information requests made by the Ministry of Parks, Culture and Sport (PCS). While presenting its arguments to the Commissioner that the requests were repetitious, systematic, vexatious and not made in good faith, PCS asserted that all five requests came from the Suffern Lake Cabin Owners Association (SLCOA). The applicants (two individuals) asserted that they made the requests as individuals and not as part of the SLCOA. After considering the arguments of both parties, the Commissioner found that there were two separate applicants in the matter. As such, only the access to information requests submitted by each individual were considered when reviewing whether the five requests met the tests for subsections 45.1(2)(a), (b) and (c) of FOIP. When assessing whether there was an abuse of the right of access, the Commissioner only considered the actions of each applicant separately and not as a group. As a result, the Commissioner found that the five access to information requests did not meet the tests for subsections 45.1(2)(a), (b) or (c) of FOIP and refused the PCS’ application to disregard them. The 30-day clock for processing the five access to information requests resumed as of the date of the Commissioner’s decision.

Section 5: Right of Access

Right of Access

5 Subject to this Act and the regulations, every person has a right to and, on an application made in accordance with this Part, shall be permitted access to records that are in the possession or under the control of a government institution.

Section 5 of FOIP establishes a right of access by any person to records in the possession or control of a government institution, subject to limited and specific exemptions, which are set out in FOIP.

The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted access to information laws as quasi-constitutional. It follows that as fundamental rights, the rights to access and to privacy are interpreted generously, while the exceptions to these rights must be understood strictly. 2

Access is defined as the right of an individual (or the individual’s lawfully authorized representative) to view or obtain copies of the records in the possession or control of a government institution including the individual’s personal information. 3

record is defined at subsection 2(1)(i) of FOIP as “a record of information in any form and includes information that is written, photographed, recorded or stored in any manner, but does not include computer programs or other mechanisms that produce records.”

A “record” includes transitory records that exist at the time of an access to information request. Transitory records are records of temporary usefulness that are needed only for a limited period of time, to complete a routine task or to prepare an ongoing document. This can include exact copies of official records made for convenience of reference. 4 Transitory records can include:

  • Information in a form used for casual communication.
  • Versions that were not communicated beyond the person who created the document.
  • Copies used for information, reference or convenience only.
  • Annotated drafts where the additional information is found in subsequent versions (except where retention is necessary as evidence of approval or the evolution of the document).
  • Source records used for updating electronic records.
  • Electronic versions of records where a hard copy is maintained in hard copy files.
  • Poor quality photographs which do not contribute to the purpose of the photography. 5

The right of access does not apply to records that are excluded under section 3 of FOIP or where another provision prevails over FOIP under section 23 of FOIP or section 12 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. For more on this see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP”.

The right of access is not absolute. There will be circumstances where information may be legitimately withheld by government institutions. The right of access is subject to limited and specific exemptions that are set out in Part III of FOIP. This includes sections 13 to 22 of FOIP. It also includes the personal information provisions at subsections 29(1), 30(1), and 31(2) in Part IV of FOIP. The exemptions all have specific criteria or tests that need to be met before an exemption may be applied. For more on exemptions see Part III and Part IV of FOIP or the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4, “Exemptions from the Right of Access”.

The reason an applicant wants specific information is not relevant when a government institution processes an access to information request. To require applicants to demonstrate a need for the information would erect a barrier to access. FOIP grants an open-ended or unqualified right of access to public information of which government institutions are only the stewards, 6 unless it is found that the access to information request should be disregarded pursuant to section 45.1 of FOIP. For more on applications to disregard see Section 45.1:

Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests later in this Chapter.

Processing Access to Information Requests

When responding to access to information requests, it is important that a government institution assign responsibilities for the various processing steps.

Government institutions should develop a procedure for processing requests. The procedure should include steps that ensure legislated timelines and other requirements of FOIP are met.

Government institutions should also create and retain documentation on their processing of requests. 7 This becomes important in the event of a review pursuant to section 49 of FOIP or a court appeal pursuant to section 57 of FOIP.

Depending on the request and the type of records requested there may be several steps that need to be taken such as giving notice to third parties. However, the most basic of access to information requests will follow these broad steps:

  1. Receive an access to information request.
  2. Assess if fees are required.
  3. Search and gather responsive records.
  4. Review and prepare the records for disclosure.
  5. Provide a response to the applicant.

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General developed a checklist titled, Help with FOIP – Access Request Checklist. It provides the steps to take when a government institution receives an access to information request. It can be modified to suit the needs of the institution and the circumstances of the access to information request. In addition, see FOIP/LAFOIP Flow Chart.

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General has also developed a resource titled, In the Door, Out the Door: A User’s Guide to Processing Access to Information Requests under FOIP and LAFOIP. It provides guidance on processing access to information requests from the time they are received, to sending the section 7 decision to the applicant.

Name of Applicant is Personal Information

Government institutions should be careful when sharing the name of an applicant who has submitted an access to information request.

When handling an access to information request, the government institution must protect the identity of the applicant, along with the applicant’s contact information that appears on the access to information request. As the name and contact information of the applicant, in most cases, is their personal information pursuant to subsection 24(1) of FOIP, it is subject to the privacy protections in Part IV of FOIP. This includes restrictions on the collection, use and disclosure of that personal information. For more on the obligations on government institutions to protect personal information, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

The data minimization and need-to-know principles should be abided by when deciding who to share the applicant’s personal information with. The key question to ask is, does the person I am sharing this with need to know the identity of the applicant or their contact information to process the request or can it be done without sharing it? If the request can still be processed without sharing it, then it should not be shared. When considering sharing this personal information internally, section 28 of FOIP should be abided by. If considering sharing it externally (e.g., with another government institution), there must be authority to do so under subsection 29(2) of FOIP. For more on these two principles and section 28 and subsection 29(2) of FOIP, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

All applicants are equal under FOIP. The identity of the applicant should not change how the government institution responds to the access to information request (e.g., the applicant is the media so the government institution decides not to release information it generally would release).

IPC Findings

In Investigation Report 278-2017, the Commissioner investigated an alleged breach of privacy involving Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower). The complaint alleged that when the individual sent an access to information request to SaskPower, it then sent a briefing note to the Minister responsible for SaskPower. The briefing note contained details about the access to information request and included the applicant’s first and last name. Upon investigation, the Commissioner found that the name of an applicant was personal information and referred to previous Review Reports LA-2012-002, 156-2017 and 267-2017. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that SaskPower did not appropriately consider the need-to-know and data minimization principles when the applicant’s personal information was disclosed to the Minister. For more on the need-to-know and data minimization principles, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

Reason for Request Not Relevant

The reason an applicant wants specific information is not relevant when processing an access to information request. To require applicants to demonstrate a need for the information would erect a barrier to access. FOIP grants an open-ended or unqualified right of access to public information of which government institutions are only the stewards. 8

Access to information legislation exists to ensure government accountability and to facilitate democracy. Therefore, where an applicant’s motivation is fact finding or to obtain proof of wrongdoing, these purposes cannot be considered unreasonable or illegitimate. Applicants may seek information to assist them in a dispute with a government institution, or to publicize what they consider to be inappropriate or problematic decisions or processes undertaken by a government institution.9

Questions in Access to Information Requests

FOIP does not require government institutions to answer questions that come in an access to information request. 10 For example, access to information requests that ask why the government institution made certain decisions.

FOIP provides access to records and unless answers are in a record, the government institution is not required under FOIP to answer them. However, a government institution does have a duty to answer questions as to whether it has responsive records.11

IPC Findings

In Disregard Decision 130-2021, the Commissioner considered an application to disregard an access to information request from the Rural Municipality of North Qu’Appelle No. 187 (RM). Although the matter involved The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP), the findings also apply to FOIP. While considering the application and the question of whether the applicant’s access to information requests (current and previous) were repetitious, the Commissioner noted that the applicant’s previous access to information requests pose several questions. The applicant had raised that previous access to information requests had not been completed answered or replied to. Furthermore, where the applicant was not satisfied with the answers to the questions, the applicant asked them again in subsequent requests. The Commissioner noted at paragraph [19] of the Decision that LA FOIP does not require an RM to answer questions that come in an access to information request. For example, why the RM made certain decisions. LA FOIP is about gaining access to records. Therefore, the RM was not required under LA FOIP to answer questions by the Applicant. However, the RM did have a duty to answer questions as to whether it had responsive records.

Verifying Identity

Government institutions should verify the identity of an applicant before giving the applicant access to the applicant’s own personal information, especially if the information is sensitive.12 Subsection 31(1)(b) of FOIP also requires that access to one’s own personal information will be provided upon giving sufficient proof of his or her identity.

Authentication is the process of proving or ensuring that someone is who they purport to be. Authentication typically relies on one or more of the following:

  • Something you know (e.g., password, security question, PIN, mother’s maiden name).
  • Something you have (e.g., smart card, key, hardware token).
  • Something you are (e.g., biometric data, such as fingerprints, iris scans, voice patterns).13

In some cases, one of these factors may be used alone to authenticate an individual. For others, combinations may be used.

There are multiple ways to confirm the identity of the applicant. The degree of authentication should be appropriate to the sensitivity of the personal information involved.

Social Insurance Numbers

Government institutions should be careful not to collect information beyond that required to fulfill the purpose to comply with section 25 of FOIP and the data minimization principle.

Identification purposes are not in themselves considered a legitimate basis for requiring an individual to provide a social insurance number. If a social insurance number is being requested for identification purposes only, the government institution must not in any way suggest that the social insurance number is required as a condition for providing records or services. Even where it is reasonable to ask an applicant for proof of identity, a request for a social insurance number must be presented and treated as optional. In verifying identity, a government institution may request the social insurance number as one option among others, but never as a requirement.14

Saskatchewan Health Services Number

Again, government institutions should be careful not to collect information beyond what is required to fulfill the purpose to comply with section 25 of FOIP and the data minimization principle.

Like social insurance numbers above, government institutions should not require an applicant to produce a health services number as a condition of receiving records. Section 11 of The Health Information Protection Act provides that an individual has a right to refuse to produce their health services number to any person, other than to a trustee who is providing a health service, as a condition of receiving a service unless the production is otherwise authorized by an Act or regulation.15

For more on verifying identity, see the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant. See also Subsection 59(e) later in this Chapter.

IPC Findings

In Investigation Report F-2012-001, the Commissioner investigated an alleged breach of privacy involving Saskatchewan Telecommunications (SaskTel). The complaint alleged that SaskTel was over collecting a customer’s personal information as part of its identity verification process. Along with other findings, the Commissioner found that SaskTel did not have authority to collect the complainant’s Saskatchewan Health Services Number. Furthermore, that SaskTel did not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why it needed to collect other unique identifiers over the phone since it could not verify the accuracy of same. The Commissioner recommended that SaskTel conduct a privacy impact assessment, revise its privacy policy and prepare a script to ensure that its customers understand what is optional when providing proof of identity. Furthermore, that SaskTel purge its system of all personal information and personal health information of its customers and third parties collected without the requisite authority within 60 days.

Requests Not on “Form A”

Applicants do not have to submit an access to information request on Form A for it to be considered a request under FOIP. A request need only be in writing and include the elements found on Form A to be a valid request under LA FOIP. Form A includes:

  • First and last name.
  • Name of organization or company (if applicable).
  • Mailing address.
  • Telephone number.
  • Email address.
  • The type of information being requested (personal or general).
  • The government institution the request is being made to.
  • The records being requested.
  • The time period of the request.
  • Signature of the applicant.

The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-26 of The Legislation Act provides that it is not mandatory for an individual to use a prescribed form provided certain criteria are met:

2-26 If an enactment requires the use of a specified form, deviations from the form do not invalidate a form used if:

(a) the deviations do not affect the substance;

(b) the deviations are not likely to mislead; and

(c) the form used is organized in the same way or substantially the same way as the form the use of which is required.16

IPC Findings

In Review Report 150-2018, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services). Social Services was asserting that FOIP did not apply and the access to information requests were not requests under FOIP. As part of the review, the Commissioner considered whether the internal form created by Social Services were still access to information request forms under FOIP. The Commissioner found that by creating a separate form, Social Services had not removed the requests from the scope of FOIP. Regardless of which form was submitted by an applicant (the prescribed Form A or Social Services’ form), FOIP was engaged when the form includes the elements of Form A and is recognized as a request for access to information. By creating its own separate process and form, Social Services was deciding in advance, independently, when FOIP applied and when it did not and was attempting to remove an applicant’s right to have that decision reviewed by the Commissioner. In conclusion, the Commissioner found that all access requests submitted to Social Services on the Child and Family Programs Access to Information Request forms were access requests pursuant to subsection 6(1) of FOIP.

In Review Report 278-2019, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the Resort Village of Candle Lake (RVCL). An applicant sought access to documentation related to a cheque including the invoice for the amount, copy of the cheque, the council resolution and retainer agreement. In the process of handling the request, the applicant made some modifications to the request and added some additional things via emails and letters. The RVCL responded requesting the applicant remit the additions on the prescribed Form A as it would help in clarifying the request in detail. The applicant requested the Commissioner review the RVCL’s decision. The Commissioner found that to qualify as a request under LA FOIP, it is not required that the request be submitted on a prescribed form, provided it has all the required elements found on the prescribed form. RVCL recognized the applicant’s email requesting records as a request under LA FOIP when it advised the applicant it would be processed in that manner. Furthermore, if RVCL did not intend to process the emailed request as a request under LA FOIP, it should not have requested and accepted the applicant’s $20 application fee.

Search for Records

Subsection 5.1(1) of FOIP requires a government institution to respond to an applicant’s access to information request openly, accurately and completely. This means that government institutions should make reasonable effort to not only identify and seek out records responsive to an applicant’s access to information request, but to explain the steps in the process. The threshold that must be met is one of “reasonableness”. In other words, it is not a standard of perfection, but rather what a fair and rational person would expect to be done or consider acceptable.17

reasonable search is one in which an employee, experienced in the subject matter, expends a reasonable effort to locate records which are reasonably related to the request. A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person searching areas where records are likely to be stored. What is reasonable depends on the request and related circumstances. 18

It is not reasonable for a government institution to rely on an employee’s opinion that no records exist when deciding not to search. A government institution should not rely on anyone’s memory as to whether records were created. It cannot know in advance of doing a search whether an individual will be right about whether records were created. All an individual can say, with any reasonable certainty, is whether he or she personally created any records. Otherwise, the individual is merely expressing an opinion as to the likelihood of whether anyone else created records.

A government institution cannot absolve itself of its duty to search based on an individual’s opinion about whether records were created. If a government institution could forego its duty to search based on such an opinion, the Act would be frustrated.19

IPC Review of Search Efforts

Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides that applicants can request a review by the Commissioner if they are not satisfied with the decision of the government institution pursuant to sections 7, 12 or 37.

The matter of search efforts is covered in subsection 7(2)(e) of FOIP. Subsection 7(2)(e) of FOIP provides that a government institution can respond to an applicant’s access to information request indicating that access is denied because records do not exist.

Applicants must establish the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a government institution is withholding a record or has not undertaken an adequate search for a record. Sometimes this can take the form of having possession of or having previously seen a document that was not included with other responsive records or media reports regarding the record. The applicant is expected to provide something more than a mere assertion that a document should exist.20

A review by the Commissioner of a government institution’s search efforts can occur in one or both of the following situations:

  1. The government institution issued a section 7 decision letter indicating records do not exist.
  2. The applicant believes there are more records than what the government institution provided.

The focus of an IPC search review is whether the government institution conducted a reasonable search. As noted above, a reasonable search is one in which an employee, experienced in the subject matter, expends a reasonable effort to locate records which are reasonably related to the request. A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person searching areas where records are likely to be stored. What is reasonable depends on the request and related circumstances. 21

It is difficult to prove a negative, therefore FOIP does not require a government institution to prove with absolute certainty that records do not exist. 22

When a government institution receives a notice of a review from the IPC requesting details of its search efforts, some or all of the following can be included in the government institutions’ submission (not exhaustive):

  • For personal information requests – explain how the individual is involved with the government institution (i.e., client, employee, former employee etc.) and why certain departments/divisions/branches were included in the search.
  • For general requests – tie the subject matter of the request to the departments/divisions/branches included in the search. In other words, explain why certain areas were searched and not others.
  • Identify the employee(s) involved in the search and explain how the employee(s) is experienced in the subject matter.
  • Explain how the records management system is organized (both paper & electronic) in the departments/divisions/branches included in the search.
  • Describe how records are classified within the records management system. For example, are the records classified by:
    • Alphabet
    • Year
    • Function
    • Subject
  • Consider providing a copy of your organization’s record schedule and screen shots of the electronic directory (folders & subfolders).
  • If the record has been destroyed, provide copies of record schedules and/or destruction certificates.
  • Explain how you have considered records stored off-site.
  • Explain how records that may be in the possession of a third party but in the government institution’s control have been searched such as a contractor or information management service provider.
  • Explain how a search of mobile electronic devices was conducted (i.e., laptops, smart phones, cell phones, tablets).
  • Explain which folders within the records management system were searched and how these folders link back to the subject matter requested. For electronic folders – indicate what key terms were used to search if applicable.
  • Indicate the calendar dates each employee searched.
  • Indicate how long the search took for each employee.
  • Indicate what the results were for each employee’s search.
  • Consider having the employee that is searching provide an affidavit to support the position that no record exists or to support the details provided. For more on this, see Using Affidavits in a Review with the IPC.

The above list is meant to be a guide. Each case will require different search strategies and details depending on the records requested.

Providing the above details eliminates any apprehension of bias and bolsters the government institution’s ability to show that a reasonable search was conducted. However, it is possible to have conducted a reasonable search without locating the record that was the basis for the allegation in the first place. Reasonableness is the standard and the efforts undertaken must be documented in the event the government institution’s search efforts are called into question in a review by the Commissioner. The government institution must be able to show it has fulfilled its obligations under FOIP.23

Records management issues discovered in the process of conducting a search for records should be addressed as soon as possible as inadequate records management practices will not be accepted as a reasonable explanation for failure to locate responsive records. 24 For more on records management, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

‌IPC Findings

In Review Report 110-2017, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety (LRWS) conducted a reasonable search for records from the applicant’s case file. The applicant had requested a copy of his file from 2000/2001. The applicant believed that records were missing from the copy he received from LRWS. The applicant identified four records he believed were missing. Upon review of LRWS’ search efforts, the Commissioner found that LRWS had demonstrated that its search for records was reasonable and adequate for purposes of FOIP. Furthermore, it persuaded the Commissioner in its attempts to explain why the four records did not exist. This finding was based partly on the fact that the applicant’s claim that records existed was based on speculation and conclusions drawn from snippets of information in the copy of the file the applicant had received.

In Review Report 344-2017, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Immigration and Career Training conducted a reasonable search for records. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Immigration and Career Training had not demonstrated that its search for records was adequate for purposes of FOIP. This finding was partly due to a lack of details provided regarding search efforts. The Commissioner recommended that the Ministry of Immigration and Career Training conduct a more fulsome search for responsive records.

In Review Report 016-2014, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Education conducted a reasonable search for records. The records the applicant asserted were missing were correspondence between the applicant and the Deputy Minister. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Education demonstrated that its search for records was reasonable and adequate for purposes of FOIP.

In Review Report 101-2014, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Justice (Corrections & Policing) had conducted a reasonable search for records. The applicant had requested a copy of a complaint that had been directed to the Regina Leader Post (Leader Post). In its submission, Corrections & Policing had explained that the applicant was seeking a letter written in 1995 to the Leader Post by a former Chief Provincial Firearms Officer in relation to an article about the applicant printed in the Leader Post by another individual. Corrections & Policing detailed the steps it took in its search to locate the letter from 1995. The Commissioner found that the search conducted by Corrections & Policing was reasonable.

Searching Records of Employees

There are two separate issues that come into play when it comes to searching records held by employees. These issues mainly come into play with electronic records, but the same considerations apply for paper records:

  1. Government records in personal accounts: Records may exist in an employee’s personal email account or record holdings because the employee conducted government-related business using a personal email account or from a remote location and the paper records are at the employee’s personal residence or other non-government location or device. These are not personal records of the employee (see Government Records in Personal Email Accounts below).
  2. Personal records in government accounts: The access to information request involves the personal records (either electronic or paper) of the employee because of the nature of the request. Depending on the request, these may be the personal records of employees and privacy matters could come into play (see Personal Records in Government Accounts below).

Government Records in Personal Email Accounts

Email is an easy and accessible form of communication and a tool that we all use in our professional and personal lives. However, for government-related activities, personal email accounts should not be used.

If a government employee uses a personal device and/or personal account (such as a personal email account) to conduct government related activities, the Commissioner has taken the position that such records are still subject to FOIP.25 In such situations, the government institution should be searching those email accounts or personal devices for responsive records in addition to regular records holdings.

There are both access and privacy issues that arise when government-related activities are conducted using personal email accounts. FOIP provides individuals with the right to access records in the possession or under the control of a government institution, subject to limited and specific exemptions. Storing government records in personal email accounts, threatens the right of access to records that FOIP provides as searches for records responsive to an access to information request are not generally done of government officials’ personal email accounts. There is also a risk that important records that reflect decision-making by government are not preserved as required by law.

The Archives and Public Records Management Act (APRM Act) defines a “public record” as follows:

2 In this Act:

“public record” means:

(a) a record made or received by a government institution in carrying out that government institution’s activities;

(b) a ministerial record;

c) a record made or received by the Legislative Assembly, the Legislative Assembly Service or an Officer of the Legislative Assembly;

(d) a court record; or

(e) an administrative record of a court; but does not include a prescribed record;

The Archives and Public Records Management Regulations further defines a public record as follows:

3(2) For the purposes of the definition of “public record” in section 2 of the Act and in these regulations, a prescribed record includes the following records:

(a) an exact duplicate or surplus copy of an official record if:

(i) nothing has been added to, changed in or deleted from the information set out in the official record; and

(ii) the official record has been captured and maintained, in accordance with policies of the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan, by the court, government institution, minister of the Government of Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Assembly Service or Officer of the Legislative Assembly who or that is responsible for the record;

(b) a record of a temporary or limited usefulness, as determined in accordance with policies of the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan, that is not necessary to sustain administrative or operational functions of the court, government institution, minister of the Government of Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Assembly Service or Officer of the Legislative Assembly who or that is responsible for the record.

Public records need to be retained, destroyed or transferred to the Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan as per the APRM Act. Using personal email for government-related activities runs contrary to this requirement as the records reside elsewhere. Government should be taking steps to ensure that it is consistently preserving records in the name of good governance as well as for the responsible preservation of documents that could be subject to future access to information requests.26

Overall, such practices undermine the transparency and accountability of government that is the foundation of access and privacy legislation. FOIP requires a government institution to respond to a written access to information request openly, accurately and completely (s.5.1(1) of FOIP). The use of personal email accounts by public servants makes this duty difficult to comply with because government may not be aware of the existence of records on personal email accounts that are responsive to an access to information request.

In addition to access to information concerns, there are also privacy concerns with housing government records in personal email accounts. Many public servants (or elected officials) are unclear how to protect government records in such environments. Email is not confidential by default and in some situations, records are stored outside Canada. See the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy” at Personal Email Use for Business for more on this.

For more on this topic, see also IPC resource, Best Practices for Managing the Use of Personal Email Accounts, Text Messaging and Other Instant Messaging Tools.

‌Conflict of Interest

An employee with personal or special interest in whether records are disclosed should not be the person who decides the issue of disclosure when the records are held in the employee’s personal email account.27 When an employee is asked to search their own records to identify and provide copies of responsive records which they may not be reflected in the best light, there is an inherent conflict of interest and very human urge to expunge or attempt to hide embarrassing records. In all cases where there is a real or apparent conflict of interest in having an employee search their own records and supply responsive records, the searches should be conducted by the FOIP Coordinator or Privacy Officer.28

When determining whether there is a conflict of interest in having the employee search their own personal accounts, consider the following:

(a) Does the decision-maker (or employee) have a personal or special interest in the records.

(b) Would a well-informed person, considering all the circumstances, reasonably perceive a conflict of interest on the part of the decision-maker.29

IPC Finding

In Review Report 184-2016, the Commissioner addressed the issue of Global Transportation Hub (GTH) board members using personal email addresses to conduct government related activities. Board members received sensitive government documents at personal email addresses. The Commissioner recommended GTH board members use the Government of Saskatchewan email system for government-related activities.

In Review Report 051-2017, the Commissioner addressed the issue of the former Premier using a personal email account and a “saskparty.com” email account for government business. The Commissioner encouraged government leaders and public servants to use the Government of Saskatchewan email system to do government-related activities.

In Investigation Report 101-2017, the Commissioner investigated a complaint by an individual that alleged the Minister of the former Saskatchewan Transportation Company responded to the complainant using a personal/business email account. The Commissioner confirmed the alleged complaint and offered best practice advice with regards to the use of personal email for government-related activities.

In Review Report 216-2017, the Commissioner again raised concerns when it was learned that public servants with the Ministry of Economy (Economy) were using personal email accounts to conduct government-related activities. The Commissioner recommended that Economy prohibit its employees from using their personal email addresses for government-related activities and require them to use government-issued email accounts only.

In Investigation Report 262-2017, the Commissioner investigated a complaint involving the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services). CBC news articles reported concerns about the use of private email accounts for government business by Social Services. The Commissioner found that Social Services was using back-up tapes for the purposes of archiving official records which was not in compliance with The Archives and Public Records Management Act (APRMA)The Commissioner recommended that Social Services continue to work with Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan to develop an institution wide records retention schedule to be compliant with APRMA and to ensure records are accessible for purposes of FOIP.

Personal Records in Government Email Accounts

There are occasions when applicants request access to records that engage the personal records of an employee of the government institution.

When a government employee uses their workplace email address to send and receive personal emails completely unrelated to their work, are those emails subject to FOIP?

It can be confidently predicted that any government employee who works in an office setting will have stored, somewhere in that office, documents that have nothing whatsoever to do with their job, but which are purely personal in nature. Such documents can range from the most intimately personal documents (such as medical records) to the most mundane (such as a list of household chores). It cannot be suggested that employees of an institution governed by FOIP are themselves subject to that legislation in respect of any piece of personal material they happen to have in their offices at any given time. That would clearly not be contemplated as being within the intent and purpose of FOIP.30

While the expectation of privacy may be somewhat circumscribed, there is still both a right to and a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to certain personal information contained on or in government owned equipment and accounts.31

Incidental personal use of government email accounts is generally anticipated. However, the government retains the right to monitor its information technology systems, which includes email. This is essential for security breaches, monitoring compliance with policies and network management.

Computers that are reasonably used for personal purposes – whether found in the workplace or the home – contain information that is meaningful, intimate and touching on the user’s biographical core. Canadians may therefore reasonably expect privacy in the information contained on these computers, at least where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected. Ownership of property is a relevant consideration but is not determinative.32

Workplace policies are also not determinative of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Whatever the policies state, one must consider the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether privacy is a reasonable expectation in the particular situation. While workplace policies and practices may diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy on a work computer, these sorts of operational realities do not in themselves remove the expectation entirely. A reasonable though diminished expectation of privacy is nonetheless a reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, it is subject to state intrusion only under the authority of a reasonable law.33

The purpose and intent of the legislation is also an important consideration.34 Would including personal and private communications of employees unrelated to government business do anything to advance the purposes of the legislation? Alternatively, would interpreting the language of the Act as not applying , interfere with a citizen’s right to fully participate in democracy?

There have been a number of cases where the Commissioner has determined that the personal records of employees were not in the possession or control of a government institution or local authority (see IPC Findings at the end of this section). In each case, the starting point was for the government institution or local authority to successfully demonstrate for the Commissioner that the records were indeed the personal records of the employee. Second, the government institution or local authority presented its case on why it did not have possession or control of the records.

For best practices for how to manage personal emails in government email accounts, see IPC resource, Best Practices for the Management of Non-Work Related Personal Emails in Work-Issued Email Accounts.

‌Conflict of Interest

If a government employee uses a personal device and/or personal account (such as personal email account) to conduct government-related activities, the Commissioner has taken the position that such records are still subject to FOIP.35 In such situations, the government institution should be searching those email accounts for responsive records in addition to regular records holdings.

An employee with personal or special interest in whether records are disclosed should not be the person who decides the issue of disclosure.36

When an employee is asked to search their own records to identify and provide copies of responsive records which they may not be reflected in the best light, there is an inherent conflict of interest and very human urge to expunge or attempt to hide embarrassing records. In all cases where there is a real or apparent conflict of interest in having an employee search their own records and supply responsive records, the searches should be conducted by the FOIP Coordinator or Access Coordinator.37

It is important to determine if a conflict of interest may exist. Consider the following:

(a) Does the decision-maker have a personal or special interest in the records.

(b) Would a well-informed person, considering all the circumstances, reasonably perceive a conflict of interest on the part of the decision-maker.38

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2014-007, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access by the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice). An applicant sought all records containing the name of an individual written, processed or possessed by a specific government employee. Justice responded indicating it did not have any responsive records. The applicant requested the Commissioner review Justice’s decision. In its submission to the Commissioner, Justice asserted that any responsive records were the personal records of the government employee which it described as emails. Furthermore, Justice asserted that it did not have possession or control of the records. Upon review, the Commissioner determined that the applicant was a family member of the government employee. Furthermore, that there was a family feud occurring. The Commissioner found that the emails responsive to the access to information request were not related in any way to the government employee’s work functions or government business. The records were personal emails sent and received using the employee’s government assigned email address. After considering 15 factors39, the Commissioner found that Justice did not have possession or control of the records.

In Review Report 023-2020, 027-2020 Part I, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice). An applicant sought records related to an automobile accident for which a Justice employee’s daughter was involved. A search for records indicated one responsive record which Justice withheld pursuant to section 22 of FOIP. In addition, Justice indicated that other responsive records were not in Justice’s possession or control. The applicant sought a review of this decision by the Commissioner. In its submission to the Commissioner, Justice asserted that the employee, whose daughter was involved in the accident, was asked to search their government email account for responsive records. The employee reported finding responsive records but asserted the records were not work related but rather personal and private. Justice accepted this response and provided the Commissioner with a sworn affidavit from the employee asserting same. The applicant raised concerns with the Commissioner that charges related to the accident were withdrawn at Traffic Safety Court by the Prosecutor and the applicant questioned whether the connection the other driver had to Justice played a factor in that. The Commissioner considered whether there was a conflict of interest for the employee and whether it was appropriate for the employee to search their own records. The Commissioner found that the employee had a personal and special interest in the matter and should not have conducted their own search for records. The Commissioner recommended an official at Justice be designated to do the search of the employee’s emails and determine whether any of those emails were responsive to the access to information request.

In Review Report 007-2019, the Commissioner considered a denial of access involving the former Ministry of Central Services (Central Services). An applicant sought access to personal emails that they had sent and received from their government email account from 2004 to the date their employment ended. The applicant requested emails from specified senders, emails related to specific topics, and listed a number of personal email folders. Central Services denied access asserting that any records related to the request were not subject to FOIP and not in the possession or control of Central Services. The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the former employee’s personal emails were not in the possession or control of Central Services. The Commissioner recommended that Central Services develop a policy or procedure to ensure access to information requests seeking emails from email backups are transferred to the appropriate government institution that may have the emails, if they still exist.

In Review Report 096-2015 and 097-2015, the Commissioner considered a denial of access involving the former Saskatchewan Transportation Company (STC). Two applicants sought access to emails sent or received by an STC employee that included any variation of the applicants’ names. STC provided access to some records and denied access to others stating that the remainder of the records were private records that were outside the scope of FOIP and not in the possession or control of STC. Both applicants requested a review by the Commissioner. After considering 15 factors40, the Commissioner determined that STC did not have possession or control of the records. The emails were the personal records of the STC employee and were not created as part of their employment duties.

Records Not Responsive

When a government institution receives an access to information request, it must determine what information is responsive to the access request.

Responsive means relevant. The term describes anything that is reasonably related to the request. It follows that any information or records that do not reasonably relate to an applicant’s request will be considered “not responsive”.

Subsection 5.1(1) of FOIP requires government institutions to respond to applicants openly, accurately and completely. If a government institution removes information from a responsive document because it has been deemed not responsive, it should advise the applicant in its section 7 response and explain why.41

Government institutions are not obligated to create records that do not exist. In Review Report 313-2016, the Commissioner said that a government institution’s duty to assist does not include an obligation to create records which do not exist at the time the access to information request was made. However, if a government institution has records containing the raw information that is sought by an applicant that can be produced, then those records would be responsive to the applicant’s access request. 42

Where information being sought can be produced from a government institution’s existing computer software by means of technical expertise normally used by it, it will constitute a record under subsection 2(1)(i) of FOIP. 43

Avoid breaking up the flow of information (i.e., do not remove information as not responsive within sentences or paragraphs). Providing an applicant with a complete copy of a record subject only to limited and specific exemptions, even if this means providing what the government institution views as not responsive information is entirely consistent with the purposes of FOIP. 44

When determining what information is responsive, consider the following:

  • The request itself sets out the boundaries of relevancy and circumscribes the records or information that will ultimately be identified as being responsive.
  • A government institution can remove information as not responsive only if the applicant has requested specific information, such as the applicant’s own personal information.
  • The government institution may treat portions of a record as not responsive if they are clearly separate and distinct and entirely unrelated to the access request. However, use it sparingly and only where necessary.
  • If it is just as easy to release the information as it is to claim not responsive, the information should be released (i.e., releasing the information will not involve time consuming consultations nor considerable time weighing discretionary exemptions).
  • The purpose of FOIP is best served when a government institution adopts a liberal interpretation of a request. If it is unclear what the applicant wants, a government institution should contact the applicant for clarification. Generally, ambiguity in the request should be resolved in the applicant’s favour.45

IPC Findings

In Review Report 016-2014, the Commissioner considered whether information removed from a record by the Ministry of Education was responsive to the applicant’s access to information request. The applicant had requested any record held by several Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers and a specific unit within the Ministry of Education that mentioned the applicant’s name between January 2013 and December 2013. The Commissioner found that some of the information deemed not responsive by the Ministry of Education was indeed responsive. Furthermore, the Commissioner also found that some information deemed not responsive was appropriately removed, as the applicant’s access to information request was very specific. The Commissioner recommended that the information found to be responsive be released to the applicant.

In Review Report 187-2015, the Commissioner considered whether information removed from records by Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) was responsive to the applicant’s access to information request. The applicant had requested copies of all records regarding his insurance claim files. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the information removed related to the applicant’s claim files. Therefore, the Commissioner found that the information deemed as not responsive by SGI, was indeed responsive.

In Review Reports 061-2017 and 023-2017 & 078-2017, the Commissioner considered the Ministry of Economy (Economy) and the Saskatchewan Power Corporation’s (SaskPower) claims that records or information were not responsive to the applicant’s access to information requests. In both reviews, the Commissioner found that Economy and SaskPower did not indicate in its section 7 response to the applicants that it was severing or withholding information deemed non-responsive. The Commissioner recommended that Economy and SaskPower revise policy and procedures so that its section 7 letters indicate when records are being withheld as non-responsive or information is being severed from a record as non-responsive and give reasons why.

Creating Records

Government institutions are not obligated to create records which do not exist.

A government institution’s “duty to assist” (section 5.1 of FOIP) does not include an obligation to create records which do not exist at the time the access to information request is made. However, if a government institution has records containing the raw information that is sought by an applicant that can be produced, then those records would be responsive to the applicant’s access request.46

FOIP does not require a government institution to create records in response to an access to information request. However, if the information requested is contained within a database the information must be provided consistent with subsection 10(2) of FOIP. For more on subsection 10(2) of FOIP see Section 10: Manner of Access, later in this Chapter.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 313-2016, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the Ministry of Economy (Economy). An applicant sought access to how many Saskatchewan Immigration Nominee Program (SINP) applications were represented by various parties (e.g., lawyer, family member, employer etc.) between October 11, 2013 and October 31, 2016. Economy responded to the applicant indicating records did not exist. The applicant requested the Commissioner review Economy’s decision. In its submission to the Commissioner, Economy asserted that the SINP does not create records with the type of information the applicant was seeking and that it was not possible to create a record that broke down the individual applicants by the criteria sought without double counting. Economy provided additional explanation as to why the records did not exist in the format sought by the applicant. The Commissioner found that Economy had demonstrated that it did not have the records responsive to the applicant’s request. During the review, the Commissioner also considered the issue of whether Economy was obligated to create a record for the applicant. The Commissioner found that some jurisdictions, such as Alberta, have provisions within the requisite FOIP Act requiring a public body to create a record (e.g., subsection 10(2) of Alberta’s FOIP Act). However, Saskatchewan’s FOIP does not have a similar obligation. The Commissioner found that in general, the duty to assist does not include an obligation to create records that do not exist at the time of the access to information request. However, if the government institution (or local authority) has records containing the raw information that is sought that can be produced, then those records would be responsive to an applicant’s request.

In Review Report 038-2018, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access involving the University of Regina (U of R). An applicant sought access to all external research funding (both private and public) to the U of R. The U of R ran a query on its database that contained information about research grants and contracts and created a spreadsheet for the applicant. However, the applicant responded by requesting the U of R add the search term “petroleum” to its search on the database. The applicant was willing to pay a fee for the request. The U of R severed portions of the spreadsheet. The applicant requested the Commissioner review the U of R’s decisions in the matter. In its submission to the Commissioner, the U of R asserted that the applicant was requesting access to information and not records. Upon review, the Commissioner confirmed that local authorities did not have to create records that did not exist.

Section 5.1: Duty to Assist

Duty of government institution to assist

5.1 (1) Subject to this Act and the regulations, a government institution shall respond to a written request for access openly, accurately and completely.

(2) On the request of an applicant, the government institution shall:

(a) provide an explanation of any term, code or abbreviation used in the information; or

(b) if the government institution is unable to provide an explanation in accordance with clause (a), endeavor to refer the applicant to a government institution that is able to provide an explanation.

Subsection 5.1(1)

Duty of government institution to assist

5.1 (1) Subject to this Act and the regulations, a government institution shall respond to a written request for access openly, accurately and completely.

Subsection 5.1(1) of FOIP requires a government institution to respond to an applicant’s written access to information request openly, accurately and completely. This means that government institutions should make reasonable effort to not only identify and seek out records responsive to an applicant’s access to information request, but to explain the steps in the process and seek any necessary clarification on the nature or scope of the request within the legislated timeframe. 47

Government institutions are not obligated to create records that do not exist. In Review Report 313-2016, the Commissioner said that a government institution’s duty to assist does not include an obligation to create records that do not currently exist. However, if a government institution has records containing the raw information that is sought by an applicant that can be produced, then those records would be responsive to the applicant’s access request. 48

It is not necessary for a government institution to put records in any specific order (e.g., chronological order) unless negotiated with an applicant beforehand. The only exception to the order of the records would be the attachments to emails. If a government institution is going to leave duplicate attachments out of the record, or re-order the record, it is best practice to provide an explanation to the applicant when it provides the record. This is part of the duty to assist. 49

Where information being sought can be produced from a government institution’s existing computer software by means of technical expertise normally used by it, it will constitute a record under subsection 2(1)(i) of FOIP. 50

Though FOIP requires the government institution to respond openly, accurately and completely, the duty to assist also involves making every reasonable effort to assist without delay. This should occur pre and post receipt of any access to information request. 51

Reasonable effort is what a fair and rational person would expect to be done or would find acceptable and helpful in the circumstances. 52

Open means to be honest, forthcoming and transparent. Where a decision is made to not provide an applicant with all or part of a record, a government institution should provide reasons for the refusal in an upfront and informative manner. Being open would also include explaining to an applicant other things such as how and why a decision was made, how responsive records were searched for, any additional information necessary to explain something found in the record that is believed to be confusing; how a fee is calculated and creating a record when appropriate. 53

Accurate means careful; precise; lacking errors. 54 Furthermore, it means the government institution must provide the applicant with sufficient and correct information about the access process and how decisions are made. This includes understanding what the applicant is actually looking for including:

  • Clarifying the nature of the access to information request.
  • Understanding the nature of the records.
  • Searching for the record to make sure that all possible responsive documents have been located.
  • Preparing an Index of Records if this would make the government institution’s response more accurate.
  • Reviewing the records line-by-line before a decision is made with respect to what, if any, exemptions apply. 55

Complete means having all its parts; entire; finished; including every item or element; without omissions or deficiencies; not lacking in any element or particular. 56 Furthermore, it means the information from a government institution must be comprehensive and not leave any gaps in its response to an applicant’s access to information request. A government institution should provide all the necessary details to enable an applicant to understand how a decision was reached. This will include explaining:

  • Search procedures when no records are found, or records have been destroyed.
  • What, if any, exemptions have been applied.
  • The reason an exemption has been applied particularly when the exemption is discretionary.
  • What factors were relied upon in exercising discretion to withhold a record or part of a record.
  • Informing an applicant about the outcome of an access process.
  • The right to request a review by the Commissioner. 57

How a government institution fulfills its duty to assist will vary according to the circumstances of each request and requires the exercise of judgment. The most important aspects of the duty to assist are likely to arise in the course of:

  • Providing the information necessary for an applicant to exercise his or her rights under FOIP.
  • Clarifying the request, if necessary.
  • Performing an adequate search for records.
  • Responding to the applicant. 58

When an individual first contacts a government institution, reasonable efforts to assist could include the following:

  • Make sure the individual is redirected to the ‘right person’ (i.e., FOIP Coordinator).
  • Discuss whether the request can be accommodated outside the formal process:
    • Can this information be routinely released.
    • Have the records sought been released previously through an earlier access to information request.
    • Does the applicant only want an answer to a question and not access to records.
    • Is there another Act or administrative process that provides a right of access.
    • Is the information being sought available publicly online or in a government publication. If it is, direct the applicant where to look.
  • Would another government institution be better able to assist the applicant. If so, the request may be transferred in certain cases.
  • Provide information about records in the government institution’s possession or control.
  • Provide copies of the prescribed form or accept written requests that contain all the necessary elements.
  • Explain the access to information processes to the applicant including:
    • That the applicant’s identity will only be shared on a need-to-know basis.
    • Any pertinent timeframes.
    • What is required if identity needs to be authenticated.
    • What is required if a fee waiver is requested.
    • If and why consent is required in certain circumstances.
    • Methods of access to records (i.e., view or receive a copy).
    • Any fees estimated.
    • Extensions.
    • The right to request a review by the Commissioner’s office if dissatisfied. 59

For further guidance on the duty to assist, see IPC resource, Understanding the Duty to Assist: A Guide for Public Bodies.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 301-2017, 302-2017, 303-2017, 304-2017, 003-2018, the Commissioner found that several ministries involved in the review did not meet their duty to assist the applicant. The applicant had requested copies of all Deputy Ministers’ emails received or sent to specific Saskatchewan Party email addresses. The applicant received identical responses from each ministry asking the applicant if he would be willing to alter or narrow his request pursuant to subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP. Upon review, each ministry reconsidered its application of subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP and began searching for records. The Commissioner found that the applicant’s request contained sufficient information to process the request. As such, subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP was not appropriately applied. The Commissioner considered how the ministries handled the applicant’s request and concluded that the ministries did not meet their duty to assist the applicant. The Commissioner recommended the ministries implement a practice for processing access to information requests. In the Report, the Commissioner referred to best practices outlined in the Nova Scotia Information and Privacy Commissioner Review Report 16-05.

Subsection 5.1(2)

Duty of government institution to assist

5.1 (2) On the request of an applicant, the government institution shall:

(a) provide an explanation of any term, code or abbreviation used in the information; or

(b) if the government institution is unable to provide an explanation in accordance with clause (a), endeavor to refer the applicant to a government institution that is able to provide an explanation.

Subsection 5.1(2) of FOIP provides that a government institution will assist applicants when they:

(a) need explanation of a term, code, or abbreviation; or

(b) if the government institution is unable to explain it, refer the applicant to a government institution that can.

In addition to providing the record, if an applicant requires assistance with understanding a term, code or abbreviation, the government institution should assist the applicant.

‌Section 6: Application

Application

6(1) An applicant shall:

(a) make the application in the prescribed form to the government institution in which the record containing the information is kept; and

(b) specify the subject matter of the record requested with sufficient particularity as to time, place and event to enable an individual familiar with the subject-matter to identify the record.

(2) Subject to subsection (4) and subsection 11(3), an application is deemed to be made when the application is received by the government institution to which it is directed.

(3) Where the head is unable to identify the record requested, the head shall advise the applicant, and shall invite the applicant to supply additional details that might lead to identification of the record.

(4) Where additional details are invited to be supplied pursuant to subsection (3), the application is deemed to be made when the record is identified.

For the legislation to work, both government institutions and applicants must follow what FOIP requires. Section 6 of FOIP provides direction for applicants who wish to make an access to information request to a government institution. The access to information request should be prepared in a way that enables the government institution to provide access to what has been requested.

Subsection 6(1)(a)

Application

6(1) An applicant shall:

(a) make the application in the prescribed form to the government institution in which the record containing the information is kept; and

An access to information request can be made on the prescribed form called “Form A”. It is located at Part II of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

Access requests do not have to be made on Form A. An access request can be in the form of an email, but must include all the elements listed on Form A.60

In determining whether applicants can deviate from using Form A, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. It defines words commonly used in legislation. Section 2-26 provides:

Deviations from required form

2-26 If an enactment requires the use of a specified form, deviations from the form do not invalidate a form used if:

(a) the deviations do not affect the substance;

(b) the deviations are not likely to mislead; and

(c) the form used is organized in the same way or substantially the same way as the form the use of which is required. 61

Section 2-26 of The Legislation Act provides that it is not mandatory for an individual to use a prescribed form (e.g., Form A) to make an application for access to information. 62

If a government institution receives a verbal request for access to information and there are no issues with releasing the information, the government institution can provide it without requiring a formal access request. However, applicants should be advised that only requests made in writing could be reviewed by the Commissioner.

Where a government institution knows a document does not contain sensitive information and it would be of interest to residents, a proactive approach to disclosure is best. 63 For more on proactive disclosure, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP” at Routine Disclosure & Active Dissemination and Section 65.1: Records Available Without an Application later in this Chapter.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 336-2017, the Commissioner addressed concerns raised by the Chinook School Division No. 211 regarding an applicant not using the prescribed access to information form (Form A). The Commissioner was of the view that it is not mandatory for applicants to use the prescribed form, provided the request is in writing and contains the information that pertains to the elements on Form A. Furthermore, if the School Division required any additional information, it should have advised the applicant at the time the access request was received. The Commissioner recommended that the School Division develop and implement a policy or procedure for the processing of access requests. 64

Subsection 6(1)(b)

Application

6(1) An applicant shall:

(b) specify the subject matter of the record requested with sufficient particularity as to time, place and event to enable an individual familiar with the subject-matter to identify the record.

While an applicant does not have a statutory duty to assist a government institution with responding to their access to information request under FOIP. However, the applicant should make a reasonable effort to assist the government institution so it can respond accurately and completely to the access to information request. Open communication between an applicant and a government institution is recommended, particularly when an access to information request is all-encompassing or unclear. 65

Subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP is intended to ensure that applicants provide enough detail to make it possible for the government institution to identify the record being requested. Applicants must be clear and provide parameters (i.e., timeframe, place, and event).

Sufficient particularity means stating precisely what is being sought. Applicants should provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the government institution, with reasonable effort, to identify the records sought.66

Specific and precise access requests enable government institutions to respond more quickly and cost-effectively. This avoids the delay often entailed when all-encompassing or imprecise access requests are made. Applicants, therefore, have an incentive to cooperate with government institutions by, whenever reasonably possible, making clear, specific and not unnecessarily broad access requests.67

Where the head cannot identify a record because it lacks sufficient particularity, the applicant will be asked to provide more detail. However, this provision is not intended to require applicants to “narrow” their requests. See below for more on clarifying versus narrowing.

If an applicant wishes to maintain a broad request, it is an applicant’s right to do so. However, applicants should be aware that a broad access request may involve fees. Narrowing a request, therefore, may result in a smaller fee. For more on fees, see Section 9: Fee, later in this Chapter.

Government institutions should adopt a liberal interpretation of a request, in order to best serve the purpose and spirit of FOIP. Generally, ambiguity in the request should be resolved in the applicant’s favour. To be considered responsive to the request, records must “reasonably relate” to the request.68

Clarifying vs Narrowing

Clarifying versus narrowing mean very different things. The Commissioner has addressed this in more than one Report where it was found that a government institution or local authority, relying on subsections 6(1)(b) or 6(3) of FOIP or The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, had attempted to force applicants to narrow a request which is not an appropriate application of these subsections.

To clarify is to remove complexity, ambiguity or obscurity from; to make clear or plain; remove ignorance, misconception or error from.69

To narrow is to become narrower, decrease in width or breadth; diminish, lessen, contract.70

Government institutions are not authorized under FOIP to require an applicant to “narrow” an access to information request. If a request is clear but is voluminous and requires a lot of work to search and gather records, the government institution should issue a fee estimate pursuant to section 9 of FOIP. Once issued, the government institution should make efforts to work with the applicant to reduce the fee by narrowing the access to information request. However, if an applicant chooses not to narrow and prefers to pay the fee, the government institution should process the request. Narrowing should not be confused with clarifying an access to information request. Section 6 of FOIP does not contemplate “narrowing” but rather “clarifying”.

Subsections 6(1)(b) and 6(3) of FOIP address situations where a government institution cannot determine what the applicant is seeking. Subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP requires an applicant to provide “sufficient particularity” as to time, place and event to enable an individual familiar with the subject-matter to identify the record.

Sufficient particularity means stating precisely what is being sought. Applicants should provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the government institution, with reasonable effort, to identify the records sought.71

The requirement of FOIP on both applicants and government institutions in combination with the purposes of the Act demonstrate an intention on the part of the Legislature that an individual’s access to information request will be processed by the government institution in a fair, reasonable, open and flexible manner. Requiring an applicant to narrow an access to information request because it is too much work or too expensive to process, is not authorized under FOIP.

In terms of “clarification” of an access to information request, many applicants are unfamiliar with an organization and its administrative practices. They may not be aware of the process by which a government institution reaches or implements a decision or policy, the kind of records that may be generated, or the process of disposing of records. As a result, their access to information requests may be unclear and they would be unsure how to articulate what they are looking for. Therefore, clarification of a request may involve assisting an applicant in defining the subject of the request, the specific kinds of records of interest and the time period for which records are being requested.72

Government institutions have a duty to engage in the clarification process up to the point when a fee estimate is provided. However, a government institution has no obligation [or authority] to require clarification of a request that is, on its face, very clear.73

In terms of “narrowing” of an access to information request, it is important to discuss with an applicant any request that involves a large amount of information or is estimated to require a large amount of search time. The objective of narrowing a large request is to reduce fees for the applicant and for the provision of better service, in terms of both time and results. However, applicants are not required to narrow a request and refusing to narrow a broad request would generally not be considered an abuse of the right of access.74

IPC Findings

In Review Report 301-2017, 302-2017, 303-2017, 304-2017, 003-2018 the Commissioner considered the application of subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP by five separate ministries. The ministries initially did not process the applicant’s access to information requests citing subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP. The ministries requested the applicant alter or narrow the access to information requests. The Commissioner noted that subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP provides that an applicant’s request is to include time, place and event. After considering the applicant’s access to information requests, the Commissioner found that it included these elements. Therefore, the ministries had not appropriately applied subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP and the access request was sufficiently clear to enable the ministries to identify the record(s) requested.

In Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022, the Commissioner considered an application from the Holy Family Roman Catholic Separate School Division No. 140 (Holy Family) to disregard an applicant’s three access to information requests. Holy Family asserted that the requests were repetitious, systematic, would unreasonably interfere with Holy Family’s operations, were an abuse of the right of access, were frivolous, vexatious and were not made in good faith pursuant to subsections 43.1(2)(a), (b) and (c) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). While considering this application, the Commissioner noted that Holy Family appeared to confuse “clarifying” with “narrowing” and appeared to be forcing the applicant to narrow their access to information requests inappropriately. Holy Family had responded to the applicant’s access to information requests indicating that “the scope of your request remains too large to identify specific records” and requested the applicant narrow the scope. The Commissioner found Holy Family wanted the applicant to narrow the access to information requests because they involved a large volume of records over a two-year period requiring a significant amount of work not because it could not identify records. When its attempts to narrow the access to information requests were unsuccessful, Holy Family should have proceeded to issue an estimate of fees associated with the broad requests. It failed to do so. Rather, it made an application to the Commissioner to have the access to information requests disregarded. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the access to information requests were described with sufficient particularity by the applicant and Holy Family should have been able to identify the records responsive to the requests. In conclusion, the Commissioner refused Holy Family’s application to disregard the applicant’s access to information requests.

In Review Report 160-2020, the Commissioner reviewed a fee estimate issued to an applicant by the Ministry of Government Relations (Government Relations). Upon review, the Commissioner found that Government Relations did not invoke subsection 6(3) of FOIP appropriately because it attempted to require the applicant to “narrow” their access to information request and that if it did not hear back from the applicant by a certain date, it would consider the access to information request abandoned pursuant to subsection 7.1(1) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the access to information request, although broad, was clear in terms of what was being sought. The Commissioner recommended that Government Relations develop policy and procedures that highlight the difference between clarifying and narrowing the scope of an access to information request. Furthermore, the Commissioner recommended Government Relations rescind its fee estimate.

In Review Report 127-2018, the Commissioner reviewed the response of the University of Saskatchewan (U of S) to an access to information request. The U of S had responded to an applicant’s access to information request indicating that further clarification was required to identify records pursuant to subsection 6(3) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon notice of the review, the U of S raised concerns that the request for review by the applicant was frivolous and vexatious. The Commissioner found that there was jurisdiction to conduct the review and that the request for review was not frivolous or vexatious. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that “clarification” pursuant to section 6 of LA FOIP was not necessary. The Commissioner recommended that the U of S develop and implement policies and procedures for clarifying and narrowing requests.

Subsection 6(2)

Application

6(2) Subject to subsection (4) and subsection 11(3), an application is deemed to be made when the application is received by the government institution to which it is directed.

Provided no clarification is needed (see s. 6(4)) and the application does not have to be transferred (see s. 11(3)), the application is considered made when the government institution receives it. The 30-day deadline to respond begins when the application is received.

In accordance with subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act 75 the first day shall be excluded in the calculation of time. Therefore, the 30-day clock begins the day following receipt of the access to information request. For more on calculating the time see Response required, Calculating 30 Days, later in this Chapter.

Subsection 6(3)

Application

6(3) Where the head is unable to identify the record requested, the head shall advise the applicant, and shall invite the applicant to supply additional details that might lead to identification of the record.

Where an access to information request is unclear or lacks sufficient detail to identify the record, the government institution must provide the applicant with the opportunity to provide more detail.

Contact with the applicant to clarify the request should occur as soon as possible.

Clarifying vs Narrowing

Clarifying versus narrowing mean very different things. The Commissioner has addressed this in more than one Report where it was found that a government institution or local authority, relying on subsections 6(1)(b) or 6(3) of FOIP or The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, had attempted to force applicants to narrow a request which is not an appropriate application of these subsections.

To clarify is to remove complexity, ambiguity or obscurity from; to make clear or plain; remove ignorance, misconception or error from.76

To narrow is to become narrower, decrease in width or breadth; diminish, lessen, contract.77

Government institutions are not authorized under FOIP to require an applicant to “narrow” an access to information request. If a request is clear but is voluminous and requires a lot of work to search and gather records, the government institution should issue a fee estimate pursuant to section 9 of FOIP. Once issued, the government institution should make efforts to work with the applicant to reduce the fee by narrowing the access to information request. However, if an applicant chooses not to narrow and prefers to pay the fee, the government institution should process the request. Narrowing should not be confused with clarifying an access to information request. Section 6 does not contemplate “narrowing” but rather “clarifying”.

Subsections 6(1)(b) and 6(3) of FOIP address situations where a government institution cannot determine what the applicant is seeking. Subsection 6(1)(b) of FOIP requires an applicant to provide “sufficient particularity” as to time, place and event to enable an individual familiar with the subject-matter to identify the record.

Sufficient particularity means stating precisely what is being sought. Applicants should provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the government institution, with reasonable effort, to identify the records sought.78

The requirement of FOIP on both applicants and government institutions in combination with the purposes of the Act demonstrate an intention on the part of the Legislature that an individual’s access to information request will be processed by the government institution in a fair, reasonable, open and flexible manner. Requiring an applicant to narrow an access to information request because it is too much work or too expensive to process, is not authorized under FOIP.

In terms of “clarification” of an access to information request, many applicants are unfamiliar with an organization and its administrative practices. They may not be aware of the process by which a government institution reaches or implements a decision or policy, the kind of records that may be generated or the process of disposing of records. As a result, their access to information requests may be unclear and they would be unsure how to articulate what they are looking for. Therefore, clarification of a request may involve assisting an applicant in defining the subject of the request, the specific kinds of records of interest and the time period for which records are being requested.79

Government institutions have a duty to engage in the clarification process up to the point when a fee estimate is provided. However, a government institution has no obligation [or authority] to require clarification of a request that is, on its face, very clear.80

In terms of “narrowing” of an access to information request, it is important to discuss with an applicant any request that involves a large amount of information or is estimated to require a large amount of search time. The objective of narrowing a large request is to reduce fees for the applicant and for the provision of better service, in terms of both time and results.

However, applicants are not required to narrow a request and refusing to narrow a broad request would generally not be considered an abuse of the right of access.81

IPC Findings

In Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022, the Commissioner considered an application from the Holy Family Roman Catholic Separate School Division No. 140 (Holy Family) to disregard an applicant’s three access to information requests. Holy Family asserted that the requests were repetitious, systematic, would unreasonably interfere with Holy Family’s operations, were an abuse of the right of access, were frivolous, vexatious and were not made in good faith pursuant to subsections 43.1(2)(a), (b) and (c) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). While considering this application, the Commissioner noted that Holy Family appeared to confuse “clarifying” with “narrowing” and appeared to be forcing the applicant to narrow their access to information requests inappropriately. Holy Family had responded to the applicant’s access to information requests indicating that “the scope of your request remains too large to identify specific records” and requested the applicant narrow the scope. The Commissioner found Holy Family wanted the applicant to narrow the access to information requests because they involved a large volume of records over a two-year period requiring a significant amount of work not because it could not identify records. When its attempts to narrow the access to information requests were unsuccessful, Holy Family should have proceeded to issue an estimate of fees associated with the broad requests. It failed to do so. Rather, it made an application to the Commissioner to have the access to information requests disregarded. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the access to information requests were described with sufficient particularity by the applicant and Holy Family should have been able to identify the records responsive to the requests. In conclusion, the Commissioner refused Holy Family’s application to disregard the applicant’s access to information requests.

In Review Report 160-2020, the Commissioner reviewed a fee estimate issued to an applicant by the Ministry of Government Relations (Government Relations). Upon review, the Commissioner found that Government Relations did not invoke subsection 6(3) of FOIP appropriately because it attempted to require the applicant to “narrow” their access to information request and that if it did not hear back from the applicant by a certain date, it would consider the access to information request abandoned pursuant to subsection 7.1(1) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the access to information request, although broad, was clear in terms of what was being sought. The Commissioner recommended that Government Relations develop policy and procedures that highlight the difference between clarifying and narrowing the scope of an access to information request. Furthermore, the Commissioner recommended Government Relations rescind its fee estimate.

In Review Report 127-2018, the Commissioner reviewed the response of the University of Saskatchewan (U of S) to an access to information request. The U of S had responded to an applicant’s access to information request indicating that further clarification was required to identify records pursuant to subsection 6(3) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon notice of the review, the U of S raised concerns that the request for review by the applicant was frivolous and vexatious. The Commissioner found that there was jurisdiction to conduct the review and that the request for review was not frivolous or vexatious. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that “clarification” pursuant to section 6 of LA FOIP was not necessary. The Commissioner recommended that the U of S develop and implement policies and procedures for clarifying and narrowing requests.

‌Subsection 6(4)

Application

6(4) Where additional details are invited to be supplied pursuant to subsection (3), the application is deemed to be made when the record is identified.

Where a government institution needs to request additional details from an applicant, the 30-day deadline for a government institution to respond pursuant to subsection 7(2) of FOIP does not start until the head can identify what record(s) the applicant is requesting.

In other words, until the necessary clarification is received, the 30-day clock has not started.

For more on calculating the time see Section 7: Response Required, Calculating 30 Days, later in this Chapter.

Section 7: Response Required

Response required

7(1) Where an application is made pursuant to this Act for access to a record, the head of the government institution to which the application is made shall:

(a) consider the application and give written notice to the applicant of the head’s decision with respect to the application in accordance with subsection (2); or

(b) transfer the application to another government institution in accordance with section 11.

(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(a) stating that access to the record or part of it will be given on payment of the prescribed fee and setting out the place where, or manner in which, access will be available;

(b) if the record requested is published, referring the applicant to the publication;

(c) if the record is to be published within 90 days, informing the applicant of that fact and of the approximate date of publication;

(d) stating that access is refused, setting out the reason for the refusal and identifying the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal is based;

(e) stating that access is refused for the reason that the record does not exist;

(f) stating that confirmation or denial of the existence of the record is refused pursuant to subsection (4); or

(g) stating that the request has been disregarded pursuant to section 45.1, and setting out the reason for which the request was disregarded.

(3) A notice given pursuant to subsection (2) is to state that the applicant may request a review by the commissioner within one year after the notice is given.

(4) If an application is made with respect to a record that is exempt from access pursuant to section 15, 16, 21 or 22 or subsection 29(1), the head may refuse to confirm or deny that the record exists or ever did exist.

(5) A head who fails to give notice pursuant to subsection (2) is deemed to have given notice, on the last day of the period set out in that subsection, of a decision to refuse to give access to the record.

Section 7 of FOIP provides that an applicant must receive a response from the government institution. The response must be within 30 days and must contain certain elements, which are enumerated at subsections 7(2) and 7(3) of FOIP.

FOIP does not require government institutions to answer questions that come in an access to information request. 82 For example, access to information requests that ask why the government institution made certain decisions. FOIP provides access to records and unless answers are in a record, the government institution is not required under FOIP to answer them. However, it does have a duty to answer questions as to whether it has responsive records. 83

All responses provided to applicants pursuant to subsection 7(2) of FOIP must include a statement that advises applicants of their right to request a review by the Information and Privacy Commissioner. The requirement is addressed at subsection 7(3) of FOIP.

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General has developed model letters to assist government institutions with responding to applicants in each of the circumstances outlined at subsection 7(2) of FOIP. See Model Letters (FOIP) for samples.

Subsection 7(1)

Response required

7(1) Where an application is made pursuant to this Act for access to a record, the head of the government institution to which the application is made shall:

(a) consider the application and give written notice to the applicant of the head’s decision with respect to the application in accordance with subsection (2); or

(b) transfer the application to another government institution in accordance with section 11.

Subsection 7(1) of FOIP requires that when a government institution receives an access to information request from an applicant, it must respond in writing advising the applicant of its decision regarding the request. Subsection 7(2) of FOIP enumerates what the response must include and the timeframe it must be provided in.

If the government institution believes that another government institution has a greater interest in the records being requested, it can transfer the access to information request to the other government institution. For more on transferring access to information requests, see Section 11: Transfer of Application, later in this Chapter.

Subsection 7(2)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(a) stating that access to the record or part of it will be given on payment of the prescribed fee and setting out the place where, or manner in which, access will be available;

(b) if the record requested is published, referring the applicant to the publication;

(c) if the record is to be published within 90 days, informing the applicant of that fact and of the approximate date of publication;

(d) stating that access is refused, setting out the reason for the refusal and identifying the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal is based;

(e) stating that access is refused for the reason that the record does not exist;

(f) stating that confirmation or denial of the existence of the record is refused pursuant to subsection (4); or

(g) stating that the request has been disregarded pursuant to section 45.1, and setting out the reason for which the request was disregarded.

It is often said that information delayed is information denied. One of the major problems with access to information regimes across Canada is delay in providing applicants with access to public records. 84

Subsection 7(2) of FOIP provides that within 30 days of receiving an access to information request, the government institution must provide a response to the applicant. The response should include one or more of the enumerated statements listed at subsection 7(2) of FOIP.

Calculating 30 Days

The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

(2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

(3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

(4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

(5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

(6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business 85

Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating 30 days under FOIP:

  • The first day the access request is received is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)].
  • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)].
  • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)].
  • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 30 calendar days, not business days.

The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 86

Subsection 49(1)(b) of FOIP provides applicants with the right to request a review where the government institution fails to respond to an access to information request within 30 days.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 063-2015 to 077-2015, the Commissioner considered a lack of a section 7 response by the Ministry of Health (Health). The applicant had submitted 15 access to information requests over the course of four months. When no response was received to any of the requests, the applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. The Commissioner found that Health did not respond to the access to information requests within the legislated timeline of 30 days. The Commissioner recommended that Health respond to the remaining access to information requests within a week of the issuance of the Commissioner’s report. The Commissioner also recommended that Health conduct a lean event within a month of issuance of the Commissioner’s report to address its issues with routing, review and approval of responses to access to information requests.

In Review Report 064-2016 to 076-2016, the Commissioner considered the Guidelines for Government Communications Activities During a General Election and its impact on the timing of responses by government institutions. The Commissioner found that the guidelines do not distinguish a separate protocol for freedom of information requests filed by the media. Furthermore, FOIP did not speak to special handling of requests because of an election. As such, access to information requests should be handled routinely during elections or the period before an election.

Subsection 7(2)(a)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(a) stating that access to the record or part of it will be given on payment of the prescribed fee and setting out the place where, or manner in which, access will be available;

Subsection 7(2)(a) of FOIP provides that the government institution can respond to the access to information request indicating that a fee must be paid prior to records being provided. This statement should also include directions for the applicant on where and how the fee can be paid.

If the government institution intends to provide notice to the applicant that a fee is required pursuant to subsection 7(2)(a), there are additional requirements when issuing fee estimates. These are outlined at section 9 of FOIP. Subsection 9(2) of FOIP requires a government institution to provide a fee estimate where the cost for providing access to records exceeds the prescribed amount of $100. This prescribed amount is found in subsection 7(1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations). Furthermore, applicants are not required to pay any fees beyond what is originally estimated. Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the FOIP Regulations provide further instruction regarding calculating fees and fee waivers.

FOIP provides for reasonable cost recovery associated with providing individuals with access to records.

reasonable fee estimate is one that is proportionate to the work required on the part of the government institution to respond efficiently and effectively to an applicant’s request. A fee estimate is equitable when it is fair and even-handed, that is, when it supports the principle that applicants should bear a reasonable portion of the cost of producing the information they are seeking, but not costs arising from administrative inefficiencies or poor records management practices. 87

Fees encourage responsible use of the right of access by applicants. However, fees should not present an unreasonable barrier to access. Therefore, fees should be reasonable, fair and at a level that does not discourage any resident from exercising their access rights.

Government institutions should ensure that in keeping with best practices it:

      • Treats all applicants the same (fairness).
      • Calculates its fees the same (consistency).

For more on fees, see Section 9: Fee, later in this Chapter.

Subsection 7(2)(b)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(b) if the record requested is published, referring the applicant to the publication;

Subsection 7(2)(b) of FOIP provides that if the record requested is published, the government institution can refer the applicant to the publication. This provision is intended to provide a government institution with the option of referring an applicant to a publicly available source of the information where the balance of convenience favors this method of alternative access. It is not intended to be used in order to avoid a government institution’s obligations under FOIP.

The government institution should take adequate steps to ensure that the record that it alleges is publicly available is the record that is responsive to the access to information request. Furthermore, applicants should not be required to compile small pieces of information from a variety of sources in order to obtain a complete version of a record that could be disclosed. 88

Published is defined as to make known to people in general…an advising of the public or making known of something to the public for a purpose. 89

Subsection 3(1)(a) of FOIP provides that FOIP does not apply to material that is published or material available for purchase by the public. For more on subsection 3(1)(a) of FOIP see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP”.

Subsection 7(2)(c)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(c) if the record is to be published within 90 days, informing the applicant of that fact and of the approximate date of publication;

Subsection 7(2)(c) of FOIP provides that if the record requested will be published within 90 days, the government institution can advise the applicant of this and provide the approximate date of publication.

The 90 days starts to run on the date the applicant’s access to information request is received by the government institution. 90

Published means to make known to people in general…an advising of the public or making known of something to the public for a purpose. 91

It is not appropriate for a government institution to invoke only subsection 7(2)(c) of FOIP if only some of the records that would be responsive to the access request will be part of the publication in 90 days. 92

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2004-005, the Commissioner considered whether Executive Council properly responded to an applicant when it cited subsection 7(2)(c) of FOIP in its response. The applicant had sought materials that showed the results of 17 budget-related questions undertaken in November 2003 including the questions, answers, and costs of a survey. Executive Council responded to the applicant indicating that the information would be published in April 2004. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the 90 days referred to in subsection 7(2)(c) of FOIP starts to run on the date the applicant’s access to information request is received by the government institution. The Commissioner further found that by responding to the applicant citing only subsection 7(2)(c) of FOIP, Executive Council failed to meet its duty to assist as it did not disclose the existence of additional documents. The Commissioner recommended Executive Council release data tables and the cost of the survey to the applicant within 30 days.

In Review Report 107-2018, the Commissioner considered whether the City of Regina (City) met its obligations under subsection 7(2)(c) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The City responded to an applicant’s request citing subsection 7(2)(c) of LA FOIP and indicating that the survey requested would be published within 90 days, the approximate date of publication and where the applicant could obtain a copy at that time. The Commissioner found that the City appropriately engaged subsection 7(2)(c) of LA FOIP.

Subsection 7(2)(d)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(d) stating that access is refused, setting out the reason for the refusal and identifying the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal is based;

Subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP provides that where access to records is refused, the government institution must set out the reason for the refusal and identify the specific exemption in FOIP that it is relying on to withhold the records or information.

For subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP, the written response to the applicant must have three elements:

  1. It must state that access is refused in full or in part.
  2. It must set out the reason for refusal.
  3. It must identify the specific provision in FOIP on which the refusal is based. 93

Subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP requires a reasonable degree of transparency as to the decision of the government institution such that the applicant can understand the basis for the denial of access. 94

The Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4, “Exemptions from the Right of Access” provides guidance on determining whether an exemption under Part III of FOIP applies to a record or information in a record.

Subsection 5.1(1) of FOIP requires government institutions to respond to applicants openly, accurately and completely. If a government institution removes information from a responsive document because it has been deemed not responsive, it should advise the applicant in its section 7 response and explain why. 95

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2006-003, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) complied with the requirements of subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP. The applicant had requested copies of Civil Law Division billable hours for 2002 and 2003. In addition, the applicant requested copies of private legal billings for 2002, 2003 and 2004. Justice responded to the applicant indicating that access was refused in part and provided a severed version of the record. The Commissioner found that Justice’s minimal notice of refusal did not satisfy the requirements of subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP. In particular, Justice’s response did not set out the reason for the refusal or identify specific provisions under FOIP it was relying on.

Subsection 7(2)(e)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(e) stating that access is refused for the reason that the record does not exist;

Subsection 7(2)(e) of FOIP provides that where a government institution determines that the record requested does not exist, it should indicate that in its response to the applicant.

A statement by a government institution that a record does not exist does not imply that the record in question does not exist at all. It would not be possible for a government institution to make such a sweeping statement about the general existence of a record. The term “exist” in subsection 7(2)(e) of FOIP is a function of being possessed or controlled by the government institution to which the access request is being made. 96

There are two circumstances where a response that records do not exist can occur:

1. Search did not produce records

There are times when a search for responsive records turns up nothing.

When responding to the applicant, government institutions should include the steps taken to find records. 97

Where a record has been destroyed, information should be provided on the date of destruction and the authority for carrying it out. 98

Applicants have a right to request a review of search efforts conducted by the government institution pursuant to subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP. In such situations, a government institution should be prepared to provide documentation of the search that was conducted to locate the responsive records. For more on search efforts and reviews involving search efforts, see Search for Records and IPC Review of Search Efforts, earlier in this Chapter.

reasonable search is one in which an employee, experienced in the subject matter, expends a reasonable effort to locate records which are reasonably related to the request. A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person searching areas where records are likely to be stored. What is reasonable depends on the request and related circumstances. 99

2. No possession/control of the record

There are times that a record exists, but it is not within the possession or under the control of the government institution.

Section 5 of FOIP provides the right of access to records that are in the possession or under the control of the government institution that received the access to information request. For more on possession and control see, the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” under FOIP Applies, Section 5: Possession or Control.

Even if a government institution does not possess or control a record, merely citing subsection 7(2)(e) of FOIP may not be adequate. If the government institution considers that another government institution has a “greater interest” in the record, the government institution should transfer the applicant’s access to information request in accordance with section 11 of FOIP.100 For more on transferring an access to information request, see Section 11: Transfer of Application, later in this Chapter.

Subsection 7(2)(f)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(f) stating that confirmation or denial of the existence of the record is refused pursuant to subsection (4); or

Subsection 7(2)(f) of FOIP provides that in certain cases, a government institution may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a record. If a government institution intends to invoke this provision, it must do so in compliance with subsection 7(4) of FOIP. For more, see Subsection 7(4), later in this Chapter.

Subsection 7(2)(g)

Response required

7(2) The head shall give written notice to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made:

(g) stating that the request has been disregarded pursuant to section 45.1, and setting out the reason for which the request was disregarded.

Subsection 7(2)(g) of FOIP provides that a government institution can respond to an applicant indicating that the access to information request has been disregarded pursuant to subsection 45.1 of FOIP. The government institution must set out the reasons why the request is being disregarded.

Section 45.1 of FOIP provides government institutions the ability to apply to the Commissioner requesting authorization to disregard an access request (section 6 application) or a correction request (section 32 request) made by an applicant.

Where a government institution intends to initiate the process for disregarding an access to information request, subsection 45.1(1) of FOIP requires a government institution to make an application to the Commissioner. This should be in the form of a written application (letter) that includes evidence and argument about how the criteria under subsection 45.1(2) are met. Details of how to make an application are contained in the IPC resource, Application to Disregard an Access to Information Request or Request for Correction. Further assistance can also be found in the IPC’s The Rules of Procedure.

A request to disregard is a serious matter as it could have the effect of removing an applicant’s express right to seek access to information in a particular case. It is important for a government institution to remember that a request to disregard must present a sound basis for consideration and should be prepared with this in mind. 101

For more on disregarding access requests, see Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests later in this Chapter.

Subsection 7(3)

Response required

7(3) A notice given pursuant to subsection (2) is to state that the applicant may request a review by the commissioner within one year after the notice is given.

All responses provided to applicants pursuant to subsection 7(2) of FOIP must include a statement that advises applicants of their right to request a review by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

Generally, this statement can appear as follows:

If you would like to exercise your right to request a review of this decision, you may do so by completing a “Request for Review” form and forwarding it to the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner within one year of this notice. Your completed form can be sent to #503 – 1801 Hamilton Street, Regina, Saskatchewan, S4P 4B4 or be submitted via email to intake@oipc.sk.ca. This form is available at the same location where you applied for access or by contacting the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner at (306) 787-8350.

Subsection 7(4)

Response required

7(4) If an application is made with respect to a record that is exempt from access pursuant to section 15, 16, 21 or 22 or subsection 29(1), the head may refuse to confirm or deny that the record exists or ever did exist.

Subsection 7(4) of FOIP provides that where a government institution intends to respond to an applicant citing subsection 7(2)(f) of FOIP, it can only do so for records that would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to sections 15, 16, 21, or 22 or subsection 29(1) of FOIP.

By invoking subsection 7(4) of FOIP, a government institution is denying an applicant the right to know whether a record exists. This subsection provides government institutions with a significant discretionary power that should be exercised only in rare cases. It is the Commissioner’s view that this provision is meant to protect highly sensitive records where confirming or denying the mere existence of a record would in itself impose significant risk. For example, the risk of harm to witnesses as a result of revealing a law enforcement investigation is underway. Although section 15 of FOIP could protect records from being disclosed that fall into the category of law enforcement and investigations, this provision enables the government institution to address risks that could occur just by revealing records exist. It is not meant to protect a government institution from possible embarrassment or negative public scrutiny. 102

Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides applicants the right to request a review of a government institution’s use of subsection 7(4) of FOIP. In order for a government institution to be able to show it properly invoked subsections 7(2)(f) and 7(4) of FOIP, the government institution must be able to:

  1. Demonstrate that records (if they existed) would qualify for the particular exemption provided for at subsection 7(4) of FOIP. Explain how disclosing the existence of records (if they existed) could reasonably compromise what it is protecting. 103
  2. Explain how disclosing the existence of records (if they existed) could reasonably compromise what it is protecting. 103

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2005-002, the Commissioner considered the application of subsection 7(4) of FOIP for the first time. The applicant had requested access to any estimates of the government’s financial liability concerning a specific family. The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) applied subsection 7(4) and refused to confirm or deny the existence of records. Upon review, the Commissioner considered whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision of Justice. The Commissioner saw no particular prejudice to Justice in that case if it acknowledged responsive records. The Commissioner found no reasonable basis for the exercise of statutory discretion for Justice to invoke subsection 7(4) of FOIP.

In Review Report 035-2015, the Commissioner considered whether the Rural Municipality of Shellbrook #493 (RM) could rely on the equivalent subsection 7(4) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant had requested records involving the installation of a culvert and communications between specific individuals and a Councillor. The Commissioner found that there was no reasonable basis for the RM to invoke subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. The Commissioner recommended that if responsive records existed that they be released to the applicant.

In Review Report 223-2015 and 224-2015, the Commissioner considered whether the City of Regina (City) could rely on the equivalent subsection 7(4) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant had requested a copy of an audit and all internal correspondence related to the Coroner’s requirement for an independent audit related to the death of a specific individual. The City responded indicating it was refusing to confirm or deny the existence of records pursuant to subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 14(1)(d) of LA FOIP would apply if the records existed. As such, the Commissioner concluded that subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP could be relied on by the City.

In Review Report 023-2016, the Commissioner considered whether the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) could rely on subsection 7(4) of FOIP. The applicant had requested information that had been provided about him to WCB and information about him that was in the possession of WCB outside his claim file. WCB responded indicating that records were not found and also that WCB refused to confirm or deny whether responsive records were found in the Fair Practices Office. The Commissioner found that WCB had not demonstrated that subsection 7(4) of FOIP was appropriately applied. The Commissioner recommended that the Fair Practices Office be searched for records responsive to the request and that a new section 7 response be provided to the applicant.

In Review Report 273-2016, the Commissioner considered whether Saskatchewan Polytechnic could rely on the equivalent of subsection 7(4) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant had requested the complete file of his allegations of harassment. Saskatchewan Polytechnic responded citing subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that there was no reasonable basis for Saskatchewan Polytechnic to invoke subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. The Commissioner recommended that if records existed, they be released to the applicant.

In Review Report 037-2017, the Commissioner considered whether the City of Saskatoon (City) could rely on the equivalent subsection 7(4) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant had requested an explanation of all cost increases in construction of the Remai Modern Art Gallery. The City responded providing access to some records and refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any further records pursuant to subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. Following the commencement of a review by the Commissioner, the City indicated it was no longer relying on subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP.

In Review Report 339-2017, the Commissioner considered whether the City of Regina (City) could rely on the equivalent subsection 7(4) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The applicant had requested a copy of all records pertaining to a specific fire report and records surrounding a previous access to information request. The City responded indicating that access to some records was granted, others were redacted pursuant to exemptions and confirmation or denial of the existence of further records was refused. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the City could not rely on subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP. The Commissioner recommended that the City reconsider its application of subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP.

In Review Report 063-2021, the Commissioner reviewed a denial of access by the Regina Police Service (RPS). An applicant had requested access to records related to a call to the police involving the applicant. The RPS refused to confirm or deny that any records existed pursuant to subsection 7(4) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The position of RPS was that if the records existed, subsection 28(1) of LA FOIP would apply to the records. Upon review, the Commissioner found that if the records existed, it would be the applicant’s personal information involved and therefore RPS could not rely on subsection 7(4) of LA FOIP to neither confirm nor deny the existence of records.

Subsection 7(5)

Response required

7(5) A head who fails to give notice pursuant to subsection (2) is deemed to have given notice, on the last day of the period set out in that subsection, of a decision to refuse to give access to the record. (c) if the record is to be published within 90 days, informing the applicant of that fact and of the approximate date of publication;

Subsection 7(5) of FOIP provides that where a government institution has failed to respond to an applicant within 30 days it is deemed to have responded on the 30th day refusing access to the record.

The government institution should be aware that if it does not respond within the original 30-day deadline as required by section 7, it is no longer able to request an extension via section 12 of FOIP. Subsection 12(2) of FOIP supports this view, as it requires that notice of an extension be given within 30 days of the application being made.104 For more on extensions, see Section 12: Extension of Time, later in this Chapter.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 104-2018, the Commissioner considered the lack of response by the Northern Village of Pinehouse (Village) to an applicant’s access to information request. The Commissioner noted that pursuant to subsection 7(5) of LA FOIP, the Village failed to provide a section 7 response to the applicant within the 30-day deadline. Therefore, it was deemed to have responded on the 30th day with a refusal to provide access. The Commissioner referred to such a situation as a “deemed refusal”. The Commissioner indicated that the Village was now required to account for responsive records in its possession and/or control and only deny access to all or part of the records if permitted by the limited and specific exemptions in LA FOIP. As the Village had not done so, the Commissioner recommended the Village release the records to the applicant.

Section 7.1: Applications Deemed Abandoned

Applications deemed abandoned

7.1(1) If the head has invited the applicant to supply additional details pursuant to subsection 6(3) or has given the applicant notice pursuant to clause 7(2)(a) and the applicant does not respond within 30 days after receiving the invitation or notice, the application is deemed to be abandoned.

(2) The head shall provide the applicant with a notice advising that the application is deemed to be abandoned.

(3) A notice provided pursuant to subsection (2) is to state that the applicant may request a review by the commissioner within one year after the notice is given.‌

Subsection 7.1(1)

Applications deemed abandoned

7.1(1) If the head has invited the applicant to supply additional details pursuant to subsection 6(3) or has given the applicant notice pursuant to clause 7(2)(a) and the applicant does not respond within 30 days after receiving the invitation or notice, the application is deemed to be abandoned.

Often, it is clear when an applicant has decided not to pursue an access request. An applicant will indicate either in writing or on the telephone an intention not to proceed. This may be for a variety of reasons. For example, the applicant has found the information is available another way or no longer needs the information. 105

Sometimes situations will arise where an applicant simply ceases to respond during the processing of an access to information request. No indication is given that the applicant has decided not to pursue the request. They simply do not respond to queries from the government institution. 106 When this situation occurs, section 7.1(1) of FOIP sets out provisions for declaring an application abandoned.

Subsection 7.1(1) of FOIP provides that the government institution can consider an application for access abandoned:

  • If the government institution invited the applicant to supply additional details to help identify the record pursuant to subsection 6(3) of FOIP and the applicant does not respond within 30 days.
  • If the government institution provided a subsection 7(2)(a) notice and the applicant does not respond within 30 days.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 302-2018, 303-2018, 304-2018, the Commissioner considered equivalent subsection 7.1(1) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) for the first time. The City of Regina (City) had received three separate access to information requests along with a request to waive the full fees for processing each request. The City provided its fee estimate for each request to the applicant, and included a fee reduction, but not a full waiver. At a certain point, the City deemed the applications abandoned because the applicant had not provided the required deposit to proceed with each request in what the City felt was the applicable timeline. The applicant requested a review by the IPC. The Commissioner found that the conditions for issuing a notice of abandonment pursuant to section 7.1 of LA FOIP were not met and that the City improperly issued a notice of abandonment to the applicant. In other words, subsection 7.1(1) of LA FOIP was not applicable following the issuing of a fee estimate. It was only applicable for the final notice of payment of the remainder of the fees pursuant to subsection 7(2)(a) of LA FOIP.107

In Review Report 136-2022, the Commissioner reviewed a fee estimate issued to an applicant by the Water Security Agency (WSA). The fee estimate was $200, and the applicant requested the Commissioner review the WSA’s estimate. Shortly after requesting a review, the applicant received a letter from the WSA indicating that as no response to the fee estimate was received in the form of a deposit, the WSA had deemed the request abandoned pursuant to subsection 7.1(1) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner pointed to Review Report 302-2018, 303-2018, 304-2018 where the Commissioner found that subsection 7.1(1) of the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) was not applicable following the issuance of a fee estimate. It was only applicable following the final notice of payment of the remainder of the fees pursuant to subsection 7(2)(a) of LA FOIP. The Commissioner found that WSA was premature in its decision to deem the access to information request abandoned.

Subsection 7.1(2)

Applications deemed abandoned

7.1(2) The head shall provide the applicant with a notice advising that the application is deemed to be abandoned.

If the applicant does not respond within 30 days of being contacted, the government institution can advise the applicant, in writing, that the application has been declared abandoned.

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General has developed model letters. The samples include a letter to an applicant notifying them that the application is being declared abandoned. See 20 Applications Deemed Abandoned – FOIP.

Subsection 7.1(3)

Applications deemed abandoned

7.1(3) A notice provided pursuant to subsection (2) is to state that the applicant may request a review by the commissioner within one year after the notice is given.

The notice provided to the applicant should include a statement that if the applicant is not satisfied with the decision to deem the application abandoned, the applicant may make a request for review by the Information and Privacy Commissioner within one year after the notice is given.

Generally, this statement can appear as follows:

If you would like to exercise your right to request a review of this decision, you may do so by completing a “Request for Review” form and forwarding it to the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner within one year of this notice. Your completed form can be sent to #503 – 1801 Hamilton Street, Regina, Saskatchewan, S4P 4B4 or emailed to intake@oipc.sk.ca. This form is available at the same location which you applied for access or by contacting the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner at (306) 787-8350.

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General has developed model letters. The samples include a letter for applicants where an application is being declared abandoned. See 20 Applications Deemed Abandoned – FOIP.

Section 8: Severability

Severability

8 Where a record contains information to which an applicant is refused access, the head shall give access to as much of the record as can reasonably be severed without disclosing the information to which the applicant is refused.

Severability is the principle described in section 8 of FOIP requiring that information be disclosed if it does not contain, or if it can be reasonably severed from, other information that the head of a government institution is authorized or obligated to refuse to disclose under the Act. 108

Severing is the actual exercise by which portions of a document are blacked or greyed out before the document is provided to an applicant. It is the physical masking or removal from a record any information that is being exempted from disclosure in order that the remainder of the record may be disclosed.109

Reasonable severability – section 8 of FOIP uses the phrase “can reasonably be severed.” FOIP does not elaborate on what constitutes reasonable severability. One principle that has emerged from decisions of other IPC offices and the courts is that information that would comprise of only disconnected or meaningless snippets is not reasonably severable and such snippets need not be released. In this regard, an important consideration is whether the degree of effort to sever the record is proportionate to the quality of information remaining in the record. 110 In SNC-Lavalin Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), (1994), the court held that “disconnected snippets of releasable information taken from otherwise exempt passages are not…reasonably severable111 and severance of exempt and nonexempt portions should be attempted only when the result is a reasonable fulfillment of the purposes of the Act.”112 The process of reaching the conclusion that information is not reasonably severable is one which should be approached with caution. It is not an issue of “what purpose is to be served by disclosure” so much as an issue of “whether there is any information which is reasonably being conveyed by the exercise of severance.” If there are more than disconnected snippets being disclosed, the information can be considered reasonably severable. 113

Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the approach above in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2012] 1 SCR 23 and also suggested two types of analysis that are needed:

[236] To begin, it is important to recognize that applying s. 25 is mandatory, not discretionary. The section directs that the institutional head “shall [not ‘may’] disclose any part of the record that does not contain” exempted information, provided it can reasonably be severed: see Dagg, at para. 80. Thus, the institutional head has a duty to ensure compliance with s. 25 and to undertake a severance analysis wherever information is found to be exempt from disclosure.

[237] The heart of the s. 25 exercise is determining when material subject to the disclosure obligation “can reasonably be severed” from exempt material. In my view, this involves both a semantic and a cost-benefit analysis. The semantic analysis is concerned with whether what is left after excising exempted material has any meaning. If it does not, then the severance is not reasonable. As the Federal Court of Appeal put it in Blank v. Canada (Minister of the Environment)2007 FCA 289, 368 N.R. 279, at para. 7, “those parts which are not exempt continue to be subject to disclosure if disclosure is meaningful”. The cost-benefit analysis considers whether the effort of redaction by the government institution is justified by the benefits of severing and disclosing the remaining information. Even where the severed text is not completely devoid of meaning, severance will be reasonable only if disclosure of the unexcised portions of the record would reasonably fulfill the purposes of the Act. Where severance leaves only “[d]isconnected snippets of releasable information”, disclosure of that type of information does not fulfill the purpose of the Act and severance is not reasonable: Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1988] 3 F.C. 551 (T.D.), at pp. 558-59; SNC-Lavalin Inc., at para. 48. As Jerome A.C.J. put it in Montana Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1989] 1 F.C. 143 (T.D.):

To attempt to comply with section 25 would result in the release of an entirely blacked-out document with, at most, two or three lines showing. Without the context of the rest of the statement, such information would be worthless. The effort such severance would require on the part of the Department is not reasonably proportionate to the quality of access it would provide. [Emphasis added; pp. 160-61.]

[238] That said, one must not lose sight of the purpose of s. 25. It aims to facilitate access to the most information reasonably possible while giving effect to the limited and specific exemptions set out in the Act: Ontario (Public Safety and Security), at para. 67.

The IPC discourages the use of white space redactingWhite space redacting is where software removes the content of a record in such a way that it renders the redacted content indistinguishable from the blank background of the document. This type of redacting creates uncertainty as to what, if anything, has been redacted. White space redaction lacks specificity because when reviewing the responsive pages, an applicant cannot tell if the white space accounts for a missing line, paragraph, table, image etc. or if the page was naturally left blank. Government institutions have a duty to assist applicants by responding openly, accurately and completely. Invisible white space redactions fall short of this mandatory duty. Applicants should be able to evaluate the amount of missing information. 114 The preference is black-out or grey-out redacting which allows sufficient visual context to indicate the length and general nature of the information (e.g., chart, column, list, sentence, or paragraph).

A line-by-line review is essential to comply with the principle of severability set out in section 8 of FOIP. This provision grants an applicant a right of access to any record from which exempted material can be reasonably severed. 115

For audio and video records that need to be severed, government institutions should have technology in place to enable it to blur out images or audio.116

Each severed item should have a notation indicating which exemption(s) applies in each instance. If the exemptions are clearly marked beside severed line items/sections, it will be clear upon review which of the multiple exemptions applies to the severed items in question. The same procedure should be utilized when providing severed records to applicants even though an applicant is not provided the information that has been severed. This would remove any doubt as to which exemption applies to which line item. Section 7 of FOIP requires that when denying an applicant’s access application, whether in full or in part, the written notice must meet three requirements:

  1. It must state that access is refused to all or part of the record.
  2. It must set out the reason for refusal.
  3. It must identify the specific provision of the Act on which the refusal is based.117

When providing the record to the IPC for a review, the government institution can submit the record in one of two ways:

  1. By showing the withheld portion of the record in red ink, leaving the disclosed portion in black ink, and clearly indicating, beside or near the withheld portion, the applicable exemption(s) of the Act.
  2. Alternatively, by providing a copy of the record with:a. The withheld information outlined or highlighted so it is still visible; and

     b. The applicable exemption(s) clearly indicated beside or near the withheld information.118

However, any format will be accepted provided it is clear what is withheld and what exemptions are being relied upon for each item severed. If including multiple exemptions to a sentence or a paragraph, government institutions should indicate which portion of the sentence or paragraph the individual exemption(s) is being applied.

For more on how to sever, see IPC Webinar, Modern Age Severing Made a Lot Easier.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2006-003, the Commissioner addressed issues with severing in a review involving the Ministry of Justice. The Commissioner noted that though severing of line items was apparent, each severed item lacked a notation indicating which exemption(s) applied in each instance. The Commissioner commented on the requirements of section 8 of FOIP. The Commissioner indicated that the duty to sever means that any exemption claimed by a government institution must be clearly linked to the appropriate lines in the document being severed.‌

Section 9: Fee

Fee

9(1) An applicant who is given notice pursuant to clause 7(2)(a) is entitled to obtain access to the record on payment of the prescribed fee.

(2) Where the amount of fees to be paid by an applicant for access to records is greater than a prescribed amount, the head shall give the applicant a reasonable estimate of the amount, and the applicant shall not be required to pay an amount greater than the estimated amount.

(3) Where an estimate is provided pursuant to subsection (2), the time within which the head is required to give written notice to the applicant pursuant to subsection 7(2) is suspended until the applicant notifies the head that the applicant wishes to proceed with the application.

(4) Where an estimate is provided pursuant to subsection (2), the head may require the applicant to pay a deposit of an amount that does not exceed one-half of the estimated amount before a search is commenced for the records for which access is sought.

(5) Where a prescribed circumstance exists, the head may waive payment of all or any part of the prescribed fee.

Subsection 9(1)

Fee

9(1) An applicant who is given notice pursuant to clause 7(2)(a) is entitled to obtain access to the record on payment of the prescribed fee.

Subsection 9(1) of FOIP provides that when an applicant pays the fee required, the applicant will be entitled to receive the records.

Subsection 9(2)

Fee

9(2) Where the amount of fees to be paid by an applicant for access to records is greater than a prescribed amount, the head shall give the applicant a reasonable estimate of the amount, and the applicant shall not be required to pay an amount greater than the estimated amount.

Subsection 9(2) of FOIP requires a government institution to provide a fee estimate where the cost for providing access to records exceeds the prescribed amount of $100. This prescribed amount is found in subsection 7(1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations). Furthermore, applicants are not required to pay any fees beyond what is originally estimated.

If the fees end up being less than what was originally estimated, the government institution should refund the applicant accordingly as required by subsection 7(2) of the FOIP Regulations.

Fees cannot be charged when access to the record is refused pursuant to subsection 8(1) of the FOIP Regulations.

Creating a Fee Estimate

FOIP provides for reasonable cost recovery associated with providing individuals access to records.

reasonable fee estimate is one that is proportionate to the work required on the part of the government institution to respond efficiently and effectively to an applicant’s request. A fee estimate is equitable when it is fair and even-handed, that is, when it supports the principle that applicants should bear a reasonable portion of the cost of producing the information they are seeking, but not costs arising from administrative inefficiencies or poor records management practices. 119

FOIP is an instrument to foster openness, transparency and accountability in government institutions. Fees should not present an unreasonable barrier to access to information in Saskatchewan. Therefore, fees should be reasonable, fair and at a level that does not discourage any resident from exercising their access rights. At the same time, the fee regime should promote and encourage applicants to be reasonable and to cooperate with government institutions in defining and clarifying their access requests. 120

When it comes to charging fees, government institutions should ensure that:

  • All applicants are treated the same (fairness).
  • Fees are calculated the same way for all applicants (consistency).

Fairness and consistency are best achieved when the government institution has a written policy or procedure in place for assessing fees and issuing fee estimates.

The Commissioner has recommended that government institutions issue fee estimates within the first three to 10 days of an access request being received so there is still time to process the request once a deposit is received. 121

Steps When Charging Fees

As a best practice, where an estimate of costs will be issued, the FOIP Coordinator should take steps to contact the applicant in an attempt to narrow the scope of the requests to reduce work and costs. 122

The following are the steps that can be taken when charging fees:

1. Contact the applicant:

a. Advise that fees will be necessary.

b. Attempt to clarify or offer ways to narrow the request to reduce or eliminate fees.

c. Follow up in writing with the applicant when narrowing occurs to ensure agreed scope is clear.

d. Address any requests for a fee waiver accordingly.

2. Make a search strategy (see Search for Records earlier in this Chapter).

3. Prepare a fee estimate based on the search strategy (do not complete the search yet).

4. Decide whether to charge a fee (refer to your internal policy or procedure).

5. Send out fee estimate and suspend work.

6. Clarify or narrow the request again (if the applicant initiates it).

7. Start searching for records when applicant pays 50% deposit.

Types of Fees

There are generally three kinds of fees that can be included in a fee estimate:

  1. Fees for searching for records.
  2. Fees for preparing records.
  3. Fees for reproduction of records.123

1. Fees for Searching

Fees for searching for a responsive record are pursuant to subsection 6(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

The government institution should develop a search strategy when preparing its fee estimate. For more on search strategies, see Search for Records earlier in this Chapter.

The Commissioner has found that it is not reasonable to charge an applicant a fee for work already completed before the applicant has agreed to pay the fee.124 Government institutions should not complete the work when fee estimates are being prepared. It should be a true estimate. Completing the entire search before an applicant has agreed to pay fees or has the opportunity to narrow the search is a potential waste of government resources. This is supported by the language found at subsection 9(4) of FOIP which indicates a deposit is paid by the applicant “before a search is commenced for the records”.

Fees for search time consists of every half hour of manual search time required to locate and identify responsive records. For example:

  • Staff time involved with searching for records.
  • Examining file indices, file plans or listings of records either on paper or electronic.
  • Pulling paper files/specific paper records out of files.

Reading through files to determine whether records are responsive.

Search time does not include:

  • Time spent to copy the records.
  • Time spent going from office to office or off-site storage to look for records.
  • Having someone review the results of the search.

Generally, the following has been applied:

  • It should take an experienced employee 1 minute to visually scan 12 pages of paper or electronic records to determine responsiveness.
  • It should take an experienced employee 5 minutes to search one regular file drawer for responsive file folders.
  • It should take 3 minutes to search one active email account and transfer the results to a separate folder or drive.

In instances where the above does not accurately reflect the circumstances, the government institution should design a search strategy and test a representative sample of records for time. The time can then be applied to the responsive records as a whole.

Where the search for responsive records exceeds two hours, the government institution can charge $15.00 for every half hour in excess of two hours for search or preparation (as per subsection 6(2) of FOIP Regulations.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 064-2016 to 076-2016, the Commissioner noted that where a search of active email accounts of current employees is required, search time should be calculated using subsection 6(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations) and not subsection 6(3) of the FOIP Regulations unless it is less expensive and the applicant agrees. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that government institutions cannot charge for searches of archived email accounts pursuant to subsection 6(3) of the FOIP Regulations because The Archives and Public Records Management Act requires records be useable and accessible.

2. Fees for Preparing

Fees for preparing the record for disclosure is pursuant to subsection 6(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

Preparation includes time spent preparing the record for disclosure including:

  • Time anticipated to be spent physically severing exempt information from records.

Preparation time does not include:

  • Deciding whether to claim an exemption.
  • Identifying records requiring severing.
  • Identifying and preparing records requiring third party notice.
  • Packaging records for shipment.
  • Transporting records to the mailroom or arranging for courier service.
  • Time spent by a computer compiling and printing information.
  • Assembling information and proofing data.
  • Photocopying.
  • Preparing an index of records.

The test related to reasonable time spent on preparation is generally, it should take an experienced employee 2 minutes per page to physically sever only.

In instances where the above test does not accurately reflect the circumstances (i.e., a complex record), the government institution should test the time it takes to sever on a representative sample of records. The time can then be applied to the responsive records as a whole.

Where the preparation of responsive records exceeds two hours, the government institution can charge $15.00 for every half hour in excess of two hours for search or preparation (as per subsection 6(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations).

3. Fees for Reproduction

Fees for the reproduction of records are pursuant to subsection 6(1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations).

FOIP prescribes $0.25 per page for photocopying or computer printouts.

Applicants sometimes want records provided to them in electronic format. Government institutions should not charge fees for records provided electronically. However, if the applicant requests the record on a portable storage device, FOIP provides that for reproduction of electronic copies for an applicant, the government institution can charge the actual cost of any portable storage device that is used to provide the records. Examples include USB flash drives and memory cards (see subsection 6(1)(b.1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations).

For records that are in other forms besides paper or electronic, the government institution can charge the actual cost of copying the record (see subsection 6(1)(l) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations).

The Ministry of Justice and Attorney General issued a resource titled, Preparing a Cost Estimate: Fees and Fee Estimates For Access Requests Under FOIP. It aids with understanding fees and preparing fee estimates.

In November 2014, the IPC posted a guest blog on its website from the former Sun Country Health Region, titled, Using an Index to Clarify an Access Request and Reduce the Cost. The blog provides advice on how to handle fees and provides an example of a template that can be used to break down a fee estimate.

IPC Review of Fee Estimates

Subsection 49(1)(a.1) of FOIP provides that an applicant can make a request for review to the Commissioner if the applicant is not satisfied that a reasonable fee was estimated by the government institution.

Reviews involving fee estimates can occur both at the time the fee estimate was issued or after the fee has already been paid and records provided to an applicant. For all fee reviews, the IPC requires details on how the fee amount was arrived at. This includes how fees were calculated for search, preparation and reproduction of the record.

For this reason, a government institution should retain details and notes about its search, preparation and reproduction so it can support the amount of the fee estimate in the event of a review.

Fee estimates under FOIP are generally judged on the basis of whether they are reasonable and equitable:

A fee estimate is reasonable when it is proportionate to the work required on the part of the government institution to respond efficiently and effectively to the applicant’s request.

A fee estimate is equitable when it is fair and even-handed, that is, when it supports the principle that applicants should bear a reasonable portion of the cost of producing the information they are seeking, but not costs arising from administrative inefficiencies or poor records management practices.125

Subsection 9(3)

Fee

9(3) Where an estimate is provided pursuant to subsection (2), the time within which the head is required to give written notice to the applicant pursuant to subsection 7(2) is suspended until the applicant notifies the head that the applicant wishes to proceed with the application.

For the government institution, the 30-day deadline to respond to an access request is suspended once the fee estimate is sent and remains suspended until the applicant notifies the government institution that the applicant wishes to proceed with the application.

When an applicant pays the 50% deposit referred to in subsection 9(4) of FOIP, this qualifies as an indication that they wish to proceed.

When the applicant indicates they wish to proceed, the clock is no longer suspended, and the government institution has whatever days are left within its original 30 days to complete the work and issue the response.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 261-2016 & 284-2016, the Commissioner found that an extension applied at the same time of a fee estimate was not necessary and not in keeping with FOIP because the clock stopped when the fee estimate was issued. The Commissioner recommended government institutions issue fee estimates within the first three to 10 days of an access request being received so there is still time to process the request once a deposit is received.

Subsection 9(4)

Fee

9(4) Where an estimate is provided pursuant to subsection (2), the head may require the applicant to pay a deposit of an amount that does not exceed one-half of the estimated amount before a search is commenced for the records for which access is sought.

Subsection 9(4) of FOIP provides that the government institution can require the applicant to pay a 50% deposit on the fee estimate. The applicant must pay this deposit before the government institution commences its search for records.

Alternatively, the applicant could request a review of the fee estimate.

If a review of the fee estimate is requested and the applicant has paid the 50% deposit, the government institution should proceed with processing the request despite the review underway. This prevents a delay in accessing records. Depending on the outcome of the review, a fee can be adjusted or refunded at any point. 126

If the applicant requests a review of the fee estimate but chooses not to pay the 50% deposit until the review is complete, the government institution does not need to proceed with processing the request until the review is complete and the applicant indicates he or she wishes to proceed.

Where a 50% deposit has been paid and access to the records is refused, the deposit must be refunded to the applicant pursuant to subsection 8(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

Subsection 9(5)

Fee

9(5) Where a prescribed circumstance exists, the head may waive payment of all or any part of the prescribed fee.

Subsection 9(5) of FOIP provides that a government institution can waive payment of all or part of the fees in prescribed circumstances. The prescribed circumstances are outlined at section 9 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

Fee Waivers
Section 9 – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(1) For the purposes of subsection 9(5) of the Act, the following circumstances are prescribed as circumstances in which a head may waive payment of fees:

(a) if payment of the prescribed fees will cause a substantial financial hardship for the applicant and, in the opinion of the head, giving access to the record is in the public interest;

(b) if the application involves the personal information of the applicant;

(c) if the prescribed fee or actual cost for the service is $100 or less.

(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(a) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Saskatchewan Assistance Act as an individual or as part of a family unit;

(b) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Training Allowance Regulations; or

(c) is receiving legal assistance or representation from any of the following organizations, including any of the same organizations operating from time to time under another name:

(i) The Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission;

(ii) Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan;

(iii) Community Legal Assistance Services for Saskatoon Inner City Inc. (CLASSIC).

Subsection 9(1)(a) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(1) For the purposes of subsection 9(5) of the Act, the following circumstances are prescribed as circumstances in which a head may waive payment of fees:

(a) if payment of the prescribed fees will cause a substantial financial hardship for the applicant and, in the opinion of the head, giving access to the record is in the public interest;

(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(a) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Saskatchewan Assistance Act as an individual or as part of a family unit;

(b) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Training Allowance Regulations; or

(c) is receiving legal assistance or representation from any of the following organizations, including any of the same organizations operating from time to time under another name:

(i) The Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission;

(ii) Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan;

(iii) Community Legal Assistance Services for Saskatoon Inner City Inc. (CLASSIC).

This provision allows a government institution to waive the payment of fees if payment would cause substantial financial hardship for the applicant and giving access is in the public interest.

Subsection 9(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations includes additional circumstances under which substantial financial hardship can exist. See Subsection 9(2) FOIP Regulations, later in this Chapter.

Applicants must establish that payment of the fee would cause substantial financial hardship. Government institutions should have established criteria to apply for determining when payment of fees may be waived (i.e., policy or form to be completed by applicants). Government institutions should only collect what information is necessary and destroy it when no longer needed.

Substantial financial hardship is where any money spent outside of life sustaining requirements (food, water, clothing and shelter) is cause for financial difficulties. 127 For example, one can consider whether an applicant’s expenses exceed their income and the value of their assets.

Two overriding principles and a non-exhaustive list of criteria have been established to help assess whether records relate to a matter of public interest in the context of a fee waiver. The two principles are: 1) the Act was intended to foster open, transparent and accountable government, subject to the limits contained in the Act; and 2) the Act contains the principle that the user seeking records should pay. The criteria are: 128

1. Will the records contribute to the public understanding of, or to debate on or resolution of, a matter or issue that is of concern to the public or a sector of the public, or that would be if the public knew about it. The following may be relevant:

  • Have others besides the applicant sought or expressed an interest in the records.
  • Are there other indicators that the public has or would have an interest in the records.

2. Is the applicant motivated by commercial or other private interests or purposes, or by a concern on behalf of the public, or a sector of the public. The following may be relevant:

  • Do the records relate to a personal conflict between the applicant and the government institution.
  • What is the likelihood the applicant will disseminate the contents of the records in a manner that will benefit the public.

3. If the records are about the process or functioning of the government institution, will they contribute to open, transparent and accountable government. The following may be relevant:

  • Do the records contain information that will show how the government institution reached or will reach a decision.
  • Are the records desirable for subjecting the activities of the government institution to scrutiny.
  • Will the records shed light on an activity of the government institution that have been called into question.

The following additional factors may be relevant to decide if a waiver is warranted on grounds of fairness:

  • If others have asked for similar records, have they been given at no cost.
  • Would the waiver of the fee significantly interfere with the operations of the government institution, including other programs of the government institution.
  • Are there other less expensive sources of the information.
  • Is the request as narrow as possible.
  • Has the government institution helped the applicant to define their request. 129

The factors above do not require that all questions be answered in the affirmative in order for the government institution to find that access to the records is in the public interest. The government institution should weigh the circumstances of each case when making its decision.

If an applicant requests a fee waiver and it is denied by the government institution, the applicant has a right to request a review by the Information and Privacy Commissioner pursuant to subsection 49(1)(a.2) of FOIP. A review of a fee waiver denial considers the criteria or process used by the government institution to deny the request and whether it was consistent with FOIP.

For this reason, government institutions should have a policy or process for dealing with fee waivers and not make decisions arbitrarily. A government institution should be able to explain in detail how it arrived at its decision to deny the request for a fee waiver.

For more information, the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General developed a resource titled, Managing Fee Waiver Requests.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 302-2018, 303-2018, 304-2018, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision [s. 8(1)(b)] of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. An applicant had requested the City of Regina (City) waive all of the fee for accessing records because the fee would cause financial hardship to the applicant. The City denied a full fee waiver. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the applicant did not provide what was requested by the City in order to establish financial hardship and to meet the prescribed circumstances. The Commissioner recommended the City amend its fee waiver application form to include examples of what “documented evidence” could include so applicants are aware of what constitutes acceptable documentation or evidence. This may include, but not be limited to, copies of a Notice of Assessment, an existing program eligibility letter or pay stub.

Subsection 9(1)(b) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(1) For the purposes of subsection 9(5) of the Act, the following circumstances are prescribed as circumstances in which a head may waive payment of fees:

(b) if the application involves the personal information of the applicant;

Subsection 9(1)(b) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides that the government institution can waive the payment of fees if the application involves the personal information of the applicant.

It is important for government institutions to be open with individuals regarding their own personal information. 130

‌Subsection 9(1)(c) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(1) For the purposes of subsection 9(5) of the Act, the following circumstances are prescribed as circumstances in which a head may waive payment of fees:

(c) if the prescribed fee or actual cost for the service is $100 or less.

Subsection 9(1)(c) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides that the government institution can waive the payment of fees if the fee is $100 or less.

In view of the administrative costs involved to collect $100 for processing fees from an applicant, the government institution may decide to waive the fees. Once a policy for this is adopted, it should be applied consistently for all access requests (i.e., the practice should not just be applied to certain applicants and not others). 131

‌Subsection 9(2) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(a) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Saskatchewan Assistance Act as an individual or as part of a family unit;

(b) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Training Allowance Regulations; or

(c) is receiving legal assistance or representation from any of the following organizations, including any of the same organizations operating from time to time under another name:

(i) The Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission;

(ii) Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan;

(iii) Community Legal Assistance Services for Saskatoon Inner City Inc. (CLASSIC).

Subsection 9(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides that substantial financial hardship for an applicant includes the enumerated list in the subsections below.

Subsection 9(2)(a) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(a) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Saskatchewan Assistance Act as an individual or as part of a family unit;

Substantial financial hardship includes applicants that are receiving assistance under The Saskatchewan Assistance Act. This includes assistance as an individual or as part of a family unit.

Some individuals or families may continue to be on the Saskatchewan Assistance Program (SAP), while others may be on Saskatchewan Income Support (SIS). Both support individuals and families who cannot meet their basic living costs. The Saskatchewan Assured Income for Disability Program (SAID) is for individuals experiencing significant and enduring disabilities.

These programs are for families and individuals who, for various reasons – including disability, illness, low income or unemployment – cannot meet their basic living costs.

For more on these programs see Saskatchewan Financial Support Programs.

Subsection 9(2)(b) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(b) is receiving assistance pursuant to The Training Allowance Regulations; or

Substantial financial hardship includes applicants that are receiving assistance under The Training Allowance Regulations.

The Provincial Training Allowance (PTA) provides income assistance to low-income adult students enrolled in full-time Adult Basic Education, workforce development or skills training programs. For more on this program see Provincial Training Allowance.

Subsection 9(2)(c) – FOIP Regulations

Waiver of fees

9(2) For the purposes of clause 9(1)(a), substantial financial hardship includes circumstances in which the applicant:

(c) is receiving legal assistance or representation from any of the following organizations, including any of the same organizations operating from time to time under another name:

(i) The Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission;

(ii) Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan;

(iii) Community Legal Assistance Services for Saskatoon Inner City Inc. (CLASSIC).

Substantial financial hardship includes applicants receiving assistance or representation from any of the following organizations:

  1. The Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission.
  2. Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan.
  3. Community Legal Assistance Services for Saskatoon Inner City Inc. (CLASSIC).

The names of these organizations may change from time to time. Subsection 9(2)(c) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations will still apply to the organizations under the new names.

Section 10: Manner of Access

Manner of access

10(1) If an applicant is entitled to access pursuant to subsection 9(1), a head shall provide the applicant with access to the record in accordance with this section.

(2)Subject to subsection (3), if a record is in electronic form, a head shall give access to the record in electronic form if:

(a) it can be produced using the normal computer hardware and software and technical expertise of the government institution;

(b) producing it would not interfere unreasonably with the operations of the government institution; and

(c) it is reasonably practicable to do so.

(3) If a record is a microfilm, film, sound or video recording or machine-readable record, the head may give access to the record:

(a) by permitting the applicant to examine a transcript of the record;

(b) by providing the applicant with a copy of the transcript of the record; or

(c) in the case of a record produced for visual or aural reception, by permitting the applicant to view or hear the record or by providing the applicant with a copy of it.

(4) A head may give access to a record:

(a) by providing the applicant with a copy of the record; or

(b) if it is not reasonable to reproduce the record, by giving the applicant an opportunity to examine the record.

Section 10 of FOIP deals with how access to a record will be given to applicants. Depending on the type of record, the manner of access can include providing paper copies of records, providing electronic copies or allowing applicants to view a record. Section 10 of FOIP guides government institutions on the manner of access to records.

Subsection 10(1)

Manner of access

10(1) Where an applicant is entitled to access pursuant to subsection 9(1), the head shall provide the applicant with access to the record in accordance with this section.

Subsection 10(1) of FOIP provides that if an applicant is entitled to access a record, the government institution should provide that access in accordance with section 10 of FOIP.

Subsection 10(2)

Manner of access

10(2) Subject to subsection (3), if a record is in electronic form, a head shall give access to the record in electronic form if:

(a) it can be produced using the normal computer hardware and software and technical expertise of the government institution;

(b) producing it would not interfere unreasonably with the operations of the government institution; and

(c) it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Subsection 10(2) of FOIP was an amendment on January 1, 2018. The provision provides that if the records requested are in electronic format, government institutions must provide access if three circumstances exist:

  1. It can be produced using the normal computer hardware and software and technical expertise of the government institution.
  2. Producing it would not interfere unreasonably with the operations of the government institution.
  3. It is reasonably practicable to do so.

Electronic means created, recorded, transmitted or stored in digital or other intangible form by electronic, magnetic or optical means or by any other similar means.132

Be produced means to be brought forward for use.133

Normal computer hardware and software and technical expertise means the computerized data processing equipment, accompanying software programs and in-house technical staff employed by the government institution on a daily basis. A government institution is not required to acquire equipment or software or seek the expertise of an outside body or person to create a record from a machine-readable record in its possession or under its control.134

For subsection 10(2)(c) of FOIP, the phrase “reasonably practicable” appears. This phrase is not defined in FOIP. However, the following assists:

Reasonably practicable:

Reasonable means fair, proper or moderate under the circumstances, sensible.135

Practicable means feasible, fair and convenient and is not synonymous with possible. An act is practicable of which conditions or circumstances permit the performance.136

What is reasonably practicable depends on the circumstances in each case.

To interfere unreasonably with the operations of the government institution is language also found in subsection 12(1)(a) of FOIP. Interference, in this context, means to obstruct or hinder the range of effectiveness of the government institution’s activities. 137

IPC Findings

In Review Report 313-2016, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Economy was required to create records requested by the applicant. The applicant requested the number of Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program (SINP) applicants represented by a lawyer, family member, employer or consultant (RCIC) between October 11, 2013, and October 31, 2016. The Ministry of Economy advised the applicant that it did not have a way to create a record that would break down individual applicants by these criteria without double counting applications. To avoid duplication, it would require manual review and sorting. The Commissioner found that the Ministry of Economy had demonstrated that it did not have records responsive to the applicant’s access to information request.

In Review Report 038-2018, the Commissioner considered whether information stored in a University of Regina database was responsive to an access to information request and whether the University of Regina was required to create records in response to an access to information request. The applicant had requested the amount of all external research funding between 2006 and 2017, the agency/company awarding the money, the title of the research project and the faculty/department that received the funding. The applicant was willing to accept a spreadsheet. Upon review, the Commissioner found that information in a database was responsive to an access request for purposes of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). Furthermore, the equivalent subsection 10(2) in LA FOIP required local authorities to give access to a record in electronic form if the record could be produced using normal computer hardware, software and technical expertise if it would not interfere with the operations of the local authority. The Commissioner found that in this case, the University of Regina was able to pull the data requested from the database without difficulty and therefore it should provide it to the applicant.

Subsection 10(3)

Manner of access

10(3) A head may give access to a record that is a microfilm, film, sound recording, machine-readable record or other record of information stored by electronic means:

(a) by permitting the applicant to examine a transcript of the record;

(b) by providing the applicant with a copy of the transcript of the record; or

(c) in the case of a record produced for visual or aural reception, by permitting the applicant to view or hear the record or by providing the applicant with a copy of it.

Subsection 10(3) of FOIP provides that if the record is:

  • Microfilm
  • Film
  • Sound or video recording
  • Machine-readable record

The government institution can provide access by:

  • Letting the applicant examine a transcript of the record.
  • Providing the applicant with a copy of the transcript.
  • For sound or video recording – enabling the applicant to view or hear the recording.
  • For sound or video recording – providing the applicant a copy of the recording.

Machine-readable record means anything upon which information is stored or recorded such that a computer or other mechanical device can render the information intelligible. Examples include:

  • A word processing electronic document stored on a hard or floppy computer disk.
  • An electronic database containing personal or general information that is stored on magnetic tape.
  • A videocassette containing recorded sound and images.
  • An offset plate used in the printing industry for printing paper copies.138

IPC Findings

In Review Report 138-2015, the Commissioner considered whether the Attorney General (Justice) permitting the applicant to view recordings was in compliance with subsection 10(3)(c) of FOIP. The applicant had requested copies of video surveillance records from the entrances of the Court of King’s Bench in Saskatoon recorded on a specific date. The applicant was not satisfied with Justice’s decision to allow him to view the recordings and wanted copies. Upon review, Justice asserted that it chose this manner of access because of court security reasons and that there was a high profile court case taking place the date the applicant specified for the recordings. The Commissioner found that subsection 10(3)(c) of FOIP had no qualifier that must be met by the government institution when opting for viewing of records other than the record needed to be a sound or video recording. In this case, the record was a video recording. As such, it was the discretion of the government institution whether to allow viewing or providing a copy. The Commissioner found that Justice was not obligated under FOIP to provide the applicant with a copy of the video recordings pursuant to subsection 10(3)(c) of FOIP.

In Review Report 110-2015, the Commissioner considered whether the Saskatchewan Police Commission complied with subsection 10(3) of FOIP. The applicant requested copies of tape recordings of interviewed witnesses involved in an investigation. As the tape recordings were transcribed and part of the file, it chose to provide copies of the transcripts to the applicant. Furthermore, the original tape recordings were considered transitory once transcribed and had been destroyed. Upon review, the Commissioner found that destroying the audio recordings following transcription complied with guidance from the Saskatchewan Archives Board. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that subsection 10(3) of FOIP did not require a government institution to provide both audio and transcription copies of a record. As such, the Saskatchewan Police Commission providing a transcript of the recordings was an appropriate manner of access for the applicant.

Subsection 10(4)

Manner of access

10(4) A head may give access to a record:

(a) by providing the applicant with a copy of the record; or

(b) if it is not reasonable to reproduce the record, by giving the applicant an opportunity to examine the record. Government institutions can provide applicants with a copy of the record or give the applicant an opportunity to examine the record if it is not reasonable to reproduce it.

This provision was formerly subsection 10(2) of FOIP prior to the amendments of January 1, 2018.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 027-2016, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) had an obligation to provide the applicant copies of records pursuant to subsection 10(2) of FOIP (now subsection 10(4) of FOIP). The applicant had requested access to any and all written documents that included the applicants name in any form from June 2014 until the time of the access request. Justice did not provide the applicant with copies of emails that were sent to or from the applicant. Justice did not provide them because the applicant was an employee of Justice and the applicant had access to the emails sent to and from him through his work email account. Justice asserted that this satisfied its requirement under subsection 10(2) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that if the applicant wanted Justice to gather and print copies of records the applicant had access to, it was reasonable to charge fees.

Section 11: Transfer of Application

Transfer of application

11(1) Where the head of the government institution to which an application is made considers that another government institution has a greater interest in the record, the head:

(a) may, within 15 days after the application is made, transfer the application and, if necessary, the record to the other government institution; and

(b) if a record is transferred pursuant to clause (a), shall give written notice of the transfer and the date of the transfer to the applicant.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a government institution has a greater interest in a record if:

(a) the record was originally prepared in or for the government institution; or

(b) the government institution was the first government institution to obtain the record or a copy of the record.

(3) For the purposes of section 7, an application that is transferred pursuant to subsection (1) is deemed to have been made to the government institution on the day of the transfer.

There are occasions when an applicant makes a request to one government institution that would be more appropriately handled by another government institution.

Greater interest is where two or more government institutions have possession or control of a record, the concept of greater interest may be used to determine which government institution should respond to a request for access to the record.139 See Subsection 11(2) below for the criteria to determine “greater interest” in a record.

Transfer means the act by which one government institution formally passes to another government institution the responsibility for processing a request for access to records under FOIP.140

Subsection 49(1)(a.3) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review of the government institution’s decision to transfer the applicant’s access to information request. For more on requests for review, see Section 49: Application for Review later in this Chapter.

Subsection 11(1)

Transfer of application

11(1) Where the head of the government institution to which an application is made considers that another government institution has a greater interest in the record, the head:

(a) may, within 15 days after the application is made, transfer the application and, if necessary, the record to the other government institution; and

(b) if a record is transferred pursuant to clause (a), shall give written notice of the transfer and the date of the transfer to the applicant.

Subsection 11(1) of FOIP enables government institutions to transfer an access to information request (and if necessary, the responsive records) to another government institution if the other government institution has a greater interest in the record.

The transfer must take place within 15 days of the government institution receiving the access to information request.

Once transferred, the 30-day deadline for the receiving government institution begins [subsection 11(3)]. In accordance with subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 141 Therefore, the 30-day clock begins the day following the day of the transfer. For more on calculating time, see Section 7: Response Required, Calculating 30 Days, earlier in this Chapter.

The receiving government institution may extend the 30-day deadline pursuant to subsection 12(1) of FOIP. This means a maximum of 60 days to process.

Where a government institution transfers a request (and if necessary, the record), it is required to provide written notice of the transfer to the applicant and provide the date of the transfer.

IPC Findings

In Review Report 059-2014, the government institution did not transfer the access to information request until more than 15 months after receiving the request. The Commissioner found that the government institution did not comply with section 11 of FOIP.

Subsection 11(2)

Transfer of application

11(2) For the purposes of this section, a government institution has a greater interest in a record if:

(a) the record was originally prepared in or for the government institution; or

(b) the government institution was the first government institution to obtain the record or a copy of the record.

Subsection 11(2) of FOIP provides the circumstances under which another government institution would have a greater interest in an access to information request or the responsive record:

  • The responsive record was originally prepared in or for the other government institution.
  • The other government institution was the first government institution to obtain the responsive record or a copy of it. This is common where a government institution sends a record or copy to several other government institutions such as contracts or agreements.

IPC Findings

In Review Report F-2013-005, the Commissioner considered subsection 11(2) of FOIP. The Ministry of Health (Health) had transferred two access to information requests to the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) stating that Justice held the responsive records for litigation purposes. However, Health acknowledged that there were responsive records “contained” within its Ministry. The Commissioner found that Health did not demonstrate that Justice had a “greater interest” in the records pursuant to subsection 11(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner also found that Health improperly transferred the requests to Justice. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that Health should have processed the responsive records it had in its possession in response to the request. The Commissioner recommended that Health complete a search for additional records it may have in its possession and process the records in response to the request.

Subsection 11(3)

Transfer of application

11(3) For the purposes of section 7, an application that is transferred pursuant to subsection (1) is deemed to have been made to the government institution on the day of the transfer.

Government institutions that receive a transferred access to information request must provide a response within 30 days.

In accordance with subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 142 Therefore, the 30-day clock begins the day following the day of transfer. For more on calculating time, see Section 7: Response Required, Calculating 30 Days, earlier in this Chapter.

The receiving government institution may extend the 30-day deadline pursuant to subsection 12(1) of FOIP. This means a maximum of 60 days to process. If the government institution intends to extend the timeline, it must comply with the requirements of section 12 of FOIP.

Applicants have a right to request a review of a government institution’s decision to extend a response time pursuant to subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP.

Section 12: Extension of Time

Extension of time

12(1) The head of a government institution may extend the period set out in section 7 or 11 for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days:

(a) where:

(i) the application is for access to a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records; or

(ii) there is a large number of requests;

and completing the work within the original period would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution;

(b) where consultations that are necessary to comply with the application cannot reasonably be completed within the original period; or

(c) where a third party notice is required to be given pursuant to subsection 34(1).

(2) A head who extends a period pursuant to subsection (1) shall give notice of the extension to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made.

(3) Within the period of extension, the head shall give written notice to the applicant in accordance with section 7.

Section 12 of FOIP provides that government institutions can extend the initial 30-day response deadline for a maximum of 30 more days. This means 60 days in total. However, this is only under limited circumstances, which are outlined in this section.

If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether the government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.143 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

When it comes to calculating the due date, subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, provides that the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 144 Therefore, the initial 30-day clock begins the day following receipt of the access to information request. For more on calculating time, see Section 7: Response Required, Calculating 30 Days, earlier in this Chapter.

Subsection 12(1)(a)

Extension of time

12(1) The head of a government institution may extend the period set out in section 7 or 11 for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days:

(a) where:

(i) the application is for access to a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records; or

(ii) there is a large number of requests;

and completing the work within the original period would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution;

Subsection 12(1)(a) of FOIP provides for an additional 30 days where:

  • The access to information request is for a large number of records.
  • A search through a large number of records is required.
  • A large number of access to information requests were received.

However, government institutions must demonstrate that even where one of the above circumstances exist, completing the work within the original 30 days would unreasonably interfere with the government institution’s operations.

If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.145 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

Subsection 12(1)(a)(i)

Subsection 12(1)(a)(i) of FOIP provides that an extension can be applied where there are a large number of records responsive to the request that require processing or where a search through a large number of records is required in order to respond to the request. In addition, completing this work within the original 30 days would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution.

Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review by the Commissioner if not satisfied with a decision of the government institution pursuant to section 12 of FOIP.

In the event an applicant requests a review of the government institution’s application of an extension, the Commissioner will consider whether the government institution’s application of the extension complied with section 12 of FOIP.

If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.146 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

For this purpose, both parts of the following test must be met:

1. Are there a large number of records requested or needing to be searched?

Volume considerations:

  • How many pages are involved?
  • Do the records require special handling?
  • Does the type of record require different methods of searching or handling? 147

    IPC Findings

    In Review Report F-2014-003, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General appropriately applied an extension for purposes of processing a large number of records. The Commissioner found that generally more than 500 records constitute a large number of records for purposes of subsection 12(1)(a)(i) of FOIP.

    In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

    In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

    2. Will meeting the original time limit unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution?

    Unreasonably interfere means going beyond the limits of what is reasonable or equitable in time and resources and the impact, which this use of resources would have on the government institution’s day-to-day activities.148

    Circumstances that may contribute to unreasonable interference:

    • Significant increase in access to information requests (e.g., sharp rise over 1-4 months)
    • Significant increase in access to information caseloads
    • Computer systems or technical problems
    • Unexpected employee leaves from the FOIP branch
    • Unusual number (high percentage) of new FOIP employees in training
    • Cross government requests
    • Program area discovers a significant amount of additional records
    • Type of records (maps, etc.)
    • Number of program areas searched
    • Location of records149

    Circumstances that would not qualify:

    • The government institution has not allocated the FOIP area sufficient resources
    • Long term or systemic problems
    • Vacations
    • Office processes (e.g., sign-off)
    • Personal commitments
    • Pre-planned events (e.g., retirements)
    • No work done during initial 30 days
    • Type of applicant (media, political, etc.) 150
    Subsection 12(1)(a)(ii)

    Subsection 12(1)(a)(ii) of FOIP provides that an extension can be applied where the government institution has received a large number of access to information requests and completing them within the original 30 days would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the public body.

    Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review by the Commissioner if not satisfied with a decision of the government institution pursuant to section 12 of FOIP.

    In the event an applicant requests a review of the government institution’s application of an extension, the Commissioner will consider whether the government institution’s application of the extension complied with section 12 of FOIP.

    If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.151 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

    For this purpose, both parts of the following test must be met:

    1. Were there a high number of requests at the time?

    Volume considerations:

    • How many requests are involved.
    • How does volume compare with average request volume.152

    IPC Findings

    In Review Report 158-2017, the Commissioner found that an increase from 69 to 112 requests (61.6% increase) qualified as a high number of requests for purposes of subsection 12(1)(a)(ii) of FOIP.

    In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner would not consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

    In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner would not consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

    2. Will meeting the original time limit unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution?

    Unreasonably interfere mean going beyond the limits of what is reasonable or equitable in time and resources and the impact, which this use of resources would have on the government institution’s day-to-day activities.153

    Circumstances that may contribute to unreasonable interference:

    • Significant increase in FOIP requests (e.g., sharp rise over 1-4 months)
    • Significant increase in FOIP caseloads
    • Computer systems or technical problems
    • Unexpected employee leaves from FOIP branch
    • Unusual number (high percentage) of new FOIP employees in training
    • Cross government requests
    • Program area discovers a significant amount of additional records
    • Type of records (maps, etc.)
    • Number of program areas searched
    • Location of records154

    Circumstances that would not qualify:

    • The government institution has not allocated the FOIP area sufficient resources
    • Long term or systemic problems
    • Vacations
    • Office processes (e.g., sign-off)
    • Personal commitments
    • Pre-planned events (e.g., retirements)
    • No work done during initial 30 days
    • Type of applicant (media, political, etc.) 155

    IPC Findings

    In Review Report 123-2015, the Commissioner found that, at least double the number of requests normally opened within the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) qualified as a “large number” of requests. In addition, because Justice had seven vacancies in its Freedom of Information and Privacy Branch, it was reasonable to consider the interference with its operations if it were to try to complete them within the original 30 days. Justice normally had 25 to 50 access to information requests. However, it had over 100 at the time it applied the extension.

    In Review Report 158-2017, the Commissioner found that a position becoming vacant in the FOIP unit during the time the access request was being processed met the second part of the test for subsection 12(1)(a)(ii) of FOIP. The Ministry of Energy and Resources was engaged in a staffing process to fill the vacant position.

    In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

      Subsection 12(1)(b)

      Extension of time

      12(1) The head of a government institution may extend the period set out in section 7 or 11 for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days:

      (b) where consultations that are necessary to comply with the application cannot reasonably be completed within the original period; or

      Subsection 12(1)(b) of FOIP provides that an extension can be applied where the government institution needs more time to consult in order to process the request. The consultations must be necessary in order to comply with the application.

      Comply with means to act in accordance with or fulfil the requirements.156

      Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review by the Commissioner if not satisfied with a decision of the government institution pursuant to section 12 of FOIP.

      In the event an applicant requests a review of the government institution’s application of an extension, the Commissioner will consider whether the government institution’s application of the extension complied with section 12 of FOIP.

      If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.157 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

      For this purpose, both parts of the following test must be met:

      1. Was the government institution consulting a third party or other public body?

      The government institution should be able to explain why it was necessary to consult with a third party or other public body in order to make a decision about access, including how the third party or other public body is expected to assist.

      Public body, in this context, means a separate government institution or local authority as defined by The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) or health trustee as defined by The Health Information Protection Act (HIPA).158

      Some valid reasons for consulting:

      • Third party or other public body has an interest in the records.
      • Records were created or controlled jointly. 159

      Consultations with staff, program areas or branches within the government institution processing the access to information request do not qualify for this provision. Internal consultations are part of every government institution’s routine responsibilities when responding to access to information requests. Therefore, activities that constitute consultations should be those outside of intrinsic and routine obligations of any government institution. 160

      Consultations for a purpose other than deciding whether to give access do not qualify for this provision. 161

      2. Was it not reasonable for the consultations to be completed within the first 30 days?

      Considerations:

      • When did the government institution initiate consultations.
      • Were a large number of consultations required.
      • Availability of third party and public body contacts.
      • Did the government institution set deadline expectations.
      • Is time required for consultation reasonable.
      • Did the government institution follow up on consultation requests.
      • Has the government institution proceeded with a phased release.162

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 261-2016 & 284-2016, the Commissioner found that an extension applied by the Ministry of Central Services at the same time of a fee estimate was not necessary and not in keeping with FOIP because the clock stopped when the fee estimate was issued.

      In Review Report F-2006-003, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice) appropriately applied an extension pursuant to subsections 12(1)(a)(i) and 12(1)(b) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that extending the response deadline for purposes of consultations was not appropriate. In arriving at this finding, the Commissioner noted that Justice did not provide sufficient explanation of the nature or complexity of the consultations. Furthermore, when considering why the consultations could not be completed within the original 30-day deadline, the Commissioner found that Justice did not offer any evidence that it sent additional reminders to the public bodies it had consulted to ensure that it would be in a position to respond to the applicant within the original 30-day deadline. The Commissioner also was not satisfied that Justice initiated and oversaw the consultations in a timely manner. In addition, the Commissioner found that many of the activities undertaken by Justice in preparation of its response did not constitute consultations under the provision.

      In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as such the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

      Subsection 12(1)(c)

      Extension of time

      12(1) The head of a government institution may extend the period set out in section 7 or 11 for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days:

      (c) where a third party notice is required to be given pursuant to subsection 34(1).

      Subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP provides that an extension can be applied where the government institution needs to provide notice to third parties pursuant to subsection 34(1) of FOIP.

      If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.163 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

      For more on notices to third parties, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 5, “Third Party Information”.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 311-2017, 312-2017, 313-2017, 316-2017, 340-2017, 341-2017, 342-2017,

      the Commissioner considered the timeframe under which the Global Transportation Hub (GTH) provided its response to an applicant. The Commissioner found that the GTH issued a fee estimate 25 days into the original 30-day deadline. Once the fee estimate was issued, the clock stopped until the applicant paid a 50% deposit. Once paid, this left only five days for GTH to provide a section 7 response. GTH then extended the response time an additional 30 days pursuant to subsection 12(1)(a) of FOIP. However, the GTH failed to provide a response within the extended 30-day deadline. GTH explained that the primary reason for the delay was significant objection by the third party to release of information. The Commissioner recommended that the GTH amend its procedures so that even where it is extending the response period, it ensures it is providing notice to third parties no later than the 30th day of the initial 30-day deadline. This would minimize the likelihood of GTH putting itself in a “deemed refusal” situation in the future.

      In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

      Subsection 12(2)

      Extension of time

      12(2) A head who extends a period pursuant to subsection (l) shall give notice of the extension to the applicant within 30 days after the application is made.

      Subsection 12(2) of FOIP provides that where a government institution intends to extend the response time, it must give notice of the extension to the applicant within the first 30 days following receipt of the access to information request.

      If a government institution does not give notice within the original 30 day deadline, it is no longer able to request an extension as its lack of response constitutes a “deemed refusal” pursuant to subsection 7(5) of FOIP. Subsection 12(2) of FOIP supports this view, as it requires that notice of an extension be given within 30 days of the application being made. 164

      If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.165 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

      Subsection 12(3)

      Extensions of time

      12(3) Within the period of extension, the head shall give written notice to the applicant in accordance with section 7.

      Subsection 12(3) of FOIP provides that following the extension, the government institution must provide its section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the extended 30-day deadline.

      In other words, the government institution has a maximum of 60 days to provide a section 7 decision letter to the applicant (initial 30 days + extension of up to 30 days).

      If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.166 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

      For more on notices to third parties, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 5, “Third Party Information”.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 311-2017, 312-2017, 313-2017, 316-2017, 340-2017, 341-2017, 342-2017,

      the Commissioner considered the timeframe under which the Global Transportation Hub (GTH) provided its response to an applicant. The Commissioner found that the GTH issued a fee estimate 25 days into the original 30-day deadline. Once the fee estimate was issued, the clock stopped until the applicant paid a 50% deposit. Once paid, this left only five days for GTH to provide a section 7 response. GTH then extended the response time an additional 30 days pursuant to subsection 12(1)(a) of FOIP. However, the GTH failed to provide a response within the extended 30-day deadline. GTH explained that the primary reason for the delay was significant objection by the third party to release of information. The Commissioner recommended that the GTH amend its procedures so that even where it is extending the response period, it ensures it is providing notice to third parties no later than the 30th day of the initial 30-day deadline. This would minimize the likelihood of GTH putting itself in a “deemed refusal” situation in the future.

      In Review Report 322-2021, 030-2022, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health (Health) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Health was not in compliance with subsection 12(3) of FOIP and as a result, the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Health was in compliance with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 164-2021, the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Corrections, Policing and Public Safety (Corrections) failed to provide the section 7 decision letter to the applicant within the period of extension. As such, the Commissioner found that Corrections was not in compliance with section 12(3) of FOIP and as a result the Commissioner did not need to consider whether Corrections had complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP. The Commissioner recommended Corrections follow its obligations pursuant to subsection 12(3) of FOIP.

      Section 31: Individual’s Access to Personal Information

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(1) Subject to Part III and subsection (2), an individual whose personal information is contained in a record in the possession or under the control of a government institution has a right to, and:

      (a) on an application made in accordance with Part II; and

      (b) on giving sufficient proof of his or her identity;

      shall be given access to the record.

      (2) A head may refuse to disclose to an individual personal information that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of government contracts and other benefits, where the information is provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence.

      This section can also be found in the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4: “Exemptions to the Right of Access” and Chapter 6: “Protection of Privacy” because it falls under Part IV of FOIP which deals with the protection of “personal information”.

      ‌Subsection 31(1)

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(1) Subject to Part III and subsection (2), an individual whose personal information is contained in a record in the possession or under the control of a government institution has a right to, and:

      (a) on an application made in accordance with Part II; and

      (b) on giving sufficient proof of his or her identity; shall be given access to the record.

      Subsection 31(1) of FOIP provides that upon application an individual is entitled to their own personal information contained within a record unless an exemption applies under Part III or subsection 31(2) of FOIP applies.

      Government institutions should interpret the exemptions to this right to personal information with a view to giving an individual as much access as possible.

      Records containing personal information may be very sensitive in nature, so care must be taken to ensure that proper safeguards are in place when these types of records are released.

      When providing an applicant with access to personal information, a government institution must be satisfied that the individual receiving the information is indeed the individual that the information is about or a duly appointed representative of that person.167 For more on duly appointed representatives, see Section 59: Exercise of Rights by Other Persons later in this Chapter.

      For more information on verifying the identity of the applicant, the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General issued the resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant. It provides helpful direction on steps that can be taken to verify identity.

      Subsection 31(2)

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(2) A head may refuse to disclose to an individual personal information that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of government contracts and other benefits, where the information is provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence.

      Subsection 31(2) of FOIP enables a government institution to withhold an individual’s information when it is evaluative or opinion material compiled for the purposes of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for employment.

      The provision attempts to address two competing interests: the right of an individual to have access to their personal information and the need to protect the flow of frank information to government institutions so that appropriate decisions can be made respecting the awarding of jobs, contracts, and other benefits.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the information personal information that is evaluative or opinion material?

      To qualify as personal information, the information must be about an identifiable individual and must be personal in nature. Some examples are provided in subsection 24(1) of FOIP. See Section 24 in the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

      Evaluative means to have assessed, appraised, to have found or to have stated the number of.168

      Opinion material is a belief or assessment based on grounds short of proof; a view held as probable for example, a belief that a person would be a suitable employee, based on that person’s employment history. An opinion is subjective in nature and may or may not be based on facts.169

      2. Was the personal information compiled solely for one of the enumerated purposes?

      Compiled means that the information was drawn from several sources or extracted, extrapolated, calculated or in some other way manipulated.170

      The enumerated purposes are:

      • For determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment.
      • For the awarding of contracts with the government institution.
      • For awarding other benefits.

      Suitability means right or appropriate for a particular person, purpose or situation.171

      Eligibility means fit and proper to be selected or to receive a benefit; legally qualified for an office, privilege or status.172

      Qualifications means the possession of qualities or properties inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for apposition or office, or to perform a public duty or function.173

      Employment means the selection for a position as an employee of a government institution.174

      Employment reference means personal information that is evaluative, or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of describing an individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment.175

      Award means to give or to order to be given as a payment, compensation or prize; to grant; to assign.176

      Benefit means a favourable or helpful factor or circumstance; advantage, profit.177

      Other benefits refer to benefits conferred by a government institution through an evaluative process. The term includes research grants, scholarships and prizes. It also includes appointments required for employment in a particular job or profession such as a bailiff or special constable.178

      Employee of a government institution means an individual employed by a government institution and includes an individual retained under a contract to perform services for the government institution.179

      The personal information must have been compiled solely for one of the enumerated purposes to qualify.

      3. Was the personal information provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information provided in confidence means that the supplier of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.180 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party providing the information.181

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.182

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was provided on the understanding that it would be kept confidential.183

      Factors considered when determining whether a document was provided in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the party providing it or by the government institution.184
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the party providing it and the government institution from the point at which it was provided until the present time.185
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.186
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records or information such as that in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the party providing it both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intended the information to be kept confidential but the other did not, the information is not considered to have been provided in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.187

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was provided implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.188

      Factors to consider when determining if a document was provided in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party providing it.189
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions to the party prior to the information being provided.190

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Two cases came before the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan dealing with the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [see s. 30(2)]. Those two cases are as follows:

      In Review Report LA-2004-001, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The review involved Lloydminster Public School Division (Division). An applicant requested access to records related to the applicant’s suitability for volunteering in after-school sport activities. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the evaluative or opinion material was not compiled for the purpose of determining the applicant’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of a contract or other benefit. It was compiled for the purpose of determining the suitability of a volunteer to engage in “volunteer” activity in an after-hours sports program. The Commissioner found that a volunteer does not meet the definition of “employee” of a local authority. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 30(2) of LA FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 258-2016, the Commissioner found that the name of the individual giving the opinion was also captured by the provision. The purpose and intent of the provision is to allow individuals to provide frank feedback where there is an evaluation process occurring. In addition, evaluating suitability for employment can take place not only during the hiring process but also during an employee’s tenure. Furthermore, the provision can include unsolicited records such as letters of concern or complaint (Fogal v. Regina School Division No. 4, (2002)).

      In Review Report 010-2018, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The review involved the South East Cornerstone Public School Division #209 (Cornerstone). An applicant was seeking parental complaints and witness statements regarding an incident. Cornerstone withheld the records pursuant to several provisions in LA FOIP including subsection 30(2) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records contained personal information that was evaluative or opinion material. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the personal information was compiled solely for the purpose of determining the applicant’s suitability for employment. Finally, the Commissioner found that the interview notes were provided explicitly in confidence. However, the written complaints were not provided implicitly or explicitly in confidence. The Commissioner recommended that Cornerstone sever the opinions and other personal information of individuals other than the applicant and release the rest.

      In Review Report 142-2022, the Commissioner considered a denial of access involving the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services). Social Services withheld portions of the record totaling 255 pages. It applied subsection 31(2) of FOIP to portions of the records. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the assessment information collected on the applicant was for the enumerated purpose of determining eligibility to an income program offered by Social Services. The assessment information contained the comments of the assessor.

      However, the Commissioner found that Social Services did not demonstrate that the scores on the assessment were provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 31(2) of FOIP did not apply.

      Section 45.1: Power to Authorize a Government Institution to Disregard Applications or Requests

      Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

      45.1(1) The head may apply to the commissioner to disregard one or more applications pursuant to section 6 or requests pursuant to section 32.

      (2) In determining whether to grant an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner shall consider whether the application or request:

      (a) would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request;

      (b) would amount to an abuse of the right of access or right of correction because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request; or

      (c) is frivolous or vexatious, not in good faith or concerns a trivial matter.

      (3) The application pursuant to subsection 6(1) or the request pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) is suspended until the commissioner notifies the head of the commissioner’s decision with respect to an application or request mentioned in subsection (1).

      (4) If the commissioner grants an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the application pursuant to subsection 6(1) or the request pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) is deemed to not have been made.

      (5) If the commissioner refuses an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the 30-day period mentioned in subsection 7(2) or subsection 32(2) resumes.

      The right of access to information is not absolute. The Legislature recognizes that there will be certain individuals who may use the access provisions of FOIP in a way that is contrary to the principles and objects of FOIP. 191

      Subsection 45.1(1)

      Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

      45.1(1) The head may apply to the commissioner to disregard one or more applications pursuant to section 6 or requests pursuant to section 32.

      Section 45.1 of FOIP provides government institutions the ability to apply to the Commissioner requesting authorization to disregard an access request (section 6 application) or a correction request (section 32 request) made by an applicant.

      Subsection 45.1(1) requires a government institution to make an application to the Commissioner. This should be in the form of a written application (letter) that includes evidence and argument about how the criteria under subsection 45.1(2) are met. Details of how to make an application are contained in the IPC resource, Application to Disregard an Access to Information Request or Request for Correction.

      An application to disregard is a serious matter as it could have the effect of removing an applicant’s express right to seek access to information. It is important for a government institution to remember that a request to disregard must present a sound basis for consideration and should be prepared with this in mind. 192

      Generally, the actions of applicants are not under scrutiny. They have no duty to be accountable to the provincial government. The law is in place to allow for the scrutiny of those who govern, not the other way around. When making access requests, applicants who frequently use the Act are exercising a statutory right. While some requests can be complicated and may even be intended as “fishing expeditions”, they are lawful and ought to be treated with respect. 193

      However, FOIP must not become a weapon for disgruntled individuals to use against a government institution for reasons that have nothing to do with the Act. 194

      For more on the IPC process for applications to disregard an application or request, see The Rules of Procedure.

      Subsection 45.1(2)(a)

      Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

      45.1(2) In determining whether to grant an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner shall consider whether the application or request:

      (a) would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request

      For this provision to be found to apply, the government institution would have to demonstrate that the applicant’s access to information requests or requests for correction interfere unreasonably with the operations of the government institution due to their repetitious or systematic nature.

      Both parts of the following test must be met:

      1. Are the requests for access or correction repetitious or systematic?

      Repetitious requests are requests that are made two or more times. 195

      Systematic requests are those made according to a method or plan of acting that is organized and carried out according to a set of rules or principles. 196 It includes a pattern of conduct that is regular or deliberate. 197 To be methodical; arranged, conducted, according to system; deliberate.198

      The following factors should be considered:

      • Are the requests repetitious (does the applicant ask more than once for the same records or information or for the same information to be corrected).
      • Are the requests similar in nature or do they stand alone as being different.
      • Do previous requests overlap to some extent.
      • Are the requests close in their filing time.
      • Does the applicant continue to engage in a determined effort to request the same information (an important factor in finding whether requests are systematic, is to determine whether they are repetitious).
      • Is there a pattern of conduct on the part of the applicant in making the repeated requests that is regular or deliberate.
      • Does the applicant methodically request records or information in many areas of interest over extended time periods, rather than focusing on accessing specific records or information of identified events or matters.
      • Has the applicant requested records or information of various aspects of the same issue.
      • Has the applicant made a number of requests related to matters referred to in records already received.
      • Does the applicant follow up on responses received by making further requests.
      • Does the applicant question the content of records received by making further access requests.
      • Does the applicant question whether records or information exist when told they do not.
      • Can the requests be seen as a continuum of previous requests rather than in isolation. 199

      The government institution should address any of the above factors that apply. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to the first part of the test being met.

      There is an important distinction to be drawn between overlap and repetition. Where there is overlap between requests that are made at the same time, only one search will be required for all of the overlapping requests. Where more than one request has been made for the same information at more than one time, more than one search will be required for the same information. The latter is repetitious; the former is not. 200

      Evidence of previous requests is relevant to the determination of whether the current request is repetitious. 201

      2. Do the repetitious or systematic requests unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution?

      To interfere with operations, the request(s) must obstruct or hinder the range of effectiveness of the government institution’s activities. The circumstances of the particular institution must be considered. For example, it would take less to interfere with the operations of a small municipality compared to a large ministry.

      Unreasonably interfere means going beyond the limits of what is reasonable or equitable in time and resources and the impact, which this use of resources would have on the government institution’s day-to-day activities.202

      Each of the following factors should be considered:

      • Are the requests large and complex, rather than confusing, vague, broadly worded, or wide-ranging (e.g., “all records” on a topic), without parameters such as date ranges.
      • Did the government institution seek clarification and was it obtained.
      • Did the clarification of the applicant’s requests, if obtained, provide useful details to enable the effective processing of the requests.
      • Do the applicant’s requests impair the government institution’s ability to respond to other requests in a timely fashion.
      • What is the amount of time to be committed for the processing of the request, such as:
        • Number of employees to be involved in processing the request;
        • Number of employees and hours expended to identify, retrieve, review, redact if necessary, and copy records;
        • Number of total employees in the same office; and
        • Whether there is an employee assigned solely to process access requests. 203

      For the second part of the test, the government institution should address all of the above factors in its application to the Commissioner.

      Requests for branch-wide searches could be found to amount to unreasonable interference, especially where an applicant is able to name the individuals who may possess the requested information. 204

      The government institution must meet a high threshold of showing “unreasonable interference”, as opposed to mere disruption. It will usually be the case that a request for information will pose some disruption or inconvenience to a government institution; that is not cause to keep information from a citizen exercising their democratic and quasi-constitutional rights. 205

      IPC Findings

      In Disregard Decision 181-2021, 182-2021, the Commissioner considered an application from Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) to disregard two access to information requests from an applicant. SGI asserted that the two access to information requests should be disregarded on the grounds that the requests amounted to an abuse of the right of access pursuant to subsections 45.1(2)(b) and (c) of FOIP. Specifically, SGI asserted the access to information requests were vexatious and not submitted in good faith. The Commissioner considered subsection 45.12(2)(c) of FOIP first at the request of SGI. While considering the application, the Commissioner noted that it was not the first disregard application from SGI involving the applicant and that the Commissioner had previously issued three disregard decisions and one Review Report. In each of the disregard cases, the Commissioner found the applicant’s conduct amounted to an abuse of the right of access. The current disregard application would be the fourth from SGI involving the applicant. Considering this and the additional arguments submitted by SGI in this case, the Commissioner found that SGI had established reasonable grounds for finding the applicant’s two requests were vexatious and not made in good faith within the meaning of subsection 45.1(2)(c) of FOIP. As a result of this finding, the Commissioner did not need to consider subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner noted that in the past three disregard decisions involving the applicant and SGI, the Commissioner had found that subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP applied because of the applicant’s conduct and as the circumstances in the present case were similar, it would likely result in a similar finding. Most notable in this disregard decision, is the Commissioner went further with the decision for the first time. The Commissioner was concerned with the cost and inefficiency of the multiple applications to disregard being submitted by SGI involving the applicant. Furthermore, that it was not in the public interest to unnecessarily add to SGI’s costs of complying with FOIP. In addition, other members of the public had an equal right to share in the public resources allocated to responding to access to information requests. When an individual overburdens the system in the way this applicant was, it has a negative impact on others who want to legitimately exercise their access to information rights. After considering how other jurisdictions handle similar situations, the Commissioner’s decision imposed other conditions not previously put forward. The Commissioner granted SGI’s application to disregard the two access to information requests. In addition, the Commissioner authorized SGI to disregard all future access to information requests made by or on behalf of the applicant that pertain to the motor vehicle accident in 2019. Upon issuance of the disregard decision, the Commissioner discontinued all reviews involving SGI and the applicant that were open pertaining to the motor vehicle accident pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP (three files at the time) and any future requests for review involving the motor vehicle accident in 2019 would not be conducted pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP.

      Subsection 45.1(2)(b)

      Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

      45.1(2) In determining whether to grant an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner shall consider whether the application or request:

      (b) would amount to an abuse of the right of access or right of correction because of the repetitious or systematic nature of the application or request; or

      For this provision to be found to apply, the government institution would have to demonstrate that the applicant’s access to information requests or requests for correction are of such a repetitious or systematic nature that they can be said to be an abuse of the right of access or correction.

      Both parts of the following test must be met:

      1. Are the requests for access or correction repetitious or systematic?

      Repetitious requests are requests that are made two or more times. 206

      Systematic requests are those made according to a method or plan of acting that is organized and carried out according to a set of rules or principles. 207 It includes a pattern of conduct that is regular or deliberate. 208

      The following factors should be considered:

      • Are the requests repetitious (does the applicant ask more than once for the same records or information or for the same information to be corrected).
      • Are the requests similar in nature or do they stand alone as being different.
      • Do previous requests overlap to some extent.
      • Are the requests close in their filing time.
      • Does the applicant continue to engage in a determined effort to request the same information (an important factor in finding whether requests are systematic, is to determine whether they are repetitious).
      • Is there a pattern of conduct on the part of the applicant in making the repeated requests that is regular or deliberate.
      • Does the applicant methodically request records or information in many areas of interest over extended time periods, rather than focusing on accessing specific records or information of identified events or matters.
      • Has the applicant requested records or information of various aspects of the same issue.
      • Has the applicant made a number of requests related to matters referred to in records already received.
      • Does the applicant follow up on responses received by making further requests.
      • Does the applicant question the content of records received by making further access requests.
      • Does the applicant question whether records or information exist when told they do not.
      • Can the requests be seen as a continuum of previous requests rather than in isolation. 209

      The government institution should address any of the above factors that apply. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to the first part of the test being met.

      There is an important distinction to be drawn between overlap and repetition. Where there is overlap between requests that are made at the same time, only one search will be required for all of the overlapping requests. Where more than one request has been made for the same information at more than one time, more than one search will be required for the same information. The latter is repetitious; the former is not. 210

      Evidence of previous requests is relevant to the determination of whether the current request is repetitious. 211

      2. Do the repetitious or systematic requests amount to an abuse of the right of access or correction?

      An abuse of the right of access or correction is where an applicant is using the access/correction provisions of FOIP in a way that is contrary to its principles and objects.

      Abuse of the right of access or correction can have serious consequences for the rights of others and for the public interest. By overburdening a government institution, misuse by one person can threaten or diminish a legitimate exercise of that same right by others. Such abuse also harms the public interest since it unnecessarily adds to a government institution’s costs of complying with the Act.

      Once it is determined that the requests are repetitious or systematic, one must consider whether there is a pattern or type of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or correction or are made for a purpose other than to obtain access to information or correction.

      It is possible to have a repetitious request without there being an abuse of the right of access. For example, applicants are not always sure how to word their access requests and may submit additional requests to pinpoint the specific records they are seeking. Although the requests may be repetitious, it would not be an abuse of the right of access. Such a situation would be better handled through the duty to assist and clarification with the applicant.

      The following factors should be considered:

      • Number of requests: is the number excessive.

      • Nature and scope of the requests: are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed. Are they identical to or similar to previous requests.

      • Purpose of the requests: are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access. For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the applicant’s aim to harass the public body or to break or burden the system.

      • Timing of the requests: is the timing of the requests connected to the occurrence of some other related event, such as a court or tribunal proceeding. 212

      • Wording of the requests: are the requests or subsequent communications in their nature offensive, vulgar, derogatory or contain unfounded allegations.

      Offensive or intimidating conduct or comments by applicants is unwarranted and harmful. They can also suggest that an applicant’s objectives are not legitimately about access to records. Requiring employees to be subjected to and to respond to offensive, intimidating, threatening, insulting conduct or comments can have a detrimental effect on well-being. 213

      The government institution should address any of the above factors that apply. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to the second part of the test being met.

      IPC Findings

      In Disregard Decision 343-2019, 352-2019 the Commissioner considered section 45.1 of FOIP for the first time. The Saskatchewan Worker’s Compensation Board (WCB) applied to the Commissioner for authorization to disregard two access to information requests that an applicant had made to the WCB. The Commissioner found that the applicant’s two requests were repetitious and an abuse of the right of access pursuant to subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP. As such, the Commissioner authorized the WCB to disregard the two access to information requests.

      In Disregard Decision 181-2021, 182-2021, the Commissioner considered an application from Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) to disregard two access to information requests from an applicant. SGI asserted that the two access to information requests should be disregarded on the grounds that the requests amounted to an abuse of the right of access pursuant to subsections 45.1(2)(b) and (c) of FOIP. Specifically, SGI asserted the access to information requests were vexatious and not submitted in good faith. The Commissioner considered subsection 45.12(2)(c) of FOIP first at the request of SGI. While considering the application, the Commissioner noted that it was not the first disregard application from SGI involving the applicant and that the Commissioner had previously issued three disregard decisions and one Review Report. In each of the disregard cases, the Commissioner found the applicant’s conduct amounted to an abuse of the right of access. The current disregard application would be the fourth from SGI involving the applicant. Considering this and the additional arguments submitted by SGI in this case, the Commissioner found that SGI had established reasonable grounds for finding the applicant’s two requests were vexatious and not made in good faith within the meaning of subsection 45.1(2)(c) of FOIP. As a result of this finding, the Commissioner did not need to consider subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner noted that in the past three disregard decisions involving the applicant and SGI, the Commissioner had found that subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP applied because of the applicant’s conduct and as the circumstances in the present case were similar, it would likely result in a similar finding. Most notable in this disregard decision, is the Commissioner went further with the decision for the first time. The Commissioner was concerned with the cost and inefficiency of the multiple applications to disregard being submitted by SGI involving the applicant. Furthermore, that it was not in the public interest to unnecessarily add to SGI’s costs of complying with FOIP. In addition, other members of the public had an equal right to share in the public resources allocated to responding to access to information requests. When an individual overburdens the system in the way this applicant was, it has a negative impact on others who want to legitimately exercise their access to information rights. After considering how other jurisdictions handle similar situations, the Commissioner’s decision imposed other conditions not previously put forward. The Commissioner granted SGI’s application to disregard the two access to information requests. In addition, the Commissioner authorized SGI to disregard all future access to information requests made by or on behalf of the applicant that pertain to the motor vehicle accident in 2019. Upon issuance of the disregard decision, the Commissioner discontinued all reviews involving SGI and the applicant that were open pertaining to the motor vehicle accident pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP (three files at the time) and any future requests for review involving the motor vehicle accident in 2019 would not be conducted pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP.

      Subsection 45.1(2)(c)

      Power to authorize a government institution to disregard applications or requests

      45.1(2) In determining whether to grant an application or request mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner shall consider whether the application or request:

      (c) is frivolous or vexatious, not in good faith or concerns a trivial matter.

      For this provision to be found to apply, the government institution would have to demonstrate that the applicant’s access to information request(s) or request(s) for correction is frivolous, vexatious, not in good faith or concerns a trivial matter.

      Similar to subsection 50(2) of FOIP, the following definitions and factors have been established:

      Frivolous is typically associated with matters that are trivial or without merit, lacking a legal or factual basis or legal or factual merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful; of little weight or importance. 214

      Vexatious means without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. 215 A request is vexatious when the primary purpose of the request is not to gain access to information but to continually or repeatedly harass a government institution in order to obstruct or grind a government institution to a standstill. It is usually taken to mean with intent to annoy, harass, embarrass or cause discomfort. 216

      A request is not vexatious simply because a government institution is annoyed or irked because the request is for information the release of which may be uncomfortable for the government institution. 217

      However, FOIP must not become a weapon for disgruntled individuals to use against a government institution for reasons that have nothing to do with the Act. 218

      A vexatious proceeding means “…that the litigant’s mental state goes beyond simple animus against the other side and rises to a situation where the litigant is attempting to abuse or misuse the legal process”: Jamieson v Denman, 2004 ABQB 593 (CanLII), para 127. 219 In Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII), Michalyshyn J identified a “catalogue” of features of vexatious litigation:

      • Collateral attack.
      • Hopeless proceedings.
      • Escalating proceedings.
      • Bringing proceedings for improper purposes.
      • Initiating “busybody” lawsuits to enforce alleged rights of third parties.
      • Failure to honour court-ordered obligations.
      • Persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.
      • Persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behavior.
      • Unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud and misconduct.
      • Scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court.
      • Advancing “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument.”

      Any of these indicia are a basis to classify a legal action as vexatious. 220

      There is no burden on an applicant to show that the access to information request is for a legitimate purpose. It is not improper to request information from the state for the purpose of seeking civil redress arising from the manner in which the state conducted proceedings against an applicant. 221

      When considering whether a request was made on grounds that are frivolous or vexatious, the Commissioner is determining whether there is a pattern or type of conduct on the part of the applicant that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or correction.

      An abuse of the right of access or correction is where an applicant is using the access/correction provisions of FOIP in a way that are contrary to its principles and objects.

      The following factors should be considered:

      • Number of requests: is the number excessive.

      • Nature and scope of the requests: are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed. Are they identical to or similar to previous requests.

      • Purpose of the requests: are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access. For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the applicant’s aim to harass the public body or to break or burden the system.

      • Timing of the requests: is the timing of the requests connected to the occurrence of some other related event, such as a court or tribunal proceeding. 222

      • Wording of the request: are the requests or subsequent communications in their nature offensive, vulgar, derogatory or contain unfounded allegations. Offensive or intimidating conduct or comments by applicants is unwarranted and harmful. They can also suggest that an applicant’s objectives are not legitimately about access to records. Requiring employees to be subjected to and to respond to offensive, intimidating, threatening, insulting conduct or comments can have a detrimental effect on well-being. 223

      The government institution should address any of the above factors that apply. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to a finding that a request is an abuse of the right of access or correction.

      Good faith means that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. Good faith is an intangible quality encompassing honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or take advantage of something.224

      Not in good faith means the opposite of “good faith”, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or other contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights, but by some interested or sinister motive. 225

      When an applicant refuses to cooperate with a government institution in the process of accessing information or if a party misrepresents events to the IPC, this could suggest the party is not acting in good faith. 226

      The intention to use information obtained from an access request in a manner that is disadvantageous to the government institution does not qualify as bad faith. To the contrary, it is appropriate for requesters to seek information “to publicize what they consider to be inappropriate or problematic decisions or processes undertaken” 227 by government institutions. Applicants do not need to justify a request and FOIP does not place limits on what an applicant can do with the information once access has been granted. 228

      A trivial matter is something insignificant, unimportant or without merit. It is similar to frivolous.

      Information that may be trivial from one person’s perspective, however, may be of importance from another’s. Therefore, what is trivial is somewhat subjective. 229

      IPC Findings

      In Disregard Decision 181-2021, 182-2021, the Commissioner considered an application from Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) to disregard two access to information requests from an applicant. SGI asserted that the two access to information requests should be disregarded on the grounds that the requests amounted to an abuse of the right of access pursuant to subsections 45.1(2)(b) and (c) of FOIP. Specifically, SGI asserted the access to information requests were vexatious and not submitted in good faith. The Commissioner considered subsection 45.12(2)(c) of FOIP first at the request of SGI. While considering the application, the Commissioner noted that it was not the first disregard application from SGI involving the applicant and that the Commissioner had previously issued three disregard decisions and one Review Report. In each of the disregard cases, the Commissioner found the applicant’s conduct amounted to an abuse of the right of access. The current disregard application would be the fourth from SGI involving the applicant. Considering this and the additional arguments submitted by SGI in this case, the Commissioner found that SGI had established reasonable grounds for finding the applicant’s two requests were vexatious and not made in good faith within the meaning of subsection 45.1(2)(c) of FOIP. As a result of this finding, the Commissioner did not need to consider subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner noted that in the past three disregard decisions involving the applicant and SGI, the Commissioner had found that subsection 45.1(2)(b) of FOIP applied because of the applicant’s conduct and as the circumstances in the present case were similar, it would likely result in a similar finding. Most notable in this disregard decision, is the Commissioner went further with the decision for the first time. The Commissioner was concerned with the cost and inefficiency of the multiple applications to disregard being submitted by SGI involving the applicant. Furthermore, that it was not in the public interest to unnecessarily add to SGI’s costs of complying with FOIP. In addition, other members of the public had an equal right to share in the public resources allocated to responding to access to information requests. When an individual overburdens the system in the way this applicant was, it has a negative impact on others who want to legitimately exercise their access to information rights. After considering how other jurisdictions handle similar situations, the Commissioner’s decision imposed other conditions not previously put forward. The Commissioner granted SGI’s application to disregard the two access to information requests. In addition, the Commissioner authorized SGI to disregard all future access to information requests made by or on behalf of the applicant that pertain to the motor vehicle accident in 2019. Upon issuance of the disregard decision, the Commissioner discontinued all reviews involving SGI and the applicant that were open pertaining to the motor vehicle accident pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP (three files at the time) and any future requests for review involving the motor vehicle accident in 2019 would not be conducted pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (a.7) of FOIP.

      Section 49: Application for Review

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a) an applicant is not satisfied with the decision of a head pursuant to section 7, 12 or 37;

      (a.1) an applicant is not satisfied that a reasonable fee was estimated pursuant to subsection 9(2);

      (a.2) an applicant believes that all or part of the fee estimated should be waived pursuant to subsection 9(5);

      (a.3) an applicant believes that an application was transferred to another government institution pursuant to subsection 11(1) and that government institution did not have a greater interest;

      (a.4) an individual believes that his or her personal information has not been collected, used or disclosed in accordance with this Act or the regulations;

      (b) a head fails to respond to an application for access to a record within the required time; or

      (c) an applicant requests a correction of personal information pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) and the correction is not made;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      (2) An applicant or individual may make an application pursuant to subsection (1) within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head or of the expiration of the time mentioned in clause (1)(b).

      (3) A third party may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of a decision pursuant to section 37 to give access to a record that affects the interest of the third party.

      (4) A third party may make an application pursuant to subsection (3) within 20 days after being given notice of the decision.

      Section 49 of FOIP provides the circumstances under which an applicant, individual or third party can request a review by the Commissioner.

      Those who wish to make a request for review can do so using Form B found in the Appendix, Part II of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s response to the applicant’s access to information request or privacy complaint. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests for review that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      Applicants can request a review of one issue or several issues. The issues identified in the request for review are considered the “scope of the review”. The scope generally remains the same through the course of the review. If the applicant raises new issues, a new request for review is needed and, in most cases, a separate file is opened.

      The Commissioner is an independent Officer of the Legislative Assembly. The Commissioner has oversight over FOIP and jurisdiction to review compliance of FOIP by all government institutions in Saskatchewan subject to it.

      The Commissioner is neutral and does not represent a government institution or an applicant in a review or investigation.

      The Commissioner prepares a report on the completion of a review or investigation, which includes findings and recommendations for the government institution. The government institution has a responsibility to respond to the Commissioner’s report under section 56 of FOIP indicating whether it will comply with the recommendations. If not satisfied with the response from the government institution, an applicant can pursue an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. The Court of King’s Bench will determine the matter de novo.

      A hearing de novo means a review of a matter anew, as if the original hearing had not taken place. 230

      For more on the IPC review process, see The Rules of Procedure.

      For more on the role of the Commissioner, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP” at Information and Privacy Commissioner – Roles and Responsibilities.

      Subsection 49(1)(a)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a) an applicant is not satisfied with the decision of a head pursuant to section 7, 12 or 37;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review of decisions made by the government institution pursuant to:

      • Section 7 (response required).
      • Section 12 (extension of time).
      • Section 37 (decision following third party notice).

      Section 7 involves any decision related to the government institution’s section 7 response to the applicant. Under this provision, applicants can request a review where the government institution has:

      • Not provided a response that contains the elements required by subsection 7(2).231
      • Not responded openly, accurately, or completely (s. 5.1).
      • Has deemed the applicant’s access request abandoned (s. 7.1).
      • Has offered access in a manner the applicant does not agree with (s. 10).
      • Denied access because records were deemed not responsive.
      • Denied access because the record is published (publicly available).
      • Denied access because the record will be published within 90 days.
      • Denied access because exemptions apply.
      • Denied access because records do not exist.
      • Denied access because the government institution refused to confirm or deny the existence of records.

      A review involving section 12 would be any decision related to the government institution’s extension of the time allotted to respond to an applicant’s access to information request. Applicants can request a review:

      • Of the decision to extend the deadline for a response (s. 12).
      • Of the contents and timing of the notice to the applicant (s.12(2) and 12(3)).

      In terms of calculating time, subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act provides that the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 232 Therefore, the initial 30-day clock begins the day following receipt of the access to information request. For more on the timeframe for responses see Section 7: Response Required, Calculating 30 Days, earlier in this Chapter.

      If a government institution has not complied with subsection 12(3) of FOIP, the Commissioner will not consider whether a government institution has complied with subsections 12(1) or 12(2) of FOIP.233 Therefore, government institutions should ensure that the section 7 decision letter is provided to the applicant within the period of the extension.

      A review involving section 37 of FOIP would be focused on the decision of the government institution to deny access to information or records following a consideration of a third party’s representations. Applicants can request a review:

      • Of the government institution’s decision to deny access to information deemed third party information.
      • Of the content or timing of the government institution’s notice [s. 37(1)(b)/37(2)]; and/or
      • Of the lack of notice [s. 37(4)].

      Subsection 49(1)(a.1)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a.1) an applicant is not satisfied that a reasonable fee was estimated pursuant to subsection 9(2);

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.1) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review of the government institution’s fee estimate. Applicants can request a review of how:

      • The fee estimate was provided (s. 7(2)(a)).
      • Access was provided following payment of fees (s. 9(2)).
      • Payment of a deposit was handled (s. 9(4)).
      • The fee estimate was calculated (s. 6 FOIP Regulations).
      • Fees exceeding the estimate were handled (s. 7(2) FOIP Regulations).
      • Fees for records that were refused were handled (s. 8(1) FOIP Regulations).
      • Refunds of fees were handled (s. 8(2) FOIP Regulations).

      Government institutions issue fee estimates in accordance with subsection 7(2)(a) and section 9 of FOIP. In addition, fee estimates are issued pursuant to sections 6, 7 and 8 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      Reviews involving fee estimates can occur both at the time the fee estimate was issued or after the fee has already been paid and records provided to an applicant. For all fee reviews, the IPC requires details on how the fee amount was arrived at. This includes how fees were calculated for search, preparation and reproduction of the record.

      For this reason, a government institution should retain details and notes about its search, preparation and reproduction so it can support the amount of the fee estimate in the event of a review.

      Fee estimates under FOIP are generally judged on the basis of whether they are reasonable and equitable. A fee estimate is reasonable when it is proportionate to the work required on the part of the government institution to respond efficiently and effectively to the applicant’s request. A fee estimate is equitable when it is fair and even-handed, that is, when it supportsthe principle that applicants should bear a reasonable portion of the cost of producing the information they are seeking, but not costs arising from administrative inefficiencies or poor records management practices. 234

      If the fees end up being less than what was originally estimated, the government institution should refund the applicant accordingly as required by subsection 7(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      Fees cannot be charged to the applicant when access to the record is refused pursuant to subsection 8(1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      For more on fee estimates, see Section 9: Fee, earlier in this Chapter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.2)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a.2) an applicant believes that all or part of the fee estimated should be waived pursuant to subsection 9(5);

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.2) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review of the government institution’s decision not to waive some or all of the fees. Applicants can request a review:

      • Of the decision not to waive some or all of the fees (s. 9 of FOIP Regulations).

      Subsection 9(5) of FOIP provides that a government institution can waive payment of all or part of the fees in prescribed circumstances. The prescribed circumstances are outlined at section 9 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      For more on waiving of fees, see Section 9: Fee, Assessing Fees, Subsection 9(5), Fee Waivers earlier in this Chapter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.3)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a.3) an applicant believes that an application was transferred to another government institution pursuant to subsection 11(1) and that government institution did not have a greater interest;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.3) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review of the government institution’s decision to transfer the applicant’s access to information request (s. 11).

      For more on transfers, see Section 11: Transfer of Application, earlier in this Chapter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.4)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a.4) an individual believes that his or her personal information has not been collected, used or disclosed in accordance with this Act or the regulations;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.4) of FOIP provides that an individual can request a review if the individual believes that his or her personal information has not been collected, used or disclosed in accordance with FOIP or The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      The IPC refers to these reviews as “privacy breach investigations” and the individuals requesting them as “complainants”.

      Subsection 49(1)(a.4) of FOIP refers to a “prescribed form” that should be submitted to the Commissioner. Subsection 2(1)(h) of FOIP provides:

      2(1) In this Act:

      (h) “prescribed” means prescribed in the regulations;

      Individuals who wish to request an investigation by the Commissioner because they are not satisfied with how a government institution handled their privacy breach complaint, can do so using Form B found in the Appendix, Part II of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s response to the individual’s privacy complaint. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      Privacy in terms of ‘information privacy’ means the right of the individual to determine when, how and to what extent he or she will share information about him/herself with others. Privacy captures both security and confidentiality of personal information. 235

      privacy breach happens when there is an unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal information, regardless of whether the personal information ends up in a third party’s possession. 236

      An unauthorized collection, use or disclosure is one that does not comply with Part IV of FOIP. Part IV of FOIP contains the privacy provisions related to a government institution’s handling of personal information of individuals.

      The IPC is the office of last resort. For the Commissioner to consider a request for a privacy breach investigation, the complainant should take the following steps first:

      1. The individual has made a written complaint to the government institution. Government institutions must have the opportunity to address an individual’s privacy concerns first. It is only after this has occurred, and the individual is still not satisfied, that the IPC can investigate.
      2. The government institution has responded (provide 30 days for a response). The IPC considers it reasonable to allow a government institution 30 days to respond to a privacy complaint. If an individual does not receive a response, it should follow up with the government institution.
      3. Once a response is received from the government institution, if the individual is still not satisfied with how their concerns were handled, the individual can request the Commissioner investigate. The Commissioner cannot levy fines. The Commissioner’s objective in an investigation is to assist government institutions with ensuring its policies and practices are compliant with FOIP. Outcomes of investigations where a privacy breach is found to have occurred generally, result in recommendations that policies and/or procedures be amended and/or individuals receive apologies for the breach.

      To proceed, the Commissioner needs sufficient information and evidence that a breach of privacy may have occurred. When making the complaint, the following should be provided to the IPC:

      1. A written complaint to the Commissioner:

      a. include details of the alleged breach; and

      b. attach any evidence that supports the complaint.

      2. A copy of the response from the government institution or indication that a response was not provided within a reasonable period (i.e., 30 calendar days).

      3. A copy of the original complaint submitted to the government institution and any supporting evidence of the breach.

      For more on the role and authorities of the Commissioner see, Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2: “Administration of FOIP”, Information and Privacy Commissioner – Roles & Responsibilities.

      For more on the IPC process for an investigation, see The Rules of Procedure.

      Subsection 49(1)(b)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (b) a head fails to respond to an application for access to a record within the required time; or

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(b) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review if the government institution fails to respond to an access to information request within the required time. The required time is either the initial 30 days or the extended maximum 60 days.

      In terms of calculating time, subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act provides that the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 237 Therefore, the initial 30-day clock begins the day following receipt of the access to information request.

      For more on response requirements, see Section 7: Response Required, earlier in this Chapter.

      Subsection 49(1)(c)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (c) an applicant requests a correction of personal information pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) and the correction is not made;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1)(c) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review where the applicant requested a government institution correct personal information and the government institution decided not to make the correction.

      Applicants who wish to make a request for review because they are not satisfied with how a government institution handled their correction request, can do so using Form B found in the Appendix, Part II of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s response to the applicant’s correction request. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests for review that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      For the Commissioner to conduct a review, the information must constitute the applicant’s personal information. In addition, the applicant must be able to specify what information is incorrect and why.

      For more on the right to request correction of personal information, see Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”, at Section 32: Right of correction.

      Subsection 49(2)

      Application for review

      49(2) An applicant or individual may make an application pursuant to subsection (1) within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head or of the expiration of the time mentioned in clause (1)(b).

      Subsection 49(2) of FOIP provides that applicants may make a request for review to the Commissioner within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the government institution.

      Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, provides that the first day is excluded in the calculation of time. 238 In addition, if the due date falls on a holiday, the due date falls on the next day that is not a holiday. 239

      If an applicant did not receive a response from the government institution, the applicant has one year from the 30th day under which the government institution was deemed to have responded pursuant to subsection 7(5) of FOIP.

      Subsection 49(3)

      Application for review

      49(3) A third party may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of a decision pursuant to section 37 to give access to a record that affects the interest of the third party.

      Subsection 49(3) of FOIP provides that a third party can request a review by the Commissioner. Third parties can request a review where a government institution has decided to provide access to information or records pursuant to section 37 of FOIP.

      Third party means a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution. 240

      A government institution may have information in its records that engage third party interests. When an access to information request is received and records or information appear to engage the interests of a third party and the government institution intends to provide access to the information or records, the government institution must provide notice to the third party pursuant to section 34 of FOIP.

      The types of information that may engage a third party includes:

      • The information described in subsection 19(1) of FOIP.
      • Personal information described in section 24(1) of FOIP but only if the government intends to release it pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP.‌

      Upon receiving notice, a third party has a right to make representations to the government institution explaining why it believes the information should not be released (section 36 of FOIP).

      After considering the representations, the government institution must decide whether it intends to release the information. The government institution must give notice of its decision to the third party (section 37 of FOIP).

      If the third party is not satisfied with that decision, it can request a review by the Commissioner pursuant to subsection 49(3) of FOIP. That request must be made within 20 days after receiving the government institution’s decision (subsection 49(4) of FOIP).

      For more on third parties and the timelines involved in third party notices see Guide to FOIP, Chapter 5, “Third Party Information”.

      Subsection 49(4)

      Application for review

      49(4) A third party may make an application pursuant to subsection (3) within 20 days after being given notice of the decision.

      Subsection 49(4) of FOIP provides that where a third party requests the Commissioner review the decision of the government institution, it must make that request within 20 days after receiving the government institution’s decision.

      Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, provides that the first day is excluded in the calculation of time.241 In addition, if the due date falls on a holiday, the due date falls on the next day that is not a holiday.242

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 012-2018, the Commissioner considered whether a request for review had been received from the third party within the legislated 20-day deadline. The third party had said it missed the 20-day deadline because it was confused about how to request a review. The Commissioner found that the City of Regina (City) met its duty to assist when it informed the third party of its right to request a review and how the third party could request one. The Commissioner further found that the third party did not request the review within the legislated timeline of 20 days after receiving the City’s notice that it intended to release information. The Commissioner recommended that the City provide the applicant with the records.

      Section 50: Review or Refusal to Review

      Review or refusal to review

      50(1) Where the commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to review any matter set out in an application pursuant to section 49, the commissioner shall review the matter.

      (2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a) is frivolous or vexatious;

      (a.1) does not affect the applicant or individual personally;

      (a.2) has not moved forward as the applicant or individual has failed to respond to the requests of the commissioner;

      (a.3) concerns a government institution that has an internal review process that has not been used;

      (a.4) concerns a professional who is governed by a professional body that regulates its members pursuant to an Act, and a complaints procedure available through the professional body has not been used;

      (a.5) may be considered pursuant to another Act that provides a review or other mechanism to challenge a government institution’s decision with respect to the collection, amendment, use or disclosure of personal information and that review or mechanism has not been used;

      (a.6) does not contain sufficient evidence;

      (a.7) has already been the subject of a report pursuant to section 55 by the commissioner;

      (b) is not made in good faith; or

      (c) concerns a trivial matter.

      Subsection 50(1)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(1) Where the commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to review any matter set out in an application pursuant to section 49, the commissioner shall review the matter.

      Subsection 50(1) of FOIP provides that where the Commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to conduct a review on any matter set out in section 49 of FOIP, the Commissioner will conduct a review.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 023-2017 & 078-2017, the Commissioner considered the issue of non-responsive information. SaskPower had removed portions of two documents based on its interpretation of the applicant’s access to information request. Upon review, SaskPower asserted that the applicant did not have an “unfettered right to a review” by the Commissioner and the Commissioner must first be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to review. SaskPower further argued that there were no reasonable grounds to review whether the entirety of the documents were responsive to the access request. The Commissioner reminded SaskPower that subsection 7(2)(d) of FOIP required government institutions to set out the reason for refusal and identify the specific provision of FOIP on which refusal is based. Further, there was no explicit authority in FOIP to redact records as “non responsive”. Finally, that the Commissioner currently accepts the application of “non-responsive” to information in records, however, the practice may be reconsidered if its application by government institutions is counter to the purposes of FOIP. The Commissioner found that there were reasonable grounds to review the issue of “non-responsive”. The Commissioner recommended that when SaskPower removes information from documents that it include an explanation in its responses to applicants.

      Subsection 50(2)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a)is frivolous or vexatious;

      (a.1) does not affect the applicant or individual personally;

      (a.2) has not moved forward as the applicant or individual has failed to respond to the requests of the commissioner;

      (a.3) concerns a government institution that has an internal review process that has not been used;

      (a.4) concerns a professional who is governed by a professional body that regulates its members pursuant to an Act, and a complaints procedure available through the professional body has not been used;

      (a.5) may be considered pursuant to another Act that provides a review or other mechanism to challenge a government institution’s decision with respect to the collection, amendment, use or disclosure of personal information and that review or mechanism has not been used;

      (a.6) does not contain sufficient evidence;

      (a.7) has already been the subject of a report pursuant to section 55 by the commissioner;

      (b) is not made in good faith; or

      (c) concerns a trivial matter.

      Subsection 50(2) of FOIP permits the Commissioner to dismiss or discontinue a review where it appears an applicant is not utilizing the access provisions of FOIP appropriately.

      A government institution can request the Commissioner dismiss or discontinue a review based on subsection 50(2) of FOIP. The government institution should provide its arguments in support of its position to the IPC.

      The Commissioner may also initiate this process independent of a request from a government institution where it appears appropriate.

      Subsection 50(2)(a)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a) is frivolous or vexatious;

      Subsection 52(2)(a) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can refuse to conduct a review or discontinue one where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the request for review is frivolous or vexatious.

      Frivolous is typically associated with matters that are trivial or without merit, lacking a legal or factual basis or legal or factual merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful; of little weight or importance. 243

      Vexatious means without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. A request is vexatious when the primary purpose of the request is not to gain access to information but to continually or repeatedly harass a government institution in order to obstruct or grind a government institution to a standstill. It is usually taken to mean with intent to annoy, harass, embarrass or cause discomfort. 244

      A request is not vexatious simply because a government institution is annoyed or irked because the request is for information the release of which may be uncomfortable for the government institution.245

      FOIP must not become a weapon for disgruntled individuals to use against a government institution for reasons that have nothing to do with the Act. 246

      A vexatious proceeding means “…that the litigant’s mental state goes beyond simple animus against the other side and rises to a situation where the litigant is attempting to abuse or misuse the legal process”: Jamieson v Denman, 2004 ABQB 593 (CanLII), para 127. 247 In Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII), Michalyshyn J identified a “catalogue” of features of vexatious litigation:

        1. Collateral attack.
        2. Hopeless proceedings.
        3. Escalating proceedings.
        4. Bringing proceedings for improper purposes.
        5. Initiating “busybody” lawsuits to enforce alleged rights of third parties.
        6. Failure to honour court-ordered obligations.
        7. Persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.
        8. Persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behavior.
        9. Unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud and misconduct.
        10. Scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court.
        11. Advancing “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument.”

      Any of these indicia are a basis to classify a legal action as vexatious. 248

      It is not improper to request information from the state for the purpose of seeking civil redress arising from the manner in which the state conducted proceedings against an applicant. 249

      When considering whether a request for review was made on grounds that are frivolous or vexatious, the Commissioner is determining whether there is a pattern or type of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to a finding that a request is an abuse of the right of access. 250 The following are the factors considered when determining if there is a pattern or type of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access:

      • Number of requests: is the number excessive. Where the volume of requests interferes with the operations of a public body it can be argued the requests are excessive. To interfere with operations, the volume of requests must obstruct or hinder the range of effectiveness of the government institution’s activities.

      • Nature and scope of the requests: are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed. Are they identical to or similar to previous requests.

      • Purpose of the requests: are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access. For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the applicant’s aim to harass the government institution or to break or burden the system.

      • Timing of the requests: is the timing of the requests connected to the occurrence of some other related event, such as a court or tribunal proceeding. 251

      • Wording of the request: are the requests or subsequent communications in their nature offensive, vulgar, derogatory or contain unfounded allegations. Offensive or intimidating conduct or comments by applicants is unwarranted and harmful. They can also suggest that an applicant’s objectives are not legitimately about access to records. Requiring employees to be subjected to and to respond to offensive, intimidating, threatening, insulting conduct or comments can have a detrimental effect on well-being. 252

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2010-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 50(2) of FOIP. A series of access to information requests were repeatedly submitted by an applicant to six separate government institutions. Requests for review were submitted to the IPC on the grounds that the six government institutions failed to meet their obligations under section 7 of FOIP. Through the course of the reviews, the government institutions raised the issue that the requests for review were frivolous, vexatious, and not in good faith pursuant to subsection 50(2). The Commissioner considered the actions of the applicant and agreed the applicant was engaging in a pattern of conduct that was vexatious and not in good faith. The Commissioner discontinued the reviews pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (b) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 053-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 50(2)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General (Justice). Justice responded to the applicant providing partial access to a report. The applicant requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon review, Justice requested the Commissioner dismiss the review as frivolous and vexatious pursuant to subsection 50(2)(a) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the circumstances of the case did not meet the threshold to support a finding that the request for review was frivolous or vexatious. The review continued.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.1)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.1) does not affect the applicant or individual personally;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.1) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review does not affect the applicant personally. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.2)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.2) has not moved forward as the applicant or individual has failed to respond to the requests of the commissioner;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.2) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the applicant has failed to respond to requests from the Commissioner and as a result the request has not moved forward. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.3)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.3) concerns a government institution that has an internal review process that has not been used;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.3) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review involves a government institution that has an internal review process that has not been used. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.4)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.4) concerns a professional who is governed by a professional body that regulates its members pursuant to an Act, and a complaints procedure available through the professional body has not been used;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.4) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review concerns a professional who is governed by a professional body that regulates its members pursuant to an Act, and a complaints procedure is available that has not been used. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.5)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.5) may be considered pursuant to another Act that provides a review or other mechanism to challenge a government institution’s decision with respect to the collection, amendment, use or disclosure of personal information and that review or mechanism has not been used;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.5) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review may be considered pursuant to another Act. The other Act should provide a review or other mechanism to challenge a government institution’s decision with respect to collection, use, disclosure or correction of personal information and that review or mechanism was not used. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.6)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.6) does not contain sufficient evidence;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.6) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review does not contain sufficient evidence. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Validity Test

      There are times when a privacy complaint is received, and it needs to be tested for validity. To test for validity means to measure the degree of accuracy in the complaint to see if there is enough evidence to proceed with an investigation.

      Validity means actually supporting the intended point or claim. To validate is to check or prove the validity of.253

      To test validity, the following three questions can be considered:

      1. What is alleged.
      2. What argument and/or evidence was presented in support of the allegations.
      3. Is there sufficient evidence to proceed with each part of the complaint.

      When applying the validity test, consideration should be made of all facts and evidence provided.

      When there is not enough evidence to proceed with a complaint, the complaint will be determined to be “not well founded”.

      Subsection 50(2)(a.7)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (a.7) has already been the subject of a report pursuant to section 55 by the commissioner;

      Subsection 50(2)(a.7) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review has already been the subject of a previous report by the Commissioner. This is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018.

      Subsection 50(2)(b)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (b) is not made in good faith; or

      Subsection 50(2)(b) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review has not been made in good faith.

      Good faith means that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. Good faith is an intangible quality encompassing honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or take advantage of something.254

      Not in good faith means the opposite of “good faith”, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or other contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights, but by some interested or sinister motive.255

      When an applicant refuses to cooperate with a government institution in the process of accessing information or if a party misrepresents events to the IPC, this could suggest the party is not acting in good faith. Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

      The intention to use information obtained from an access request in a manner that is disadvantageous to the government institution does not qualify as bad faith. To the contrary, it is appropriate for requesters to seek information “to publicize what they consider to be inappropriate or problematic decisions or processes undertaken” by government institutions.256

      When considering whether a request for review was made on grounds that are frivolous, vexatious or not in good faith, the Commissioner is determining whether there is a pattern or type of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access. The following factors are considered. Depending on the nature of the case, one factor alone or multiple factors in concert with each other can lead to a finding that a request is an abuse of the right of access:

      • Number of requests: is the number excessive. Where the volume of requests interferes with the operations of a government institution it can be argued the requests are excessive. To interfere with operations, the volume of requests must obstruct or hinder the range of effectiveness of the government institution’s activities.

      • Nature and scope of the requests: are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed. Are they identical to or similar to previous requests.

      • Purpose of the requests: are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access. For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the applicant’s aim to harass the public body or to break or burden the system.

      • Timing of the requests: is the timing of the requests connected to the occurrence of some other related event, such as a court or tribunal proceeding.257

      • Wording of the request: are the requests or subsequent communications in their nature offensive, vulgar, derogatory or contain unfounded allegations. Offensive or intimidating conduct or comments by applicants is unwarranted and harmful. They can also suggest that an applicant’s objectives are not legitimately about access to records. Requiring employees to be subjected to and to respond to offensive, intimidating, threatening, insulting conduct or comments can have a detrimental effect on well-being. 258

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2010-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 50(2) of FOIP. A series of access to information requests were repeatedly submitted by an applicant to six separate government institutions. Requests for review were submitted to the IPC on the grounds that the six government institutions failed to meet their obligations under section 7 of FOIP. Through the course of the reviews, the government institutions raised the issue that the requests for review were frivolous, vexatious, and not in good faith pursuant to subsection 50(2). The Commissioner considered the actions of the applicant and agreed the applicant was engaging in a pattern of conduct that was vexatious and not in good faith. The Commissioner discontinued the reviews pursuant to subsections 50(2)(a) and (b) of FOIP.

      Subsection 50(2)(c)

      Review or refusal to review

      50(2) The commissioner may refuse to conduct a review or may discontinue a review if, in the opinion of the commissioner, the application for review:

      (c) concerns a trivial matter.

      Subsection 50(2)(c) of FOIP provides that the Commissioner can dismiss or discontinue a review where the request for review concerns a trivial matter.

      trivial matter is something insignificant, unimportant or without merit. It is similar to frivolous. However, what is trivial to one person may not be trivial to another. 259

      Section 57: Appeal to the Court

      Appeal to courts

      57(1) Within 30 days after receiving a decision of the head pursuant to section 56, an applicant or individual or a third party may appeal that decision to the court.

      (2) A head who has refused an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by an applicant, give written notice of the appeal to any third party that the head:

      (a) has notified pursuant to subsection 34(1); or

      (b) would have notified pursuant to subsection 34(1) if the head had intended to give access to the record or part of the record.

      (3) A head who has granted an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by a third party, give written notice of the appeal to the applicant.

      (4) A third party who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (2) or an applicant or individual who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (3) may appear as a party to the appeal.

      (5) The commissioner shall not be a party to an appeal.

      A person or party (not the government institution) who is dissatisfied with the head’s decision following the Commissioner’s review or investigation under FOIP, may pursue an appeal of the decision to the court.

      An appeal to the court begins with an application to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan and may be appealed further by any party. For more on the process of appealing to the Court of King’s Bench see IPC resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee.

      The levels of an appeal follow a hierarchical model as follows:

      1. Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan
      2. Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
      3. Supreme Court of Canada260

      Judges are required to give reasons for their decisions. These reasons may be contained in a written judgement of the court or may be given orally in court. Sometimes judges may do both – giving their decision orally in court with written reasons for the decision following at a later date.261 These judgments or orders are binding on the parties. The Queen’s Bench Rules, Part 10: Judgments and Orders at section 10-22 states:

      10-22 Every order of the Court in any cause or matter may be enforced against all persons bound by the order in the same manner as a judgement to the same effect.

      The Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan consists of a Chief Justice, an Associate Chief Justice- and currently 36262 other judges. Each King’s Bench judge is assigned to a specific judicial centre, but because the Court is an itinerant263 court, the judges also travel to and sit in other judicial centres.264

      In Saskatchewan, there are court locations in:

      • Battleford
      • Estevan
      • La Ronge
      • Meadow Lake
      • Melfort
      • Moose Jaw
      • Prince Albert
      • Regina
      • Saskatoon
      • Swift Current
      • Weyburn
      • Yorkton

      When the Commissioner concludes a review, an applicant, individual or third party can appeal the decision of the head of the government institution to the Court of King’s Bench. The steps for this are as follows:265

      1. The Commissioner issues report with recommendations.
      2. The head of the government institution has 30 days from the date of the Commissioner’s report to make a decision in regard to the Commissioner’s recommendations or any other decision the head decides. The head’s decision must be sent to the applicant (if an access matter), the individual (if a privacy matter), the third party (if applicable) and the Commissioner within those 30 days of the Commissioner’s report.
      3. Once received, the applicant, individual or third party can launch an appeal of the head’s decision to the Court of King’s Bench. The application form is called an Originating Application (Form 3-49). It should be filed at the Local Registrar’s office. There is a fee involved for filing the application. It is around $200. A sample of an Originating Application for an access to information appeal can be found at Appendix A of IPC resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee.
      4. The applicant, individual or third party that launches the appeal is responsible for serving the government institution with the Originating Application once filed with the court.
      5. Once the Originating Application is filed and served, the parties are embarking on a two-step procedure:

      i. The first step involves determining whether the parties can agree or whether the court will have to decide what is filed sealed and what is argued in camera or in open court. Because of the nature of the appeal, the government institution will have filed sealed records (both unredacted and redacted) which means they are not seen by the other parties to the appeal.

      If the parties agree that submissions need not be filed sealed and the representations can be made in open court, the parties can proceed directly to argue the appeal.

      ii. If the parties cannot agree, a court application will have to be made to determine the procedure to be used, what is filed sealed, what is argued in camera and what is argued in open court. The court will determine this procedure and issue an order.

      In camera, in private or in the judge’s private chambers. 266

      iii. The second step will be the actual argument by the parties as has been previously directed by the judge or agreed by the parties. 267

      In the recent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), the court clarified the de novo nature of an appeal pursuant to 57 of FOIP. Part VII of FOIP does not in any way contemplate that, on an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, parties can raise any and all provisions of the Act that bear on the question of whether the record in issue may be released. The system of the Act offers no room for a direct appeal to the Court of King’s Bench from the decision of a head, i.e., an appeal that circumvents the application to the Commissioner for a review.268

      ‌Section 59: Exercise of Rights by Other Persons

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (a) where the individual is deceased, by the individual’s personal representative if the exercise of the right or power relates to the administration of the individual’s estate;

      (b) where a personal guardian or property guardian has been appointed for the individual, by the guardian if the exercise of the right or power relates to the powers and duties of the guardian;

      (c) where a power of attorney has been granted, by the attorney if the exercise of the right or power relates to the powers and duties of the attorney conferred by the power of attorney;

      (d) where the individual is less than 18 years of age, by the individual’s legal custodian in situations where, in the opinion of the head, the exercise of the right or power would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of the privacy of the individual; or

      (e) by any person with written authorization from the individual to act on the individual’s behalf.

      Section 59 of FOIP provides that another person, under specific circumstances, may exercise any right or power under FOIP that is conferred on an individual.

      Subsection 59(a)

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (a) where the individual is deceased, by the individual’s personal representative if the exercise of the right or power relates to the administration of the individual’s estate;

      Subsection 59(a) of FOIP provides that where an individual is deceased, the individual’s personal representative can exercise the deceased individual’s rights or powers under FOIP provided it relates to the administration of the deceased individual’s estate.

      For this provision to apply, the applicant must meet two requirements:

      1. Proof of the right to act as the personal representative is required.

      personal representative would be someone appointed by the court as Executor or Executrix or Administrator of an estate. 269

      Proof could include a copy of the signed and attested document naming the representative to act in matters related to the individual’s estate such as copies of a will or letters of administration.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2006-001, copies of the Letters of Administration from a law firm were determined to be sufficient in demonstrating that the law firm’s client (mother of the deceased) was acting as the personal representative of two deceased persons. 270

      2. Proof that disclosure of the requested information is necessary for purposes of administering the deceased’s estate.

      FOIP does not permit a personal representative to access information for all purposes, but only those relating to the administration of the estate.

      Administration of an estate means the management and settlement of the estate of a deceased, including selling, collecting and liquidating assets, paying debts, and making claims for funds owing or exercising any right of a financial benefit of the deceased. 271

      The duties of an executor in administering an estate in Saskatchewan are not always limited to winding up the estate. There is a function of administration that includes the management of the estate and considerations of what assets may exist or may come into existence (such as when an estate sues for damages resulting from a wrongful death) and form part of the estate to be administered. 272

      An example of a case where disclosure may be necessary for this purpose would be where a widower needs information to help decide whether to proceed with litigation related to the partner’s death. 273

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 098-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 59(a) of FOIP. The Applicant requested records from Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) related to her deceased son’s auto claim file. SGI denied access to some of the information under subsection 29(1) of FOIP because the information was the personal information of the Applicant’s deceased son. The Commissioner considered subsection 59(a) of FOIP and determined that the Applicant was appointed Administrator of her son’s estate. Furthermore, the Applicant requested the information to challenge SGI’s decision to deny her son’s claim. The Commissioner found that this related to the administration of her son’s estate. The Commissioner recommended the personal information of the Applicant’s son be released to the Applicant.

      Subsection 59(b)

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (b) where a personal guardian or property guardian has been appointed for the individual, by the guardian if the exercise of the right or power relates to the powers and duties of the guardian;

      The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act provides a means of protection and assistance for adults who are not able to make sound decisions independently and, as a result, may be vulnerable to personal or financial harm. 274 For more information about this Act or about adult guardianship, contact the Public Guardian and Trustee’s office in Saskatchewan.

      Subsection 59(b) of FOIP provides that where an individual has a personal guardian or property guardian, the guardian can exercise the individual’s rights or powers under FOIP provided it relates to the powers and duties of the guardian. FOIP provides for broader permission for a personal guardian than for the personal representative of a deceased individual.

      For this provision to apply, the applicant must meet two requirements:

      1. Proof of the right to act as the personal guardian or property guardian is required.

      A guardian is someone who has the authority to make decisions for an adult. A personal guardian makes decisions about an adult’s personal welfare and a property guardian makes decisions about an adult’s finances and property. 275

      To become a personal or property guardian, an application must be made to the Court of King’s Bench to be appointed. Proof could include a copy of the court order naming the person as personal or property guardian.

      The role of personal or property guardian can be permanent or temporary.

      2. Proof that disclosure of the requested information relates to the powers and duties of the guardian.

      The court determines what matters come under the authority of the personal or property guardian.

      Section 15 of The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act provides several matters that can fall under the authority of an appointed personal guardian. This includes for example, decisions where and with whom the individual will live, what social activities the individual will engage in, what educational, vocational or training the individual will participate in. The court order may include limitations or conditions that it deems necessary.

      A property guardian has authority for all financial and property matters except for any limitations or conditions indicated in the court order. 276 Section 43 of The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act outlines the authority of an appointed property guardian.

      An applicant can provide a copy of the court order which would outline the matters the guardian has authority over. The applicant should explain what the information is needed for, and it should be within the scope of the powers and duties set out in the court order.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 047-2021, the Commissioner considered subsection 59(b) of FOIP. The applicant had submitted an access to information request to the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services). The applicant sought access to information pertaining to another individual whom the applicant asserted they were the personal guardian for pursuant to subsection 19(1) of The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act. The applicant included a copy of a completed Form N- Order Appointing a Decision-Maker of the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan (a Guardianship Order). Social Services responded to the applicant indicating that it was working to establish legal authority to release the requested records to the applicant. After some delay and no response, the applicant requested the Commissioner review the matter. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the first part of the two-part test was met. This was based on a review of the Guardianship Order. The Commissioner found that the applicant did have the legal right to act as the individual’s personal guardian. For the second part of the test, the Commissioner found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the information sought related to the powers and duties of the guardian. In fact, the applicant’s lawyer had indicated to Social Services that “it is not the applicant’s responsibility to, nor within their capacity to explain to you the order and its effects.” The Commissioner did not agree. When an applicant is making a request for another individual’s personal information, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate they have the authority to do so pursuant to section 59 of FOIP. The Commissioner looked at the matters under which the applicant had authority under the Guardianship Order and determined that the applicant did not have authority under subsection 59(b) of FOIP to exercise the rights of the individual in this case.

      Subsection 59(c)

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (c) where a power of attorney has been granted, by the attorney if the exercise of the right or power relates to the powers and duties of the attorney conferred by the power of attorney;

      Subsection 59(c) of FOIP provides that a power of attorney can exercise the rights and powers of an individual provided it relates to the powers and duties of the power of attorney. FOIP provides for broader permission for a power of attorney than for the personal representative of a deceased individual.

      For this provision to apply, the applicant must meet two requirements:

      1. Proof of the right to act as the power of attorney is required.

      power of attorney is an authority given to one person (called the attorney) to do certain acts in the name of, and personally representing, the person granting the power (called the grantor). 277

      Lawyers usually draft a power of attorney. However, there are also forms that can be completed by both the grantor and the attorney without the use of a lawyer. 278

      A grantor can appoint more than one attorney and give each specific powers or state that they are to act separately, together or successively when dealing with his or her affairs.

      The applicant can provide a copy of the power of attorney. The government institution should verify the identity of the person exercising the power of attorney. It may also be necessary to verify that the grantor is alive. The death of a grantor normally revokes the power of attorney. 279 In addition, a power of attorney may be enduring and either comes into effect immediately or on a specified future date or on the occurrence of a specified event, such as when the grantor becomes mentally incapable. 280

      2. Proof that disclosure of the requested information relates to the powers and duties of the power of attorney.

      A grantor may appoint a personal attorney, a property attorney or both a personal and property attorney. A power of attorney may be general, covering all of the grantor’s personal affairs (in the case of a personal attorney), all of the grantor’s property affairs (in the case of a property attorney) or all of the grantor’s personal and property affairs (in the case of a personal and property attorney). It can also be specific, limiting the attorney’s authority to a specific purpose, such as the sale of a property on the grantor’s behalf. 281

      The government institution should be satisfied that the scope of the power of attorney is sufficient to authorize the attorney to access the information being requested.

      Subsection 59(d)

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (d) where the individual is less than 18 years of age, by the individual’s legal custodian in situations where, in the opinion of the head, the exercise of the right or power would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of the privacy of the individual; or

      Subsection 59(d) of FOIP provides that the legal custodian of a minor (less than 18 years of age), can exercise the minor’s rights and powers under FOIP, provided it would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of the minor’s privacy.

      A person reaches 18 years immediately at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person’s date of birth. 282

      For this provision to apply, two requirements must be met:

      2. The applicant must demonstrate the right to act as the legal decision-maker.

      Legal decision-maker means the person having lawful decision-making responsibility with respect to a child. 283

      child means a person who:

      (a) is under 18 years of age

      (b) has never married284

      Legal decision-maker is not necessarily always the parent of the minor. A legal decision-maker can be a birth parent, an adoptive parent, a stepparent, the Minister, a foster parent or a legal decision-maker appointed under an agreement. 285

      In terms of legal decision-makers, The Children’s Law Act, 2020 provides for who would be a legal decision-maker for a child as follows:

      • The parents of a child are joint legal decision-makers with equal rights unless otherwise ordered in a court order or an agreement.286
      • Where parents have not lived together after the birth of a child, the parent with whom the child resides is the sole legal decision-maker.287
      • If a parent dies, the surviving parent is the legal decision-maker of that child unless changed by a court order or an agreement.288

      If parents are separated, they both are still joint legal decision-makers unless changed by a court order or an agreement. In a court order, a judge can order that one parent is the sole legal decision-maker. In an agreement, one parent can give up his or her rights to be a joint legal decision-maker. In these instances, the head should ask for a copy of the court order or agreement and identify the clause that deals with legal decision-making. 289

      A parent’s girlfriend, boyfriend or new spouse has no rights unless it has been directed in a court order or dealt with in an agreement.290 If a stepparent is a legal decision-maker, then he or she will have the same rights and responsibilities as any other legal decision-maker.

      In demonstrating that an applicant is the legal decision-maker for purposes of subsection 59(d) of FOIP, the applicant could provide a copy of:

      • A custody order.
      • A copy of an agreement dealing with the legal decision-makers for the child.
      • Other evidence that would be considered reliable and appropriate in the circumstances (e.g., a statutory declaration may suffice in some cases or a copy of documentation showing the child is in the care of the Minister).291

      The government institution should also verify the individual’s identity (e.g., photo identification).

      2. Access to the information would not be an unreasonable invasion of the personal privacy of the minor.

      The fact that an applicant is the legal decision-maker for a minor does not automatically entitle the applicant to the minor’s personal information. The head must determine if the exercise of the rights and powers by the legal decision-maker would be an unreasonable invasion of the minor’s privacy.

      Some minors have the capacity to exercise their own access and privacy rights under FOIP. They may be considered mature minors and disclosure of their personal information to a legal decision-maker may not be appropriate.

      Even though FOIP does not include an express requirement to consider if a child is a mature minor, it is recommended that local authorities do so. For more on this see my offices blog, UPDATED: Who Signs for a Child? Applying this approach, the head should use their discretion to enable the exercise of rights by the minor “understands the nature of the right or power and the consequences of exercising the right or power.” Some factors to consider are maturity, economic status (i.e., self-supporting, or not), living arrangements and mental state.292

      Social workers, teachers and guidance counsellors can run into this problem. Parents may want all the information, but that information could include information on pregnancy, drug addiction, sexually transmitted disease, contemplated suicide, contemplated leaving home or commission of a crime. In these instances, the professional involved, their supervisor or the head must consider very carefully the words “unreasonable invasion of privacy”.293

      If the child verbally or in writing tells the professional that the child has shared the information in confidence and does not want his or her parents to know, it is important that the professional takes that into consideration in determining whether there would be an “unreasonable invasion of privacy” when disclosing the information to a legal decision-maker.

      Where the head determines it is not an unreasonable invasion of privacy, the legal decision-maker can sign on behalf of the child.

      IPC Findings

      In Investigation Report 083-2022, the Commissioner investigated an alleged breach of privacy involving St. Paul’s Roman Catholic Separate School Division #20 (St. Paul’s). The complainant was the mother of two children. The complainant alleged that disclosure of the children’s personal information to the children’s stepmother was a breach of the children’s privacy. Part of that investigation involved considering the equivalent provision (subsection 49(d)) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The mother and father had joint legal decision-making for the children via an agreement pursuant to subsection 3(3) of The Children’s Law Act, 2020. The Commissioner found that both parents had equal responsibility for and were entitled to communicate with the children’s school. Therefore, both parents had equal rights to exercise the powers and rights of the children under subsection 49(d) of LA FOIP. Furthermore, that subsection 49(d) of LA FOIP should not be interpreted to permit one equally ranked substitute decision-maker to override the decision of the other equally ranked substitute decision-maker. This is particularly the case where the substitute decision-makers share rights as joint custodians. Without an agreement, court order or other evidence that one decision-maker’s views should prevail in a conflict, a head should not rely on the consent of one joint decision-maker where the other joint decision-maker objects. The Commissioner also clarified that there was no requirement for a local authority to canvass the views of every substitute decision-maker who is equally ranked to satisfy itself that it has the requisite authority. However, where a local authority is aware that one of the decision-makers does not agree with a request from the other equally ranked decision-maker, the local authority should not rely on the direction of one of the decision-makers only. For this reason, the Commissioner found that St. Paul’s did not properly apply subsection 49(d) of LA FOIP.

      Subsection 59(e)

      Exercise of rights by other persons

      59 Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised:

      (e) by any person with written authorization from the individual to act on the individual’s behalf.

      Subsection 59(e) of FOIP provides that any person can act on another’s behalf in terms of exercising the rights and powers under FOIP provided they have written authorization to do so.

      written authorization is a document in writing signed by an individual who authorizes another individual to do certain acts in the name of and on behalf of the individual signing the document. 294

      Subsection 18(1) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides that:

      18(1) If consent is required by the Act for the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, the consent:

      (a) must relate to the purpose for which the information is required;

      (b) must be informed;

      (c) must be given voluntarily; and

      (d) must not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or coercion.

      A written authorization should be to perform specific acts (e.g., provide consent, make a FOIP request on behalf of the authorizing individual) or, more generally, to exercise the rights or powers of the individual under FOIP.

      For this provision to apply, the applicant must meet two requirements:

      1. Provide a copy of the written authorization

      Applicants should provide a copy of the written authorization. For a sample written authorization, see the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant at Appendix A.

      In some instances, government institutions may want to contact the individual who has granted the authority to confirm that they are aware of the amount and type of personal information that will be disclosed. In other instances, the government institution may want to insist on documents verifying the identity of the individual signing the authorization.

      2. Verify the identity of the applicant

      When a government institution receives a written authorization from an applicant to act on behalf of another person, the government institution should authenticate the identity of the person exercising the right. 295

      Authentication is the process of proving or ensuring that someone is who he or she purports to be. Authentication typically relies on one or more of the following:

      • Something you know (e.g., password, security question, PIN, mother’s maiden name);
      • Something you have ( e.g., smart card, key, hardware token); or
      • Something you are (e.g., biometric data, such as fingerprints, iris scans, voice patterns). 296

      In some cases, one of these factors may be used alone to authenticate an individual; for others, combinations may be used.

      There are multiple ways to confirm the identity of the applicant. The degree of authentication should be appropriate to the sensitivity of the personal information involved.

      For more on verifying identity, see the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 277-2017, an individual had given consent for another individual to act on the individual’s behalf and access any records containing the subject individual’s personal information. Rather than accept the consent form, the Ministry of Corrections and Policing asked the applicant for further details regarding the subject individual’s consent. Upon review, the Commissioner agreed with the Ministry of Corrections and Policing that the consent form was too vague because it:

      • Was not addressed to the Ministry of Corrections and Policing;
      • Was not clear the subject individual understood what specific personal information was to be disclosed to the applicant;
      • Was older with the consent signed ten months earlier. It did not have an effective and expiration date;
      • Was not clear if the subject individual voluntarily gave the consent or if it was obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or coercion.

      The Commissioner recommended that the Ministry of Corrections and Policing try to work with the applicant and the subject individual to obtain informed consent.

      Section 65: Access to Manuals

      Access to manuals

      65(1) Every government institution shall take reasonable steps to:

      (a) make available on its website all manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that are used in decision-making processes that affect the public by employees of the government institution in administering or carrying out programs or activities of the government institution; or

      (b) provide those documents when requested in electronic or paper form.

      (2) Any information in a record that a head would be authorized to refuse to give access to pursuant to this Act or the regulations may be excluded from manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that are made available or provided pursuant to subsection (1).

      Subsection 65(1)

      Access to manuals

      65(1) Every government institution shall take reasonable steps to:

      (a) make available on its website all manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that are used in decision-making processes that affect the public by employees of the government institution in administering or carrying out programs or activities of the government institution; or

      (b) provide those documents when requested in electronic or paper form.

      Subsection 65(1) of FOIP requires government institutions to take reasonable steps to make available its manuals, policies, guidelines, or procedures used in decision-making where they affect the public in terms of administering or carrying out its programs or activities. The manuals, policies, guidelines and procedures should be made available on the government institution’s website.

      The principle underpinning this provision is one of open government. The availability of material that guides decision-making allows members of the public to understand how decisions that affect them are made and opens up the decision-making process to public scrutiny. 297

      The documentation need not carry the title, “manual”, “policy”, “guideline” or “procedure”. They may be stand-alone documents, or they may be part of larger documents.

      decision-making process that affects the public means a process that determines how a government institution’s programs and services will be delivered to the public in general or the segment of the public that the government institution is intended to serve or to regulate. 298

      Examples of decision-making processes include:

      • Assessing or verifying eligibility for a program.
      • Calculating a fee.
      • Awarding a contract in a tendering business.
      • Applying standards in tests or inspections.
      • Deciding to use a law enforcement measure that carries a risk of harm. 299

      In the context of an access to information request by the public, there is no requirement under this provision for a government institution to provide access to a manual, policy, guideline or procedure that is already available to the public. However, government institutions should direct applicants to where they can find the manual, policy, guideline or procedure online. For more on published material or material that is available for purchase see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” at FOIP Does Not Apply.

      Subsection 65(1) applies to manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that are used by employees of the government institution. Employee of a government institution is defined at subsection 2(1)(b.1) of FOIP as an individual employed by a government institution and includes an individual retained under a contract to perform services for the government institution.

      Subsection 65(1) of FOIP does not apply to manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that do not involve decision-making, such as manuals and guidelines for administrative support staff who perform clerical functions relating to an application process. Nor does this provision apply to technical documentation for machines or equipment, even if these may be used in support of a decision-making process. It also does not apply to manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that do not affect the public. For example, a government institution is not required to make internal administrative guidelines available under this provision (if they do not affect the public). 300

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 042-2019, the Commissioner considered subsection 65(1) of FOIP. The Ministry of Corrections and Policing (Ministry) received an access to information request from Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan. The request was for copies of various policies, directives and other records used in decision-making processes that affect offenders. Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan requested a waiver of processing fees however, the Ministry denied the request. Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan requested a review by the Commissioner. Upon review, the Commissioner found that given the types of records requested, and the context surrounding those records, the requirements imposed on the Ministry by subsection 65(1) of FOIP superseded the issue related to fees. The Commissioner recommended that the Ministry ensure records used in a decision-making process that affects the public are provided in accordance with subsection 65(1) of FOIP, and without charging any fees.

      Subsection 65(2)

      Access to manuals

      65(2) Any information in a record that a head would be authorized to refuse to give access to pursuant to this Act or the regulations may be excluded from manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that are made available or provided pursuant to subsection (1).

      Subsection 65(2) of FOIP provides that any information within the manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures that can be withheld in accordance with exemptions under FOIP can be excluded prior to posting them online. For more on what exemptions may apply see Part III of FOIP or the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4, “Exemptions from the Right of Access”.

      This provision allows a government institution to remove or “sever” information from the manuals, policies, guidelines or procedures. For more on severing see Section 8: Severability earlier in this Chapter.

      Section 65.1: Records Available Without an Application

      Records available without an application

      65.1(1) Subject to subsection (2), the head may establish categories of records that are in the possession or under the control of the government institution and that are available to the public within a reasonable time without an application for access pursuant to this Act.

      (2) The head shall not establish a category of records that contain personal information or third party information unless that information may be disclosed pursuant to this Act or the regulations.

      Section 65.1 of FOIP is a new provision following the amendments of January 1, 2018. The purpose of this provision is to encourage open information strategies within government institutions.

      In addition to providing access to records in response to access requests, government institutions may provide access to information and records through two other means:

      1. Routine disclosure in response to inquiries and requests for information.
      2. Active dissemination of information.301

      ‌Routine Disclosure

      Routine disclosure, in response to an inquiry or request, occurs when access to a record can be granted without a request under FOIP. 302

      A government institution may make information accessible by routine disclosure through:

      • Answers to particular questions: Many inquiries are from members of the public seeking the answer to a question rather than asking for access to records. Occasionally, a person will combine a question with a request for records. To the greatest extent possible, government institutions should deal with these questions without a request for access under FOIP. 303
      • Specifying categories of records for routine disclosure: Section 65.1 of FOIP provides that government institutions may specify categories of records in their possession or under their control that will be made available to the public without a request for access under FOIP. This is intended to enable government institutions to take a proactive approach by setting up channels for the release of information. This approach promotes openness and accountability.

      Active Dissemination

      Active dissemination occurs when information or records are periodically released without any request, under a program or communications plan. 304

      Active dissemination is best used where there is an anticipated demand for information by the public. For example, a government institution may establish sites or online databases where interested citizens can obtain information.

      Open government is a governing culture that holds the public has the right to access the documents and proceedings of government to allow for greater openness, accountability, and engagement. 305

      Open data is the idea that data should be freely available for everyone to access, use and republish as they wish, published without restrictions from copyright, patents or other mechanisms of control. Public sector information made available to the public as open data is termed ‘Open Government Data’. 306

      In Canada, the access to information and privacy commissioners are advocates for open government and promote the paradigm shift from reactive to proactive disclosure, and ultimately to open government. 307

      Examples of open data or active dissemination by government institutions in Saskatchewan include:

      • Ministry of Energy and Resources – Saskatchewan Mineral Assessment Database;
      • Ministry of Finance – Public Accounts;
      • Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics – Economic reports and Demography reports; and
      • Ministry of Environment, Sask Spills – Hazardous Materials Storage Search.

      For more on routine disclosure and active dissemination, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP” at Government Institutions – Roles & Responsibilities, Routine Disclosure & Active Dissemination.


      Office of the Saskatchewan Information And Privacy Commissioner

      503 – 1801 Hamilton Street

      Regina SK S4P 4B4 306-787-8350

      www.oipc.sk.ca


      ‌1 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(a).

      ‌2 Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy in Canadian Democracy, May 5, 2009, also cited in Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC) Review Report F-2010-002 at [44].

      ‌3 SK OIPC, 2012-2013 Annual Report, Appendix 3.

      Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan, Records Classification and Retention Schedules, Administrative Records Management System 2014 at p. 13Available at https://www.saskarchives.com/services-government/records-classification-and-retention-schedules.

      ‌5 Drapeau, Professor Michel W., Racicot, Me Marc-Auréle, Federal Access to Information and Privacy Legislation Annotated 2020, (Toronto: Thomson Reuters 2019) at p. 1-628.

      ‌6 Office of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (ON IPC) Order M-618 at p.16-17.

      ‌7 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3, at p. 68.

      ‌8 ON IPC Order M-618 at p.p. 16 and 17.

      ‌9 SK OIPC Review Report 053-2015 at [32].

      ‌10 SK OIPC Review Report 091-2015 at [15].

      11 AB IPC Order F2014-39 at [22].

      ‌12 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 89.

      ‌13 Service Alberta, Bulletin #17, Consent and Authentication at p. 2.

      14 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Fact Sheets – Best Practices for the use of Social Insurance Numbers in the private sector. Available at Best Practices for the use of Social Insurance Numbers in the private sector – Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Also cited in SK OIPC Investigation Report F-2012-001 at [33].

      ‌15 See The Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999, c H-0.021 at section 11.

      ‌16 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at subsection 2-26.

      ‌17 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-002 at [27].

      ‌18 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌19 AB Order 99-021 at [33] to [35]. Also quoted in SK OPIC Review Report 180-2019 at [22].

      ‌20 NFLD IPC, Resource, Practice Bulletin, Reasonable Search, a p. 2.

      ‌21 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌22 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] to [40], F-2012-002 at [26] and NFLD IPC, Resource, Practice Bulletin, Reasonable Search, at p. 1.

      ‌23 NFLD IPC, Resource, Practice Bulletin, Reasonable Search, a p. 4.

      ‌24 NFLD IPC, Resource, Practice Bulletin, Reasonable Search, a p. 4.

      25 SK OIPC resource, Best Practices for Managing the Use of Personal Email Accounts, Text Messaging and Other Instant Messaging Tools, May 2018 at p. 4. Available at Best Practices for Managing the Use of Personal Email Accounts, Text Messaging and Other Instant Messaging Tools (oipc.sk.ca). Accessed December 29, 2022.

      ‌26 SK OIPC Investigation Report 101-2017 at [34].

      ‌27 ON IPC Order MO-2867 at [22]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 023-2020, 027-2020, Part I, at [37].

      ‌28 Office of the Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner (NU IPC) Review Report 16-102 at [4] and [5].

      ‌29 ON IPC Order MO-2867 at [22]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 023-2020, 027-2020, Part I, at [37].

      30 See City of Ottawa v. Ontario, 2010 ONSC 6835 (CanLII) at [37]. See also SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-007. Also cited in Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” at pp. 11 to 12.

      ‌31 Office of the Northwest Territories Information and Privacy Commissioner (NWT IPC) Review Report 20-247 at [37]. Also cited in Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” at pp. 11 to 12.

      ‌32 R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2012] 3 SCR 34.

      ‌33 R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2012] 3 SCR 34.

      ‌34 For more on the purposes of FOIP, see Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP”.

      35 SK OIPC resource, Best Practices for Managing the Use of Personal Email Accounts, Text Messaging and Other Instant Messaging Tools, May 2018 at p. 4. Available at Best Practices for Managing the Use of Personal Email Accounts, Text Messaging and Other Instant Messaging Tools (oipc.sk.ca). Accessed December 29, 2022.

      ‌36 ON IPC Order MO-2867 at [22]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 023-2020, 027-2020, Part I, at [37].

      ‌37 Office of the Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner (NU IPC) Review Report 16-102 at [4] and [5].

      ‌38 ON IPC Order MO-2867 at [22]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 023-2020, 027-2020, Part I, at [37].

      39 For the 15 factors, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” under Section 5: Possession or Control.

      40 For the 15 factors, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP” under Section 5: Possession or Control.

      41 SK OIPC Review Reports 061-2017 at [82] and 023-2017 & 078-2017 at [39] and [40].

      ‌42 SK OIPC Review Reports 313-2016 at [18] and 038-2018 at [21].

      ‌43 Toronto Police Services Board v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009, ONCA 20 (CanLII) at [59].

      ‌44 SK OIPC Review Report 023-2017 and 078-2017 at [37].

      45 ON IPC Order PO-3492 at [15].

      ‌46 SK OIPC Review Reports 313-2016 at [18], 038-2018 at [21] and 057-2019 at [9] to [15].

      ‌47 SK OIPC, Resource, Understanding the Duty to Assist: A Guide for Public Bodies, January 2018, at p. 2.

      ‌48 SK OIPC Review Reports 313-2016 at [18] and 038-2018 at [21].

      ‌49 SK OIPC Review Reports 086-2018 at [151] to [154], 080-2018 at [85] to [87], 077-2018 at [75].

      ‌50 Toronto Police Services Board v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009, ONCA 20 (CanLII) at [59].

      ‌51 SK OIPC Resource, Understanding the Duty to Assist: A Guide for Public Bodies, at p. 1.

      ‌52 Office of the Nova Scotia Information and Privacy Commissioner (NS IPC), Resource, What is the Duty to Assist, at p. 1. Similar definition cited in SK Review Report F-2006-003 at [55].

      ‌53 NS IPC, Resource, What is the Duty to Assist, at p. 1

      ‌54 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-003 at [49].

      ‌55 NS IPC, Resource, What is the Duty to Assist, at p. 1

      ‌56 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-003 at [49].

      ‌57 NS IPC, Resource, What is the Duty to Assist, at p. 2

      ‌58 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 50.

      ‌59 SK OIPC, Resource, Understanding the Duty to Assist: A Guide for Public Bodies, January 2018, at p. 3.

      60 See SK OIPC website under Resources tab, FAQsAccess to Information“I want to obtain information about the latest public sector program, how do I make an access request? How long do I have to wait for the information?” www.oipc.sk.ca.

      ‌61 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-26.

      ‌62 SK OIPC Review Reports 223-2018 at [10], 149-2017 at [13].

      ‌63 Office of the Newfoundland and Labrador Information and Privacy Commissioner (NFLD IPC), Resource, Guide for Municipalities, December 2014 at p. 15.

      ‌64 SK OIPC Review Report 336-2017 at [56] to [57].

      ‌65 NFLD IPC Review Report A-2010-006 at [17].

      66 See SK OIPC Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022 at [49] and [50]. See also subsection 5(1)(a) of British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, subsection 24(1)(b) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and subsection 6(1)(b) of Nova Scotia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      ‌67 Office of the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BC IPC) Order 328-1999 at p. 3.

      ‌68 ON IPC Order PO-3492 at [15]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 016-2014 at [20] to [27].

      ‌69 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Sixth edition, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 422.

      70 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Sixth edition, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 1891.

      71 See SK OIPC Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022 at [49] and [50]. See also subsection 5(1)(a) of British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, subsection 24(1)(b) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and subsection 6(1)(b) of Nova Scotia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      ‌72 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 51.

      ‌73 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 52.

      ‌74 SK OIPC Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022 at [58].

      ‌75 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      ‌76 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Sixth edition, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 422.

      77 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Sixth edition, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 1891.

      78 See SK OIPC Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022 at [49] and [50]. See also subsection 5(1)(a) of British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, subsection 24(1)(b) of Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and subsection 6(1)(b) of Nova Scotia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      ‌79 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 51.

      ‌80 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 52.

      ‌81 SK OIPC Disregard Decision 040-2022, 041-2022, 042-2022 at [58].

      ‌82 SK OIPC Review Report 091-2015 at [15].

      ‌83 AB IPC Order F2014-39 at [22].

      ‌84 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2013-004 at [13], LA-2014-001 at [20] and 104-2018 at [12].

      ‌85 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      86 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      ‌87 SK OIPC Review Report 2005-005 at [21].

      ‌88 ON IPC Order MO-3191-F at [86], [87] and [88].

      ‌89 SK OIPC Review Report 249-2017 at [7].

      ‌90 SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-005 at [18].

      91 Originated from Black, Henry Campbell, 1979. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition St. Paul, Minn.: West Group. Adopted by ON IPC in Order P-204 at p. 4. Adopted by SK OIPC in Review Report 249-2017 at [7].

      ‌92 SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-005 at [22].

      ‌93 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-003 at [22].

      ‌94 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-003 at [25].

      ‌95 SK OIPC Review Reports 061-2017 at [82] and 023-2017 & 078-2017 at [39] and [40].

      ‌96 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-002 at [17] to [18].

      ‌97 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 90.

      ‌98 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 90.

      ‌99 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌100 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-002 at [20].

      ‌101 NB IPC, Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

      ‌102 SK OIPC Review Report 339-3017 at [18].

      ‌103 SK OIPC Review Report 339-2017 at [19].

      ‌104 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-001 at [32].

      ‌105 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 81.

      ‌106 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 81.

      ‌107 SK OIPC Review Report 302-2018, 303-2018, 304-2018 at [51] to [52].

      ‌108 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Glossary of terms related to access to information and privacy, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/glossary-access-information-privacy.html. Accessed on June 27, 2019.

      109 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌110 ON IPC PHIPA Decision 52, HA15-8-2 at [57].

      ‌111 SNC-Lavalin Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), (1994), 79 F.T.R. 113, 1994 CarswellNat 354,

      [1994] F.C.J. No. 1059 (Fed. T.D.) at [48].

      ‌112 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1998] 3 F.C. 551 (Fed. T.D.) at p.p. 558-559.

      ‌113 Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189 at [104] to [105].

      ‌114 Office of the Quebec Information and Privacy Commissioner Order 2017 QCCAI 274 at [46]. Office of the Prince Edward Island Information and Privacy Commissioner (PEI IPC) Order FI-10-008 at [66] and [71].

      ‌115 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 3 at p. 82.

      ‌116 See SK OIPC Review Report 023-2019, 098-2019 at [111].

      117 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-003 at [21] to [22], F-2008-001 at [28], F-2012-006 at [126], F-2014-

      001 at [62], 211-2017 at [125].

      ‌118 SK OIPC Resource, What to Expect During a Review with the IPC, at p. 4, Review Reports F-2006-003 at [20], F-2008-001 at [27], F-2012-006 at [126], F-2013-006 at [36], F-2014-001 at [62], 263-2016 to 268-2016 at [51], 211-2017 at [125].

      ‌119 SK OIPC Review Report 2005-005 at [21].

      ‌120 SK OIPC Review Report 2005-005 at [24].

      ‌121 SK OIPC Review Reports 261-2016 at [21], [71], and 037-2017 at [20].

      ‌122 SK OIPC Review Reports 064-2016 to 076-2016 at [51] and 078-2016 to 091-2016 at [50].

      ‌123 Subsection 6(3) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations provides that where search and retrieval of electronic records is required, a fee equal to the actual cost is payable at the time access is given. See SK OIPC Review Report 258-2022 at [35] to [43] for more on this.

      ‌124 SK OIPC Review Reports 146-2015 and 147-2015 at [16] to [19], 115-2016 at [15].

      ‌125 SK OIPC Review Report 2005-005 at [21].

      ‌126 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [13] and [14].

      ‌127 ON IPC Order PO-2464 at p. 10.

      ‌128 AB IPC originally relied on 13 criteria when assessing public interest when reviewing a fee waiver decision. The 13 criteria originate from AB IPC Order 96-002 at pp. 16-17. Due to repetition and overlap of some of the criteria, AB IPC condensed them in Order 2006-032 at [42] and [43]. The condensed criteria are reflected in this Guide. These criteria were adopted in SK OIPC Review Report 145-2014 at [12] and [13].

      ‌129 AB IPC Order 2006-032 at [44].

      ‌130 Ministry of Justice, Resource, Managing Fee Waiver Requests, at p. 5.

      ‌131 Ministry of Justice, Resource, Managing Fee Waiver Requests, at p. 5.

      ‌132 The Electronic Information and Documents Act, 2000, SS 2000, c E-7.22 at s. 3(a).

      133 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      134 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      135 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1456.

      136 Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 4, P to R, at p. P-280. The Court of Appeal of Alberta relied on this definition in R. v. Mudry, 1979 ABCA 286 (CanLII) at [14] and again in the Provincial Court of Alberta decision R. v. Graham, 2014 ABPC 197 (CanLII) at [14].

      ‌137 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-005 at [60] to [63].

      138 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      139 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      140 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌141 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens 

      ‌142 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens

      ‌143 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌144 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      ‌145 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌146 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌147 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      148 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌149 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      ‌150 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      ‌151 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌152 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      153 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      154 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      ‌155 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 5-6.

      156 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌157 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌158 Adapted from BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 8.

      ‌159 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 8.

      ‌160 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-003 at [44].

      ‌161 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 8.

      ‌162 BC IPC, Resource, Time Extension Guidelines for Public Bodies, at p. 8.

      ‌163 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌164 SK OIPC Review Report F-2008-001 at [32].

      ‌165 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌166 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌167 Government of Saskatchewan, Ministry of Justice, Resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant, September 2017, at p. 2.

      ‌168 AB IPC Order 98-021 at p.4.

      ‌169 AB IPC Order 98-021 at p.4.

      170 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      171 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1434.

      172 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 657.

      173 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1497.

      ‌174 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices, 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 141.

      ‌175 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations, c. F-22.01 Reg. 1, s. 2(1)(b).

      ‌176 AB IPC, Order 98-021 at p.5.

      177 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌178 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices, 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 141.

      ‌179 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 as am], s. 2(1)(b.1).

      ‌180 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104, SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌181 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌182 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌183 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌184 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌185 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌186 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌187 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌188 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      ‌189 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order

      03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌190 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      ‌191 AB IPC Application by Alberta Municipal Affairs to disregard an access request made by an applicant under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act at p. 3.

      ‌192 Office of the New Brunswick Information and Privacy Commissioner (NB IPC) Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

      ‌193 AB IPC Investigation Report F2017-IR-01 at [80].

      ‌194 BC IPC Order 110-1996 at p. 6.

      ‌195 BC IPC Order F10-01 at [16].

      ‌196 BC IPC Order F13-18 at [23].

      ‌197 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 9.

      198 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌199 NB IPC Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

      ‌200 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 10.

      ‌201 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 9.

      202 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌203 NB IPC Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

      ‌204 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 11.

      ‌205 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 12.

      ‌206 BC IPC Order F10-01 at [16].

      ‌207 BC IPC Order F13-18 at [23].

      ‌208 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 9.

      ‌209 NB IPC Interpretation Bulletin, Section 15 – Permission to disregard access request.

      ‌210 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 10.

      ‌211 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 9.

      ‌212 Four factors adopted from ON IPC Order MO-3108 at [24]. Also, in SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌213 Fifth factor adopted from AB IPC Order F2015-16 at [39] to [54]. Added to criteria in SK OIPC Review Report 053-2015 at [15] and [38] to [41].

      ‌214 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [57], [60] and [61].

      215 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [62].

      ‌216 Office of the Northwest Territories Information and Privacy Commissioner (NWT IPC), Review 17-161 at p. 10. Also, in SK OIPC Review Report 2010-002 at [69].

      ‌217 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌218 BC IPC Order 110-1996 at p. 6.

      ‌219 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌220 Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII) at [93]. See also AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌221 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌222 Four factors adopted from ON IPC Order MO-3108 at [24]. Also in SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌223 Fifth factor adopted from AB IPC Order F2015-16 at [39] to [54]. Added to criteria in SK OIPC Review Report 053-2015 at [15] and [38] to [41].

      224 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌225 SK OPIC Review Report F-2010-002 at [89].

      ‌226 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [103] and [105].

      ‌227 ON IPC Order MO-1924 at p. 10.

      ‌228 ON IPC Order MO-1924 at p. 10.

      ‌229 ON IPC Order M-618 at [17].

      230 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 837.

      ‌231 This also includes if the applicant is not satisfied with the final fee. For example, see SK OIPC Review Report 037-2022 at [64] to [65].

      ‌232 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      ‌233 SK OIPC Review Reports 322-2021, 030-2022at [19], 164-2021 at [124].

      ‌234 SK OIPC Review Report 2005-005 at [21].

      ‌235 SK OIPC 2012-2013 Annual Report, at Appendix 3.

      ‌236 SK OIPC 2012-2013 Annual Report, at Appendix 3.

      ‌237 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      ‌238 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      239 Subsection 2-28(5) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides “A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday”. 240 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01, s. 2(1)(j).

      ‌241 Subsection 2-28(3) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens”.

      ‌242 Subsection 2-28(5) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides, “A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday”.

      ‌243 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [57] to [63].

      ‌244 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [57] to [63] and [69].

      245 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌246 BC IPC Order 110-1996 at p. 6.

      ‌247 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌248 Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 (CanLII) at [93]. See also AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌249 AB IPC Request to Disregard F2019-RTD-01 at p. 13.

      ‌250 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [70].

      ‌251 Four factors adopted from ON IPC Order MO-3108 at [24]. Also, in SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌252 Fifth factor adopted from AB IPC Order F2015-16 at [39] to [54]. Added to criteria in SK OIPC Review Report 053-2015 at [15] and [38] to [41].

      253 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1583.

      254 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌255 ON IPC Order MO-3108 at [37].

      ‌256 ON IPC Order MO-1924 at p. 9.

      ‌257 Four factors adopted from ON IPC Order MO-3108 at [24]. Also, in SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [69].

      ‌258 Fifth factor adopted from AB IPC Order F2015-16 at [39] to [54]. Also, in SK OIPC Review Report 053-2015 at [15] and [38] to [41].

      ‌259 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [50] and [51].

      ‌260 Courts of Saskatchewan, Resources, Court Structure. Available at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/resources/learn-about-the-courts-resources/court-structure.

      ‌261 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/decisions.

      262 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. Accessed February 4, 2020.

      263 Itinerate” (of a judge) means to travel on a circuit for the purpose of holding court – Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 997.

      264 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. See also The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, RSS c Q-1.01 at s. 4.

      ‌265 Modified from SK OIPC Resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee. Available at https://oipc.sk.ca/assets/guide-to-appealing-to-the-decision-of-a-head.pdf.

      266 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 909.

      ‌267 SK OIPC Resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee at p. 10.

      ‌268 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [41] and [47].

      ‌269 SK OIPC Review Reports H-2006-001 at [12], LA-2009-002/H-2009-001 at [81], 098-2015 at [14].

      ‌270 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [103] to [106].

      ‌271 SK OIPC Review Report 098-2015 at [16].

      ‌272 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2009-002/H-2009-001 at [106].

      ‌273 Service Alberta, Resource, Bulletin #16, Personal Information of Deceased Persons at p. 3.

      ‌274 Public Guardian and Trustee, Resource, Adult Guardianship in Saskatchewan, Application Manual, January 2002 at p. 2.

      ‌275 Public Guardian and Trustee, Resource, Adult Guardianship in Saskatchewan, Application Manual, January 2002 at p. 4.

      ‌276 Public Guardian and Trustee, Resource, Adult Guardianship in Saskatchewan, Application Manual, January 2002 at p. 6.

      ‌277 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, at p. 37.

      ‌278 Government of Saskatchewan, Powers of Attorney for Adultswww.saskatchewan.ca/residents/justice-crime-and-the-law/power-of-attorney-guardianship-and-trusts/powers-of-attorney-for-adults.

      ‌279 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, at p. 37.

      280 Government of Saskatchewan, Powers of Attorney for Adultswww.saskatchewan.ca/residents/justice-crime-and-the-law/power-of-attorney-guardianship-and-trusts/powers-of-attorney-for-adults.

      ‌281 Government of Saskatchewan, Powers of Attorney for Adultswww.saskatchewan.ca/residents/justice-crime-and-the-law/power-of-attorney-guardianship-and-trusts/powers-of-attorney-for-adults.

      ‌282 Subsection 2-28(10) of The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides “A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person’s birth date.”

      ‌283 The Children’s Law Act, 2020 [S.S., 2020], s. 2(1).

      ‌284 The Children’s Law Act, 2020 [S.S., 2020], s. 2(1).

      ‌285 Schirr Q.C., Darcia, Legal Issues on Consent and Counselling of Minors at p. 3. Available at: https://sasw.in1touch.org/document/4522/Consent%20when%20Counselling%20with%20Minors%20S chirr.pdf.

      ‌286 The Children’s Law Act, 2020 [S.S., 2020], s. 3(1).

      ‌287 The Children’s Law Act, 2020 [S.S., 2020], s. 3(2).

      ‌288 The Children’s Law Act, 2020 [S.S., 2020], s. 4(1).

      ‌289 SK OIPC Blog, Who Signs for a Child, February 15, 2018.

      ‌290 SK OIPC Blog, Who Signs for a Child, February 15, 2018, Investigation Report 101-2016 at [22].

      ‌291 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 38.

      ‌292 SK OIPC Investigation Report 083-2022 at [44].

      ‌293 SK OIPC Blog, UPDATED: Who Signs for a Child? February 15, 2018.

      ‌294 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 39.

      ‌295 Service Alberta, Bulletin #17, Consent and Authentication at p. 3.

      ‌296 Service Alberta, Bulletin #17, Consent and Authentication at p. 2.

      297 Service Alberta, Bulletin No. 3: Access to Manuals and Guidelines at p. 1 and Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, at p. 42.

      ‌298 Service Alberta, Bulletin No. 3: Access to Manuals and Guidelines at p. 2.

      ‌299 Service Alberta, Bulletin No. 3: Access to Manuals and Guidelines at p. 2.

      ‌300 Service Alberta, Bulletin No. 3: Access to Manuals and Guidelines at p. 2.

      ‌301 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2, at p. 31.

      ‌302 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 31.

      ‌303 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practice: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 32.

      ‌304 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 2 at p. 33.

      305 Government of Canada, Open Data 101, 2017, available at www.open.canada.ca/en/open-data-principles.

      ‌306 Open Government Partnership, Open Government Guide, at p. 197. Available at www.opengovguide.com.

      ‌307 Resolution of Canada’s Access to Information and Privacy Commissioners, September 1, 2010. Cited in SK OIPC Investigation Report LA-2012-002 at [68].

      Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access

      Guide to FOIP: Chapter 4

      Guide to FOIP

      The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

      Chapter 4

      Exemptions from the Right of Access

      Table of Contents

      Overview 1

      Interpreting Exemptions 2

      Limited & Specific 4

      Balancing Interests 5

      Class and Harm – Based Exemptions 7

      Class-based Exemptions 7

      Harm-based Exemptions 8

      Mandatory & Discretionary Exemptions 9

      Mandatory Exemptions 9

      Discretionary Exemptions 10

      Exercise of Discretion 11

      Public Interest Override 14

      Subsection 19(3) 14

      Subsection 29(2)(o) 15

      Section 13: Records From Other Governments 16

      Subsection 13(1)(a) 17

      Subsection 13(1)(b) 21

      Subsection 13(1)(c) 26

      Subsection 13(1)(d) 31

      Subsection 13(2) 35

      Section 14: Information Injurious to Intergovernmental Relations or National Defence 39

      Subsection 14(a) 39

      Subsection 14(b) 41

      Section 15: Law Enforcement and Investigations 43

      Subsection 15(1)(a) 44

      Subsection 15(1)(a.1) 48

      Subsection 15(1)(b) 50

      Subsection 15(1)(c) 52

      Subsection 15(1)(d) 56

      Subsection 15(1)(e) 59

      Subsection 15(1)(f) 62

      Subsection 15(1)(g) 65

      Subsection 15(1)(h) 69

      Subsection 15(1)(i) 71

      Subsection 15(1)(j) 73

      Subsection 15(1)(k) 76

      Subsection 15(1)(k.1) 81

      Subsection 15(1)(k.2) 82

      Subsection 15(1)(k.3) 86

      Subsection 15(1)(l) 88

      Subsection 15(1)(m) 90

      Subsection 15(2) 93

      Section 16: Cabinet Documents 95

      Subsection 16(1)(a) 100

      Subsection 16(1)(b) 106

      Subsection 16(1)(c) 113

      Subsection 16(1)(d) 118

      Subsection 16(2) 123

      Subsection 16(2)(a) 123

      Subsection 16(2)(b) 124

      Section 17: Advice From Officials 126

      Subsection 17(1)(a) 129

      Subsection 17(1)(b) 137

      Subsection 17(1)(c) 143

      Subsection 17(1)(d) 148

      Subsection 17(1)(e) 152

      Subsection 17(1)(f) 154

      Subsection 17(1)(g) 157

      Subsection 17(2) 161

      Subsection 17(3) 165

      Section 18: Economic and Other Interests 166

      Subsection 18(1)(a) 168

      Subsection 18(1)(b) 171

      Subsection 18(1)(c) 176

      Subsection 18(1)(d) 180

      Subsection 18(1)(e) 184

      Subsection 18(1)(f) 189

      Subsection 18(1)(g) 192

      Subsection 18(1)(h) 195

      Subsection 18(2) 198

      Section 19: Third Party Business Information 199

      Subsection 19(1)(a) 202

      Subsection 19(1)(b) 204

      Subsection 19(1)(c) 216

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(i) 217

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(ii) 222

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(iii) 228

      Subsection 19(1)(d) 232

      Subsection 19(1)(e) 235

      Subsection 19(1)(f) 238

      Subsection 19(2) 241

      Subsection 19(3) 242

      Section 20: Testing Procedures, Tests and Audits 250

      Subsection 20(a) 250

      Subsection 20(b) 254

      Section 21: Danger to Health or Safety 257

      Section 22: Solicitor-Client Privilege 261

      Subsection 22(a) 262

      Solicitor-client privilege 264

      Case-by-Case Privilege 277

      Common Interest Privilege 279

      Legislative Privilege 281

      Litigation Privilege 283

      Settlement Privilege 290

      Subsection 22(b) 291

      Subsection 22(c) 293

      Subsection 23: Confidentiality Provisions in Other Enactments 295

      Subsection 29(1): Disclosure of Personal Information 296

      Section 30: Personal Information of Deceased Individual 297

      Subsection 30(1) 297

      Subsection 30(2) 298

      Section 31: Access to Personal Information 299

      Subsection 31(1) 300

      Subsection 31(2) 300

      Overview

      This Chapter explains the various exemptions that a government institution may rely on to deny access to records or information to an applicant who has made an access to information request. For more on making an access to information request, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records.”

      What follows is non-binding guidance. Every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is not intended to be an exhaustive authority on the interpretation of these exemptions. Government institutions may wish to seek legal advice when deciding on exemptions to apply. Government institutions should keep section 61 of FOIP in mind.

      Section 61 places the burden of proof for establishing that access to a record may or must be refused on the government institution. For more on the burden of proof, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP.” This is a guide.

      This chapter covers:

      • Interpretation of Exemptions.
      • Class and Harm Based Exemptions.
      • Mandatory and Discretionary Exemptions.
      • Exercise of Discretion.
      • Public Interest Overrides.
      • Guidance on each of the exemptions in Part III of FOIP.

      The tests, criteria and interpretations established in this Chapter reflect the precedents set by the current and/or former Information and Privacy Commissioners in Saskatchewan through the issuing of Review Reports. Court decisions from Saskatchewan affecting The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) will be followed. Where this office has not previously considered a section of FOIP, the Commissioner looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. This includes other Information and Privacy Commissioners’ Orders, Reports and/or other relevant resources. In addition, court decisions from across the country are relied upon where appropriate.

      This Chapter will be updated regularly to reflect any changes in precedent. This office will update the footer to reflect the last update. Using the electronic version directly from our website will ensure you are always using the most current version.

      ‌Interpreting Exemptions

      Section 5 of FOIP establishes a right of access by any person to records in the possession or control of a government institution, subject to limited and specific exemptions, which are set out in FOIP. For more on the right of access, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records.”

      Generally, an applicant has a right to access all or part of any record that is the subject of an access to information request. Refusal to disclose all or part of a record should occur only where FOIP provides a specific exemption. If the record or information is subject to FOIP and no exemption applies, the information or record must be disclosed.

      The rule of statutory interpretation enunciated by Driedger in The Construction of Statutes (2nd ed., 1983), was adopted by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority (2019) as follows:

      [17] Applying the exemptions set out in FOIP involves, in large part, an exercise in statutory interpretation. The modern principle of statutory interpretation is that the words in an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislative body: Tran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50 at para 23 [2017] 2 SCR 289; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC),

      [1998] 1 SCR 27.1

      Driedger also says in The Construction of Statutes that:

      3. If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then a meaning that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably capable of bearing, is to be given them.2

      Regard must also be had for the provisions of The Legislation Act, which provides:

      2-10(1) The words of an Act and regulations authorized pursuant to an Act are to be read in their entire context, and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of the Legislature.

      (2) Every Act and regulation is to be construed as being remedial and it to be given the fair, large and liberal interpretation that best ensures the attainment of its objects.3

      The Supreme Court of Canada has stated various approaches to the interpretation of statutes. In his dissenting judgement in Singleton v. Canada (2001), Justice LeBel discussed and summarized three approaches utilized in recent cases. They are the words-in-total-context approach, the teleological (or purposive) approach and the plain meaning approach. He rationalized the three approaches in this way:

      If the “plain meaning” approach is to make any sense at all, it surely cannot mean that we are always to ignore context when interpreting statutory language. Rather, it must be understood to say that although context is always important, sweeping considerations of general statutory purpose cannot outweigh the specific statutory language chosen by Parliament. It is an acknowledgement that Parliament’s purpose can be complex. Rather than finding a single purpose for the Act as a whole and using it to interpret the clear language of specific provisions, we should use such broad purposes only as a context to help elucidate the meaning of specific statutory language. Understood in this way, it is not inconsistent with the basic thrust of the words-in-total-context approach.4

      The Supreme Court of Canada accepted the “words-in-total-context” approach to statutory interpretation when considering a denial of access to information in Merck Frosst Canada Inc.v. Canada (Minister of National Health), (2000):

      The test for the application of the exemption in paragraph 20(1)(c) is that of a “reasonable expectation of probable harm”. In Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada, [1989] F.C. 47, the Federal Court of Appeal interpreted this disposition as follows, at page 60:

      …The words-in-total-context approach to statutory interpretation which this court has followed in Lor-Wes Contracting Ltd. v. The Queen, [1986] 1 F.C. 346: (1985), 60 N.R. 321 and Cashin v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1983] 3 F.C. 494 requires that we view the statutory language in these paragraphs in their total context, which must here mean particularly in the light of the purpose of the Act as set out in section 2. Subsection 2(1) provides a clear statement that the Act should be interpreted in the light of the principle that government information should be available to the public and that exceptions to the public’s right of access should be “limited and specific”.5

      A number of presumptions, including the principle against absurdity articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (1998), also informs statutory interpretation:

      [27] …It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to [Pierre-Andre Cote, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)] an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to some interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes supra at p. 88).6

      Limited & Specific

      The right of access is subject to limited and specific exemptions that are set out in Part III of FOIP. This includes sections 13 to 23 of FOIP. It also includes the withholding personal information provision at subsection 29(1) in Part IV of FOIP.

      Canadian courts agree that exemptions are the exception and disclosure is the general rule, with any doubt being resolved in favour of disclosure.7 The basic policy of the Act is that “disclosure, not secrecy is the dominant objective of the Act”.8

      The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted access to information laws as quasi-constitutional. It follows that as fundamental rights, the rights to access and to privacy are interpreted generously, while the exceptions to these rights must be understood strictly.9 For more on FOIP’s quasi-constitutional status, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP.”

      Each record must be carefully reviewed to determine whether an exemption applies. Government institutions should interpret the exemptions narrowly and only apply an exemption to the specific information in a record to which the exemption applies. More than one exemption may apply to all or part of a record. For more on redacting or severing information, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records.”

      The majority of requests for review to the Commissioner under section 49 of FOIP arise from refusal to provide access. Government institutions should be prepared to document and support their decisions to withhold information.

      ‌Balancing Interests

      When considering what exemptions to apply, government institutions must balance the right of access against denying it in order to protect other interests.

      In John Doe v Ontario (Finance), (2014), the Supreme Court of Canada concisely summarized the legislative purpose of access to information statutes such as FOIP:

      [1] Access to information legislation serves an important public interest: accountability of government to the citizenry. An open and democratic society requires public access to government information to enable public debate on the conduct of government institutions.

      [2] However, as with all rights recognized in law, the right of access to information is not unbounded. All Canada access to information statutes balance access to government information with the protection of other interests that would be adversely affected by otherwise unbridled disclosure of such information.10

      In Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the balancing act inherent in access to information. In that case, third party interests were at issue:

      [1] Broad rights of access to government information serve important public purposes. They help to ensure accountability and ultimately, it is hoped, to strengthen democracy. “Sunlight”, as Louis Brandeis put it so well, “is said to be the best of disinfectants” (“What Publicity Can Do”, Harper’s Weekly, December 20, 1913, 10, at p. 10).

      [2] Providing access to government information, however, also engages other public and private interests. Government, for example, collects information from third parties for regulatory purposes, information which may include trade secrets and other confidential commercial matters. Such information may be valuable to competitors and disclosing it may cause financial or other harm to the third party who had to provide it. Routine disclosure of such information might even ultimately discourage research and innovation. Thus, too single-minded a commitment to access to this sort of government information risks ignoring these interests and has the potential to inflict a lot of collateral damage. There must, therefore, be a balance between granting access to information and protecting these other interests in relation to some types of third party information.

      [3] The need for this balance is well illustrated by these appeals. They arise out of requests for information which had been provided to government by a manufacturer as part of the new drug approval process. In order to get approval to market new drugs, innovator pharmaceutical companies, such as the appellant Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. (“Merck”), are required to disclose a great deal of information to the government regulator, the respondent Health Canada, including a lot of material that they, with good reason, do not want to fall into their competitors’ hands. But competitors, like everyone else in Canada, are entitled to the disclosure of government information under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (“Act” or “ATI”).

      [4] The Act strikes a careful balance between the sometimes competing objectives of encouraging disclosure and protecting third party interests. While the Act requires government institutions to make broad disclosure of information, it also provides exemptions from disclosure for certain types of third party information, such as trade secrets or information the disclosure of which could cause economic harm to a third party. It also provides third parties with procedural protections. These appeals concern how the balance struck by the legislation between disclosure and protection of third parties should be reflected in the interpretation and administration of that legislation.

      Furthermore, Justice Gabrielson described the balancing act in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, (2019) as follows:

      [15] As can be seen, the Act attempts to strike a balance between the public’s right to access information which the Government of Saskatchewan (or a body holding delegated authority from the government) has to ensure accountability to persons affected by the information and the corresponding need to protect the privacy of individuals or other legitimate interests that may be impacted by the release of such material. It starts with the proposition that a person has access to all government records subject to limitations established by the Act. The limitations are set out in Part III of the Act which is entitled “Exemptions”. The exemptions define circumstances under which the head of a government or a government institution is required to refuse access to information contained in a record. Part IV of the Act, which is entitled “Protection of Privacy” deals with balancing the right of access to information with the protection of the interests of the individual in their own personal information.11

      Class and Harm – Based Exemptions

      Exemptions under FOIP fall into two types – class-based and harm-based exemptions.

      Class-based Exemptions

      Class-based exemptions apply where the information falls within the class of information described in the exemption, and there is no reference to any consequence (or harm) that might result from the release of the information. Class-based exemptions presuppose that the information is inherently sensitive and that an injury or prejudice would automatically flow from release.12 Examples include section 16 of FOIP which protects cabinet documents. For class-based exemptions, the government institution must show that the information in question falls within the class of records described in the exemption.

      Class-based exemptions in FOIP include:

      • Section 13;
      • Section 14;
      • Parts of section 15;
      • Section 16;
      • Section 17;
      • Parts of section 18;
      • Parts of section 19; and
      • Section 22.

      ‌Harm-based Exemptions

      Harm-based exemptions, on the other hand, are based on a determination by the government institution that it is reasonable to expect that some injury, harm, or prejudice will occur if the information is released.13 Examples include subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP which contemplates three different types of harm to a third party – financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual or other negotiations.

      Harm-based exemptions in FOIP include:

      • Parts of section 15;
      • Parts of section 18;
      • Parts of section 19;
      • Section 20; and
      • Section 21.

      For harm-based exemptions to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged. The government institution (or third party) does not have to prove that the harm is probable but needs to show that there is a likelihood the harm will occur if any of the information or records were released.

      In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Justice Bracken confirmed that it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      The Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014) set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      Mandatory & Discretionary Exemptions

      The basis on which the exemptions are applied by the government institution also varies. In some cases, it is mandatory that the exemption be applied. In other cases, the head of the government institution has discretion as to whether to apply the exemption.14

      The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 provides the following clarification on the terms “shall”, “must” and “may”:

      2-30(1) In the English version of an enactment:

      (a) “shall” shall be interpreted as imperative;

      (b) “must” shall be interpreted as imperative; and

      (c) “may” shall be interpreted as permissive and empowering.

      Mandatory Exemptions

      A mandatory exemption is one where the government institution has no, or a more limited, discretion regarding whether or not to apply the exemption. That is, if the information is covered by the exemption and the conditions for the exercise of discretion do not exist, then it must not be disclosed. Mandatory exemptions can be contrasted with discretionary exemptions, where the head of the government institution must turn their mind actively to the question of whether or not the information should be protected or released.15

      Mandatory exemptions begin with the phrase “A head shall refuse…”

      Shall is to be interpreted as imperative.16

      The four mandatory exemptions in FOIP are as follows:

      • Records from other governments (section 13);‌
      • Cabinet documents (section 16);
      • Third party business information (section 19); and
      • Personal information (subsection 29(1)).

      The government institution must weigh all the criteria, factors and tests relating to the mandatory exemption before deciding whether the exemption applies.

      Information that falls within a mandatory exemption can be disclosed in some circumstances. For instance, where there is consent to release (e.g., 13(1) of FOIP), authority to release without consent (e.g., subsection 29(2) of FOIP), enough time has passed (16(2)(a) of FOIP) or there is a public interest override. For more on public interest overrides, see Public Interest Override later in this Chapter.

      Discretionary Exemptions

      Discretionary exemptions offer discretion for the government institution. In other words, disclosure can still occur even where a discretionary exemption is found to apply.

      Discretionary exemptions begin with the phrase “A head may refuse…”

      May is to be interpreted as permissive and empowering.17

      Fish J. provided guidance in the Supreme Court of Canada decision Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (2006), when dealing with a discretionary exemption in the federal Access to Information Act. In the majority judgment for the Court, he observed that:

      The language of [the solicitor-client exemption] is, moreover permissive. It provides that the Minister may invoke the privilege. This permissive language promotes disclosure by encouraging the Minister to refrain from invoking the privilege unless it is thought necessary to do so in the public interest. And it thus supports an interpretation that favours more government disclosure, not less.18

      All of the remaining exemptions in Part III of FOIP are discretionary exemptions. This includes:

      • Information injurious to intergovernmental relations or national defence (section 14);
      • Law enforcement and investigations (section 15);
      • Advice from officials (section 17);
      • Economic and other interests (section 18);
      • Testing procedures, tests, and audits (section 20);
      • Danger to health or safety (section 21); and
      • Solicitor-client privilege (section 22).

      A decision to apply a discretionary exemption requires two steps:

      1. The head must determine whether the exemption applies; and
      2. If it does, the head must go on to ask whether, having regard to all relevant interests, including public interest in disclosure, disclosure should be made.19

      To determine the first step, the tests provided in this guide can be a starting point. For the second step, the following guidance on the exercise of discretion can assist.

      Exercise of Discretion

      The exercise of discretion is fundamental to applying FOIP. It requires the head, or staff member delegated to exercise the discretion of the head, to weigh all factors in determining whether or not information can be released despite a discretionary exemption being found to apply.

      Exercise of discretionary power means making a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in an objective sense.20

      A discretion conferred by statute must be exercised consistently with the purposes underlying its grant. It follows that to properly exercise this discretion, the head must weigh the considerations for and against disclosure, including the public interest in disclosure.21

      Some factors that should be considered when exercising discretion include:

      • The general purposes of the Act (i.e., government institutions should make information available to the public, and individuals should have access to personal information about themselves).
      • The wording of the discretionary exemption and the interests which the exemption attempts to protect or balance.
      • Whether the applicant’s request may be satisfied by severing the record and providing the applicant with as much information as is reasonably practicable.
      • The historical practice of the government institution with respect to the release of similar types of records.
      • The nature of the record and the extent to which the record is significant or sensitive to the government institution.
      • Whether the disclosure of the information will increase public confidence in the operation of the government institution.
      • The age of the record.
      • Whether there is a definite and compelling need to release the record.
      • Whether the Commissioner’s recommendations have ruled that similar types of records or information should be released.22

      Taking a “blanket approach” to applying exemptions may demonstrate that the government institution has not exercised its discretion or has exercised it improperly. Although it may be proper for a decision maker to adopt a policy under which decisions are made, it is not proper to apply this policy inflexibly to all cases. In order to preserve the discretionary aspect of a decision, the head must take into consideration factors personal to the applicant and must ensure that the decision conforms to the policies, objects, and provisions of the Act.23

      The Supreme Court of Canada ruling Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association(2010) confirmed the authority of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to quash a decision not to disclose information pursuant to a discretionary exemption and to return the matter for reconsideration to the head of the public body.24

      The Supreme Court also considered the following factors to be relevant to the review of discretion:

      • The decision was made in bad faith.
      • The decision was made for an improper purpose.
      • The decision took into account irrelevant considerations.
      • The decision failed to take into account relevant considerations.25

      When a government institution exercises its statutory discretion in a manner that results in information being withheld from disclosure, that discretion is properly reviewed by the Commissioner.26 During a review of a discretionary exemption, the Commissioner may recommend that the head of the government institution reconsider its exercise of discretion if the Commissioner feels one of these factors played a part in the original decision to withhold records. However, the Commissioner will not substitute their own discretion for that of the head.27

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 305-2016, the Commissioner recommended the head of Executive Council reconsider the use of discretion in withholding an email under subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP. In making this recommendation, the Commissioner noted that the advice in the email was not about a proposed policy or direction of the government organization but rather the best way to communicate a particular message to public servants. It did not appear that Executive Council took into account the nature of the record and the extent to which the record was significant or sensitive to Executive Council.

      In Review Report 086-2018, the Commissioner recommended the Ministry of Health reconsider its exercise of discretion in withholding a record that would reveal the content of draft or subordinate legislation (subsection 17(1)(e) of FOIP). In making this recommendation, the Commissioner noted that the record was 14 years old, and the specific piece of legislation had been amended five times since the record was created.

      Public Interest Override

      FOIP does not contain an overarching public interest override which would require that information be disclosed in all cases where the general public interest in disclosure outweighs the specific interest which is intended to be protected by the exempting provision. Rather, the public interest in disclosure is addressed on a case-by-case basis only in connection with two exemptions in FOIP.28 These are subsections 19(3) and 29(2)(o).

      The purpose of adding a public interest override includes promoting democracy by increasing public participation. When considering a public interest override, the government institution should create a list of factors in favour of withholding and public interest factors for releasing. This will help when it comes to assessing the relative weight of the factors.29

      Generally, a government institution should not consider factors such as embarrassment, loss of confidence in the government, potential misunderstanding or that release could result in unnecessary confusion and debate.30

      Subsection 19(3)

      Third party information

      19(3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      1. disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      2. the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

        1. financial loss or gain to;

        2. prejudice to the competitive position of; or

        3. interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(3) of FOIP is a discretionary provision for the release of third-party information in circumstances where the head of the government institution forms the opinion that disclosure “could reasonably be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment”. For more on this provision, see subsection 19(3) later in this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered subsection 19(3) of FOIP in Review Report 043-2015. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Environment for the “2012 and 2013 Water and Air Quality Compliance Reports”. The Ministry withheld portions of the two reports citing subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP (third party information). Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP applied to portions of the reports. Further, the Commissioner found that the public interest resulting from disclosure of the information would outweigh in importance any financial loss or prejudice to the competitive position of the third party. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(3) of FOIP applied. The Commissioner recommended release.

      ‌Subsection 29(2)(o)

      Disclosure of personal information

      29(2) Subject to any other Act or regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution may be disclosed:

      (o) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head:

          1. the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure; or
          2. disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates;

      Subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP is a discretionary provision for the release of personal information without consent in circumstances where the head of the government institution forms the opinion that the public interest “clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy” or where disclosure would “clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.” For more on this provision, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 5, “Third Party Information” or Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy.”

      Where a government institution intends to rely on this provision to release personal information in response to an access to information request, notification is required to the individual to whom the information relates pursuant to the third-party notification requirements outlined at subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP.

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered the equivalent subsection in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) in Investigation Report 092-2015 to 095-2015. The investigation involved the collection and disclosure of a care aide’s personal information. The Commissioner found that there was a public interest in the release of the information and that the public interest outweighed any invasion of privacy.

      Section 13: Records From Other Governments

      Records from other governments

      13(1) A head shall refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from:

        1. the Government of Canada or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions;

        2. the government of another province or territory of Canada, or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions;

        3. the government of a foreign jurisdiction or its institutions; or

        4. an international organization of states or its institutions;

      unless the government or institution from which the information was obtained consents to the disclosure or makes the information public.

      (2) A head may refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from a local authority as defined in the regulations.

      Subsection 13(1) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based provision. It mandates refusal of access to information in records received in confidence both formally and informally from other governments including its agencies or institutions. When considering this provision, government institutions should determine whether there is consent to release the information or if the information has been made public by the organization to which the information was obtained.

      Subsection 13(1)(a)

      Records from other governments

      13(1) A head shall refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from:

      (a) the Government of Canada or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions;

      unless the government or institution from which the information was obtained consents to the disclosure or makes the information public.

      Subsection 13(1)(a) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It mandates refusal of access to information in a record where the information was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly from the Government of Canada unless there is consent to release or the information was made public. It includes the Government of Canada’s agencies, Crown corporations and other institutions.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information obtained from the Government of Canada or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions?

      For this exemption to apply, the agencies in question must qualify as either “Government of Canada or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions”. Because of the possessive pronoun in this clause, “agencies” and “other institutions” should be understood as federal agencies and federal institutions. For “other institutions”, it should be either federal government institutions as defined by the federal Access to Information Act or institutions controlled by the federal government.31

      For some assistance, Schedule 1 (Section 3) of the federal Access to Information Act provides a list of federal government institutions.

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure; or to get a hold of by effort.32

      A government institution could obtain information either intentionally or unintentionally. It can also include information that was received indirectly provided its original source was the Government of Canada. However, to obtain information suggests that the government institution did not create it. Regardless, the provision is not so much driven by the source of the record to which access is sought as it is by the confidential nature and source of the information it contains. As such, authorship (or who created the record) is irrelevant.33

      Section 13 of FOIP uses the term “information contained in a record” rather than “a record” like other exemptions in FOIP. Therefore, the exemption can apply to information contained within a record that was authored by the government institution provided the information at issue was obtained from the Government of Canada.

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.34

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2006-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 13(1)(a) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the analysis conducted by Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC) on samples provided by Environment Canada met the first part of the test because Environment Canada voluntarily supplied samples to SRC and requested that SRC analyze the samples and report back. Although the record was prepared by SRC, it was built upon information provided by Environment Canada.

      2. Was the information obtained implicitly or explicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the provider of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.35 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party that provided the information.36

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.37 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014)).

      Once it has been established that the executive branch of government obtained a record from another government in confidence, the continued confidentiality of that record must be presumed, unless the other government has consented to disclosure or has made the information public.38 In other words, there are no time limits on the confidentiality. Just because a record might be old, it does not lose its confidential nature.

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.39

      Factors to consider when determining whether information was obtained in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the government institution or the party that provided the information.40
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the government institution and the party that provided the information from the point it was obtained until the present time.41
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.42
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the party that provided the information both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been obtained in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.43

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was obtained implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.44

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was obtained with the understanding that it would be kept confidential.45

      Factors to consider when determining if information was obtained in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party that provided the information.46
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions prior to the information being provided.47

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.48

      3. Is there consent to disclose the information or has the information been made public?

      Subsection 13(1)(a) has a built-in exception. The information contained in the record can be disclosed if the Government of Canada (or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions) agrees to its disclosure or if it has made the information public.

      Consent in this context means there is an agreement, approval, or permission to disclose the information.49

      Public in this context means the information in the record is open to view by the public.50

      Released to the public means made available to the public at large either through active dissemination channels or through provision of the information at specific locations (e.g., public libraries, posted on a website).51

      Consultation with the other party or parties from which the information was obtained should take place to determine if either consent will be given or if the information has or will be made public.52

      Subsection 13(1)(b)

      Records from other governments

      13(1) A head shall refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from:

      (b) the government of another province or territory of Canada, or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions;

      unless the government or institution from which the information was obtained consents to the disclosure or makes the information public.

      Subsection 13(1)(b) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It mandates refusal of access to information in a record where the information was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly from another provincial or territorial government in Canada unless there is consent to release or the information was made public. It includes the province or territory’s agencies, Crown corporations and other institutions.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information obtained from the government of another province or territory of Canada, or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions?

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure; or to get a hold of by effort.53

      A government institution could obtain information either intentionally or unintentionally. It can also include information that was received indirectly provided its original source was the government of another province or territory of Canada. However, to obtain information suggests that the government institution did not create it. Regardless, the provision is not so much driven by the source of the record to which access is sought as it is by the confidential nature and source of the information it contains. As such, authorship (or who created the record) is irrelevant.54

      Section 13 of FOIP uses the term “information contained in a record” rather than “a record” like other exemptions. Therefore, the exemption can include information within a record that was authored by the government institution provided the information at issue was obtained from the government of another province or territory of Canada.

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.55

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 016-2016, the Commissioner considered whether records created by the Ministry of Health qualified as information obtained from the government of another province or territory of Canada. The records were summaries of specific telephone conversations with counterparts in three other provinces. The Commissioner found that the summaries, although created by the Ministry of Health, constituted information obtained from governments of other provinces of Canada. Therefore, the first part of the test was met.

      In Review Report 051-2017, the Commissioner found that the North American Strategy for Competitiveness (NASCO) did not qualify for the first part of the test. While the members of NASCO may have included representatives of governments, NASCO itself was not an entity that acted on behalf of any government of another province, territory of Canada or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions. As such, the Commissioner found subsection 13(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply.

      2. Was the information obtained implicitly or explicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the provider of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.56 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party that provided the information.57

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.58 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated. (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014))

      Once it has been established that the executive branch of government obtained a record from another government in confidence, the continued confidentiality of that record must be presumed, unless the other government has consented to disclosure or has made the information public.59 In other words, there are no time limits on the confidentiality. Just because a record might be old, it does not lose its confidential nature.

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.60

      Factors to consider when determining whether information was obtained in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the government institution or the party that provided the information.61
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the government institution and the party that provided the information from the point it was obtained until the present time.62
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.63
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the party that provided the information both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been obtained in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.64

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was obtained implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.65

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated, or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was obtained with the understanding that it would be kept confidential.66

      Factors to consider when determining if information was obtained in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party that provided the information.67
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions prior to the information being provided.68

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.69

      3. Is there consent to disclose the information or has the information been made public?

      Subsection 13(1)(b) has a built-in exception. The information contained in the record can be disclosed if the government of the other province or territory (or its agencies, Crown corporations or other institutions) agrees to its disclosure or if it has made the information public.

      Consent in this context means there is an agreement, approval or permission to disclose the information.70

      Public in this context means the information in the record is open to view by the public.71

      Released to the public means made available to the public at large either through active dissemination channels or through provision of the information at specific locations (e.g., public libraries, posted to a website).72

      Consultation with the other party or parties from which the information was obtained should take place to determine if either consent will be given or if the information has or will be made public.73

      Subsection 13(1)(c)

      Records from other governments

      13(1) A head shall refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from:

      (c) the government of a foreign jurisdiction or its institutions;

      unless the government or institution from which the information was obtained consents to the disclosure or makes the information public.

      Subsection 13(1)(c) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It mandates refusal of access to information in a record where the information was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly from the government of a foreign jurisdiction unless there is consent to release or the information was made public.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information obtained from the government of a foreign jurisdiction or its institutions?

      foreign jurisdiction refers to a government or its institutions of any foreign nation or state outside of Canada.74

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure; or to get a hold of by effort.75

      A government institution could obtain information either intentionally or unintentionally. It can also include information that was received indirectly provided its original source was the government of a foreign jurisdiction or its institutions. However, to obtain information suggests that the government institution did not create it. Regardless, the provision is not so much driven by the source of the record to which access is sought as it is by the confidential nature and source of the information it contains. As such, authorship (or who created the record) is irrelevant.76

      Section 13 of FOIP uses the term “information contained in a record” rather than “a record” like other exemptions. Therefore, the exemption can include information within a record that was authored by the government institution provided the information at issue was obtained from the government of a foreign jurisdiction.

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.77

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 051-2017, the Commissioner found that the North American Strategy for Competitiveness (NASCO) did not qualify for the first part of the test. While the members of NASCO may have included representatives of governments, NASCO itself was not an entity that acted on behalf of, or under the authority of any government of a foreign jurisdiction or its institutions. As such, the Commissioner found subsection 13(1)(c) of FOIP did not apply.

      2. Was the information obtained implicitly or explicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the provider of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.78 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party providing the information.79

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.80 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated. (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014))

      Once it has been established that the executive branch of government obtained a record from another government in confidence, the continued confidentiality of that record must be presumed, unless the other government has consented to disclosure or has made the information public.81 In other words, there are no time limits on the confidentiality. Just because a record might be old, it does not lose its confidential nature.

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement, or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.82

      Factors to consider when determining whether information was obtained in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the government institution or the party that provided the information.83
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the government institution and the party that provided the information from the point it was obtained until the present time.84
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.85
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidenceMutual understanding means that the government institution and the party that provided the information both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been obtained in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist in addition.86

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was obtained implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.87

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was obtained with the understanding that it would be kept confidential.88

      Factors to consider when determining if information was obtained in confidence explicitly

      include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party that provided the information.89
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions prior to the information being provided.90

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.91

      3. Is there consent to disclose the information or has the information been made public?

      Subsection 13(1)(c) has a built-in exception. The information contained in the record can be disclosed if the government of the foreign jurisdiction (or its institutions) agrees to its disclosure or if it has made the information public.

      Consent in this context means there is an agreement, approval or permission to disclose the information.92

      Public in this context means the information in the record is open to view by the public.93

      Released to the public means made available to the public at large either through active dissemination channels or through provision of the information at specific locations (e.g., public libraries, posted on a website).94

      Consultation with the other party or parties from which the information was obtained should take place to determine if either consent will be given or if the information has or will be made public.95

      Subsection 13(1)(d)

      Records from other governments

      13(1) A head shall refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from:

      (d) an international organization of states or its institutions;

      unless the government or institution from which the information was obtained consents to the disclosure or makes the information public.

      Subsection 13(1)(d) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It mandates refusal of access to information in a record where the information was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly from international organizations of states or its institutions, unless there is consent to release or the information was made public.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information obtained from an international organization of states or its institutions?

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.96

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure; or to get a hold of by effort.97

      An international organization of states refers to any organization with members representing and acting under the authority of the governments of two or more states. Examples include the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund.98

      A government institution could obtain information either intentionally or unintentionally. It can also include information that was received indirectly provided its original source was the international organization of states. However, to obtain information suggests that the government institution did not create it. Regardless, the provision is not so much driven by the source of the record to which access is sought as it is by the confidential nature and source of the information it contains. As such, authorship (or who created the record) is irrelevant.99

      Section 13 of FOIP uses the term “information contained in a record” rather than “a record” like other exemptions. Therefore, the exemption can include information within a record that was authored by the government institution provided the information at issue was obtained from the international organization of states.

      2. Was the information obtained implicitly or explicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the provider of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.100 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party providing the information.101

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.102 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated. (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014))

      Once it has been established that the executive branch of government obtained a record from another government in confidence, the continued confidentiality of that record must be presumed, unless the other government has consented to disclosure or has made the information public.103 In other words, there are no time limits on the confidentiality. Just because a record might be old, it does not lose its confidential nature.

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.104

      Factors to consider when determining whether information was obtained in confidence

      implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the government institution or the party that provided the information.105
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the government institution and the party that provided the information from the point it was obtained until the present time.106
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.107
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the party that provided the information both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been obtained in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.108

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was obtained implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.109

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was obtained with the understanding that it would be kept confidential.110

      Factors to consider when determining if information was obtained in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party that provided the information.111
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions prior to the information being provided.112

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.113

      3. Is there consent to disclose the information or has the information been made public?

      Subsection 13(1)(d) of FOIP has a built-in exception. The information contained in the record can be disclosed if the international organization of states (or its institutions) agrees to its disclosure or if it has made the information public.

      Consent in this context means there is an agreement, approval or permission to disclose the information.114

      Public in this context means the information in the record is open to view by the public.115

      Released to the public means made available to the public at large either through active dissemination channels or through provision of the information at specific locations (e.g., public libraries, posted on a website).116

      Consultation with the other party or parties from which the information was obtained should take place to determine if either consent will be given or if the information has or will be made public.117

      Subsection 13(2)

      Records from other governments

      13(2) A head may refuse to give access to information contained in a record that was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, from a local authority as defined in the regulations.

      Subsection 13(2) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. The provision mandates refusal of access to information in a record where the information was obtained in confidence, implicitly or explicitly from a local authority.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information obtained from a local authority?

      For assistance, subsection 2(2) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations) points to the definition of a “local authority” found in subsection 2(1)(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP).

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.118

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure; or to get a hold of by effort.119

      A government institution could obtain information either intentionally or unintentionally. It can also include information that was received indirectly provided its original source was the local authority. However, to obtain information suggests that the government institution did not create it. Regardless, the provision is not so much driven by the source of the record to which access is sought as it is by the confidential nature and source of the information it contains. As such, authorship (or who created the record) is irrelevant.120

      Section 13 uses the term “information contained in a record” rather than “a record” like other exemptions. Therefore, the exemption can include information within a record that was authored by the government institution provided the information at issue was obtained from a local authority.

      2. Was the information obtained implicitly or explicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the provider of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.121 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the local authority at the time the information was obtained.122

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.123 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated. (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014))

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.124

      Factors to consider when determining whether information was obtained in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the government institution or the local authority.125
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the government institution and the local authority from the point it was obtained until the present time.126
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.127
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the local authority both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been obtained in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.128

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was obtained implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.129

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was obtained with the understanding that it would be kept confidential.130

      Factors to consider when determining if information was obtained in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the local authority.131
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions prior to the information being provided.132

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.133

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2006-001, the Commissioner considered subsection 13(2) of FOIP. An applicant had requested access to a copy of a fire investigation report for a fire that occurred in November 2002 at an apartment building in the City of Regina. The applicant also sought access to any remedial orders that were given to the building owners. The access request was made to Saskatchewan Corrections and Public Safety. The Commissioner found that the Regina Fire Department was an established department of the City of Regina which qualified as a local authority as defined under section 2 of LA FOIP. However, the Commissioner found that the records were not obtained in confidence from the Regina Fire Department.

      Section 14: Information Injurious to Intergovernmental Relations or National Defence

      Information injurious to intergovernmental relations or national defence

      14 A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect:

      (a) relations between the Government of Saskatchewan and another government; or

      (b) the defence or security of Canada or of any foreign state allied or associated with Canada.

      Section 14 of FOIP is a harm-based discretionary provision. For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Injurious means harmful; tending to injure.134

      Subsection 14(a)

      Information injurious to intergovernmental relations or national defence

      14 A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect:

      (a) relations between the Government of Saskatchewan and another government;

      Subsection 14(a) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where the release of a record could reasonably be expected to prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect relations between the Government of Saskatchewan and another government.

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to intergovernmental relations.135 To interfere with means to obstruct or make much more difficult.136

      To adversely affect is to have a harmful or unfavorable impact.137

      The term relations in this context are intended to cover both formal negotiations and more general exchanges and associations between the Government of Saskatchewan and other governments.138

      To determine the level of harm, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014) set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Justice Bracken confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harms are self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.139

      Subsection 14(b)

      Information injurious to intergovernmental relations or national defence

      14 A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect:

      (b) the defence or security of Canada or of any foreign state allied or associated with Canada.

      Subsection 14(b) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where the release of a record could reasonably be expected to prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the defence or security of Canada or of any foreign state allied or associated with Canada.

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to national defence or security.140

      To interfere with means to obstruct or make much more difficult.141

      To adversely affect is to have a harmful or unfavorable impact.142

      Defence means any activity or plan relating to the defence of Canada (or any foreign state allied or associated with Canada), including improvements to its ability to resist attack.143

      foreign state in this context refers to any allied or associated foreign nation or state, including the component state governments of federated states.144

      An allied state is one with which Canada has concluded formal alliances or treaties.145

      An associated state is one with which Canada may be linked for trade or other purposes outside the scope of a formal alliance.146

      To determine the level of harm, the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014) set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Justice Bracken confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harms are self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;

      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and

      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.147

      Section 15: Law Enforcement and Investigations

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (a) prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the detection, investigation, prevention or prosecution of an offence or the security of a centre of lawful detention;

      (a.1) prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity as defined in the Criminal Code;

      (b) be injurious to the enforcement of:

      (i) an Act or a regulation; or

      (ii) an Act of the Parliament of Canada or a regulation made pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada;

      (c) interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation;

      (d) be injurious to the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution in the conduct of existing or anticipated legal proceedings;

      (e) reveal investigative techniques or procedures currently in use or likely to be used;

      (f) disclose the identity of a confidential source of information or disclose information furnished by that source with respect to a lawful investigation or a law enforcement matter;

      (g) deprive a person of a fair trial or impartial adjudication;

      (h) facilitate the escape from custody of an individual who is under lawful detention;

      (i) reveal law enforcement intelligence information;

      (j) facilitate the commission of an offence or tend to impede the detection of an offence;

      (k) interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter;

      (k.1) endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement officer or any other person;

      (k.2) reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion;

      (k.3) reveal a record that has been seized by a law enforcement officer in accordance with an Act or Act of Parliament;

      (l) reveal technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons; or

      (m) reveal the security arrangements of particular vehicles, buildings or other structures or systems, including computer or communication systems, or methods employed to protect those vehicles, buildings, structures or systems.

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Section 15 of FOIP recognizes that there is a strong public interest in protecting documents related to law enforcement: see Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23 at para 44, [2010] 1 SCR 815.148

      Section 15 of FOIP is a discretionary class-based and harm-based provision. Meaning, it contains both class and harm based exemptions.

      For the harm based exemptions, section 15 of FOIP uses the word “could” versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for “could” is lower than the threshold for “could reasonably be expected to.”149

      Subsection 15(1)(a)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (a) prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the detection, investigation, prevention or prosecution of an offence or the security of a centre of lawful detention;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(a) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the detection, investigation, prevention or prosecution of an offence or the security of a centre of lawful detention.

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.150 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the detection, investigation, prevention or prosecution of an offence or the security of a centre of lawful detention.151

      Interfere with includes hindering or hampering an ongoing investigation and anything that would detract from an investigator’s ability to pursue the investigation.152

      Adversely affect in this context means to have a harmful or unfavorable impact153 on the detection, investigation, prevention or prosecution of an offence or the security of a centre of lawful detention.

      Detection is the act of discovering or revealing something that is hidden or barely perceptible, especially to solve a crime.154

      Investigation can include police, security or administrative investigations or a combination of these. Investigation has been defined, in general terms, as a systematic process of examination, inquiry and observation.155

      • police investigation is one carried out by the police, or other persons who carry out a policing function that involves investigations.156 For example, a police investigation may include an investigation by a special constable appointed under The Police Act, 1990.
      • security investigation includes activities carried out by, for, or concerning a government institution and relates to the security of the organization and its clients, staff, resources or the public. It includes the work that is done to secure, ensure safety or protect from danger, theft or damage. In order to qualify, the investigation must lead or could lead to a penalty or sanction imposed under a statute, regulation, bylaw or resolution.157
      • An administrative investigation refers to activities undertaken to enforce compliance or to remedy non-compliance with standards, duties and responsibilities imposed by statute or regulation.158 For example, investigations under The Securities Act, 1988 as the Act provides for such investigative powers. A regulation is understood to mean a regulation as defined by section 1-2 of The Legislation Act.

      The government institution must have authority to conduct the investigation and the investigation must lead or could lead to penalties or sanctions (i.e., fines, imprisonment, revocation of a license, an order to cease activities).159 The penalties or sanctions do not have to be imposed by the investigating body to qualify but can be referred to another body to impose the penalty or sanction (e.g., RCMP).160

      Prevention means the stopping of something, especially something bad, from happening; to hinder or impede.161 In the context of subsection 15(1)(a) of FOIP, it means the stopping of an offence.

      prosecution, in this context, refers to proceedings in respect of a criminal or quasi-criminal charge laid under an enactment of Saskatchewan or Canada and may include regulatory offences that carry true penal consequences such as imprisonment or a significant fine.162

      Offence means a violation of the law; a crime.163

      Security means a state of safety or physical integrity.164 Security includes securing, ensuring safety or protecting from danger, theft or damage.165 Security means sufficient security.166

      Lawful detention means any person held in custody pursuant to a valid warrant or other authorized order. It extends to individuals remanded in custody (charged but not yet tried or convicted). It does not include individuals released under bail supervision.167

      Centre of lawful detention is a centre where persons are detained when suspected of a crime, awaiting trial, or sentencing, found to be an illegal immigrant or youthful offender, or for political reasons. It can also include a centre where persons are in custody under federal or provincial statute.168 In general, any person held in custody pursuant to a valid warrant or other authorized order is under lawful detention.169

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe the harm in detail to support the application of the provision. Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident on the face of the records.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(a) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(a.1)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (a.1) prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity as defined in the Criminal Code;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(a.1) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could prejudice, interfere with, or adversely affect the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity.

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.170 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity.171

      Interfere with includes hindering or hampering the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity.172

      Adversely affect in this context means to have a harmful or unfavorable impact173 on the detection, investigation or prevention of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity.

      Detection is the act of discovering or revealing something that is hidden or barely perceptible, especially to solve a crime.174

      Investigation can include police, security or administrative investigations or a combination of these. Investigation has been defined, in general terms, as a systematic process of examination, inquiry and observation.175

      • police investigation is one carried out by the police, or other persons who carry out a policing function that involves investigations.176 For example, a police investigation may include an investigation by a special constable appointed under The Police Act, 1990.
      • security investigation includes activities carried out by, for or concerning a government institution and relates to the security of the organization and its clients, staff, resources or the public. It includes the work that is done to secure, ensure safety or protect from danger, theft or damage. In order to qualify, the investigation must lead or could lead to a penalty or sanction imposed under a statute, regulation, bylaw or resolution.177
      • An administrative investigation refers to activities undertaken to enforce compliance or to remedy non-compliance with standards, duties and responsibilities imposed by statute or regulation.178 For example, investigations under The Securities Act, 1988 as the Act provides for such investigative powers. A regulation is understood to mean a regulation as defined by section 1-2 of The Legislation Act.

      The government institution must have authority to conduct the investigation and the investigation must lead or could lead to penalties or sanctions (i.e., fines, imprisonment, revocation of a license, an order to cease activities).179 The penalties or sanctions do not have to be imposed by the investigating body to qualify but can be referred to another body to impose the penalty or sanction (e.g., RCMP).180

      Prevention means the stopping of something, especially something bad, from happening; to hinder or impede.181 In the context of subsection 15(1)(a.1) of FOIP, it means the stopping of an act or omission that might constitute a terrorist activity.

      Omission means a failure to do something.182

      Terrorist activity is defined at section 83.01 of the Criminal Code of Canada. It includes, for example, an act or omission that is committed in or outside Canada that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective or cause.183

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe the harm in detail to support the application of the provision. Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident on the face of the records.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(a.1) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(b)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (b) be injurious to the enforcement of:

      (i) an Act or a regulation; or

      (ii) an Act of the Parliament of Canada or a regulation made pursuant to an Act of the Parliament of Canada;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(b) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could be injurious to the enforcement of an Act or regulation provincially or federally.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Which Act or regulation is being enforced?

      The main question is under which power was the enforcement conducted. If the government institution cannot advance any Acts or regulations in force in any part of Canada under which the enforcement was conducted, the exemption cannot be claimed.184

      An Act or a regulation means an Act of the Legislature together with any regulations issued thereunder and includes an Ordinance of the Northwest Territories in force in Saskatchewan.185

      An Act of Parliament of Canada or a regulation encompasses all Acts enacted by the Parliament of Canada together with any regulations issued thereunder.186

      Enforcement is the act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate, command, decree or agreement.187

      2. Could release of the record injure enforcement of the Act or regulation?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.188 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Injury implies damage or detriment.189

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe the harm in detail to support the application of the provision. Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident on the face of the records.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(b) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(c)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (c) interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based and harm-based exemption. Meaning it contains both a class and harm based component. It permits refusal of access in situations where the release of a record could interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the government institution’s activity qualify as a “lawful investigation?”

      lawful investigation is an investigation that is authorized or required and permitted by law.190

      The government institution should identify the legislation under which the investigation is occurring.

      The investigation can be concluded, active and ongoing or be occurring in the future.191

      It is not limited to investigations that are conducted by a government institution.192 In other words, it can include investigations conducted by other organizations (e.g., a police investigation).

      2. Does one of the following exist?

      a) Could release of the information interfere with a lawful investigation?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.193

      Interfere with includes hindering or hampering an investigation and anything that would detract from an investigator’s ability to pursue the investigation.194

      Interference can occur on concluded, active, ongoing or future investigations.195

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could interfere with a lawful investigation. Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident on the face of the records.

      b) Could release disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation?

      It is only necessary for the government institution to demonstrate that the information in the record is information with respect to a lawful investigation to meet this part of the test.

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.196

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the outcome could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.197

      Records that existed before an investigation commenced, such as regular reporting information, may not qualify for the exemption.198

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 223-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant had requested access to results from on-site tests and inspections of Husky Pipelines dating back to 2011. The Ministry of Economy withheld the records in full citing in part, subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP. The records were 26 pages of completed audit forms. The Commissioner found that the first part of the test was met as the investigation was conducted pursuant to The Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The Commissioner found that the second part of the test was not met because the pipeline audit forms were created two years prior to the commencement of the investigation. The Commissioner stated that records caught by this exemption should relate to the process of the investigation itself. Records that existed before the investigation commenced, such as regular reporting information, would not qualify. However, government institutions should consider the unique circumstances in each case. There may be circumstances where the exemption would apply to such records.

      In Review Report 030-2020, 050-2020, the Commissioner reviewed whether the Ministry of Government Relations (Government Relations) appropriately applied subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP to records withheld from an applicant. Part of the Commissioner’s review considered whether Government Relations’ activity qualified as a “lawful investigation” for purposes of the first part of the test for subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP. Government Relations asserted that the records withheld pursuant to subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP were created as a result of the ministerial-appointed inspector recommending an inspection be expanded into an inquiry and that a supervisor also be appointed pursuant to section 422 of The Northern Municipalities Act during said inquiry. Furthermore, Government Relations asserted that an inspection pursuant to section 417 of The Northern Municipalities Act is an investigation into the management, administration or operation of any municipality. The scope of the investigation is set out in the Minister’s Order. An inquiry is conducted if it is determined during the inspection that a more in-depth investigation is required, which is what occurred in the Northern Village of Pinehouse. Government Relations further asserted that while these provisions use the word inspection and inquiry, both an inspection and inquiry are an investigation that is authorized and permitted by law, specifically sections 417 and 418 of The Northern Municipalities Act. The Commissioner found that based upon the powers provided to an inspector or person of inquiry in The Public Inquiries Act, 2013, an inspection or inquiry under The Northern Municipalities Act qualifies as a ”lawful investigation” for purposes of subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP.

      In Review Report 330-2023, 334-2023 the Commissioner noted that the terms “lawful investigation” are not interchangeable with “law enforcement matter”. “Law enforcement” includes investigations conducted for the purpose of enforcing an enactment which leads to or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed under the enactment that authorizes the investigation. In that case, the Commissioner found that because investigations by the Office of the Saskatchewan Coroners Service (SCS) do not lead to penalty or sanctions under The Coroners Act, 1999, such that it could be considered a “law enforcement matter” on its own. Had the Coroner’s investigation been handed onto another party, such as a police service, then it would form part of the police service’s investigation and may qualify for exemption pursuant to subsection 15(1)(k). See paragraphs [70] to [72].

      Subsection 15(1)(d)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (d) be injurious to the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution in the conduct of existing or anticipated legal proceedings;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(d) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could be injurious to the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution in the conduct of existing or anticipated legal proceedings.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Do the proceedings qualify as existing or anticipated legal proceedings?

      Legal proceedings are any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is or may be given and includes an arbitration.199 It includes proceedings governed by rules of court or rules of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals that can result in a judgement of a court or a ruling by a tribunal. Legal proceedings include all proceedings authorized or sanctioned by law and brought or instituted in a court or legal tribunal, for the acquiring of a right or the enforcement of a remedy.200

      Labour grievances qualify as “legal proceedings” for statutory purposes.201

      To qualify for this exemption, the legal proceedings must be “existing or anticipated” as the provision uses these terms.

      Anticipated means more than merely possible.202 To regard as probable.203

      2. Could disclosure of the records be injurious to the government institution in the conduct of the legal proceedings?

      There must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in injury. Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectation. The requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.204

      Injury implies damage or detriment.205 The exemption is designed to protect the government institution from harm in its existing or anticipated legal proceedings.

      In order for the release of a record to be injurious to the government institution (or Government of Saskatchewan) “in the context of existing or anticipated legal proceedings”, the government institution (or Government of Saskatchewan) would need to be a party to such proceedings.206

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe the harm in detail to support the application of the provision. Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident on the face of the records.

      Parallel civil court action does not bar or preclude a formal review by the IPC.207 Discovery and disclosure provisions of The Queen’s Bench Rules of Saskatchewan operate independent of any process under FOIP. Subsection 4(c) of FOIP establishes that FOIP does not limit access to information otherwise available by law to parties to litigation. Section 4 also establishes that FOIP complements and does not replace existing procedures for access to records. Therefore, the injury should be above and beyond any prejudice that relates to the production of a relevant, non-privileged document in the usual course of a lawsuit.208 Where there are concerns or objections to the admissibility of any records in legal proceedings, such concerns could be argued before that tribunal. If a record is prejudicial to a government institution’s position, it would have the usual opportunity to make a submission to the tribunal who will then make a determination as it determines appropriate.209

      In Britto v University of Saskatchewan, (2018), Justice Danyliuk confirmed the above position at paragraph [61] but determined that it did not go far enough. Danyliuk J. added at paragraph [66] that the Act does not trump every potential privilege claim simply because the documents disclosed may later be argued to be inadmissible. The problem is twofold: not only is there potential use and abuse of the disclosed record before any admissibility ruling is made under the adjudicative process, but there is also the broader problem of the undercutting of the free communications essential to seeking and obtaining legal advice.210

      Admissibility means the quality, state, or condition of being allowed to be entered into evidence in a hearing, trial or other official proceeding.211

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(d) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP in Review Report 223-2015 and 224-2015. An applicant had requested a copy of a completed audit report. The City of Regina (the City) refused to confirm or deny the existence of any records responsive to the request. The City cited subsection 14(1)(d) and section 21 as provisions that would apply if the records existed. The City also provided a severed copy of a briefing note citing subsection 14(1)(d) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the first part of the test was met because there was a lawsuit commenced against the City at the time of the review. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the second part of the test was met because a trial date had not yet been set and injury could result from potential swaying of jury members prior to trial due to the high profile of the case and the media attention it had garnered.

      Subsection 15(1)(e)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (e) reveal investigative techniques or procedures currently in use or likely to be used;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(e) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal investigative techniques or procedures currently in use or likely to be used. Subsection 15(1)(e) of FOIP recognizes that unrestricted access to law enforcement techniques could reduce their usefulness, effectiveness and success.212

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information in question constitute “investigative techniques” or “procedures?”

      Investigative techniques and procedures mean techniques and procedures used to conduct an investigation or inquiry for the purpose of law enforcement.213

      • The techniques or procedures must include specific steps. General information (such as forms and standard policies that do not include specific investigative steps and procedures) would not qualify.214
      • Routine, common or customary investigative techniques and procedures would not qualify.215
      • Generally known investigative techniques and procedures which the public is already aware of would not qualify.216

      It does not include well-known investigative techniques, such as wiretapping, fingerprinting and standard sources of information about individuals’ addresses, personal liabilities, real property, etc.217

      2. Are the investigative techniques and/or procedures currently in use or likely to be used?

      Likely means probable, a likely outcome; reasonably expected.218

      The exemption is more likely to apply to new technologies in electronic monitoring or surveillance equipment used for a law enforcement purpose.219

      The exemption extends to techniques and procedures that are likely to be used, in order to protect techniques and technology under development and new equipment or procedures that have not yet been used.220

      3. Could disclosure reveal investigative techniques or procedures?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.221 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal investigative techniques or procedures.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.222

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution must establish how and why disclosure of the information in question could reveal investigative techniques or procedures.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(e) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      ‌Subsection 15(1)(f)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (f) disclose the identity of a confidential source of information or disclose information furnished by that source with respect to a lawful investigation or a law enforcement matter;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(f) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could disclose the identity of a confidential source of information, or disclose information furnished by that source with respect to a lawful investigation or a law enforcement matter.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Could the information disclose the identity of a confidential source?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.223 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could disclose the identity of a confidential source of information or disclose information furnished by a confidential source.

      Identity includes the name and any identifying characteristics, symbols and numbers relating to the source.224

      confidential source is someone who has provided information with the assurance that his or her identity will remain secret. The assurance may be express or implied. There must be evidence of the circumstances in which the information was provided to establish whether the source is confidential.225

      The government institution should establish that the source of the information qualifies as a confidential source.226

      2. Could disclosure reveal information that was provided by the confidential source with respect to a lawful investigation or law enforcement matter?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.227 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could disclose the identity of a confidential source of information or disclose information furnished by a confidential source.

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.228

      The information must relate to a lawful investigation and/or law enforcement matter.

      lawful investigation is an investigation that is authorized or required and permitted by law.229

      Law enforcement includes:230

      a) Policing, including criminal intelligence operations.

      Policing refers to the activities of police services. This means activities carried out under the authority of a statute regarding the maintenance of public order, detection and prevention of crime or the enforcement of law.231

      Criminal intelligence is information relating to a person or group of persons compiled by law enforcement to anticipate, prevent or monitor possible criminal activity. Intelligence-gathering is sometimes a separate activity from the conduct of specific investigations. Intelligence may be used for future investigations, for activities aimed at preventing the commission of an offence, or to ensure the security of individuals or organizations.232

      b) Investigations, inspections or proceedings conducted under the authority of or for the purpose of enforcing an enactment which lead to, or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed under the enactment.

      Investigation has been defined, in general, as a systematic process of examination, inquiry and observations.233

      Inspection has been defined, in general, as a careful examination.234

      Legal proceeding has been defined, in general, as any proceeding authorized by law and instituted in a court or tribunal to acquire a right or to enforce a remedy.235

      Penalty or sanction means a punishment or penalty used to enforce obedience to law.236 It can include a fine, imprisonment, revocation of a license, an order to cease an activity, or expulsion from an educational institution.237

      Matter should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. It does not necessarily always have to apply to some specific on-going investigation or proceeding.238

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution must establish how and why disclosure of the information in question could disclose the identity of a confidential source of information or disclose information furnished by a confidential source.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(f) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      ‌Subsection 15(1)(g)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (g) deprive a person of a fair trial or impartial adjudication;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Applicants have a general right to access information pursuant to section 5 of FOIP. However, other rights and freedoms must be upheld notwithstanding the right of access. The Canadian Bill of Rights sets out a number of rights and freedoms. Although only a federal statute, it is helpful in understanding the origins of these rights and freedoms. Subsection 2(e) and (f) of the Canadian Bill of Rights provides that:

      2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to

      e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of rights and obligations;

      f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right to reasonable bail without just cause.239

      The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also recognizes these rights and freedoms at section 7 and subsection 11(d). As part of the Constitution, it is the supreme law of Canada and applies to both federal and provincial acts of government.240

      Subsection 15(1)(g) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could deprive a person of a fair trial or impartial adjudication.241

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Who is the “person” impacted by possible disclosure?

      Person includes an individual, corporation or the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person.242

      2. Is there a trial or adjudication occurring now or in the future?

      Trial means a formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding.243

      Adjudication means the legal process of resolving a dispute, the process of judicially deciding a case.244

      This exemption applies not only to civil and criminal court actions but also to proceedings before tribunals established to adjudicate individual and collective rights. Examples of proceedings before tribunals include hearings before the Labour Relations Board, and Automobile Injury Appeal Commission.245

      Commencement of a legal action is not by itself enough to support the application of this exemption.246

      3. Could disclosure of the information deprive the person of a fair trial or impartial adjudication?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.247 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Deprive means to take away or prevent the happening of a certain event.248

      Fair trial refers to a trial by an impartial tribunal in accordance with regular procedures; especially a criminal trial in which the defendant’s constitutional and legal rights are respected.249 It means a hearing by an impartial tribunal; a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgement only after consideration of evidence and facts as a whole.250

      Impartial adjudication means a proceeding in which the parties’ legal rights are safeguarded and respected.251 Not favoring one side more than another; unbiased and disinterested; unswayed by personal interest.252

      The right to a fair trial is fundamental and cannot be sacrificed.253

      For guidance on determining the harm, the Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1994) decision may be of assistance. It concerned a publication ban to prevent the televised broadcast of a fictional account of the sexual abuse of boys in an orphanage until the completion of four criminal charges, where there was a similarity between the subject matter of the television program and the charges faced by the accused individuals. The main issue addressed was whether the infringement of the Charter right to freedom of expression was justified in order to ensure that the accused individuals received a fair and impartial adjudication as contemplated in subsection 11(d) of the Charter. Speaking for the majority, Lamer C.J.C. said:

      The common law rule governing publication bans has always been traditionally understood as requiring those seeking a ban to demonstrate that there is a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial.

      [P]ublication bans are not available as protections against remote and speculative dangers.254

      In separate reasons, McLachlin J. said:

      What must be guarded against is the facile assumption that if there is any risk of prejudice to a fair trial, however speculative, the ban should be ordered.255

      Where a government institution intends to assert that a jury may be influenced by release of the record or information, it should consider R. v. Corbett, (1988), wherein Justice Dickson said:

      …the Court should not be heard to call into question the capacity of juries to do the job assigned to them. The ramifications of any such statement would be enormous… (i)t is logically incoherent to hold that juries are incapable of following the explicit instructions of a judge.256

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or hearing.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(g) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(h)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (h) facilitate the escape from custody of an individual who is under lawful detention;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(h) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could facilitate the escape from custody of an individual who is under lawful detention.257

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is there an individual who is under lawful detention?

      Under lawful detention means any person held in custody pursuant to a valid warrant or other authorized order. It extends to individuals remanded in custody (charged but not yet tried or convicted). It does not include individuals released under bail supervision.258

      2. Could release of the record facilitate escape from custody?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.259 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Facilitate means to make the occurrence of escape easier; to render less difficult.260

      Escape means the act or an instance of breaking free from confinement.261

      An example of information protected by this exemption is the building plans for a correctional facility.262

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could facilitate escape.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(h) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(i)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (i) reveal law enforcement intelligence information;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(i) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal law enforcement intelligence information.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information constitute law enforcement intelligence information?

      Law enforcement includes:263

      a) Policing, including criminal intelligence operations.

      Policing refers to the activities of police services. This means activities carried out under the authority of a statute regarding the maintenance of public order, detection and prevention of crime or the enforcement of law.264

      Criminal intelligence is information relating to a person or group of persons compiled by law enforcement to anticipate, prevent or monitor possible criminal activity. Intelligence-gathering is sometimes a separate activity from the conduct of specific investigations. Intelligence may be used for future investigations, for activities aimed at preventing the commission of an offence, or to ensure the security of individuals or organizations.265

      b) Investigations, inspections or proceedings conducted under the authority of or for the purpose of enforcing an enactment which lead to or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed under the enactment.

      Investigation has been defined, in general, as a systematic process of examination, inquiry and observations.266

      Inspection has been defined, in general, as a careful examination.267

      Legal proceeding has been defined, in general, as any proceeding authorized by law and instituted in a court or tribunal to acquire a right or to enforce a remedy.268

      Penalty or sanction means a punishment or penalty used to enforce obedience to law.269 It can include a fine, imprisonment, revocation of a license, an order to cease an activity or expulsion from an educational institution.270

      Matter should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. It does not necessarily always have to apply to some specific on-going investigation or proceeding.271

      Intelligence information is information gathered by a law enforcement agency in a covert manner with respect to ongoing efforts devoted to the detection and prosecution of crime or the prevention of possible violation of law and is distinct from information which is compiled and identifiable as part of the investigation of a specific occurrence.272

      2. Could disclosure reveal law enforcement intelligence information?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.273 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal law enforcement intelligence information.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.274

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution must establish how and why disclosure of the information in question could reveal the intelligence information.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(i) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(j)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (j) facilitate the commission of an offence or tend to impede the detection of an offence;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(j) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could facilitate the commission of an offence or impedes the detection of one.

      The following two-part test can be applied. However, only one of the questions needs to be answered in the affirmative for the exemption to apply. There may be circumstances where both questions apply and can be answered in the affirmative.

      1. Could release of the record facilitate the commission of an offence?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.275 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that releasing the information could facilitate the commission of an offence.

      Facilitate to make the occurrence of something easier; to render less difficult.276

      Commission of an offence means committing a breach of law.277

      Examples include information about techniques, tools and instruments used for criminal acts; names of individuals with permits for guns; the location of police officers; and the location of valuable assets belonging to a government institution.278

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could facilitate escape.

      2. Could release of the record tend to impede the detection of an offence?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.279 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that releasing the information could impede the detection of an offence.

      Tend to means to have a direct bearing or effect; to contribute or conduce in some degree or way; to have a tendency to.280

      Impede in this context means to delay or block the progress or action of detection.281

      Detection means the act of discovering or revealing something that is hidden or barely perceptible, especially to solve a crime.282

      Offence means a violation of the law; a crime.283

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could impede the detection of an offence.

      Examples include information about techniques, tools and instruments used for criminal acts; names of individuals with permits for guns; the location of police officers; and the location of valuable assets belonging to a government institution.284

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(j) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 037-2018, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision (subsection 14(1)(j)) in LA FOIP. The applicant had requested records relating to a specific incident that occurred in 2012. The Saskatoon Police Service (SPS) withheld portions of the records citing a number of exemptions including subsection 14(1)(j) of LA FOIP. SPS specifically applied subsection 14(1)(j) of LA FOIP to seven pages that contained “ten codes” which were used by SPS when dispatching officers. The codes were used as a means of communication that conveyed a specific message without publicly identifying their true meaning. The codes were unique to SPS. SPS pointed to Ontario IPC Order PO-1665, which dealt with “ten codes”. In that case, the Ontario Commissioner agreed the codes should be withheld. The reason was that disclosure would leave OPP officers more vulnerable. Furthermore, it would compromise their ability to provide effective policing services, as it would make it easier for individuals engaged in illegal activities to carry them out and would jeopardize the safety of OPP officers who communicate with each other on publicly accessible radio transmission space. The Commissioner found that SPS appropriately applied subsection 14(1)(j) of LA FOIP to the “ten codes” because release could facilitate the commission of an offence.

      Subsection 15(1)(k)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (k) interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP is a discretionary exemption that contains both a class and harm based component. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter.

      The following two-part test can be applied:285

      1. Is there a law enforcement matter involved?

      Although FOIP does not define “law enforcement”, other privacy legislation across Canada does define the term in the context of access and privacy. The following definitions have been drawn from other jurisdictions and can be relied upon for subsection15(1)(k) of FOIP.

      Law enforcement includes:286

      a) Policing, including criminal intelligence operations.

      Policing refers to the activities of police services. This means activities carried out under the authority of a statute regarding the maintenance of public order, detection and prevention of crime or the enforcement of law.287

      Criminal intelligence is information relating to a person or group of persons compiled by law enforcement to anticipate, prevent or monitor possible criminal activity. Intelligence-gathering is sometimes a separate activity from the conduct of specific investigations. Intelligence may be used for future investigations, for activities aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or to ensure the security of individuals or organizations.288

      b) Investigations, inspections or proceedings conducted under the authority of or for the purpose of enforcing an enactment which lead to or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed under the enactment.

      Investigation has been defined, in general, as a systematic process of examination, inquiry and observations.289

      Inspection has been defined, in general, as a careful examination.290

      Legal proceeding has been defined, in general, as any proceeding authorized by law and instituted in a court or tribunal to acquire a right or to enforce a remedy.291

      Penalty or sanction means a punishment or penalty used to enforce obedience to law.292 It can include a fine, imprisonment, revocation of a license, an order to cease an activity or expulsion from an educational institution.293

      Matter should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. It does not necessarily always have to apply to some specific on-going investigation or proceeding.294

      The law enforcement matter does not have to be active and ongoing in order to qualify.295 It is not limited to law enforcement matters involving the government institution.296

      Activities of agencies and investigative bodies listed in section 14 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations for the purpose of subsection 29(2)(g) of FOIP may also qualify as law enforcement matters for the purpose of subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP.297

      2. Does one of the following exist?

      a) Could release of information interfere with a law enforcement matter?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.298 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Interfere means to hinder or hamper.299

      Interference can occur on concluded, active, ongoing or future law enforcement matters. For example, the right to ensure witnesses of complete confidentiality and secrecy would be severely compromised if the protection only existed until the end of a criminal proceeding.300

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could interfere with a law enforcement matter.

      b) Could release disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter?

      It is necessary for the government institution to demonstrate that the information in the record is information with respect to a law enforcement matter to meet this part of the test.

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the outcome could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.301

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.302

      ‌A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2014-001, the Commissioner, considered subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access request to the Financial and Consumer Affairs Authority of Saskatchewan (FCAAS) for all information associated to the applicant. The FCAAS provided access to some records and withheld others citing a number of exemptions including subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the FCAAS was conducting investigations pursuant to three pieces of legislation therefore, it was an appropriate law enforcement agency for purposes of subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP and sanctions could result from the enforcement actions (proceedings) being taken by the FCAAS. As such, a law enforcement matter was found to exist. Further, the Commissioner found that release of the records could disclose information respecting that law enforcement matter.

      In Review Report 330-2023, 334-2023 the Commissioner noted that the terms “lawful investigation” are not interchangeable with “law enforcement matter”. “Law enforcement” includes investigations conducted for the purpose of enforcing an enactment which leads to or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed under the enactment that authorizes the investigation. In that case, the Commissioner found that because investigations by the Office of the Saskatchewan Coroners Service (SCS) do not lead to penalty or sanctions under The Coroners Act, 1999, such that it could be considered a “law enforcement matter” on its own. Had the Coroner’s investigation been handed onto another party, such as a police service, then it would form part of the police service’s investigation and may qualify for exemption pursuant to subsection 15(1)(k). See paragraphs [70] to [72].

      Subsection 15(1)(k.1)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (k.1) endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement officer or any other person;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(k.1) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement officer or any other person.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Who is at risk of harm (law enforcement officer or another person)?

      Law enforcement officer is a person whose duty is to enforce the laws and preserve the peace.303

      Person includes an individual, corporation or the heirs, executors, administrators, or other legal representatives of a person.304

      2. Could disclosure endanger the life or physical safety of that person?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for asserting the harm could occur. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.305 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Endanger means exposure to peril or harm.306

      Physical safety means to be protected from any physical injury or impairment to the human body.307

      Endanger the life or physical safety refers to situations in which disclosure of information could threaten, or put in peril, someone’s life or physical well-being. An individual’s physical safety can be threatened as a result of a physical attack or an attack against property that is likely to cause casualties.308

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could endanger the life or physical safety of the person.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(k.1) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(k.2)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (k.2) reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      (a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      (b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(k.2) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion requires protection. The leading authority on the issue of prosecutorial discretion in Canada is Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada defined the role of the Attorney General and Crown counsel and described their constitutional dimensions in terms of prosecutorial discretion. The Court said:

      It is a constitutional principle in this country that the Attorneys General of this country must act independently of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign authority to initiate, continue or terminate prosecutions…

      The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General cannot be subjected to interference from parties who are not as competent to consider the various factors involved in making a decision to prosecute. To subject such decisions to political interference, or to judicial supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of prosecution…309

      The following three-part test can be applied:310

      1. Was the prosecutorial discretion exercised in matters within the prosecutor’s authority concerning the prosecution of offences?

      Exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not defined in FOIP. However, where a legislative instrument [such as FOIP] uses a legal term of art, it is generally presumed that the term is used in its correct legal sense.311

      Prosecutorial discretion was defined in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta (2002) as follows:

      Without being exhaustive, we believe the core elements of prosecutorial discretion encompass the following: (a) the discretion whether to bring the prosecution of a charge laid by police; (b) the discretion to enter a stay of proceedings in either a private or public prosecution, as codified in the [Criminal Code], ss. 579 and 579.1; (c) the discretion to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge; (d) the discretion to withdraw from criminal proceedings altogether: [R. v. Osborne (1975)]; and (e) the discretion to take control of a private prosecution: [R. v. Osiowy (1989)]. While there are other discretionary decisions, these are the core of the delegated sovereign authority peculiar to the office of the Attorney General.312

      Exercise means to make use of; to put into action; to execute.313

      Subsection 2(u) of The Summary Offences Procedure Act1990, SS 1990-91, c S-63.1 defines “prosecutor” as follows:

      2 In this Act:

      (u) “prosecutor” means:

      (i) the Attorney General or, where the Attorney General does not intervene, the informant or the person who issued the ticket, and includes counsel or the agent acting on behalf of the Attorney General, the informant or the person who issued the ticket;

      (ii) with respect to a bylaw, anyone authorized by a municipality or by a body corporate mentioned in subclauses (a)(ii) to (iv) to prosecute bylaws on its behalf;

      The exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be with respect to offences under the Criminal Code and any other enactment of Canada for which the Attorney General for Saskatchewan may initiate and conduct a prosecution. Prosecutorial discretion may also be exercised with respect to offences under an enactment of Saskatchewan, including prosecution of provincial regulatory offences.314 A regulatory offence is a statutory crime, as opposed to a common-law crime. It is an offence in which motive is not a consideration in determining guilt, such as a traffic violation.315

      2. Is the information related to or was it used in the exercise of the discretion?

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.316 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.317 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.318

      Most records relating to this exemption will be in the possession or under the control of the Ministry of Justice. Copies of records or notes reflecting the discretion exercised may be in the files of local authorities or police services.319

      The fact that information is in a Crown Prosecutor’s files does not necessarily mean that the information relates to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The substance, not location, of the information is determinative.320

      3. Could disclosure reveal this information?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.321 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.322

      There are also many smaller decisions regarding the “nature and extent” of a prosecution. For example, there are decisions to request and review information, conduct particular legal research or obtain the views of others. Disclosure of these kinds of information may reveal the grounds on which the larger prosecutorial decisions are based.323

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should describe how and why disclosure of the information in question could result in the release of information related to or used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(k.2) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 004-2020, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) (subsection 14(1)(k.2)). The City of Moose Jaw (City) had applied subsection 14(1)(k.2) of LA FOIP to an email exchange between a City Bylaw Enforcement Officer and the City’s legal counsel. The Commissioner found that the City was acting as the prosecutor and as such could exercise prosecutorial discretion. Bylaw Enforcement Officers may act on behalf of the City as a prosecutor and may from time to time exercise prosecutorial discretion. The Commissioner found that the City’s submission did not explain how the information related to or was used in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, subsection 14(1)(k.2) of LA FOIP was found not to apply.

      Subsection 15(1)(k.3)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (k.3) reveal a record that has been seized by a law enforcement officer in accordance with an Act or Act of Parliament;

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program

      Subsection 15(1)(k.3) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal a record that had been seized by a law enforcement officer in accordance with an Act or Act of Parliament.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is there a record seized by a law enforcement officer in accordance with an Act or Act of Parliament?

      Record means a record of information in any form and includes information that is written, photographed, recorded or stored in any manner, but does not include computer programs or other mechanisms that produce records.324

      Seized means to forcibly take possession.325 In this context, seizure may occur as the result of a warrant but there are other circumstances where a warrant may not be involved, for example the seizure of plain view evidence or in exigent circumstances (see subsection 87(7) of the Criminal Code).

      Law enforcement officer is a person whose duty is to enforce the laws and preserve the peace.326

      An Act means an Act of the Legislature and includes an Ordinance of the Northwest Territories in force in Saskatchewan.327

      An Act of Parliament encompasses all Acts enacted by the Parliament of Canada.328 An example is the Criminal Code.

      2. Could release reveal the record that was seized?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.329 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal a record that has been seized by a law enforcement officer in accordance with an Act or Act of Parliament.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.330

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(k.3) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(l)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (l) reveal technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons; or

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(l) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons. An example could include information on how to make a bomb.

      The following test can be applied:

      Could release reveal technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.331 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.332

      Technical information is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts. Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering or electronics…it will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment or thing. Finally, technical information must be given a meaning separate from scientific information.333

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.334 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.335 “Relating to” requires some connection between the technical information and weapons both existing and potential.336

      Weapon means an instrument used or designed to be used to injure or kill someone.337 Potential means capable of coming into being; possible if the necessary conditions exist.338

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(l) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      Subsection 15(1)(m)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

      (m) reveal the security arrangements of particular vehicles, buildings or other structures or systems, including computer or communication systems, or methods employed to protect those vehicles, buildings, structures or systems.

      (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(1)(m) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reveal the security arrangements of particular vehicles, buildings or other structures or systems, including computer or communication systems, or methods employed to protect those vehicles, buildings, structures or systems.

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the type of information that could be presumed to qualify as “security arrangements”.339

      The following questions should be considered. However, note that only one of the questions needs to be answered in the affirmative for the exemption to apply. There may be circumstances where both questions apply and can be answered in the affirmative:

      1. Could release reveal security arrangements (of particular vehicles, buildings, other structures, or systems)?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.340 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal security arrangements of particular vehicles, buildings, other structures, or systems.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.341

      Security means a state of safety or physical integrity. The security of a building includes the safety of its inhabitants or occupants when they are present in it. Examples of information relating to security include methods of transporting or collecting cash in a transit system; plans for security systems in a building; patrol timetables or patterns for security personnel; and the access control mechanisms and configuration of a computer system.342 Security means sufficient security.343

      Other structures or systems includes computer and communication systems. An example of a communication system could be a radio communication system such as two-way radios.

      2. Could release reveal security methods employed to protect the particular vehicles, buildings, other structures, or systems?

      Section 15 of FOIP uses the word could versus “could reasonably be expected to” as seen in other provisions of FOIP. The threshold for could is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectationThe requirement for could is simply that the release of the information could have the specified result. There would still have to be a basis for the assertion. If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.344 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could reveal security methods employed to protect particular vehicles, buildings, other structures or systems.

      Reveal means to make known; cause or allow to be seen.345

      Security means a state of safety or physical integrity. The security of a building includes the safety of its inhabitants or occupants when they are present in it. Examples of information relating to security include methods of transporting or collecting cash in a transit system, plans for security systems in a building, patrol timetables or patterns for security personnel, and the access control mechanisms and configuration of a computer system.346

      Method means a mode of organizing, operating, or performing something.

      Other structures or systems includes computer and communication systems. An example of a communication system could be radio communication systems such as two-way radios.

      The government institution must demonstrate that the information in the record is information that would reveal security methods employed to protect particular vehicles, buildings, other structures or systems to meet this part of the test.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1)(m) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program (see subsection 15(2)).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 037-2018, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP. The applicant had requested records from the Saskatoon Police Service (SPS) related to a specific incident. SPS released some records to the applicant and withheld others pursuant to several provisions including subsection 14(1)(m) of LA FOIP. SPS applied subsection 14(1)(m) of LA FOIP to two pages of the record which constituted a note from an officer to a prosecutor. It advised of special arrangements that may have been required in the courtroom based on the history of some of the individuals involved in the court proceeding. SPS asserted that the note revealed the security arrangements of the Court of King’s Bench building. Furthermore, that it would reveal patterns of security personnel at the Court. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the note only contained one suggestion about security for the Court of King’s Bench. In addition, there was no evidence that the suggestion had been relayed on to the Court or that the Court followed the suggestion. Finally, if the security measure had been followed, it would have been observable by those who attended at the time. The Commissioner was not persuaded that subsection 14(1)(m) of LA FOIP applied to the note.

      Subsection 15(2)

      Law enforcement and investigations

      15(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a record that:

      a) provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      Subsection 15(2) of FOIP provides that a government institution cannot rely on subsection 15(1) of FOIP for a record that:

      a) Provides a general outline of the structure or programs of a law enforcement agency; or

      b) Reports, by means of statistical analysis or otherwise, on the degree of success achieved in a law enforcement program.

      The purpose of this provision is to encourage disclosure of general information about the structure of law enforcement or its programs or reports and statistics about the success of law enforcement programs.

      Structure in this context means the organization of elements or parts such as corporate structure.347

      Programs in this context means a set of related measures or activities with a long-term aim, a planned series of events.348 An example would be the Regina Crime Stoppers Program.

      Reports and statistics on the success of law enforcement programs should be routinely disclosed whenever possible. Only if the contents of the report could interfere with or harm any of the matters set out in the preceding subsections would information be withheld. This would be done by severing the appropriate parts of the report.349

      Examples of statistical law enforcement reports include information on the success of programs such as “Crime Stoppers”, statistics on safety inspections and reports on matters such as reducing car thefts.

      Section 16: Cabinet Documents

      Cabinet documents

      16(1) A head shall refuse to give access to a record that discloses a confidence of the Executive Council, including:

      (a) records created to present advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options to the Executive Council or any of its committees;

      (b) agendas or minutes of the Executive Council or any of its committees, or records that record deliberations or decisions of the Executive Council or any of its committees;

      (c) records of consultations among members of the Executive Council on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy, or records that reflect those consultations;

      (d) records that contain briefings to members of the Executive Council in relation to matters that:

      (i) are before, or are proposed to be brought before, the Executive Council or any of its committees; or

      (ii) are the subject of consultations described in clause (c).

      (2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(1) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based provision. Subsections 16(1)(a) through(d) of FOIP are not an exhaustive list. Therefore, even if none of the subsections are found to apply, the introductory wording of subsection 16(1) of FOIP must still be considered.350 In other words, is the information a confidence of Executive Council?

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to disclose a confidence of the Executive Council (Cabinet).351

      The Saskatchewan Government is based on a Cabinet system. Consisting of the Premier and ministers.

      In Supreme Court of Canada decision, Ontario (Attorney Genera) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4, the following highlights the importance and purpose of protecting cabinet confidences:

      [28] In our constitutional democracy, the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations is a precondition to responsible government because it enables collective ministerial responsibility. Responsible government is a fundamental principle of our system of government (OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at p. 38) and the “most important non-federal characteristic of the Canadian Constitution” (P. W. Hogg and W. K. Wright, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp.), at § 9:3). Government is “responsible” in that the executive is accountable to, and must maintain the confidence of, the legislative assembly (§ 9:1; Heard, at p. 90). Cabinet ministers are both individually responsible for their own conduct and respective departments, and collectively responsible for government policy and action (G. White, Cabinets and First Ministers (2005), at pp. 15-16).

      [29] Cabinet secrecy derives from the collective dimension of ministerial responsibility (Y. Campagnolo, “The Political Legitimacy of Cabinet Secrecy” (2017), 51 R.J.T.U.M. 51, at p.59). Collective ministerial responsibility requires that ministers be able to speak freely when deliberating without fear that what they say might be subject to public scrutiny (IPC reasons, at paras. 86-87 and 97). This is necessary so ministers do not censor themselves in policy debate, and so ministers can stand together in public, and be held responsible as a whole, once a policy decision has been made and announced. These purposes are referred to by scholars as the “candour” and “solidarity” rationales for Cabinet confidentiality (see Campagnolo (2017), at pp. 66-72). At base, Cabinet confidentiality promotes executive accountability by permitting private disagreement and candour in ministerial deliberations, despite public solidarity (ibid.; see also N. d’Ombrain, “Cabinet secrecy” (2004), 47 Can. Pub. Admin. 332, at p. 336).

      [30] Scholars also refer to a third rationale for the convention of Cabinet confidentiality: it promotes the efficiency of the collective decision-making process (see Campagnolo (2017), at p. 68). Thus, Cabinet secrecy promotes candour, solidarity, and efficiency, all in aid of effective government. This objective is also reflected in the jurisprudence of this Court. In Carey, this Court observed that the very purpose of the confidentiality is the proper functioning of government (pp. 664, 670-71 and 673). In Babcock, McLachlin C.J. stated: “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government” (para. 15). And in John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 3, this Court noted that exposure of policy priorities at an early stage of the deliberative process to journalists or political opponents “is combustible material liable to fuel a fire that could quickly destroy governmental credibility and effectiveness” (para. 44, quoting Canadian Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1999] 4 F.C. 245, at para. 31).

      [31] Cabinet confidentiality is therefore “not just a convenient political dodge; it is essential to effective government” (see White, at p. 139; see also p. 138). Our jurisprudence focuses broadly on the value of deliberative secrecy to the effective operation of government institutions, including Cabinet. It also recognizes that too much openness can impair that aim (see Babcock, at para. 18; Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (Criminal Lawyers’ Association 2010), at para. 40; B.C. Judges, at para. 96; see also John Doe, at para. 44; Williams Report, at p. 235).

      [35] …Lord Reid famously explained the value of Cabinet confidentiality to government efficiency in Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910 (H.L.), at p. 952, in words quoted with approval by this Court in Carey, at pp. 658-59:

      [The premature disclosure of Cabinet secrets] would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind.

      [36] The prerogative to determine when and how to announce Cabinet decisions is grounded in the harmful impact that premature disclosure of policy priorities can have on the deliberative process. As Professor Campagnolo explains, as a matter of convention, the efficiency of the deliberative process justifies “keeping Cabinet proceedings confidential until a final decision is made and announced by ministers” (Behind Closed Doors: The Law and Politics of Cabinet Secrecy (2021), at p. 26). Publicizing Cabinet’s decision-making process before the formulation and announcement of a final decision “would increase the public pressure that stakeholders put on ministers and give rise to partisan criticism from their political opponents”; this scrutiny “would ultimately paralyze the collective decision-making process” (p. 26).

      [61] In approaching assertions of Cabinet confidentiality, administrative decision makers and reviewing courts must be attentive not only to the vital importance of public access to government-held information but also to Cabinet secrecy’s core purpose of enabling effective government, and its underlying rationales of efficiency, candour, and solidarity. They must also be attentive to the dynamic and fluid nature of executive decision making, the function of Cabinet itself and its individual members, the role of the Premier, and Cabinet’s prerogative to determine when and how to announce its decisions.

      Cabinet establishes the provincial government’s policies and priorities for the province. Cabinet ministers are collectively responsible for all actions taken by the Cabinet and must publicly support all Cabinet decisions. In order to reach final decisions, ministers must be able to express their views freely during the discussions held in Cabinet. To allow the exchange of views to be disclosed publicly would result in the erosion of the collective responsibility of ministers. As a result, the collective decision-making process has traditionally been protected by the rule of confidentiality, which upholds the principle of collective responsibility and enables ministers to engage in full and frank discussions necessary for the effective running of a Cabinet system.352

      The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. In the decision Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002, the Court explained the reasons for this: “The process of democratic governance works best when Cabinet members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves around the Cabinet table unreservedly.”353

      Mr. Justice Culliton, made a recommendation about the type of records that should be protected as cabinet confidences in his report titled, Report of the Honourable E.M. Culliton, Former Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, on the Matter of Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy in the Province of Saskatchewan. In Review Report F-2012-004, the Commissioner quoted these recommendations from Justice Culliton as follows:

      The solidarity of cabinet can be maintained only by complete confidentiality in respect to all records relevant to its administration and operation. I recommend that the legislation provide for such complete confidentiality and without in any way restricting that wide protection, should provide specifically that access shall not be granted to:

      a) memoranda the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations to the executive council;

      b) discussion papers, the purpose of which is to present background, explanation, analysis of problems or political options to the executive council for consideration by the council in making decisions;

      c) agenda of executive council or minister or records disclosing deliberations or decisions of the executive council;

      d) records used for or reflecting conclusions or discussions by the members of the executive council on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy;

      e) records the purpose of which is to brief members of the executive council in relation to matters that are before or are proposed to be brought before the executive council; and

      f) draft legislation.354

      IPC Findings

      In 2015, the Commissioner issued 10 Review Reports355 involving 10 different government institutions. An applicant had requested the Transition Briefing Binders provided to new ministers in June 2014 for each of the 10 government institutions. Each of the government institutions responded to the applicant. All of the responses indicated that the Transition Briefing Binders were being withheld in full from the applicant. Seven of the government institutions cited subsection 16(1)(a), one cited subsection 16(1)(b) and two cited subsection 16(1) of FOIP. The Transition Briefing Binders varied between each government institution with the smallest being 16 pages and the largest being 262 pages. The government institutions asserted that the Transition Briefing Binders were not only a set of briefing notes but also a record that identified the issues, policies and directions of priority for the new ministers. Upon review, the Commissioner found that some portions of the Transition Briefing Binders were appropriately withheld under subsection 16(1) of FOIP. The Commissioner also found that some portions contained personal information pursuant to subsection 24(1) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner also found that some portions were publicly available or had been publicly revealed. For example, organizational charts, some financial information, information on mandates and missions of the government institutions. For portions that were already publicly available or already publicly revealed, the Commissioner found that subsection 16(1) of FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 16(1)(a)

      Cabinet documents

      16(1) A head shall refuse to give access to a record that discloses a confidence of the Executive Council, including:

      (a) records created to present advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options to the Executive Council or any of its committees;

      (2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could disclose a confidence of Cabinet including records created to present advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses, or policy options to Cabinet or any of its committees.

      Cabinet confidences are generally defined as, in the broadest sense, the political secrets of Ministers individually and collectively, the disclosure of which would make it very difficult for the government to speak in unison before Parliament and the public.356

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to disclose a confidence of the Executive Council (Cabinet).357

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options?

      Advice is guidance offered by one person to another.358 It can include the analysis of a situation or issue that may require action and the presentation of options for future action, but not the presentation of facts.359 Advice encompasses material that permits the drawing of inferences with respect to a suggested course of action, but which does not itself make a specific recommendation. It can be an implied recommendation.360 The “pros and cons” of various options also qualify as advice.361 It should not be given a restricted meaning. Rather, it should be interpreted to include an opinion that involves exercising judgement and skill in weighing the significance of fact. It includes expert opinion on matters of fact on which a public body must make a decision for future action.362

      Advice includes the views or opinions of a public servant as to the range of policy options to be considered by the decision maker even if they do not include a specific recommendation on which option to take.363

      Advice has a broader meaning than recommendations.364 The legislative intention was for advice to have a distinct meaning from recommendations. Otherwise, it would be redundant.365 While “recommendation” is an express suggestion, “advice” is simply an implied recommendation.366

      recommendation is a specific piece of advice about what to do, especially when given officially; a suggestion that someone should choose a particular thing or person that one thinks particularly good or meritorious.367 Recommendations relate to a suggested course of action more explicitly and pointedly than “advice”.368 It can include material that relates to a suggested course of action that will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the person being advised.369 It includes suggestions for a course of action as well as the rationale or substance for a suggested course of action.370 A recommendation, whether express or inferable, is still a recommendation.371

      proposal is something offered for consideration or acceptance.372

      Analyses is a detailed examination of the elements or structure of something; the process of separating something into its constituent elements.373

      Policy options are lists of alternative courses of action to be accepted or rejected in relation to a decision that is to be made. They would include matters such as the public servant’s identification and consideration of alternative decisions that could be made. In other words, they constitute an evaluative analysis as opposed to objective information.374

      Records containing policy options can take many forms. They might include the full range of policy options for a given decision, comprising all conceivable alternatives, or may only list a subset of alternatives that in the public servant’s opinion are most worthy of consideration. They can also include the advantages and disadvantages of each opinion. The list can also be less fulsome and still constitute policy options. For example, a public servant may prepare a list of all alternatives and await further instructions from the decision maker for which options should be considered in depth. Or, if the advantages and disadvantages of the policy options are either perceived as being obvious or have already been canvassed orally or in a prior draft, the policy options might appear without any additional explanation. As long as a list sets out alternative courses of action relating to a decision to be made, it will constitute policy options.375

      Advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses, or policy options.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the nature of the actual advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options.376

      2. Was the record created to present to Cabinet or any of its committees?

      Records that contain advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options developed from sources outside of the Executive Council for presentation to the Executive Council are intended to be covered by the provision.

      A draft memorandum that was created for the purpose of presenting proposals and recommendations to Cabinet but that was never actually presented to Cabinet remains a confidence. Equally, a memorandum in final form is a confidence even if it has not been presented to Cabinet.377

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.378 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.379 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.380

      committee of the Executive Council, also known as a Cabinet committee, includes one or more Cabinet ministers.381 The committee exercises some or all of the powers of Cabinet as a whole, or develops and provides recommendations to Cabinet. Also included in the definition is an entity or individual to which the Executive Council or any of its committees has delegated decision-making authority on their behalf.382 Section 6 of The Executive Government Administration Act provides that:

      6(1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may:

      (a) establish one or more committees to the executive council, each consisting of a minister, who shall preside over the committee, and any other persons that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may appoint; and

      (b) determine the duties and functions of each committee established pursuant to clause (a).

      (2) Each committee established pursuant to clause (1)(a) may make its own rules and procedures.383

      The Commissioner has formally found the following are committees of Executive Council. However, this list is not exhaustive. These are only the ones considered by the Commissioner:

      • Treasury Board;384 and

      • The Legislation and Regulation Review Committee.385

      Subsection 16(2) of FOIP requires disclosure of cabinet documents where:

      • The record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or
      • Consent to release is given by the President of the Executive Council or, in absence of the President, the next senior member of Executive Council.

      However, if the record contains personal information, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP still apply.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 079-2013, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to Executive Council for analysis and review of the sale of all or part of the Information Services Corporation prepared for or by the corporation in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Executive Council applied subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP to a Decision Item. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the Decision Item contained proposals, recommendations, and analyses. Further, it was addressed to the chair of the Legislation and Regulation Review Committee. This committee was a committee of the Executive Council. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP applied to the Decision Item.

      In Review Report 016-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Health (Health) for briefing notes, analysis and reports related to the adoption of, or transition to user-pay CT scans or MRIs in Saskatchewan since January 1, 2013. Health responded to the request by providing partial access to records. It withheld portions pursuant to subsection 16(1)(a) and several other provisions. Upon review, the Commissioner found that information in the briefing note under the heading “Confidential/Sensitive Information” did not qualify for subsection 16(1)(a) because the briefing note stated that the Minister of Health had requested that information be compiled on a certain topic for Cabinet. As this was a directive, it did not qualify as advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options.

      In Review Report 311-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Justice (Justice) for a copy of a recently completed review report on the Office of the Chief Coroner. Justice withheld the report in full citing subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that absent any evidence from Justice, the mere assertion that the report had been loaded to DocShare was not sufficient to demonstrate that the report was intended for Executive Council. As such, the Commissioner found that Justice had not demonstrated that subsection 16(1)(a) of FOIP applied.

      Subsection 16(1)(b)

      Cabinet documents

      16(1) A head shall refuse to give access to a record that discloses a confidence of the Executive Council, including:

      (b) agendas or minutes of the Executive Council or any of its committees, or records that record deliberations or decisions of the Executive Council or any of its committees;

      (2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(1)(b) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could disclose a confidence of Cabinet including agendas or minutes of Cabinet or any of its committee or records that record deliberations or decisions of Cabinet or any of its committees.

      Cabinet confidences are generally defined as, in the broadest sense, the political secrets of Ministers individually and collectively, the disclosure of which would make it very difficult for the government to speak in unison before Parliament and the public.386

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to disclose a confidence of the Executive Council (Cabinet).387

      The following two-part test can be applied. However, only one of the questions needs to be answered in the affirmative for the exemption to apply. There may be circumstances where both questions apply and can be answered in the affirmative.

      1. Does the record disclose agendas or minutes of Cabinet or any of its committees?

      An agenda is a list of things to be done, as items to be considered at a meeting, arranged in order of consideration.388

      Minutes are memoranda or notes of a transaction, proceeding or meeting. An official record. It mainly contains a record of what was done at the meeting.389

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.390 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.391 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.392

      committee of the Executive Council, also known as a Cabinet committee, includes one or more Cabinet ministers.393 The committee exercises some or all of the powers of Cabinet as a whole, or develops and provides recommendations to Cabinet. Also included in the definition is an entity or individual to which the Executive Council or any of its committees has delegated decision-making authority on their behalf.394

      The Commissioner has formally found the following are committees of Executive Council. However, this list is not exhaustive. These are only the ones considered by the Commissioner:

      • Treasury Board;395 and
      • The Legislation and Regulation Review Committee.396

      This includes drafts of these documents and any informal notes, which officials may make during the meetings. By disclosing drafts and notes, the associated substance could be disclosed.397

      2. Is the record a record of deliberations or decisions of Cabinet or any of its committees?

      A record of in this context means a documented account of past events, usually designed to memorialize those events.398

      Deliberation means:

      • The action of deliberating (to deliberate: to weigh in mind; to consider carefully with a view to a decision; to think over); careful consideration with a view to a decision.
      • The consideration and discussions of the reasons for and against a measure by a number of councillors.399

      A deliberation can occur when there is a discussion or consideration of the reasons for or against an action.400 It can refer to discussions conducted with a view towards making a decision.401

      Deliberations can include outcomes or decisions of Cabinet’s deliberative process, topics of deliberation, and priorities identified by the Premier, even if they do not ultimately result in government action.402

      There is a distinction between information that is provided to Cabinet and information that would disclose the deliberations of Cabinet. In cases where the information and the deliberations are inseparable are at the core of this exemption. In cases where it is argued that the topics of discussion reveal the deliberation of Cabinet, the matters must be considered contextually and based on the evidence. Cabinet confidence is essential to ensure that the government can deliberate freely and unimpeded, but it does not exist to allow governing in secrecy.403

      decision is a determination after consideration of the facts.404

      In Supreme Court of Canada decision, Ontario (Attorney Genera) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4, the court explained the deliberative process and that it isn’t always conducted at a boardroom table behind closed doors and this must be taken into consideration:

      [46] To begin, Cabinet’s deliberative process consists of discussion, consultation, and policy formulation between the Premier, individual ministers, and Cabinet as a whole — informed by the advice of civil servants every step along the way. The first minister, as head of Cabinet, enjoys extensive powers within Cabinet’s deliberative process by convention. In many regards, the role and activities of the Premier are inseparable from Cabinet and its deliberations. First ministers preside over Cabinet, set Cabinet agendas, determine Cabinet’s membership and its internal structure (e.g., the number, nature, and membership of Cabinet committees), set Cabinet procedures, and have the right to identify the consensus and determine what Cabinet has decided (Hogg and Wright, at §§ 9:5-9:6).

      [47] As this Court recognized in John Doe, “the policy-making process include[s] false starts, blind alleys, wrong turns, changes of mind, the solicitation and rejection of advice, and the re-evaluation of priorities and the re-weighing of the relative importance of the relevant factors as a problem is studied more closely” (para. 44, quoting Canadian Council of Christian Charities, at para. 31). In other words, the process is dynamic, fluid, and continues to evolve as leadership changes hands. Cabinet enjoys tremendous flexibility in terms of its organization, its processes, and its composition (White, at p. 34).

      [49] The dynamic and fluid nature of Cabinet’s deliberative process also means that not all stages of the process take place sitting around the Cabinet table behind a closed door. The decision-making process in Cabinet extends beyond formal meetings of Cabinet or its committees, and encompasses “[o]ne-on-one conversations in the corridors . . ., in the [first minister’s] office . . ., over the phone, or however and wherever they may take place” (Brooks, at p. 242). As Professor Brooks writes, “[n]o organization chart can capture this informal but crucial aspect” of the deliberative process, nor the centrality of the first minister’s role within it (ibid.).

      [52] The priorities communicated to ministers by the Premier at the outset of governance are the initiation of Cabinet’s deliberative process, and are subject to change. Ministers may seek to persuade the Premier and the rest of Cabinet that priorities should be added, abandoned, or approached in a different way (see, e.g., H. Bakvis, “Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of Reform?” (2000), 35:4 J. Can. Stud. 60, at pp. 65-66 (discussing the important role of individual ministers and their ability to shape the government’s priorities)). Moreover, the Premier may revise priorities at any point throughout the process — whether due to Cabinet colleagues’ views, advice from civil servants, or events and changing circumstances.

      [54] Relatedly, to the extent the IPC required evidence linking the Letters to “actual Cabinet deliberations at a specific Cabinet meeting”, that approach was unreasonable. Such a requirement is far too narrow and does not account for the realities of the deliberative process, including the Premier’s priority-setting and supervisory functions, which are not necessarily performed at a specific Cabinet meeting and may occur throughout the continuum of Cabinet’s deliberative process. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable for the Commissioner to establish a heightened test for exemption from disclosure that would require evidence linking the record to “actual Cabinet deliberations at a specific Cabinet meeting”.

      [61] In approaching assertions of Cabinet confidentiality, administrative decision makers and reviewing courts must be attentive not only to the vital importance of public access to government-held information but also to Cabinet secrecy’s core purpose of enabling effective government, and its underlying rationales of efficiency, candour, and solidarity. They must also be attentive to the dynamic and fluid nature of executive decision making, the function of Cabinet itself and its individual members, the role of the Premier, and Cabinet’s prerogative to determine when and how to announce its decisions.

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.405 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.406 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.407

      committee of the Executive Council, also known as a Cabinet committee, includes one or more Cabinet ministers.408 The committee exercises some or all of the powers of Cabinet as a whole, or develops and provides recommendations to Cabinet. Also included in the definition is an entity or individual to which the Executive Council or any of its committees has delegated decision-making authority on their behalf.409

      The Commissioner has formally found the following are committees of Executive Council. However, this list is not exhaustive. These are only the ones considered by the Commissioner:

      • Treasury Board;410 and
      • The Legislation and Regulation Review Committee.411

      The following are a few of the types of records that could reveal the substance of deliberations of Executive Council (Cabinet) or a Cabinet committee:

      • An agenda, minute or other record that documents matters addressed by Cabinet (e.g. a list of issues tabled at Cabinet that reflects the priorities of Cabinet).
      • A letter from Cabinet or a Cabinet committee that relates to the discussion or consideration of an issue or problem, or that reflects a decision made but not made public (e.g., a letter from Treasury Board to a ministry executive stating a decision that affects the ministry’s budget, but which has not been announced).
      • A briefing note placed before Cabinet or one of its committees.
      • A memo from a deputy minister to an assistant deputy minister in a ministry that informs them when Cabinet will consider an issue.
      • A briefing note from a deputy minister to a minister concerning a matter that is or will be considered by Cabinet.
      • A draft or final Cabinet submission.
      • Draft legislation or regulations.412

      This includes drafts of these documents, and any informal notes which officials may make during the meetings. By disclosing drafts and notes, the associated substance could be disclosed.413

      Subsection 16(2) of FOIP requires disclosure of cabinet documents where:

      • the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or
      • consent to release is given by the President of the Executive Council or in absence of the President, the next senior member of Executive Council.

      However, if the record contains personal information, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP still apply.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 041-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Finance (Finance) for any analysis, briefing notes or correspondence related to the impact on provincial finances of changing the liquor retailing system conducted since January 1, 2012. Finance responded to the applicant indicating that the records were being withheld in full pursuant in part to subsection 16(1)(b) of FOIP. Finance applied subsection 16(1)(b) of FOIP to two documents which were both Treasury Board Minutes. The Commissioner found that Treasury Board was a committee of Executive Council. The Commissioner found that the minutes qualified for exemption under subsection 16(1)(b) of FOIP.

      Subsection 16(1)(c)

      Cabinet documents

      16(1) A head shall refuse to give access to a record that discloses a confidence of the Executive Council, including:

      (c) records of consultations among members of the Executive Council on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy, or records that reflect those consultations;

      (2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could disclose a confidence of Cabinet including records of consultations among members of Cabinet on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy, or records that reflect those consultations.

      Cabinet confidences are generally defined as, in the broadest sense, the political secrets of Ministers individually and collectively, the disclosure of which would make it very difficult for the government to speak in unison before Parliament and the public.414

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to disclose a confidence of the Executive Council (Cabinet).415

      The following two-part test can be applied. However, only one of the questions needs to be answered in the affirmative for the exemption to apply. There may be circumstances where both questions apply and can be answered in the affirmative:

      1. Is it a record of consultations among members of Cabinet on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy?

      This part of the provision is more specific and is intended to capture records containing consultations. The second part of the provision is broader and is intended to capture records that may reflect the consultations but less directly.

      consultation in this context occurs when one or more members of Executive Council discuss matters related to making government decisions or formulating government policy.416

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.417 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.418 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.419

      Relate to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.420 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.421 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy.422

      decision is a determination after consideration of the facts.423

      Formulation means to create or prepare methodically.424

      policy is a standard course of action that has been officially established by government.425

      2. Does the record reflect the consultations among members of Cabinet on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy?

      This first part of the provision is more specific and is intended to capture records containing consultations. The second part of the provision is broader and is intended to capture records that may reflect the consultations but less directly.

      Reflect means to embody or represent in a faithful or appropriate way.426

      consultation in this context occurs when one or more members of Executive Council discuss matters related to making government decisions or formulating government policy.427

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.428 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.429 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.430

      Relate to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.431 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.432 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.433

      decision is a determination after consideration of the facts.434

      Formulation means to create or prepare methodically.435

      policy is a standard course of action that has been officially established by government.436 Subsection 16(2) of FOIP requires disclosure of cabinet documents where:

      • the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or
      • consent to release is given by the President of the Executive Council or in absence of the President, the next senior member of Executive Council.

      However, if the record contains personal information, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP still apply.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 051-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Finance (Finance) for any analysis or briefing materials on royalty rates since January 1, 2012. Finance withheld the records in full citing in part subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP. The records contained substantial handwritten notes. Finance asserted the notes were made by a Director and were the Director’s speaking notes for presentations to Treasury Board and Cabinet as well as the results of the consultations among the ministers. Upon review, the Commissioner agreed that the notes reflected speaking notes as well as consultations among members of Executive Council following the presentation. As such, subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP was found to apply.

      In Review Report 079-2018, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Health (Health) for information pertaining to the creation of the Lloydminster EMS BLS and ALS Medical Protocols. Health provided access to some records but withheld others citing in part subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP as reason to withhold. The record at issue was a letter to the chairperson of a regional health authority from the Minister of Health. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the letter did not reflect any discussions between members of the Executive Council as required by the provision. The Commissioner was not persuaded that subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP applied to the letter.‌

      Subsection 16(1)(d)

      Cabinet documents

      16(1) A head shall refuse to give access to a record that discloses a confidence of the Executive Council, including:

      (d) records that contain briefings to members of the Executive Council in relation to matters that:

      (i) are before, or are proposed to be brought before, the Executive Council or any of its committees; or

      (ii) are the subject of consultations described in clause (c).

      (2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could disclose a confidence of Cabinet including records that contain briefings to members of Cabinet in relation to matters that are before, or proposed to be brought before, Cabinet or any of its committees. It also permits refusal where release of a record could disclose matters that are the subject of consultations described in subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP above.

      Cabinet confidences are generally defined as, in the broadest sense, the political secrets of Ministers individually and collectively, the disclosure of which would make it very difficult for the government to speak in unison before Parliament and the public.437

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to disclose a confidence of the Executive Council (Cabinet).438

      An important qualifier here is that the records must be for the purpose of briefing a minister in relation to matters before Cabinet, proposed to be brought before, or for use in a discussion with other ministers as be subsection 16(1)(c) of FOIP above.439

      The following two-part test can be applied. However, only one of the questions needs to be answered in the affirmative for the exemption to apply. There may be circumstances where both questions apply and can be answered in the affirmative.

      1. Does the record contain briefings to members of Cabinet in relation to matters that are before, or are proposed to be brought before, Cabinet or any of its committees?

      Briefing means a written summary of short duration; concise; using few words; a summary of facts or a meeting for giving information or instructions.440 An example would be a briefing note.

      In relation to has been found to have a similar meaning as “in respect of”. It was considered in Nowegijick v. The Queen (1983):

      The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as “in relation to”, “with reference to” or “in connection with”. The phrase “in respect of” is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject-matters.441 The phrase “are before, or are proposed to be brought before,” suggests present or future tense. It would not include a record already presented to and dealt with by the Executive Council or its committees.442

      Proposed means something offered for consideration or acceptance, a suggestion.443 To put forward an idea or plan for consideration.444

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.445 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.446 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.447

      committee of the Executive Council, also known as a Cabinet committee, includes one or more Cabinet ministers.448 The committee exercises some or all of the powers of Cabinet as a whole, or develops and provides recommendations to Cabinet. Also included in the definition is an entity or individual to which the Executive Council or any of its committees has delegated decision-making authority on their behalf.449

      The Commissioner has formally found the following are committees of Executive Council. However, this list is not exhaustive. These are only the ones considered by the Commissioner:

      • Treasury Board;450 and
      • The Legislation and Regulation Review Committee.451

      This includes drafts of these documents, and any informal notes which officials may make during the meetings. By disclosing drafts and notes, the associated substance could be disclosed.452

      2. Does the record contain briefings to members of Cabinet on matters that relate to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy?

      Briefing means a written summary of short duration; concise; using few words; a summary of facts or a meeting for giving information or instructions.453

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.454 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.455 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.456

      In relation to has been found to have a similar meaning as “in respect of”. It was considered in Nowegijick v. The Queen (1983):

      The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as “in relation to”, “with reference to” or “in connection with”. The phrase “in respect of” is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject-matters.457

      consultation in this context occurs when one or more members of Executive Council discuss matters related to making government decisions or formulating government policy.458

      decision is a determination after consideration of the facts.459

      Formulation means to create or prepare methodically.460

      A policy is a standard course of action that has been officially established by government.461

      In order for this provision to apply, the records must contain briefings and be intended for Executive Council. In addition, subsections 16(1)(d)(i) or (ii) must apply. The purpose for which the record was prepared is key.

      Subsection 16(2) of FOIP requires disclosure of cabinet documents where:

      • the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or
      • consent to release is given by the President of the Executive Council or in absence of the President, the next senior member of Executive Council.

      However, if the record contains personal information, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP still apply.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 016-2015, the Commissioner found that information in Transition Briefing Binders that was already publicly available did not qualify for the exemption.

      In Review Report 159-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Global Transportation Hub Authority (GTH) for all internal documentation/records related to Brightenview Internal Developments Inc. between January 1, 2013 and April 5, 2016. The GTH responded to the applicant withholding the records in full citing several provisions including subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that nine of the records could be described as briefing notes. As GTH did not provide anything to demonstrate that the briefing notes were prepared for or intended for members of the Executive Council, the Commissioner was not persuaded that subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP applied to the briefing notes.

      In Review Report 157-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the GTH for all correspondence between the GTH and any other ministry related to Brightenview International Development Inc. from December 1, 2015 to April 5, 2016. The GTH responded to the applicant withholding the records in full citing several provisions including subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP. The GTH applied subsection 16(1)(d) to 12 emails. Upon review, one group of the emails dealt with the timing of an announcement of a decision already approved by Cabinet. None of the emails included a member of the Executive Council. The second group of emails dealt with a news release regarding a decision approved by Cabinet. Again, no members of the Executive Council were included in the emails. The Commissioner was not persuaded that subsection 16(1)(d) of FOIP applied to the emails.

      Subsection 16(2)

      Cabinet documents

      16(2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years; or

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(2) of FOIP is a mandatory exemption. It sets out circumstances where a head must not withhold cabinet confidences pursuant to subsection 16(1) of FOIP.

      Subsection 16(2)(a)

      Cabinet documents

      16(2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (a) the record has been in existence for more than 25 years;

      Subsection 16(2)(a) of FOIP provides that confidences that have been in existence for more than 25 years cannot be withheld under subsection 16(1) of FOIP. After that time, information in the record becomes subject to the Act and may be released subject to any applicable exemptions.462

      Before releasing, if the record contains the personal information of a deceased individual, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP must be considered. For more on section 30 see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy.”

      Subsection 16(2)(b)

      Cabinet documents

      16(2) Subject to section 30, a head shall not refuse to give access pursuant to subsection (1) to a record where:

      (b) consent to access is given by:

      (i) the President of the Executive Council for which, or with respect to which, the record has been prepared; or

      (ii) in the absence or inability to act of the President, by the next senior member of the Executive Council who is present and able to act.

      Subsection 16(2)(b) of FOIP recognizes that the Executive Council may lift the designation of Cabinet confidence from a record which has been prepared under its auspices. This consent is not a regular or normal practice.463

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.464

      Subsection 16(2)(b) does not impose a requirement on the head of a government institution to seek the consent of Cabinet to release the relevant record. What the section requires, at minimum, is that the head turn his or her mind to the issue. This means considering whether to request consent in relation to a request for access. Only the Cabinet for which, or in respect of which, a record was prepared can consent to its release.465

      Subsection 16(2)(b) provides no express guidance on appropriate criteria for a head to consider in deciding whether to seek Cabinet consent. These criteria will develop with time and experience, but could perhaps include the following:

      • The subject matter contained in the records.
      • Whether or not the government policy contained in the records has been announced or implemented.
      • Whether the record would reveal the nature of Cabinet discussion on the position of an institution.
      • Whether the records have, in fact, been considered by the Cabinet.

      This list is by no means exhaustive or definitive and is only included in an effort to identify examples of the types of criteria that could be considered.466

      Before releasing, if the record contains the personal information of a deceased individual, the rules around disclosure under section 30 of FOIP must be considered. For more on section 30 see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy.”

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2004-004, the Commissioner considered subsection 16(2)(b) of FOIP. An applicant asserted that the Premier, as President of the Executive Council, verbally gave his consent to the release of the requested documents in a media scrum before the applicant launched his access to information request. The applicant provided a copy of a transcript of the Premier’s statement. Upon review, the Commissioner found that section 18 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations) applied to subsection 16(2)(b) of FOIP meaning that the consent needed to be in writing. Verbal consent was therefore insufficient and could not be used to circumvent the head’s mandatory prohibition in section 16(1) of the Act. Finally, the Commissioner found that all consents must be in writing unless it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the written consent of the individual. The Commissioner found that the document remained exempt from disclosure.‌

      Section 17: Advice From Officials

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (a) advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options developed by or for a government institution or a member of the Executive Council;

      (b) consultations or deliberations involving:

      (i) officers or employees of a government institution;

      (ii) a member of the Executive Council; or

      (iii) the staff of a member of the Executive Council;

      (c) positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution, or considerations that relate to those negotiations;

      (d) plans that relate to the management of personnel or the administration of a government institution and that have not yet been implemented;

      (e) contents of draft legislation or subordinate legislation;

      (f) agendas or minutes of:

      (i) a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution; or

      (ii) a prescribed committee of a government institution mentioned in subclause (i); or

      (g) information, including the proposed plans, policies or projects of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in disclosure of a pending policy or budgetary decision.

      (2) This section does not apply to a record that:

      (a) has been in existence for more than 25 years;

      (b) is an official record that contains a statement of the reasons for a decision that is made in the exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function;

      (c) is the result of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (i) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (ii) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (A) developing methods of testing; or

      (B) testing products for possible purchase;

      (d) is a statistical survey;

      (e) is the result of background research of a scientific or technical nature undertaken in connection with the formulation of a policy proposal; or

      (f) is:

      (i) an instruction or guide-line issued to the officers or employees of a government institution; or

      (ii) a substantive rule or statement of policy that has been adopted by a government institution for the purpose of interpreting an Act or regulation or administering a program or activity of a government institution.

      (3) A head may refuse to give access to any report, statement, memorandum, recommendation, document, information, data or record, within the meaning of section 10 of The Evidence Act, that, pursuant to that section, is not admissible as evidence in any legal proceeding.

      Section 17 of FOIP is a discretionary class-based provision. It is intended to allow for candor during the decision-making process.

      The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the purpose of the equivalent provision in Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 13(1) in John Doev Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36:

      [43] The purpose of this provision is to preserve an effective and neutral public service so as to permit public servants to provide full, free and frank advice… Failing to exempt such material risks having advice or recommendations that are less candid and complete, and the public service no longer being perceived as neutral…

      [44] In my opinion, Evens J. (as he then was) in Canada Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 1999 CanLII 8293 (FC), [1999] 4 F.C. 245, persuasively explained the rationale for the exemption for advice given by public servants. Although written about the equivalent federal exemption, the purpose and function of the federal and Ontario advice and recommendations exemptions are the same. I cannot improve upon the language of Evans J. and his explanation and I adopt them as my own:

      To permit or to require the disclosure of advice given by officials, either to other officials or to ministers, and the disclosure of confidential deliberations within the public service on policy options, would erode government’s ability to formulate and to justify its policies.

      It would be an intolerable burden to force ministers and their advisors to disclose to public scrutiny the internal evolution of the policies ultimately adopted. Disclosure of such material would often reveal that the policy-making process included false starts, blind alleys, wrong turns, changes of mind, the solicitation and rejection of advice, and the re-evaluation of priorities and the re-weighing of the relative importance of the relevant factors as a problem is studied more closely. In the hands of journalists or political opponents this is combustible material liable to fuel a fire that could quickly destroy governmental credibility and effectiveness. [paras. 30-31]

      [45] Political neutrality, both actual and perceived, is an essential feature of the civil service in Canada (Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1991 CanLII 60 (SCC) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, at p. 86; OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), 1987 CanLII 71 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R., at pp. 44-45). The advice and recommendations provided by a public servant who knows that his work might one day be subject to public scrutiny is less likely to be full, free and frank, and is more likely to suffer from self-censorship. Similarly, a decision maker might hesitate to even request advice or recommendations in writing concerning a controversial matter if he knows the resulting information might be disclosed. Requiring that such advice and recommendations be disclosed risks introducing actual or perceived partisan considerations into public servants’ participation in the decision-making process.

      [46] Interpreting “advice” in s. 13(1) as including opinions of a public servant as to the range of alternative policy options accords with the balance struck by the legislature between the goals of preserving an effective public service capable of producing full, free and frank advice and the goal of providing a meaningful right of access.467

      The British Columbia Court of Appeal similarly stated in College of Physicians of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2002), that the equivalent provision in British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, “recognizes that some degree of deliberative secrecy fosters the decision-making process.”468

      However, protecting information is balanced against the need for effective public participation in a democracy. In Canada Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), (1999), Justice Evans stated:

      [32] On the other hand, of course, democratic principles require that the public, and this often means the representatives of sectional interests, are enabled to participate as widely as possible in influencing policy development. Without a degree of openness on the part of government about its thinking on public policy issues, and without access to relevant information in the possession of government, the effectiveness of public participation will inevitably be curbed.469

      When determining the application of section 17 of FOIP, government institutions should keep the intention of the Legislature for provisions like section 17 of FOIP in mind along with the purposes of FOIP. For more on this, go to Balancing Interests under the heading titled, Interpreting Exemptions earlier in this Chapter. In addition, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 1, “Purposes and Scope of FOIP,” under the heading, The Purposes of FOIP.

      Subsection 17(1)(a)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (a) advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options developed by or for a government institution or a member of the Executive Council;

      Subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options developed by or for a government institution or a member of the Executive Council.

      The following two-part test can be applied:470

      1. Does the information qualify as advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options?

      Advice is guidance offered by one person to another.471 It can include the analysis of a situation or issue that may require action and the presentation of options for future action, but not the presentation of facts.472 Advice encompasses material that permits the drawing of inferences with respect to a suggested course of action, but which does not itself make a specific recommendation. It can be an implied recommendation.473 The “pros and cons” of various options also qualify as advice.474 It should not be given a restricted meaning. Rather, it should be interpreted to include an opinion that involves exercising judgement and skill in weighing the significance of fact. It includes expert opinion on matters of fact on which a government institution must make a decision for future action.475

      Advice includes the views or opinions of a public servant as to the range of policy options to be considered by the decision maker even if they do not include a specific recommendation on which option to take.476

      Advice has a broader meaning than recommendations.477 The legislative intention was for advice to have a distinct meaning from recommendations. Otherwise, it would be redundant.478 While “recommendation” is an express suggestion, “advice” is simply an implied recommendation.479

      recommendation is a specific piece of advice about what to do, especially when given officially; it is a suggestion that someone should choose a particular thing or person that one thinks particularly good or meritorious.480 Recommendations relate to a suggested course of action more explicitly and pointedly than “advice”.481 It can include material that relates to a suggested course of action that will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the person being advised.482 It includes suggestions for a course of action as well as the rationale or substance for a suggested course of action.483 A recommendation, whether express or inferable, is still a recommendation.484

      proposal is something offered for consideration or acceptance.485

      Analyses (or analysis) is the detailed examination of the elements or structure of something; the process of separating something into its constituent elements.486

      Policy options are lists of alternative courses of action to be accepted or rejected in relation to a decision that is to be made. They would include matters such as the public servant’s identification and consideration of alternative decisions that could be made. In other words, they constitute an evaluative analysis as opposed to objective information.487

      Records containing policy options can take many forms. They might include the full range of policy options for a given decision, comprising all conceivable alternatives, or may only list a subset of alternatives that in the public servant’s opinion are most worthy of consideration. They can also include the advantages and disadvantages of each option. The list can also be less fulsome and still constitute policy options. For example, a public servant may prepare a list of all alternatives and await further instructions from the decision maker for which options should be considered in depth. Or, if the advantages and disadvantages of the policy options are either perceived as being obvious or have already been canvassed orally or in a prior draft, the policy options might appear without any additional explanation. As long as a list sets out alternative course of action relating to a decision to be made, it will constitute policy options.488

      2. Was the advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options developed by or for a government institution or a member of the Executive Council?

      The advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options can be developed by a government institution or for a government institution including one not relying on the exemption.489 This is supported by the use of “a government institution” and not “the government institution” in the provision.

      Executive Council means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.490 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.491 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.492

      Developed by or for means the advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options must have been created either: 1) within the government institution, or 2) outside the government institution but for a government institution and at its request (for example, by a service provider or stakeholder).493

      For information to be developed by or for a government institution, the person developing the information should be an official, officer or employee of the government institution, be contracted to perform services, be specifically engaged in an advisory role (even if not paid) or otherwise have a sufficient connection to the government institution.494

      To put it another way, in order to be “developed by or for” the government institution, the advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options should:

      • Be either sought, be expected or be part of the responsibility of the person who prepared the record.
      • Be prepared for the purpose of doing something, for example, taking an action or making a decision.
      • Involve or be intended for someone who can take or implement the action.495

      General feedback or input from stakeholders or members of the public would not normally qualify, as they are not sufficiently engaged in an advisory role. For example, general stakeholders and members of the public responding to a survey or poll would not qualify as they have simply been asked to provide their own comments and have developed nothing on behalf of the government institution. However, where a government institution asks a specific stakeholder – who has a particular knowledge, expertise or interest in relation to a topic – to provide advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options for it, it would be specifically engaging the stakeholder (even if not paid) in an advisory role and there would be a sufficient close connection to the government institution.496

      Use of the word “developed” suggests the Legislature’s intention was for the provision to include information generated in the process leading up to the giving of advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options (for example, draft versions).497

      Drafts and redrafts of advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options may be protected by the exemption. A public servant may engage in writing any number of drafts before communicating part or all of their content to another person. The nature of the deliberative process is to draft and redraft advice or recommendations until the writer is sufficiently satisfied that they are prepared to communicate the results to someone else. All the information in those earlier drafts informs the end result even if the content of any one draft is not included in the final version.498

      The information does not have to have arrived at the person who can take or implement the action in order to qualify as advice, recommendations, proposals, analyses and/or policy options.499

      The provision is not meant to protect the bare recitation of facts, without anything further.500 The provision should be reserved for the opinion, policy, or normative elements of advice, and should not be extended to the facts on which it is based. The exception is where the advice and facts may be so intertwined as to preclude release.501

      Factual material means a cohesive body of facts, which are distinct from advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options. A government institution can only withhold factual material or assertions of fact under subsection 17(1) of FOIP if the factual information is sufficiently interwoven with other advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses and/or policy options so that it cannot reasonably be considered separate and distinct. In other words, where factual information is intertwined with advice or recommendations in a manner whereby no reasonable separation can be made, then the information is not factual material and can be withheld.502

      The exemption does not generally apply to records or parts of records that in themselves reveal only the following:

      • That advice was sought or given;
      • That particular persons were involved in the seeking or giving of advice; or
      • That advice was sought or given on a particular topic or at a particular time.503

      It also generally does not apply to process notes. Process notes are brief descriptions of next steps that result from a decision, or directions regarding who should attend meetings or review documents. Processes are established and simply followed and generally contain no advice or recommendations.504

      If releasing this information reveals the substance of the advice, recommendations, proposals, analyses and/or policy options, the government institution can withhold this information.505 Where a review by the IPC occurs and this is the exception, the government institution should demonstrate how and why release of this type of information would reveal the substance of the advice, recommendations, proposals, analyses and/or policy options.506

      Advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the nature of the actual advice, proposals, recommendations, analyses or policy options.507

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2) FOIP. Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 042-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant had requested analysis, briefing notes, publications or correspondence related to the impact of provincial finances of changing the liquor retailing system conducted since January 1, 2012. The applicant made the request to the Ministry of Finance who transferred it to Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA). SLGA responded to the applicant indicating that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to subsections 17(1)(a) and (b) FOIP. The records at issue for subsection 17(1)(a) included 23 Excel Workbooks and Appendices to budget submissions. Upon review, the Commissioner found that most of the Excel Workbooks contained only raw numerical data with no textual analysis or indication about a course of action. Without this, there was no way of knowing what advice was being given or what policy options had been proposed. Although SLGA referred to the data as analysis, the Commissioner found it was purely numerical data and would not qualify as analyses in the context of subsection 17(1)(a). Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the content of the Appendices qualified as analyses and policy options. In addition, it was developed by SLGA for Treasury Board. As such, the Commissioner found subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP applied to the Appendices.

      In Review Report 216-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant requested copies of all documentation, memos, emails and minutes of meetings showing all steps the Ministry of Economy (Economy) had taken to make the Mineral Administration Registry Saskatchewan (MARS) compliant with subsection 15(1) of The Mineral Tenure Registry Regulations. Economy responded to the applicant indicating that access was granted to some records while others were being withheld pursuant to subsections 17(1)(a) and 29(1) of FOIP. The records at issue under subsection 17(1)(a) were copies of a draft policy. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the edits and comments (track changes) within the draft versions of the policy qualified as recommendations. Furthermore, the individuals involved in sending the recommendations in the drafts of the policy were individuals within Economy that would appropriately have the responsibility to provide the recommendations and were involved in the development and implementation of the policy. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP applied to the draft versions of the policy.

      Subsection 17(1)(b)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (b) consultations or deliberations involving:

      (i) officers or employees of a government institution;

      (ii) a member of the Executive Council; or

      (iii) the staff of a member of the Executive Council;

      Subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose consultations or deliberations involving officers or employees of a government institution, a member of the Executive Council or the staff of a member of the Executive Council.

      The provision is intended to allow persons having the responsibility to make decisions to freely discuss the issues before them in order to arrive at well-reasoned decisions. The intent is to allow such persons to address an issue without fear of being wrong, looking bad or appearing foolish if their frank deliberations were to be made public.508

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain consultations or deliberations?

      Consultation means:

      • The act of consulting or taking counsel together: deliberation, conference.
      • A conference in which the parties consult and deliberate.509

      A consultation can occur when the views of one or more officers or employees of a government institution are sought as to the appropriateness of a particular proposal or suggested action.510 It can include consultations about prospective future actions and outcomes in response to a developing situation. It can also include past courses of action. For example, where an employer is considering what to do with an employee in the future, what has been done in the past can be summarized and would qualify as part of the consultation or deliberation.511

      Deliberation means:

      • The act of deliberating (to deliberate: to weigh in mind; to consider carefully with a view to a decision; to think over); careful consideration with a view to a decision.
      • The consideration and discussions of the reasons for and against a measure by a number of councillors.512

      A deliberation can occur when there is a discussion or consideration of the reasons for or against an action.513 It can refer to discussions conducted with a view towards making a decision.514

      2. Do the consultations or deliberations involve officers or employees of a government institution, a member of the Executive Council, or the staff of a member of the Executive Council?

      Involving means including.515

      There is nothing in the exemption that limits the exemption to participation only of officers or employees of a government institution, a member of the Executive Council or the staff of a member of the Executive Council. Collaboration with others is consistent with the concept of consultation.516

      Officers or employees of a government institution“Employee of a government institution” means an individual employed by a government institution and includes an individual retained under a contract to perform services for the government institution.517

      A member of Executive Council“Executive Council” means the Executive Council appointed pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act.518 It consists of the Premier and Cabinet Ministers. Executive Council is also referred to as “Cabinet”.519 Cabinet has also been defined as the committee of senior ministers (heading individual provincial government ministries) which acts collectively with the Premier to decide matters of government policy.520

      The staff of a member of the Executive CouncilThe phrase includes the staff in a Minister’s office, such as Chief of Staff, Administrative Assistants and Ministerial Assistants.

      It also includes the staff of the Office of the Executive Council. Subsection 28(1) of The Executive Government Administration Act defines the staff of the Office of the Executive Council as follows:

      28(1) The staff of the office consists of:

      (a) the Deputy Minister to the Premier;

      (b) the Cabinet Secretary;

      (c) the Clerk of the Executive Council; and

      (d) any other employees that are required for the proper conduct of the business of the office.

      When there is a review by the IPC, the government institution is invited to provide a submission (arguments). The government institution should identify the individuals involved in the consultations or deliberations, include the job title of each, list organization affiliation and clarification as to each individuals’ role in the decision making process.

      The provision is not meant to protect the bare recitation of facts, without anything further.521

      Factual material means a cohesive body of facts, which are distinct from the consultations or deliberations. It does not refer to isolated statements of fact, or to the analyses of the factual material. Factual material refers specifically to information that cannot be withheld under section 17(1) of FOIP and which must be separated from consultations or deliberations if those are being withheld. Where factual information is intertwined with the consultations and/or deliberations in a manner whereby no reasonable separation can be made, then the information is not factual material and can be withheld.522

      The exemption does not generally apply to records or parts of records that in themselves reveal only that:

      • A consultation or deliberation took place at a particular time;
      • Particular persons were involved; or
      • A particular topic was involved.523

      If releasing this information reveals the substance of the consultations or deliberations, the government institution can withhold this information.524 Where a review by the IPC occurs and this is the exception, the government institution should demonstrate how and why release of this type of information would reveal the substance of the consultations and/or deliberations.525

      Consultations and deliberations can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of consultations or deliberations.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the nature of the actual consultations or deliberations.526

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…‌

      There is often confusion among government institutions as to when to apply subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP versus subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP. Subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP is intended to protect communications developed for a government institution by an advisor, while subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP protects communications involving decision-makers. This is supported by the use of the word “deliberation”: only a person charged with making a decision can be said to deliberate that decision. Moreover, “consultation” typically refers to the act of seeking advice regarding an action one is considering taking, but not to giving advice in relation to it. Information that is the subject of subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP may be voluntarily or spontaneously provided to a decision-maker for the decision-makers’ use because it is the responsibility of an employee to provide information of this kind; however, such information cannot be described as a “consultation” or a “deliberation”. Put simply, subsection 17(1)(a) of FOIP is concerned with the situation where advice is given, subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP is concerned with the situation where advice is sought or considered.527

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 042-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had requested analysis, briefing notes, publications or correspondence related to the impact of provincial finances of changing the liquor retailing system conducted since January 1, 2012. The applicant made the request to the Ministry of Finance who transferred it to Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA). SLGA responded to the applicant indicating that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to subsections 17(1)(a) and (b) of FOIP. For subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP, the records remaining at issue were Excel Workbooks containing only raw numerical data. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the raw numerical data did not qualify as consultations or deliberations. As such, the Commissioner found subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP would not apply to the Excel Workbooks.

      Subsection 17(1)(c)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (c) positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution, or considerations that relate to those negotiations;

      Subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose positions, plans, procedures, criteria, or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of a government institution. It also covers considerations related to those negotiations.

      Examples of the type of information that could be covered by this exemption are the various positions developed by a government institution’s negotiators in relation to labour, financial and commercial contracts.528

      Subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP protects as a class the strategies and tactics employed or contemplated by government institutions for the purpose of negotiations. Such information can be protected from disclosure even after the negotiations have been completed.529

      The following test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain positions, plans, procedures, criteria, or instructions?
        1. Developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations.
        2. By or on behalf of the government institution.
      2. Or does the record contain considerations that relate to those negotiations?

      The requirements for each part of the test are broken down below.

      1. Does the record contain positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions?

      position is a point of view or attitude.530 An opinion; stand; a way of regarding situations or topics; an opinion that is held in opposition to another in an argument or dispute.531

      plan is a formulated and especially detailed method by which a thing is to be done; a design or scheme.532 A detailed proposal for doing or achieving something; an intention or decision about what one is going to do.533

      procedure is an established or official way of doing something; a series of actions conducted in a certain order or manner.534

      Criteria are standards, rules or tests on which a judgement or decision can be based or compared; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated.535

      Instructions are directions or orders.536

      a. Developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations 

      Developed means to start to exist, experience or possess.537

      Use of the word “developed” suggests the Legislature’s intention was for the provision to include information generated in the process leading up to the contractual or other negotiations (for example, draft versions).538

      For the purpose of means intention; the immediate or initial purpose of something.539

      A negotiation is a consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. It can also be defined as dealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.540 It connotes a more robust relationship than “consultation”. It signifies a measure of bargaining power and a process of back-and-forth, give-and-take discussion.541

      The contractual or other negotiations can be concluded,542 ongoing or future negotiations.543

      There must be a clear indication that the information was “developed for the purpose of” negotiations. There must be a clear indication that the negotiations were in mind when the record was developed.544

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences” …

      Drafts and redrafts of positions, plans, procedures, criteria, instructions or considerations may be protected by the exemption. A public servant may engage in writing any number of drafts before communicating part or all their content to another person. The nature of the deliberative process is to draft and redraft until the writer is sufficiently satisfied that they are prepared to communicate the results to someone else. All the information in those earlier drafts informs the result even if the content of any one draft is not included in the final version.545

      b. By or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution

      The negotiations must be conducted by the government or on behalf of the government.

      On behalf of means “for the benefit of”.546 A person does something “on behalf of” another, when he or she does the thing in the interest of, or as a representative of, the other person.547

      c. Or does the record contain considerations that relate to those negotiations?

      Subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP extends its protection beyond the positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions to considerations that relate to the negotiations.

      consideration is a careful thought; a fact taken into account when making a decision.548 Thus, a record identifying the facts and circumstances connected to positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions could also fall within the scope of this provision.549

      Relate to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.550 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.551 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the negotiations.552

      Examples of records or information that could fit under this part of the exemption could include the things considered by the government institution when formulating its positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions such as how another government institution approached similar negotiations. Such records may not have been developed by or on behalf of the government institution, but this is not a requirement for this part of the exemption.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 258-2016, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). An applicant had made an access to information request to the former Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority (KTHR) for copies of all allegations by KTHR employees regarding the applicant’s return to work and all correspondence between specific departments and staff where the applicant was mentioned. KTHR responded to the applicant indicating that access was partially granted to some records but was withheld for others citing several subsections including subsection 16(1)(c) of LA FOIP. The record at issue for subsection 16(1)(c) of LA FOIP was an email. KTHR asserted the information severed in the email constituted “plans” and “instructions” developed for the purpose of negotiations regarding the applicant’s return-to-work. Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 16(1)(c) of LA FOIP was intended to capture negotiations involving a local authority and an outside party. It did not include internal negotiations with employees. In arriving at this finding, the Commissioner relied on similar interpretations by federal counterparts (see paragraph [48]).

      Subsection 17(1)(d)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (d) plans that relate to the management of personnel or the administration of a government institution and that have not yet been implemented;

      Subsection 17(1)(d) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose plans that relate to the management of personnel or the administration of a government institution which have not yet been implemented.

      The provision protects as a class of record, plans that relate to the internal management of government institutions, for example, plans about the relocation or reorganization of government institutions or the management of personnel, and plans to abolish positions or programs.553

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain a plan(s)?

      plan is a formulated and especially detailed method by which a thing is to be done; a design or scheme.554 A detailed proposal for doing or achieving something; an intention or decision about what one is going to do.555

      2. Does the plan(s) relate to:

      i) The management of personnel?

      Management of personnel refers to all aspects of the management of human resources of a government institution that relate to the duties and responsibilities of employees. This includes staffing requirements, job classification, recruitment and selection, employee salary and benefits, hours, and conditions of work, leave management, performance review, training, separation and layoff. It also includes the management of personal service contracts (i.e., contracts of service) but not the management of consultant, professional or other independent contractor contracts (i.e., contracts for service).556

      ii) The administration of the government institution?

      Administration of a government institution comprises all aspects of a government institution’s internal management, other than personnel management, that are necessary to support the delivery of programs and services. Administration includes business planning, financial operations, and contract, property, information and risk management.557

      Relate to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.558 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.559 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the management of personnel or the administration of a government institution.560

      3. Has the plan(s) been implemented by the government institution?

      Implemented means the point when the implementation of a decision begins. For example, if a government institution decides to go forward with an internal budget cut or restructuring of departments, implementation commences when this plan of action is communicated to its organizational units.561

      In order for the third part of the test to be met, the plan(s) cannot yet have been implemented. However, it is not necessary for the implementation activities to have been completed.562

      Yet means at some time in the future, in the remaining time available, before all is over.563

      The plans can relate to a government institution and not just the one relying on the exemption.

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(d) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 166-2018, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(d) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission (SLAC) for any proposals and correspondence related to proposals prepared by SLAC that called for the closure of the Saskatoon Legal Aid office. The SLAC responded to the applicant advising that it was denying access to all of the records citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 17(1)(d). The record consisted of 843 pages of records including emails and drafts of proposed plans. Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 17(1)(d) of FOIP did not apply to the records because the proposed plans had been replaced with a different plan. It was not clear that the plan was intended to be implemented anymore.

      In Review Report LA-2014-004, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the University of Regina (U of R) for any records where the applicant had been discussed or mentioned during meetings that occurred over three dates. The U of R responded to the applicant advising that all of the records were withheld pursuant to subsections 14(1)(d) and 16(1)(d) of LA FOIP. The record consisted of 40 pages of notes taken during the meetings responsive to the applicant’s access to information request. Upon review, the Commissioner found that 13 of the 40 pages did not appear to contain plans but rather opinions, feelings and thoughts of employees. The Commissioner recommended these pages be released to the applicant. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the remaining pages met the first part of the test because they contained plans as defined. The notes referred to different staffing requirements and costs for different positions. The Commissioner also found that the second part of the test was met because the pages referred to the management of personnel. Finally, the Commissioner found that the third part of the test was met because the plans had not yet been implemented. As such, the Commissioner found that the U of R established that subsection 16(1)(d) of LA FOIP applied to the pages. The Commissioner recommended that the pages continue to be withheld.

      ‌Subsection 17(1)(e)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (e) contents of draft legislation or subordinate legislation;

      Subsection 17(1)(e) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose the contents of draft legislation or subordinate legislation (e.g., regulations).

      The following test can be applied:

      Could release of the record disclose the contents of draft legislation or subordinate legislation?

      The contents of draft legislation or subordinate legislation can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of draft legislation or subordinate legislation.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the nature of the actual drafts.564

      The provision can apply to records that are themselves the draft versions of legislation or subordinate legislation. It can also apply to a record that is not the actual draft but discloses the content of draft legislation or subordinate legislation.565

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      Contents means the things that are contained in something.566

      Draft legislation or subordinate legislation refers to preliminary versions of legislative instruments, such as draft versions.567 It means that the Act in question has not yet been introduced to the Legislative Assembly, or the subordinate legislation has not been approved by Cabinet, as the case may be.568

      Subordinate legislation is legislation that derives from any authority other than the sovereign power in a state and that therefore depends for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority. A regulation is often referred to as subordinate legislation.569

      Subordinate legislation can include regulations, rules, orders, bylaws, or ordinances.570

      For more on subordinate legislation, including what is included in this phrase, see The Canadian Bar Review, Subordinate Legislation by Elmer Driedger.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(e) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 086-2018, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(e). An applicant had submitted an access to information request to the Ministry of Health (Health) for information pertaining to the Ministry of Health EMS Working Group. Health responded to the applicant providing partial access to 1,697 pages citing several subsections including subsection 17(1)(e) for authority to withhold some of the information. Three pages were at issue under subsection 17(1)(e). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the three pages would disclose the content of draft or subordinate legislation. However, the Commissioner noted that the pages were 14 years old, and the specific piece of legislation had been amended five times since the creation of the three pages. The Commissioner recommended that Health reconsider its exercise of discretion.

      Subsection 17(1)(f)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (f) agendas or minutes of:

      (i) a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution; or

      (ii) a prescribed committee of a government institution mentioned in subclause (i);

      Subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose agendas or minutes of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution or a prescribed committee of a government institution. The provision is intended to protect agendas and/or meeting minutes as they relate to decision-making within the bodies listed.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record an agenda of a meeting or minutes of a meeting?

      Agendas and minutes of meetings can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of agendas or meeting minutes.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the content of the actual agendas or meeting minutes.571

      Agendas are a list of things to be done, as items to be considered at a meeting, usually arranged in order of consideration.572

      Minutes are memoranda or notes of a transaction, proceeding or meeting; the formal record of a deliberative assembly’s meeting, approved by the assembly; the record of all official actions taken.573

      2. Are the agendas or minutes of:

      • A board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution. (See the Appendix at Part I of the FOIP Regulations for bodies that qualify) or
      • A prescribed committee of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution. Currently, the FOIP Regulations do not list any committees of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body that is a government institution.

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where itcould reasonably be expected to disclose the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”… .

      In a review with the IPC, the government institution must demonstrate that the agenda or minutes are those of one of the bodies noted in the provision. The exemption can only be applied to the records of the bodies listed in the provision.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2). Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 157-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Global Transportation Hub Authority (GTH) for all correspondence between the GTH and any other ministry related to Brightenview International Development Incorporation. The GTH responded to the applicant advising that all responsive records were withheld citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP. The GTH applied subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP to minutes of the GTH’s Audit and Finance Committee. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the record qualified as minutes. The Commissioner also found that the minutes were minutes of a committee meeting of the GTH. However, as the FOIP Regulations did not have any prescribed committees, the Audit and Finance Committee of the GTH did not qualify for subsection 17(1)(f)(ii) of FOIP. In fact, there are no committees for purposes of subsection 17(1)(f)(ii) of FOIP prescribed in the FOIP Regulations. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP did not apply to the minutes.

      In Review Report 025-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP. An applicant submitted an access to information request to the Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for all reports or documentation analyzing and/or evaluating the possibility of purchasing land in the Global Transportation Hub between January 1, 2012 and December 30, 2013. SaskPower responded to the applicant providing access to some records and withholding others pursuant to subsections 17(1)(a) and (f) of FOIP. SaskPower applied subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP to a two-page document titled, Minutes – Thursday May 23, 2013. SaskPower asserted the minutes were minutes of a meeting of a Crown corporation that is a government institution under subsection 17(1)(f) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the document constituted minutes and the minutes were from a SaskPower Board of Directors meeting. As SaskPower qualified as a Crown corporation for purposes of subsection 17(1)(f)(i) of FOIP, the Commissioner found the exemption was appropriately applied. The Commissioner recommended the meeting minutes continue to be withheld.

      Subsection 17(1)(g)

      Advice from officials

      17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      ‌(g) information, including the proposed plans, policies or projects of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in disclosure of a pending policy or budgetary decision.

      Subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose information, including the proposed plans, policies or projects of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in disclosure of a pending policy or budgetary decision.

      The provision allows government institutions to prevent premature disclosure of a policy or budgetary decision. Once a policy or budgetary decision has been taken and is being implemented, the information can no longer be withheld under this exemption. A decision has been implemented once those expected to carry out the activity have been authorized and instructed to do so.574

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is it information of a government institution?

      The information can be from a government institution other than the one relying on the exemption.575 The government institution must demonstrate that the information is of a government institution in order for the exemption to apply.

      Information means facts or knowledge provided or learned as a result of research or study.576

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information presumed to be involved.577

      Proposed means something offered for consideration or acceptance; a suggestion.578 To put forward an idea or plan for consideration.579

      plan is a formulated and especially detailed method by which a thing is to be done; a design or scheme.580 A detailed proposal for doing or achieving something; an intention or decision about what one is going to do.581

      policy is a standard course of action that has been officially established by government.582

      project is an enterprise carefully planned to achieve a particular aim; a proposed or planned undertaking.583

      The information does not have to be proposed plans, policies or projects to qualify. The government institution should describe what the information is.

      2. Could disclosure reasonably be expected to result in disclosure of a pending policy or budgetary decision?

      Subsection 17(1) of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 17 of FOIP is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      Pending means awaiting decision or settlement; about to happen.584

      policy is a standard course of action that has been officially established by government.585

      Budgetary means of or pertaining to a budget. A budget is a periodic, (especially annual) estimate of revenue and expenditure.586

      Decision means the action of coming to a determination or resolution with regard to any point or course of action; resolution or conclusion arrived at.587

      The government institution must tie the information in the record to the pending policy or budgetary decision that could be disclosed.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 17(2). Before applying subsection 17(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 17(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 042-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Finance who transferred it to Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming (SLGA). The access to information request was for records related to the impact of provincial finances of changing the liquor retailing system conducted since January 1, 2012. SLGA responded to the applicant indicating that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to subsections 17(1)(a) and (b) of FOIP. During the course of the review, SLGA added subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP along with other exemptions. The records at issue for subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP were 23 Excel Workbooks. SLGA asserted that the workbooks were information of SLGA. Furthermore, that the workbooks indicated different factors SLGA was considering as part of proposed policy regarding the retail liquor system in Saskatchewan and that disclosure of the workbooks could disclose a pending policy decision. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the exemption did not apply because the policy had not yet been finalized and that SLGA was considering a “range of potential actions”. The Commissioner was not persuaded that release of the Excel Workbooks could reasonably be expected to result in disclosure of a pending policy.

      In Review Report 086-2018, the Commissioner considered subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Health (Health) for information pertaining to the Ministry of Health EMS Working Group. Health responded to the applicant by providing 1,697 pages. Some of the information in the pages was withheld pursuant to several provisions in FOIP including subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP. Health applied the exemption to three pages of the record. In its submission to the IPC, Health asserted that the information pertained to budget development for a government institution regarding pending plans and projects that pertained to budgetary decisions. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the pages concerned the 2009-2010 budget and that decisions regarding the 2009-2010 budget had already been made. As such, the decisions were no longer pending. The Commissioner found the second part of the test was not met and subsection 17(1)(g) of FOIP was found not to apply.

      Subsection 17(2)

      Advice from officials

      17(2) This section does not apply to a record that:

      (a) has been in existence for more than 25 years;

      (b) is an official record that contains a statement of the reasons for a decision that is made in the exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function;

      (c) is the result of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (i) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (ii) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (A) developing methods of testing; or

      (B) testing products for possible purchase;

      (d) is a statistical survey;

      (e) is the result of background research of a scientific or technical nature undertaken in connection with the formulation of a policy proposal; or

      (f) is:

      (i) an instruction or guide-line issued to the officers or employees of a government institution; or

      (ii) a substantive rule or statement of policy that has been adopted by a government institution for the purpose of interpreting an Act or regulation or administering a program or activity of a government institution.

      Subsection 17(2) of FOIP provides some specific cases where subsection 17(1) of FOIP does not apply. This includes a record that:

      (a) Has been in existence for more than 25 years;

      Any information contained within a record which has been in existence for 25 years or more cannot be withheld under subsection 17(1). Other exemptions may still apply to the information.588

      (b) Is an official record containing a statement of the reasons for a decision that is made in the exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function;

      This provision makes it clear that subsection 17(1) of FOIP cannot be used to withhold formal judgments, including reasons for reaching those judgments. The provision applies when the decision has already been made and is not merely contemplated.589

      Reasons for decision means the motive, rationale, justification or facts leading to a decision.590

      Exercise of discretionary power refers to making a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in an objective sense.591

      Discretionary means a choice given to a decision-maker as to whether, or how, to exercise a power.592 Involves the exercise of judgement and choice.593

      Adjudicative function means a function conferred upon an administrative tribunal, board or other non-judicial body or individual that has the power to hear and rule on issues involving the rights of people and organizations. Examples would be a school board hearing an appeal under Part V of The Education Act1995, or a hearing by a review board.594

      Reasons for decisions of this type cannot be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP despite the fact that the decisions may contain advice or recommendations prepared by or for a minister or a government institution.595

      (c) Is the result of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (i) As a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (ii) As preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (A) Developing methods of testing; or

      (B) Testing products for possible purchase.

      Examples include test results of commercial products and soil testing. Subsection 17(1) of FOIP may apply if the testing was done for the purpose of developing methods of testing, for example, the development of a new methodology for recycling tires. It also covers test results where testing was done by a government institution in order to determine whether or not to purchase a product.596

      (d) Is a statistical survey;

      Statistical survey refers to a specific study of a condition, situation or program, by means of data collection and analysis.597

      Where a statistical survey appears with information that can be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP, the exempted information should be severed, and the statistical survey released unless another exemption applies.598

      An example of a statistical survey would be a study of growth rates in various forested areas of northern Saskatchewan. Such a study could not be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP even though it may be part of a larger document dealing with reform of forestry law, regulation, or policy.599

      (e) Is the result of background research of a scientific or technical nature undertaken in connection with the formulation of a policy proposal; or

      Background research encompasses a wide range of study, review and fieldwork aimed at analyzing and presenting an overview of issues.600

      Subsection 17(2) of FOIP applies to research that is scientific (conducted according to the principles of objective research) or technical (based on a particular technique or craft) and directed toward policy formulation. For information to be considered background research under this provision, it must be connected with the development of some specific policy. This would clearly be the case if, for example, a policy proposal referred directly to the research on which the proposal was based.601

      Normally the research methodology, data and analysis cannot be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP. However, advice and recommendations contained in the same record as the background research or prepared separately by or for a government institution or a minister could be withheld.602

      In connection with has a very broad meaning. The word “connection” simply means that there is some relationship between two things or activities – that they have something to do with each other. The relationship need not be purposive to constitute a connection. Many activities might be carried out in connection with a particular object, as integrally related activities, without being carried out for the purpose of that object.603

      (f) Is:

      (i) An instruction or guideline issued to the officers or employees of a government institution;

      Information used by officials in interpreting legislation, regulations or policy cannot be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP. Generally, an official or employee in a position to provide interpretation or policy direction will have issued the instruction or guideline.604

      (ii) A substantive rule or statement of policy that has been adopted by a government institution for the purpose of interpreting an Act, regulation, resolution or bylaw or administering a program or activity of a government institution.

      Basic interpretations of the law, regulations, and policy under which a government institution operates its programs and activities cannot be withheld under subsection 17(1) of FOIP. The public should have access to any manual, handbook or other guideline used in the decision-making processes that affect the public.605

      Subsection 17(3)

      Advice from officials

      17(3) A head may refuse to give access to any report, statement, memorandum, recommendation, document, information, data or record, within the meaning of section 10 of The Evidence Act, that, pursuant to that section, is not admissible as evidence in any legal proceeding.

      Subsection 17(3) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access to any report, statement, memorandum, recommendation, document, information, data or record, within the meaning of section 10 of The Evidence Act that is not admissible as evidence in any legal proceeding. Section 10 of The Evidence Act pertains to evidence given before quality improvement committees.

      Committee, in this context, means a committee designated as a quality improvement committee by a health services agency to carry out a quality improvement activity the purpose of which is to examine and evaluate the provision of health services for the purpose of:

      (a) Educating persons who provide health services.

      (b) Improving the care, practice or services provided to patients by the health services agency.606

      Health services agency, in this context, means:

      (a) The provincial health authority established or continued pursuant to The Provincial Health Authority Act;

      (b) A health care organization as defined in The Provincial Health Authority Act;

      (c) the operator of a mental health centre as defined in The Mental Health Services Act;

      (d) the Saskatchewan Cancer Agency continued by The Cancer Agency Act; or

      (e) the Athabasca Health Authority Inc.; (« organisme de services de santé »)607

      Legal proceeding, in this context, means any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is or may be given, and includes a proceeding for the imposition of punishment by way of fine, penalty or imprisonment to enforce an Act or a regulation made pursuant to an Act.608

      Section 18: Economic and Other Interests

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (a) trade secrets;

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or other information:

      (i) in which the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution has a proprietary interest or a right of use; and

      (ii) that has monetary value or is reasonably likely to have monetary value;

      (c) scientific or technical information obtained through research by an employee of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to deprive the employee of priority of publication;

      (d) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution;

      (e) positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution, or considerations that relate to those negotiations;

      (f) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the economic interest of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution;

      (g) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy of Saskatchewan; or

      (h) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in an undue benefit or loss to a person.

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Section 18 of FOIP is a discretionary class-based and harm-based provision, meaning, it contains both class and harm based exemptions.

      Section 18 of FOIP refers to the Government of Saskatchewan as a whole. It recognizes that government institutions, individually or collectively, may hold significant amounts of financial and economic information that is critical to the management of the provincial economy.609

      The Government of Saskatchewan is responsible for managing many aspects of the province’s economic activities in the interests of the people of Saskatchewan, by ensuring that an appropriate economic infrastructure is in place and by facilitating and regulating the activities of the marketplace.610

      The heading of the provision is “Economic and other interests”. The meaning of economic interests can be defined as follows:

      Economic interests refers to both the broad interests of a government institution and, for the government as a whole, in managing the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. This also covers financial matters such as the management of assets and liabilities by a government institution and the government institution’s ability to protect its own or the government’s interests in financial transactions.611

      Subsection 18(1)(a)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (a) trade secrets;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose trade secrets.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information constitute a trade secret?

      Trade Secret is defined as information, including a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound, which possesses the following characteristics:

      1. The information must be secret in an absolute or relative sense (is known only by one or a relatively small number of people).
      2. The possessor of the information must demonstrate he/she has acted with the intention to treat the information as secret.
      3. The information must be capable of industrial or commercial application.
      4. The possessor must have an interest (e.g., an economic interest) worthy of legal protection.612

      The information must meet all of the above criteria to be considered a trade secret.

      For the fourth criterion, the government institution must own the trade secret or be able to prove a claim of legal right to the information (i.e., license agreement). Normally, this will mean that the trade-secret information has been created by employees of the government institution as part of their jobs, or by a contractor as part of a contract with the government institution.613

      2. Could release reasonably be expected to disclose the trade secret?

      Trade secrets can be revealed in two ways:

      1. The information itself consists of trade secrets.
      2. The information, if disclosed, would permit the drawing of accurate inferences as to the nature of the actual trade secrets.614

      Section 18 of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it could reasonably be expected to disclose the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although some of the exemptions contained in section 18 are not harms-based exemptions, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 185-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for a copy of the COsupply agreement between SaskPower and Cenovus.

      SaskPower responded to the applicant advising that the supply agreement was being withheld in full pursuant to several exemptions including subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP. The records included an original Carbon Dioxide Purchase and Sale Agreement between SaskPower and Cenovus and two amending agreements. SaskPower applied subsection 18(1)(a) to Schedule B of each agreement. SaskPower asserted the information contained in the schedules were trade secrets as they were the specifications of the compressed carbon dioxide (CO2) that SaskPower was selling. Upon review, the Commissioner agreed that the information was a trade secret as it qualified as a formula. Furthermore, the Commissioner was satisfied that the formula was a secret and that SaskPower demonstrated that it has acted with the intention to treat the information as secret. The Commissioner was persuaded that information in each Schedule B qualified as a trade secret. As the criteria was met in the definition of trade secret, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP applied to each Schedule B.

      Subsection 18(1)(b)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or other information:

      (i) in which the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution has a proprietary interest or a right of use; and

      (ii) that has monetary value or is reasonably likely to have monetary value;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose financial, commercial, scientific, technical or other information which the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution has a proprietary interest or a right of use and which has monetary value or reasonably likely to have monetary value.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information contain financial, commercial, scientific, technical or other information?

      Financial information is information regarding monetary resources, such as financial capabilities, assets, and liabilities, past or present. Common examples are financial forecasts, investment strategies, budgets, and profit and loss statements. The financial information must be specific to a particular party.615

      Commercial information means information relating to the buying, selling or exchange of merchandise or services. This includes third party associations, past history, references and insurance policies and pricing structures, market research, business plans and customer records.616

      Scientific information is information exhibiting the principles or methods of science. The information could include designs for a product and testing procedures or methodologies.617 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge in the natural, biological, or social sciences or mathematics. In addition, for information to be characterized as scientific, it must relate to the observation and testing of specific hypothesis or conclusions and be undertaken by an expert in the field. Finally, scientific information must be given a meaning separate from technical information.618

      Technical information is information relating to a particular subject, craft or technique. Examples are system design specifications and the plans for an engineering project.619 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge, which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts. Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering, or electronics. It will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment or thing. Finally, technical information must be given a meaning separate from scientific information.620

      2. Does the government institution have a proprietary interest or a right to use it?

      This means that the government institution must be able to demonstrate rights to the information.

      Proprietary means of, relating to or holding as property.621

      Proprietary interest is the interest held by a property owner together with all appurtenant rights, such as a stockholder’s right to vote the shares.622 It signifies simply “interest as an owner” or “legal right or title”.623

      Owner means someone who has the right to possess, use and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests are vested.624

      Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act subsection 18(1)(a) is similar to Saskatchewan’s but instead of proprietary interest or right of use, it uses the phrase “that belongs to the Government of Ontario or an institution”.625 In Ontario Order MO-1746, the phrase “belongs to” was found to mean “ownership” which makes it relevant for Saskatchewan’s subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP. In Order MO-1746, the Adjudicator stated:

      The Assistant Commissioner has thus determined that the term “belongs to” refers to “ownership” by an institution, and that the concept of “ownership of information” requires more than the right to simply possess, use or dispose of information, or control access to the physical record in which the information is contained. For information to “belong to” an institution, the institution must have some proprietary interest in it either in a traditional intellectual property sense – such as copyright, trade mark, patent or industrial design – or in the sense that the law would recognize a substantial interest in protecting the information from misappropriation by another party. Examples of the latter type of information may include trade secrets, business to business mailing lists (Order P-636), customer or supplier lists, price lists, or other types of confidential business information. In each of these examples, there is an inherent monetary value in the information to the organization resulting from the expenditure of money or the application of skill and effort to develop the information. If, in addition, there is a quality of confidence about the information, in the sense that it is consistently treated in a confidential manner, and it derives its value to the organization from not being generally known, the courts will recognize a valid interest in protecting the confidential business information from misappropriation by others. [See, for example, Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14 (S.C.C.), and the cases discussed therein].626

      Right of use means a legal, equitable or moral title or claim to the use of property, or authority to use.627

      3. Does the information have monetary value for the government institution or is it reasonably likely to?

      Monetary value requires that the information itself have an intrinsic value.628 This may be demonstrated by evidence of potential for financial return to the government institution. An example of information that is reasonably likely to have monetary value might include a course developed by a teacher employed by a school board.629

      The mere fact that the government institution incurred a cost to create the record does not mean it has monetary value for the purposes of this section.630

      Reasonably likely to implies that the question be considered objectively. This means that there must be evidence that will, on a balance of probabilities, support the necessary finding.631

      Section 18 of FOIP includes the requirement that access can be refused where it could reasonably be expected to disclose the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although some of the exemptions contained in section 18 of FOIP are not harms-based exemptions, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 185-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for a copy of the COsupply agreement between SaskPower and Cenovus.

      SaskPower responded to the applicant advising that the supply agreement was being withheld in full pursuant to several exemptions including subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP. The records withheld included an original Carbon Dioxide Purchase and Sale Agreement between SaskPower and Cenovus and two amending agreements. SaskPower applied subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP to all of the records asserting it was financial, commercial, and scientific information. Upon review, the Commissioner agreed that the information was commercial information. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that SaskPower had a right to use the information. However, the Commissioner found the third part of the test was not met. The Commissioner was not persuaded that the contract itself would have any monetary value for SaskPower. In coming to this finding, the Commissioner noted that SaskPower had only demonstrated that other organizations would find monetary value in the contract. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply to the record.

      Subsection 18(1)(c)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (c) scientific or technical information obtained through research by an employee of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to deprive the employee of priority of publication;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(c) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose scientific or technical information obtained through research by an employee of a government institution, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to deprive the employee of priority of publication.

      Government institutions employ a wide range of researchers, including professional scientists, technicians and social scientists. Their reputations are often dependent on the research they publish.632

      The fact that the employees have a professional reputation is of considerable value to the government institutions that employ them. In addition, their research often has monetary and program value for the government institutions. For these reasons, FOIP protects the priority of publication for all types of research.633

      The objective is to maintain the government’s ability to hire scientific and technical experts.634

      The exemption is discretionary and is based on a harms test. The exemption recognizes the exclusive rights of employees of a government institution to publish works based on scientific or technical research done by them while employed by the government institution. These rights are temporary because, upon publication, the background data are no longer covered by this exemption.635

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information in question constitute scientific or technical information?

      Scientific information is information exhibiting the principles or methods of science. The information could include designs for a product and testing procedures or methodologies.636 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge in the natural, biological, or social sciences or mathematics. In addition, for information to be characterized as scientific, it must relate to the observation and testing of specific hypothesis or conclusions and be undertaken by an expert in the field. Finally, scientific information must be given a meaning separate from technical information.637

      Technical information is information relating to a particular subject, craft or technique. Examples are system design specifications and the plans for an engineering project.638 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts. Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering or electronics…it will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment or thing. Finally, technical information must be given a meaning separate from scientific information.639

      2. Was the information obtained through research conducted by an employee of the government institution?

      Obtained means to acquire in any way; to get possession of; to procure or to get a hold of by effort.640

      Research is defined as a systematic investigation designed to develop or establish principles, facts or generalized knowledge, or any combination of them, and includes the development, testing and evaluation of research.641

      Examples include scientific and technical research carried out at research institutes or universities; historical research connected with the designation or preservation of historical or archaeological resources; and epidemiological and other medical studies carried out in health care bodies. A government institution would have to be able to provide some proof that publication is expected to result from the research or that similar research in the past has resulted in publication.642

      In order to apply this provision, the research must refer to specific, identifiable research projects conducted by a specific employee of the government institution.

      3. Could disclosure reasonably be expected to deprive the employee of priority publication?

      For this exemption to be invoked, the employee must be actively engaged in the research with a reasonable expectation of publication.643

      There must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could deprive the employee of priority publication. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…644

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.645

      Deprive means to take away or prevent the happening of a certain event.646

      Employee means an individual employed by a government institution and includes an individual retained under a contract to perform services for the government institution.647

      Priority publication is the status of being earlier in time; precedence; the status of being first to publish.648

      Government institutions should not assume that the deprivation with respect to priority publication is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(c) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      Subsection 18(1)(d)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (d) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(d) of FOIP is a discretionary harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution.

      This exemption is intended to protect a government institution’s ability to negotiate effectively with other parties.649 It provides similar protection as is provided third parties under subsection 19(1)(c)(iii) of FOIP.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Are there contractual or other negotiations occurring involving the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution?

      negotiation is a consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. It can also be defined as dealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.650 It connotes a more robust relationship than “consultation”. It signifies a measure of bargaining power and a process of back-and-forth, give-and-take discussion.651

      Prospective or future negotiations could be included within this exemption, as long as they are foreseeable.652 It may be applied even though negotiations have not yet started at the time of the access to information request, including when there has not been any direct contact with the other party or their agent. However, a vague possibility of future negotiations is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable fact-based expectation that the future negotiations will take place.653

      Once a contract is executed, negotiation is concluded. The exemption would generally not apply unless, for instance, the same strategy will be used again, and it has not been publicly disclosed.654

      The exemption covers negotiations either conducted directly by employees or officers of a government institution or Government of Saskatchewan or conducted by a third party acting as an agent of the government institution. It does not cover information relating to negotiations to which a government institution or the Government of Saskatchewan is not a party.655

      When under review by the IPC, government institutions will be invited to provide the IPC with its submission (i.e., arguments) as to why the exemption applies. Government institutions should detail what negotiations are occurring and what parties are involved.

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations?

      Interfere means to hinder or hamper.656

      There must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could interfere with contractual or other negotiations. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…657

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;

      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and

      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.658

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted on the basis of fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary, or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…659

      When determining whether disclosure could interfere with contractual or other negotiations of the government institution or the Government of Saskatchewan, the following questions can be asked to assist:

      • What negotiations would be affected by disclosure.
      • Are these negotiations ongoing.
      • Have the negotiations been concluded.
      • At what stage are the negotiations.
      • How long have they been going on.
      • What is the subject matter of the negotiations.
      • How would disclosure specifically interfere with the negotiations.
      • Does the information relate to an outstanding issue in the negotiations. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations on this issue.
      • Does the information relate to issues already resolved in the negotiations.
      • Would disclosure cause the issue to be reopened. Why.
      • Would it otherwise interfere with negotiations. How.
      • Is the information current. How old is the information.
      • Does it relate to events prior to the negotiations.
      • Does the other side of the negotiations already have this information. If not, have they asked for it.
      • Is the information commonly known in the industry.
      • Is the information reasonably available elsewhere. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations.660

      Examples of information to which this exemption may apply include negotiating positions, options, instructions, pricing criteria and points used in negotiations.

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(d) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2). Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      Subsection 18(1)(e)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (e) positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution, or considerations that relate to those negotiations;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(e) of FOIP is a discretionary, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to disclose positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of a government institution. It also covers considerations related to the negotiations.

      Examples of the type of information that could be covered by this exemption are the various positions developed by a government institution’s negotiators in relation to labour, financial and commercial contracts.661

      Subsection 18(1)(e) of FOIP is worded the same as subsection 17(1)(c) of FOIP. Although the context of the larger provisions is different (advice from officials versus economic and other interests), the same definitions and test can be applied.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain positions, plans, procedures, criteria, instructions, or considerations that relate to the negotiations?

      A position is a point of view or attitude.662 An opinion, stand; a way of regarding situations or topics; an opinion that is held in opposition to another in an argument or dispute.663

      plan is a formulated and especially detailed method by which a thing is to be done; a design or scheme.664 A detailed proposal for doing or achieving something; an intention or decision about what one is going to do.665

      procedure is an established or official way of doing something; a series of actions conducted in a certain order or manner.666

      Criteria are standards, rules or tests on which a judgement or decision can be based or compared; a reference point against which other things can be evaluated.667

      Instructions are directions or orders.668

      Subsection 18(1)(e) extends its protection beyond positions, plans, procedures, criteria, or instructions to “considerations that relate to those negotiations”. To qualify, the information must constitute considerations and they must relate to the negotiations.

      consideration is a careful thought; a fact taken into account when making a decision.669 Thus, a record identifying the facts and circumstances connected to positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions could also fall within the scope of this provision.670

      Relate to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.671 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.672 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the negotiations.673

      2. Were the positions, plans, procedures, criteria, instructions, or considerations developed for the purpose of contractual or other negotiations by or on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution?

      Developed means to start to exist, experience or possess.674

      Use of the word “developed” suggests the Legislature’s intention was for the provision to include information generated in the process leading up to the contractual or other negotiations (for example, draft versions).675

      Drafts and redrafts of positions, plans, procedures, criteria, instructions or considerations may be protected by the exemption. A public servant may engage in writing any number of drafts before communicating part or all of their content to another person. The nature of the deliberative process is to draft and redraft until the writer is sufficiently satisfied that they are prepared to communicate the results to someone else. All the information in those earlier drafts informs the end result even if the content of any one draft is not included in the final version.676

      For the purpose of means intention; the immediate or initial purpose of something.677 The negotiations can be conducted by the government or on behalf of the government.

      On behalf of means “for the benefit of”.678 A person does something “on behalf of” another, when he or she does the thing in the interest of, or as a representative of, the other person.679

      negotiation is a consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. It can also be defined as dealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.680 It connotes a more robust relationship than “consultation”. It signifies a measure of bargaining power and a process of back-and-forth, give-and-take discussion.681

      The contractual or other negotiations can be concluded,682 ongoing or future negotiations.683

      Subsection 18(1) includes the requirement that access can be refused where itcould reasonably be expected to disclose the protected information listed in the exemptions. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although section 18(1)(e) is not a harms-based provision, the threshold provided by the Court for “could reasonably be expected to” is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(e) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      Subsection 18(1)(f)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (f) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the economic interest of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(f) of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to prejudice the economic interest of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution.

      The following test can be applied:

      Could disclosure reasonably be expected to prejudice the economic interests of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution?

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could prejudice the economic interests of the government institution or the Government of Saskatchewan. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…684

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.685

      A reasonable expectation of prejudice to economic interest is not established by simply asserting that disclosure of records would result in financial loss or that it would interfere in future business dealings. Nor is it established by the mere prospect of heightened competition flowing from disclosure: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v Canada (National Capital Commission), 147 FTR (Fed CT). The use of the word “reasonably” in subsection 18(1)(f) adds an objective and qualitative element to the analysis required: Kattenburg v Manitoba (Industry, Trade and Tourism) (1999), 143 Man R 92d) 42 (Man QB).686

      While direct evidence of specific future harm is not required, there must be an explanation based on the evidence to establish that the harm feared is more than speculative or “merely possible”. The evidence must be more than conjecture: Canada (Information Commissioner) v Toronto Port Authority, 2016 FC 683.687

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to economic interests.688

      Economic interests refer to both the broad interests of a government institution and, for the government as a whole, in managing the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. This also covers financial matters such as the management of assets and liabilities by a government institution and the government institution’s ability to protect its own or the government’s interests in financial transactions.689

      Examples of harm to economic interests can include:

      • Information in budget preparation documents which could result in segments of the private sector taking actions affecting the government’s ability to meet economic goals (Note: approved budgets are not included as they are tabled in the Legislature as public documents).
      • Background material to be used in establishing land costs which if released would affect revenue from the sale of the land.690

      In the recent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), stated the following with regards to third parties doing business with government institutions and what does not constitute prejudice to the economic interest of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution:

      [55] …Individuals or entities doing business with a government institution are required to take the access to information regime prescribed by the Act as a given. The possibility of information being disclosed pursuant to the Act is an unavoidable part of the environment in which they are obliged to operate.

      [56] …In other words, the application of s. 18(1)(f) does not depend on whether a party doing business with a government institution will, or will not, be irritated or made unhappy by the disclosure of records. The Act specifically addresses the release of third party information in s. 19. That is the vehicle by which the interests of third parties, like Brightenview, are accommodated.

      [57] …The Legislature, by enacting the Act, has prescribed the rules of the game. Those wishing to do business with a government institution must play by those rules. Negative reactions to the Act, and the possibility of information being disclosed pursuant to it, cannot be what the Legislature had in mind when it referred to “prejudice the economic interest of the Government of Saskatchewan or a government institution”. If that were the case, s. 18(1)(f) would merely operate at the whim of third parties doing business with the Government and government institutions.691

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(f) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      ‌Subsection 18(1)(g)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (g) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy of Saskatchewan;

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(g) of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy of Saskatchewan.

      The following test can be applied:

      Could disclosure reasonably be expected to be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy of Saskatchewan?

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy of Saskatchewan. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…692

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.693

      Injury implies damage or detriment.694

      Ability to manage the economy refers to the responsibility of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the province’s economic activities by ensuring that an appropriate economic infrastructure is in place, and by facilitating and regulating the activities of the marketplace. This depends on a range of activities, including fiscal and economic policies, taxation, and economic and business development initiatives.695

      Government of Saskatchewan used in subsection 18(1)(g) of FOIP, has a broader meaning than “government institution”, used elsewhere in FOIP. This recognizes that government institutions, individually or collectively, may hold significant amounts of financial and economic information critical to the management of the provincial economy. Sensitive information about provincial government bodies not subject to FOIP can also be exempt under subsection 18(1)(g) of FOIP if it can be shown that disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the ability of the Government of Saskatchewan to manage the economy in the province.696

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(g) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      Subsection 18(1)(h)

      Economic and other interests

      18(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

      (h) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in an undue benefit or loss to a person.

      (2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      Subsection 18(1)(h) of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where release of a record could reasonably be expected to result in an undue benefit or loss to a person.

      The following test can be applied:

      Could disclosure reasonably be expected to result in an undue benefit or loss to a person?

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could result in an undue benefit or loss to a person. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…697

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.698

      Undue means excessive or disproportionate.699

      The word ‘undue’ must be given real meaning, determined in the circumstances of each case. Generally speaking, that which is ‘undue’ can only be measured against that which is ‘due’.700

      Persons or businesses that contract with public bodies (local authorities, government institutions, and health trustees) must have some understanding that those dealings are necessarily more transparent than purely private transactions. Even if one assumes loss could be expected to the person or business, such loss would not be ‘undue’.701

      Benefit means a favourable or helpful factor or circumstance; advantage, profit.702

      Loss means an undesirable outcome of a risk; the disappearance or diminution of value, usually in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way.703

      Person includes an individual, corporation or the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person.704

      Examples can include:

      • The disclosure of confidential information about the government’s intention to buy certain property might result in third parties buying the property in anticipation of profits from the government’s acquisition.
      • Premature disclosure of information about a change in revenue sources, such as taxes, duties or tariff rates, could result in undue benefit to a third party.
      • Disclosure of the specifications of special testing equipment or software developed by a government institution that have been kept secret or confidential could reasonably be expected to result in improper benefit.705

      A government institution cannot rely on subsection 18(1)(h) of FOIP for a record that fits within the enumerated exclusions listed at subsection 18(2) of FOIP. Before applying subsection 18(1) of FOIP, government institutions should ensure that subsection 18(2) of FOIP does not apply to any of the records.

      ‌Subsection 18(2)

      Economic and other interests

      18(2) A head shall not refuse, pursuant to subsection (1), to give access to a record that contains the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution, unless the testing was conducted:

      (a) as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee; or

      (b) as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) developing methods of testing; or

      (ii) testing products for possible purchase.

      The intent of subsection 18(2) of FOIP is to ensure that a government institution does not withhold information resulting from product or environmental testing carried out by the employees of a government institution, or by another organization on behalf of a government institution.

      Results of product or environmental testing means information recording the results of product or environmental testing. For example, water quality reports; results of routine testing of food served in correctional facilities; or testing of a hospital’s air conditioning.706

      Other examples include information on products such as air filters, environmental test results on water quality or air quality, and commercial product testing and soil testing.707

      Subsection 18(2) of FOIP provides that the exemptions in 18(1) of FOIP do not apply to a record containing the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for a government institution unless:

      (a) The testing was done as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than a government institution, and for a fee.

      In other words, information can be withheld when the government institution performs the testing, for a fee, as a service to a private citizen or a private corporate body.708

      Examples:

        • A commercial product test.
        • A soil test conducted at the request of an individual, for which a fee is charged.
        • A test intended to develop a new drug testing technique.709

      (b) As preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of:

      (i) Developing methods of testing.

      (ii) Testing products for possible purchase.

      In other words, information can be withheld if the testing was done for the purpose of developing testing methods, such as a new methodology for tire recycling. Information can also be applied to test results compiled to determine whether or not a government institution would purchase a product.710

      Section 19: Third Party Business Information

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (a) trade secrets of a third party;

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that is supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, to a government institution by a third party;

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of; a third party;

      (d) a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution;‌

      (e) a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution; or

      (f) information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Section 19 of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based and harm-based provision, meaning, it contains both class and harm based exemptions. As a mandatory provision, the government institution has no, or more limited, discretion regarding whether or not to apply the exemption. That is, if the information is covered by the exemption and the conditions for the exercise of discretion do not exist, then it must not be disclosed.

      FOIP defines a third party as a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution.711 A “local authority”, as defined under subsection 2(1)(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act can also qualify as a third party for purposes of FOIP.712

      The provision is intended to protect the business interests of third parties and to ensure that government institutions are able to maintain the confidentiality necessary to effectively carry on business with the private sector.713

      The Government of Saskatchewan collects a wide range of information from third parties. This information may be submitted voluntarily, such as in a bid for a government contract, or submitted as required by law, such as for proof of regulatory compliance. There is a compelling need to protect information that is provided to the government by third parties if the information falls within one of the enumerated exemptions under section 19.714

      Although government institutions need to be open and accountable, they also need to conduct business and enter into business relationships; in doing so, they must be able to assure their private sector partners that their trade secrets and commercial and financial secrets will not be readily disclosed to competitors and the public.715

      The leading case authority in terms of third-party information is Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012). At paragraph [23], the court recognized that a balance must be struck between the private interests of third parties and the public interest in the disclosure of information. The court commented:

      [23] Nonetheless, when the information at stake is third party, confidential commercial and related information, the important goal of broad disclosure must be balanced with the legitimate private interests of third parties and the public interest in promoting innovation and development. The Act strikes this balance between the demands of openness and commercial confidentiality in two main ways. First, it affords substantive protection of the information by specifying that certain categories of third party information are exempt from disclosure. Second, it provides procedural protection. The third party whose information is being sought has the opportunity, before disclosure, to persuade the institution that exemptions to disclosure apply…716

      Third parties doing business with public institutions must understand that certain information detailing the expenditure of public funds might be disclosed.717

      Third parties should be aware that the right of access to information under government control is available to every member of the public and cannot be restricted by considerations of motive or occupation. The only way motivation could be relevant is in order to establish a reasonable expectation of harm to third parties [subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP].718

      Subsection 19(1)(a)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (a) trade secrets of a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(a) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains the trade secrets of a third party.

      The following test can be applied:

      Does the record contain trade secrets of a third party?

      Trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound, which possesses each of the four following characteristics:

      (i) The plan/process/tool/mechanism or compound must be secret in an absolute or relative sense (is known only by one or a relatively small number of people)

      (ii) The possessor of the plan/process/tool/mechanism or compound must demonstrate he/she has acted with the intention to treat the information as secret.

      (iii) The plan/process/tool/mechanism or compound must be capable of industrial or commercial application.

      (iv) The possessor must have an interest (e.g., an economic interest) worthy of legal protection.719

      The plan/process/tool/mechanism or compound must meet all the above criteria to be considered a trade secret.

      The types of plans (etc.) that could potentially fall in this class include the chemical composition of a product and the manufacturing processes used. However, not every process or test would fall into this class, particularly when the process or test is common in a particular industry.720

      If the government institution determines that the information qualifies as a trade secret and it intends to withhold it, it should ask the third party if it consents to the release of the information pursuant to subsection 19(2). Consent should be in writing.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      In Canadian Bank Note Limited v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, (2016), Justice Zarzeczny found that unit prices in a contract between Saskatchewan Government Insurance and a third party (Veridos Canada Ltd.) did not qualify as a trade secret.

      Subsection 19(1)(b)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that is supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, to a government institution by a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains financial, commercial, scientific, technical, or labour relations information that was supplied in confidence to a government institution by a third party.

      The following three-part test can be applied:721

      1. Is the information financial, commercial, scientific, technical, or labour relations information of a third party?

      Financial information is information regarding monetary resources, such as financial capabilities, assets and liabilities, past or present. Common examples are financial forecasts, investment strategies, budgets and profit and loss statements. The financial information must be specific to a third party.722

      Commercial information is information relating to the buying, selling or exchange of merchandise or services. This can include third party associations, past history, references and insurance policies and pricing structures, market research, business plans, and customer records.723

      Types of information included in the definition of commercial information can include:

      • Offers of products and services a third-party business proposes to supply or perform.
      • A third-party business’ experiences in commercial activities where this information has commercial value.
      • Terms and conditions for providing services and products by a third party.
      • Lists of customers, suppliers or sub-contractors compiled by a third-party business for its use in its commercial activities or enterprises – such lists may take time and effort to compile, if not skill.
      • Methods a third-party business proposes to use to supply goods and services.
      • Number of hours a third-party business proposes to take to complete contracted work or tasks.724

      Scientific information is information exhibiting the principles or methods of science. The information could include designs for a product and testing procedures or methodologies.725 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge in the natural, biological, or social sciences or mathematics. In addition, for information to be characterized as scientific, it must relate to the observation and testing of specific hypothesis or conclusions and be undertaken by an expert in the field. Finally, scientific information must be given a meaning separate from technical information.726

      Technical information is information relating to a particular subject, craft or technique. Examples are system design specifications and the plans for an engineering project.727 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts. Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering, or electronics. It will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment, or thing. Finally, technical information must be given a meaning separate from scientific information.728

      Labour relations information is information that relates to the management of personnel by a person or organization, whether or not the personnel are organized into bargaining units. It includes relationships within and between workers, working groups, managers, employers and their organizations. Labour relations information also includes collective relations between a public body and its employees. Common examples of labour relations information are hourly wage rates, personnel contracts, and information on negotiations regarding collective agreements.729

      In the decision Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that administrative details such as page and volume numbering, dates, and location of information within records do not constitute financial, commercial, scientific or technical information.73

      2. Was the information supplied by the third party to a government institution?

      Supplied means provided or furnished.731

      Information may qualify as “supplied” if it was directly supplied to a government institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.732

      Information gathered by government inspectors via their own observations does not qualify as information “supplied” to the government institution. Judgements or conclusions expressed by officials based on their own observations generally cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party.733

      Records can still be “supplied” even when they originate with the government institution (i.e., the records still may contain or repeat information extracted from documents supplied by the third party). However, the third-party objecting to disclosure will have to prove that the information originated with it and that it is confidential.734

      Whether confidential information has been “supplied” to a government institution by a third party is a question of fact. The content rather than the form of the information must be considered: the mere fact that the information appears in a government document does not, on its own, resolve the issue.735

      The following are examples of information not supplied by a third party:

      • Information that reflects the viewpoints, opinions, or comments of government officials;
      • Reports resulting from factual observations made by government inspectors; and
      • The terms of a lease negotiated between a third party and a government institution.736

      The contents of a contract involving a government institution and a third party will not normally qualify as having been supplied by a third party. The provisions of a contract, in general, have been treated as mutually generated, rather than “supplied” by the third party, even where the contract is preceded by little or no negotiation or where the final agreement reflects information that originated from a single party.737

      An agreement where the government institution contributed significantly to its terms would not qualify under this exemption because it is the result of negotiation between the parties and was also largely based on the criteria set out by the government institution in its request for proposals.738

      There are two exceptions to the general rule of “mutually generated” information in contracts.739 If one of these exceptions apply, the information in a contract could be found to have been supplied by the third party:

      (i) Inferred disclosure – where disclosure of the information in a contract would permit accurate inferences to be made with respect to underlying non-negotiated confidential information supplied by the third party to the public body;740 and

      (ii) Immutability – information the third party provided that is immutable or not open or susceptible to change and was incorporated into the contract without change, such as the operating philosophy of a business, or a sample of its products.74

      3. Was the information supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly?

      Supplied means provided or furnished.742

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the supplier of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.743 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the third party providing the information.744

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement, or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.745

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated, or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was supplied on the understanding that it would be kept confidential.746

      In order for subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP to apply, a government institution must show that both parties intended the information be held in confidence at the time the information was supplied.747

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.748 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes, and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014)).

      Factors considered when determining whether a document was supplied in confidence

      implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the third party or the government institution.749
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the third party and the government institution from the point at which it was supplied until the present time.750
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.751
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence.

      Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the third party both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was supplied. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been supplied in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist in addition.752

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was supplied implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.753

      Factors to consider when determining if a document was supplied in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the third party.754
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be supplied in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions to the third party prior to the information being supplied.755

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      The Federal Court has summarized the following in terms of what is considered confidential:

      • It is an objective standard (based on facts);
      • It is not sufficient that the third-party state, without further evidence, that the information is confidential;
      • Information has not been held to be confidential even if the third party considered it so, where it has been available to the public from other sources or where it has been available at an earlier time or in another form from government; and
      • Information is not confidential where it could be obtained by observation albeit with more effort by the applicant.756

      Compulsory supply means there is a compulsory legislative requirement to supply information. Where supply is compulsory, it will not ordinarily be confidential. In some cases, there may be indications in the legislation relevant to the compulsory supply that establish confidentiality The relevant legislation may even expressly state that such information is deemed to have been supplied in confidence.757 Where information is required to be provided, unless otherwise provided by statute, confidentiality cannot be built in by agreement, informally or formally.758

      Example: In Review Report 043-2015, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply because the third party was required to provide the information in question to the Ministry of Environment pursuant to The Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002The Water Regulations and The Clean Air Act. As such, this constituted compulsory supply. In addition, these statutes did not have any confidentiality provisions related to the types of information in question.

      In the decision Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada established that information is not confidential if it is in the public domain, including being publicly available through another source. To be confidential, the information must not be available from sources otherwise accessible by the public or obtainable by observation or independent study by a member of the public acting on his or her own. Information that has been published is not confidential. Furthermore, information, which merely reveals the existence of publicly available information, cannot generally be confidential.759

      Contractors setting out to win government contracts through a confidential bidding process should not expect that the monetary terms will remain confidential if the bid succeeds. The public’s right to know how government spends public funds as a means of holding government accountable for its expenditures is a fundamental notion of responsible government that is known to all.760

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.761 The typical bottom of e-mail “confidentiality” note is not sufficient to establish that information was supplied in confidence. Such notes are largely format and platitudes.762

      Government institutions cannot be relieved of their responsibilities under FOIP merely by agreeing via a confidentiality clause in a contract/agreement to keep matters confidential.763 Since a government institution cannot guarantee confidentiality if FOIP mandates disclosure, it should frame any contract provisions, representations or policies accordingly so third parties are informed prior to providing information to the government institution. This includes tenders, requests for proposals and other processes.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(b). The Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant was the financial and commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant were not supplied by the third party because they were part of the contract between Central Services and the third party and the result of negotiation between the parties. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 031-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for all records relating to a Request for Proposals (RFP). SGI responded to the applicant indicating that access was partially granted to some records, but others were withheld pursuant to several exemptions including subsection 19(1)(b). The records at issue under subsection 19(1)(b) were hundreds of pages that constituted the actual proposals submitted by two separate third parties to SGI. There were also 87 pages worth of emails.

      Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records contained financial, commercial, scientific, technical, and labour relations information. The Commissioner further found that the entire proposal packages of the two third parties constituted commercial information because the proposals related to the buying or selling of goods and services. This approach was consistent with other jurisdictions including British Columbia (Order F09-22) and Ontario (MO-3179). The Commissioner went on to find that all the records were supplied by the third parties, including emails sent to SGI by the third parties. Finally, the Commissioner found that the records were supplied explicitly in confidence. This was based on the submissions of all the parties which indicated all the parties agreed on this fact (mutual understanding).

      Furthermore, the RFP included a confidentiality clause. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was appropriately applied by SGI to the proposals and the severed information in the emails.

      In Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision, subsection 18(1)(b), in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). An applicant had made an access to information request to the City of Regina (City) for a tender and contract related to a street infrastructure project. The records involved were two documents titled, Form of Tender. The applicant was only interested in the unit prices and total prices severed from the two documents. The City withheld this information in part under subsection 18(1)(b) of LA FOIP. The City asserted that the unit prices disclosed pricing and pricing practices of the third parties involved in a competitive contract award process. The Commissioner found the unit prices and total prices constituted commercial and financial information of the third parties. The City asserted that the tender package supplied by the City to bidders contained a blank Form of Tender. Bidders entered their specific data in Schedule A of the form and returned it to the City as part of their bid package. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the third parties supplied the unit prices and total prices. The City asserted that clause 19 of the Instructions to Bidders issued by the City indicated that financial and commercial information supplied by bidders would be supplied in confidence. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the unit pricing and total prices were supplied explicitly in confidence. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(b) of LA FOIP was appropriately applied.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including withholding the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(b). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the hourly rates for contracted services qualified as commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the third party did not supply the hourly rates for contracted services because they were provisions of a contract that were mutually generated through negotiation. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 229-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for information related to a contract for Centralized Driver License and Identification Card Production and Facial Recognition Services including contract price, price per card components, lump sum price components, and card volume and contract term. SGI responded to the applicant indicating that some of the information was being withheld pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices constituted the commercial information of the third party. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices were terms of the contract that had been agreed to by both the third party and SGI and as such were mutually generated as part of the negotiation process. The Commissioner distinguished this case from Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, where the unit prices were provided on a blank Form of Tender provided by the City of Regina to bidders. The Commissioner noted that unlike the other case, the bidding process was concluded, the successful bidder was selected, and a contract was already awarded. The Commissioner found that the unit prices and lump sum prices were not supplied by the third party but were negotiated terms of the contract that both parties agreed to. As the second part of the test was not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was not appropriately applied. The third party appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Court of King’s Bench where Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, considered the facts and circumstances in the de novo appeal, agreed that the information was commercial information of the third party but found that the unit prices were supplied to SGI by the third party.764

      In Review Report 052-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for a copy of an appraisal related to SaskPower’s purchase of land from the Global Transportation Hub. SaskPower responded to the applicant denying access to the appraisal citing subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP. The third party responsible for developing the appraisal provided a submission to the Commissioner for consideration. The third party asserted, in part, that release of the appraisal would infringe on the third party’s copyright to the integrity of its work in accordance with the Copyright Act, RSC 1985 c. C-42. The Commissioner did not agree with this line of reasoning. The Commissioner referred to subsection 32.1(1)(a) of the Copyright Act which provided that disclosing under access to information legislation is not an infringement of copyright. The Commissioner could not find that the information was technical information as asserted by the third party as insufficient evidence was provided. As the first part of the test was not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply to the appraisal.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based provision. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in the harms outlined at subclauses (i), (ii) and (iii).

      Government institutions and third parties should not assume that the harms are self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(i)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(i) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to result in financial loss or gain to a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. What is the financial loss or gain being claimed?

      Financial loss or gain must be monetary, have a monetary equivalent or value (e.g., loss of revenue or loss of corporate reputation).765

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to result in financial loss or gain to a third party?

      For this exemption to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in loss or gain to a third party measured in monetary terms (e.g., loss of revenue).766

      The disclosure of information that is not already in the public domain that is shown to give competitors a head start in developing competing products, or to give them a competitive advantage in future transactions may, in principle, meet the requirements. The evidence would have to demonstrate that there is a direct link between the disclosure and the apprehended harm and that the harm could reasonably be expected to ensue from disclosure.767 However, asserting disclosure would create a more competitive environment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a material financial loss or prejudice to a third party’s competitive position.768

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could result in financial loss or gain to a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…769

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.770

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted based on fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…771

      Some relevant questions that may assist are:772

      • What kind of harm is expected from disclosure.
      • How will the loss or gain specifically occur.
      • How much money is involved.
      • Will the loss or gain affect the financial performance of the third party. How. To what degree.
      • How old is the information. If the information is not current, why would disclosure still adversely affect the third party.
      • Has similar information about the third party been made public in the past. If so, what was the impact. Was the impact quantifiable (e.g., lost sales or revenues).
      • Is information of this nature available about competitors of the third party.
      • Are there examples in other businesses where disclosure of similar information led to material financial loss or gain. If so, describe and quantify the financial loss or gain. Why is the situation parallel to that of this third party.
      • What actions could the third party take to counteract potential financial loss or gain knowing the information would be disclosed.

      In Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), the Federal Court stated that proof of harm for the equivalent provisions in the federal Access to Information Act, required reasonable speculation because “in many circumstances a party cannot rely on harm from past disclosures as evidence of reasonably expected harm because past disclosures of that type of evidence may never have occurred”. Nonetheless, the party seeking to exempt the information must put forward something more than internally held beliefs and fears. Forecasting evidence, expert evidence and evidence of treatment of similar elements of proof or similar situations are frequently accepted as a logical basis for the expectation of harm.773

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c). An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). During the review, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant would result in a competitor having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts, which would cause the third party to experience a competitive disadvantage. However, neither Central Services nor the third party provided anything further to support this assertion. The Commissioner also stated that the winning contractor would have access to the internal cost estimates in question as it is part of the current contract and that keeping these figures from the public, including other future bidders, would jeopardize competitive bidding processes. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP was not properly applied by Central Services.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions that were over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). Specifically, Central Services withheld the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(c). Upon review, both Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the hourly rates could result in competitors having the ability the provide a lower rate for future contracts and result in undue loss to Solvera Solutions and prejudice its competitive position. The Commissioner found that the bids were evaluated based on several criteria and laid out the three stages used by Central Services at paragraph [44] of the report. As such, the selection was not based on price alone. Finally, the Commissioner found that releasing costs would increase the chances that a public body would, in the future, obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) did not apply to the hourly rates.

      In Review Report 236-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Water Security Agency (WSA) for copies of a report of the standing of each firm who submitted quotes to WSA in response to a Request for Quotes. Upon review, the WSA asserted that if the quotes were released to the applicant, it would result in financial loss for the third parties and result in a competitive advantage. Relying on Review Reports 007-2015 and 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner found that the risk of being underbid by competitors for future contracts did not meet the threshold for this provision. Releasing costs would increase the chances that the public body would obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(ii)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(ii) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. What is the prejudice to a third party’s competitive position that is being claimed?

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the competitive position of a third party.774

      Competitive position means the information must be capable of use by an existing or potential business competitor, whether that competitor currently competes for the same market share. For example:

      • Information that discloses the profit margin on a private company’s operations.
      • Marketing plans, including market research surveys, polls.
      • Information that reveals the internal workings of a private company.775

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to result in the prejudice?

      The disclosure of information that is not already in the public domain that is shown to give competitors a head start in developing competing products, or to give them a competitive advantage in future transactions may, in principle, meet the requirements. The evidence would have to demonstrate that there is a direct link between the disclosure and the harm. Furthermore, that the harm could reasonably be expected to ensue from disclosure.776 However, asserting disclosure would create a more competitive environment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a material financial loss or prejudice to a third party’s competitive position.777

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could prejudice the competitive position of a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…778

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.779

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted on the basis of fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary, or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…780

      Some relevant questions that may assist are: 781

      • Does the third party perceive that disclosure would likely prejudice its competitive position.
      • How would disclosure impact on the competitive position of the third party.
      • Would it have an adverse effect on sales or marketing. How.
      • Would disclosure reveal plans or strategy. If so, what kind of plans or strategy.
        • Product launch
        • Product approvals
        • Marketing plans
        • Business acquisitions
        • Asset acquisitions
        • Others
      • How would knowledge of these plans specifically prejudice the third party’s competitive position.
      • Is there an indication of how a competitor could use the information to its advantage, i.e., by developing competing pricing strategies.‌
      • Has the information or same subject matter been disclosed elsewhere.
        • Publications
        • In applications to government that are public
        • In the press
        • In annual reports, government filings
        • In public registries
      • How old is the information. If the information is not current, why would disclosure still adversely affect the third party.
      • Has similar information about the third party been made public in the past. If so, what was the impact. Was the impact quantifiable (e.g., lost sales or revenues).
      • Is information of this nature available about competitors of the third party.
      • Are there examples in other businesses where disclosure of similar information led to competitive prejudice. If so, describe and quantify the financial loss or gain. Why is the situation parallel to that of this third party.
      • What actions could the third party take to counteract potential competitive prejudice knowing the information would be disclosed.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c). An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). During the review, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant would result in a competitor‌having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts, which would cause the third party to experience a competitive disadvantage. However, neither Central Services nor the third party provided anything further to support this assertion. The Commissioner also stated that the winning contractor would have access to the internal cost estimates in question as it is part of the current contract and that keeping these figures from the public, including other future bidders, would jeopardize competitive bidding processes. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP was not properly applied by Central Services.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions that were over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). Specifically, Central Services withheld the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(c). Upon review, both Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the hourly rates could result in competitors having the ability the provide a lower rate for future contracts and result in undue loss to Solvera Solutions and prejudice its competitive position. The Commissioner found that the bids were evaluated based on several criteria and laid out the three stages used by Central Services at paragraph [44] of the report. As such, the selection was not based on price alone. Finally, the Commissioner found that releasing costs would increase the chances that a public body would, in the future, obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) did not apply to the hourly rates.

      In Review Report 236-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Water Security Agency (WSA) for copies of a report of the standing of each firm who submitted quotes to WSA in response to a Request for Quotes. Upon review, the WSA asserted that if the quotes were released to the applicant, it would result in financial loss for the third parties and result in a competitive advantage. Relying on Review Reports 007-2015 and 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner found that the risk of being underbid by competitors for future contracts did not meet the threshold for this provision. Releasing costs would increase the chances that the public body would obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(iii)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subclause 19(1)(c)(iii) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Are there contractual or other negotiations occurring involving a third party?

      negotiation is a consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. It can also be defined as dealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.782 It connotes a more robust relationship than “consultation”. It signifies a measure of bargaining power and a process of back-and-forth, give-and-take discussion.783

      Prospective or future negotiations could be included within this exemption, if they are foreseeable.784 It may be applied even though negotiations have not yet started at the time of the access to information request, including when there has not been any direct contact with the other party or their agent. However, a vague possibility of future negotiations is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable fact-based expectation that the future negotiations will take place.785

      Once a contract is executed, negotiation is concluded. The exemption would generally not apply unless, for instance, the same strategy will be used again, and it has not been publicly disclosed.786

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party?

      Interfere means to hinder or hamper.787

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…788

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions and third parties should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.789

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted based on fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…790

      The Federal Court in Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State) (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 58, interpreted the equivalent provision in the federal Access to Information Act as requiring that “it must refer to an obstruction to those negotiations and not merely the heightening of competition for the third party which might flow from disclosure”.791 Furthermore, a distinction must be drawn between actual contractual negotiations and the daily business operations of a third party.792

      When determining whether disclosure could interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party, the following questions can be asked to assist:793

      • What negotiations would be affected by disclosure.
      • Are these negotiations ongoing.
      • Have the negotiations been concluded.
      • What stage are the negotiations at.
      • How long have they been going on.
      • What is the subject matter of the negotiations.
      • How would disclosure specifically interfere with the negotiations.
      • Does the information relate to an outstanding issue in the negotiations. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations on this issue.
      • Does the information relate to issues already resolved in the negotiations.
      • Would disclosure cause the issue to be reopened. Why.
      • Would it otherwise interfere with negotiations. How.
      • Is the information current. How old is the information.
      • Does it relate to events prior to the negotiations.
      • Does the other side of the negotiations already have this information. If not, have they asked for it.
      • Is the information commonly known in the industry.
      • Is the information reasonably available elsewhere. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations.794

      Examples of information to which this exemption may apply include negotiating positions, options, instructions, pricing criteria and points used in negotiations.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      Subsection 19(1)(d)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (d) a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(d) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution.

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for accounts for routine services rendered by a government institution to a third party.795 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy ActS.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, has a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services?

      A statement is a formal written or oral account, setting down facts, a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.796

      A “statement of a financial account” is not defined in FOIP. However, the following is helpful in interpreting what the Legislative Assembly intended by this phrase:

      statement of account is a report issued periodically (usually monthly) by a creditor to a customer, providing certain information on the customer’s account, including the amounts billed, credits given and the balance due;797 a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.798

      An accounting means a detailed statement of the debits and credits between parties to a contract or to a fiduciary relationship; a reckoning of monetary dealings.799

      An account means a record of financial expenditure and receipts; a bill taking the form of such a record.800

      Financial means of or pertaining to revenue or money matters.801

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.802 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.803 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the provision of routine services.804

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.805

      Routine means a regular course of procedure; an unvarying performance of certain acts; regular or unvarying procedure or performance.806

      Services means labour performed in the interest or under the direction of others; the performance of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another, usually for a fee; an intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labour, skill or advice.807

      FOIP defines a third party as a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution.808 A “local authority”, as defined under subsection 2(1)(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, can also qualify as a third party for purposes of FOIP.809

      2. Is the statement from a government institution?

      FOIP defines a government institution at subsection 2(1)(d).

      The statement must be from the government institution to meet the second part of the test.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 020-2016, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the City of Lloydminster (City) for a copy of a proposal submitted by a third party for waste disposal services. The City withheld the proposal in full citing several provisions of LA FOIP including subsection 18(1)(d). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the portions being considered under subsection 18(1)(d) of LA FOIP was background information about the third party. The information did not relate to a specific financial account and did not appear to be a statement of any kind. Therefore, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(d) of LA FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(1)(e)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (e) a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution; or

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution.

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for statements of financial assistance from a prescribed Crown corporation to a third party.810 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy ActS.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, have a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record a statement of financial assistance?

      statement is a formal written or oral account, setting down facts, a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.811

      Financial assistance means any economic benefit, such as a scholarship or stipend, given by one person or entity to another.812

      The exemption does not include records that merely list a company as having received a loan. It must include other details such as credits and debits to meet the definition of a statement of financial assistance.813

      2. Was the statement provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution?

      See the Appendix, Part I of the FOIP Regulations for prescribed Crown corporations.

      Subsection 2(1)(h) of FOIP provides:

      2(1) In this Act:

      (h) “prescribed” means prescribed in the regulations;

      When considering subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP, section 11 of the FOIP Regulations should be considered. Section 11 of the FOIP Regulations provides:

      Third party statements

      11 For the purposes of clause 19(1)(e) of the Act, the Agricultural Credit Corporation is prescribed as a Crown corporation the head of which is required to refuse to give access to a record that contains a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP for the first time. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Agriculture for records related to the planning, share purchase and takeover of two businesses by Agri-Food Equity Fund in 1998. The Ministry responded to the applicant advising that the records were being withheld in full citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP. Upon review, the Ministry asserted that the correspondence and documents related to the provision of financial assistance to a business through the sale of the AgriFood Equity Fund (AFEF) shares. Further, that the AFEF was part of the Agricultural Corporation of Saskatchewan (ACS), which was a prescribed Crown corporation under FOIP at the time. Finally, that the records detailed proposed shares for debt transactions, as well as the loans owed AFEF by two third parties. The Commissioner found that although some of the records qualified as a statement of financial assistance, the Ministry did not identify which third party benefited from the financial assistance. As such, the Commissioner found that the Ministry had not met the burden of proof in demonstrating that subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP applied to the records.

      In Review Report F-2014-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC) for cultivated and seeded acres claimed by tenants on the applicant’s land between 2001 and 2010 SCIC responded to the applicant indicating that the information was being withheld citing several provisions including subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP. Upon review, the SCIC asserted that the SCIC was a prescribed Crown corporation. Furthermore, the information related to financial assistance provided by SCIC to an Operator. The Commissioner found that no portion of the Seeded Acreage Reports appeared to be a statement of financial assistance. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(1)(f)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (f) information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party;

      Subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for applications for financial assistance from a prescribed Crown corporation to a third party.814 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy ActS.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, have a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information to support an application for financial assistance?

      The provision is intended to protect information that a third party provides to a Crown corporation, which supports its application for financial assistance.

      Support means to corroborate.815

      Application means a formal request to an authority.816

      Financial assistance means any economic benefit, such as a scholarship or stipend, given by one person or entity to another.817

      2. Was the information supplied by a third party?

      Supplied means provided or furnished.818

      Information may qualify as “supplied” if it was directly supplied to a government institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.819

      Information gathered by government inspectors via their own observations does not qualify as information “supplied” to the government institution. Judgements or conclusions expressed by officials based on their own observations generally cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party.820

      Records can still be “supplied” even when they originate with the government institution (i.e., the records still may contain or repeat information extracted from documents supplied by the third party). However, the third-party objecting to disclosure will have to prove that the information originated with it and that it is confidential.821

      Whether confidential information has been “supplied” to a government institution by a third party is a question of fact. The content rather than the form of the information must be considered: the mere fact that the information appears in a government document does not, on its own, resolve the issue.822

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP for the first time. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Agriculture for records related to the planning, share purchase and takeover of two businesses by Agri-Food Equity Fund in 1998. The Ministry responded to the applicant advising that the records were being withheld in full citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 19(1)(f). Upon review, the Ministry asserted that subsection 19(1)(f) applied to the project submissions provided by the third party which outlined proposals, plans, amount of debt, marketing plans, financial analysis statements etc. Furthermore, that the third party supplied sales figures, sales projections, losses incurred by the third party, projected losses, as well as information related to inspections and improvements. The Ministry asserted that this information was provided to request additional investment in the third party by AgriFood Equity Fund (AFEF). The Ministry asserted that the AFEF was part of the Agricultural Corporation of Saskatchewan (ACS), which was a prescribed Crown corporation under FOIP at the time. The Commissioner found that although the Ministry claimed the records were provided by the third party, it appeared the record was created by AFEF. Further, that the record appeared to be commenting and making recommendations with respect to the third party’s need for financial assistance. AFEF was apparently a business unit of the crown corporation. The Commissioner found that the record was supplied to the Ministry by another government institution. As such, the Commissioner found that the burden of proof was not met in establishing that subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP applied.

      In Review Report F-2014-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC) for cultivated and seeded acres claimed by tenants on the applicant’s land between 2001 and 2010. SCIC responded to the applicant indicating that the information was being withheld citing several provisions including subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP. Upon review, the SCIC asserted that the SCIC was a prescribed Crown corporation. Furthermore, the information related to financial assistance provided by SCIC to an Operator. The Commissioner found that SCIC did not offer any evidence that the third party supplied the information in the Seeded Acreage Reports for the purposes of financial assistance. Due to the lack of persuasive argument and lack of evidence offered, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(2)

      Third party information

      19(2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      Subsection 19(2) of FOIP provides that the government institution may give access to a record that contains third party information if the third-party consents in writing to disclosure. The provision is intended to prevent situations where the government institution would be under an obligation to withhold a record when the third party agreed to disclosure.823

      If the government institution determines that the information qualifies as third-party information, it should make a reasonable effort to seek the consent of the third party to disclose the requested information.824

      Subsection 19(3)

      Third party information

      19(3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(3) of FOIP is a discretionary provision for the release of third-party information in circumstances where the head of the government institution forms the opinion that disclosure “could reasonably be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment”.

      A government institution should consider subsection 19(3) of FOIP when dealing with third party information. A government institution should first determine that the information is indeed third-party information pursuant to one of the subsections outlined at 19(1) of FOIP. If it is, then consider subsection 19(3) of FOIP.

      To properly apply the provision, government institutions should do the following:825

      (i) Determine whether the information qualifies or might qualify for exemption pursuant to subsection 19(1) of FOIP.

      The public interest “override” comes into play only when all or part of a record falls within one or more of the classes of records described in subsection 19(1) of FOIP.

      (ii) Determine whether the record is related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment.

      When undertaking the initial review of records, consider immediately whether a public interest “override” may come into play.

      (iii) Consider whether disclosure of the record related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment may be in the public interest.

      (iv) Send a notice to the third party pursuant to section 34 of FOIP.

      If the records are related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment, government institutions should ask the third party to provide not only representations as to why they consider the information to be exempted from disclosure but also reasons why disclosure in the public interest should not outweigh in importance the injury involved. The government institution should be very clear about the type of information needed from the third party to decide.

      (v) Analyze the representations of the third party.

      Once the representations have been received, government institutions should thoroughly analyze the arguments presented by the third party to justify subsection 19(1) exemptions.

      If the government institution accepts the third party’s representations as substantiating an exemption under subsection 19(1) of FOIP, it must then consider the representations made against disclosure in the public interest.

      Once a decision is made, the government institution should provide notification procedures as set out in section 37 of FOIP.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information relate to public health, public safety or protection of the environment?

      Relates to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.826 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.827 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and public health, public safety or protection of the environment.828

      Public health means the health of the community at large, the healthful or sanitary condition of the general body of people or the community collectively; especially the methods of maintaining the health of the community, as by preventative medicine an organized care for the sick.829 Public health refers to the well-being of the public at large. This may include physical, mental or emotional health.830

      Public safety means the welfare and protection of the general public, usually expressed as a governmental responsibility.831

      Protection of the environment refers to guarding or defending natural surroundings, i.e., plants and animals. For example, it may be necessary to disclose the information of an industrial plant that is discharging toxic wastes into a waterway.832

      2. Could disclosure of the information reasonably be expected to be in the public interest?

      There must be a public interest in disclosure of the information, not a private interest.

      Public interest is not black and white; it is a matter of degree. There is always a balance to be struck.833 In determining if there is a public interest, the following can be considered:834

      • Whose interests would be affected by disclosure other than the third party.
        • Individual
        • General
        • Describe affected group
      • Does the information concern an event/proposal/incident/condition involving health, safety, or protection of the environment.
        • If so, what group in the public is affected by the event/proposal/incident/condition
      • Is the event/proposal/incident/condition one which requires government approval.
      • Did it result in government enforcement activity or investigation.
      • Did it involve contravention or violation of standards in health, safety, and environmental protection.
        • Describe the extent of the danger or risk
        • Who is affected by the danger or risk
      • Has the danger or risk been alleviated.
        • To what extent
        • When
        • What was the degree of exposure to the danger or risk before it was alleviated
        • For how long
      • What was the impact of any past event/incident described in the record.
        • Describe the degree or extent
      • What are the remaining effects or impacts.
      • Are people, animals or environment currently exposed to the dangers or risks arising from the event described in the information.
        • To what degree
      • Have the issues described in the information been publicly examined elsewhere.
        • In an ongoing process
      • Will the process likely result in disclosure of the information to the public or in public discussion of the information.
      • What are the dangers, if any, that would be caused by disclosure (aside from 19(1) harm).
        • What are they
        • Why would they arise

      Subsection 19(3) of FOIP includes the requirement that the information “could reasonably be expected” to be in the public interest. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although this part of the provision does not contemplate harm, the threshold proposed by the Supreme Court is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      3. Could the public interest in disclosure reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh the importance of the financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive positions or interference with contractual relationships relating to a third party?

      Clear means free from doubt; sure; unambiguous.835

      Use of the word “clearly” means the test is rigorous, limiting the applicability of the public interest “override”.836

      Outweigh means to be of more importance or value than something else.837

      In determining if the public interest clearly outweighs in importance the financial loss or gain, competitive prejudice or interference in negotiations of a third party, the following can be considered:838

      • Quantify the financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or degree of interference in negotiations of the third party.
      • In the case of information described in subsection 19(1), what degree of importance is attached to keeping the information confidential.
      • What is the nature of the relationship between the government institution and the third party, i.e., why did the third party supply the information to the government.
        • Voluntary
          • If so, what were the circumstances.
        • Mandatory
      • Describe any chilling effect of disclosure, if any.
      • Describe any impact on the government relationship or duty it must maintain information in a confidential fashion.
      • What factors did the government institution consider in assessing whether subsection 19(3) applies.
      • Why did the government institution decide not to disclose pursuant to subsection 19(3).
      • Did the government institution consider the purposes of FOIP in its decision. For example:
        • Provides for the right of access.
        • Government information should be available to the public.
        • Necessary exemptions should be limited and specific.
      • Did the government institution consider:
        • The value of public education with respect to the subject matter of the information.
        • Public confidence in regulatory, enforcement or investigatory systems.
        • Need for public awareness of successes or failures of regulatory enforcement or investigatory systems.
        • The need for public awareness of legislative or regulatory gaps or inadequacies in the areas of public health, safety, or environmental protection.
      • Were the interests of all groups interested in disclosure of the information considered.
        • How
      • What is the danger of further disclosure.
      • Was the decision not to apply subsection 19(3) based in part on a fear of public confusion.
        • If so, what would give rise to or cause the confusion.
      • Could the government institution take measures to reduce or eliminate the dangers.
        • Are there public relations measures.
        • Are there explanations that can be given.
        • Why could no other measures be taken.
      • Could the third party take measures (with respect to subsection 19(1) information) that could reduce the impact on them of disclosure.
        • What measures.
        • Why could no measures be taken.
      • ‌Was the government’s own performance an issue in the consideration leading to a decision to not apply subsection 19(3) of FOIP.
      • Have there been any allegations of impropriety, negligence, cover-up or inadequacy about the government institution arising from the matters described in the records.
      • Has the government institution responded to these allegations.

      Subsection 19(3) of FOIP includes the requirement that the public interest in disclosure “could reasonably be expected” to clearly outweigh in importance the harms listed. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014):

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered subsection 19(3) of FOIP in Review Report 043-2015. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Environment for the “2012 and 2013 Water and Air Quality Compliance Reports”. The Ministry withheld portions of the two reports citing subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP (third party information). Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP applied to portions of the reports. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the public interest resulting from disclosure of the information would outweigh in importance, any financial loss or prejudice to the competitive position of the third party. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(3) of FOIP applied. The Commissioner recommended release.

      Section 20: Testing Procedures, Tests and Audits

      Testing procedures, tests and audits

      20 A head may refuse to give access to a record that contains information relating to:

      (a) testing or auditing procedures or techniques; or

      (b) details of specific tests to be given or audits to be conducted;

      if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits.

      Section 20 of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based provision. The provision is intended to protect records that contain information relating to:

      • Test or auditing procedures or techniques;
      • Details of specific tests to be given; or
      • Details of specific audits to be conducted.

      In addition, the consequences of disclosure must almost certainly lead to:

      • The inability to use the test or auditing procedure; or
      • The inability to use or rely upon the tests or to use the techniques etc.839

      Subsection 20(a)

      Testing procedures, tests and audits

      20 A head may refuse to give access to a record that contains information relating to:

      (a) testing or auditing procedures or techniques; or

      if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits.

      Subsection 20(a) of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains information relating to testing or auditing procedures or techniques if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain information relating to testing or auditing procedures or techniques?

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.840 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.841 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the testing or auditing procedures or techniques.842

      test is a set of questions, exercises, or practical activities that measure either what someone knows or what someone or something is like or can do.843

      An audit is the formal examination of an individual’s or organization’s accounting records, financial situation or compliance with some other set of standards.844 It is the systematic identification, evaluation and assessment of an organization’s policies, procedures, acts and practices against pre-defined standards.845

      Procedures are the manner of proceeding; a system of proceeding; conduct, behavior.846

      Techniques are the manner of execution or performance in relation to mechanical or formal details; a skillful or efficient way of doing or achieving something.847

      The terms testing and auditing cover a wide range of activities. Examples include environmental testing, language testing, personnel audits, financial audits, staffing examinations and program audits. The exemption applies to testing and auditing carried out by government institutions, consultants, and contractors.848

      2. Could disclosure reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits?

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…849

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.850

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the use or to the results of tests or audits.851

      The provision may apply where there is an intention to use the testing or auditing procedure in the future, and disclosure would result in unreliable results being obtained and the test or the audit having to be abandoned as a result. Test questions that are regularly used – for example, in making staffing decisions – may qualify.852

      For subsection 20(a) of FOIP, the provision primarily protects testing or auditing procedures and techniques; the testing/auditing mechanism, not the content.853

      The exemption does not cover the results of tests or audits.854

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2010-001, the Commissioner considered subsection 20(a) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Health for information related to the inclusion and interpretation of section 57 of The Health Information Protection Act (HIPA), policy rationale related to proposed HIPA Regulations covering 12 years. The applicant also requested information pertaining to submissions received during the public consultation for the HIPA Regulations. The Ministry withheld portions of the records pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 20(a). Upon review, the Commissioner found that a privacy impact assessment (PIA) qualified as an audit for purposes of subsection 20(a) of FOIP. However, the provision was found not to apply, as a PIA was a fact-finding exercise where the questions remained constant. The responses change with the circumstances. The exemption was intended to primarily protect procedures and techniques: the testing mechanism and not the content. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 20(a) of FOIP did not apply. The Commissioner recommended release of the PIA.

      In Review Report 145-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 20(a) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for a copy of the investigation report prepared by SaskPower that led to the applicant’s termination along with copies of email conversations and calibration session comments. SaskPower responded to the applicant advising that the investigation report was being withheld pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 20(a). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the investigation performed by SaskPower would qualify as an audit for the purposes of section 20 of FOIP. However, the techniques or procedures must include specific steps. General information, such as forms and standard policies that did not include specific steps and procedures, would not qualify. Routine, common or customary auditing techniques and procedures would not qualify. The Commissioner found that three portions of the investigation report, which included a section titled, Forensic Analysis Procedures, would constitute auditing techniques or procedures. Further, the Commissioner was persuaded that the release of the auditing techniques and procedures could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 20(a) of FOIP applied to portions of the investigation report.

      In Review Report 231-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 20(a) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Economy (Economy) for specific potash royalty information. Economy responded to the applicant advising that records were being withheld under several provisions of FOIP including subsection 20(a).

      Economy applied subsection 20(a) to royalty and tax audit reports. Economy asserted that the royalty and tax audit reports outlined specific steps taken by the auditor to analyze the company’s returns. Furthermore, the identification of the subject areas reviewed represented an auditing technique by which the auditor is able to focus on the areas most likely to reveal shortfalls in tax reported. The Commissioner was persuaded that subsection 20(a) of FOIP applied to the audit reports.

      Subsection 20(b)

      Testing procedures, tests and audits

      20 A head may refuse to give access to a record that contains information relating to:

      (b) details of specific tests to be given or audits to be conducted;

      if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits.

      Subsection 20(b) of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based provision. This provision protects details relating to specific tests to be given or audits to be conducted.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the record contain information relating to details of specific tests to be given or audits to be conducted?

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.855 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.856 “Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the testing or auditing procedures or techniques.857

      Details means a number of particulars; an aggregate of small items.858

      test is a set of questions, exercises or practical activities that measure either what someone knows or what someone or something is like or can do.859

      An audit is the formal examination of an individual’s or organization’s accounting records, financial situation or compliance with some other set of standards.860 It is the systematic identification, evaluation and assessment of an organization’s policies, procedures, acts and practices against pre-defined standards.861

      The terms testing and auditing cover a wide range of activities. Examples include environmental testing, language testing, personnel audits, financial audits, staffing examinations and program audits. The exemption applies to testing and auditing carried out by government institutions, consultants, and contractors.862

      2. Could disclosure reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits?

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could prejudice the use or results of particular tests or audits. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…863

      The government institution does not have to prove that a harm is probable but needs to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way in order to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.864

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the use or to the results of tests or audits.865

      It is generally applied where disclosure of a specific test to be given or audit to be conducted, or one that is currently in process, would invalidate the results. This applies even if there is no intention to use the test or audit again in the future.866

      The exemption does not cover the results of tests or audits.867

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 159-2016, the Commissioner considered subsection 20(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Global Transportation Hub Authority (GTH) for all internal records related to Brightenview International Developments Inc. between January 1, 2013 and April 5, 2016. The GTH responded to the applicant advising that access to the records was denied pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 20(b). The GTH applied the exemption to one email where the GTH responded to questions of an external auditor who was hired to perform an audit for the GTH. It also applied the exemption to the attachments to the email that demonstrated the approval for travel of one of its employees. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the exemption does not apply to the perception of the results of a completed audit. Furthermore, the exemption applied to testing and auditing procedures and techniques or the mechanism, not the content. As the withheld information related to the content of an audit, the Commissioner was not convinced that subsection 20(b) of FOIP applied.

      Section 21: Danger to Health or Safety

      Danger to health or safety

      21 A head may refuse to give access to a record if the disclosure could threaten the safety or the physical or mental health of an individual.

      Section 21 of FOIP is a discretionary, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of a record could threaten the safety or the physical or mental health of an individual.

      Every jurisdiction in Canada (except Quebec) has a similarly worded provision as Saskatchewan’s section 21 of FOIP. However, the thresholds for every other jurisdiction are higher and use the “could reasonably be expected” threshold. No other jurisdiction in Canada has the same lower threshold as Saskatchewan’s section 21.

      The following test can be applied:

      Could disclosure of the record threaten the safety or the physical or mental health of an individual?

      For section 21 of FOIP, the question that must be answered is could disclosure of the record threaten the safety or the physical or mental health of an individual? The threshold for “could” is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectation but well beyond or considerably above mere speculation. On the continuum, speculation is at one end and certainty is at the other. The threshold for “could” therefore, is that which is possible.

      Speculative means engaged in, expressing or based on conjecture rather than knowledge. Conjecture is an opinion or conclusion based on incomplete information.868 Speculation generally has no objective basis. If the harm is fanciful or exceedingly remote, it is in the realm of speculation or conjecture.

      Possible means capable of existing, happening, or being achieved; that which is not certain or probable.869

      Probable means likely to happen or be the case.870

      If it is fanciful or exceedingly remote, the exemption should not be invoked.871 For this provision to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in the harm alleged.

      Generally, this means the government institution must assess the risk and determine whether there are reasonable grounds for concluding there is a danger to the health or safety of any person. The assessment must be specific to the circumstances under consideration. Inconvenience, upset or the unpleasantness of dealing with difficult or unreasonable people is not sufficient to trigger the exemption. The threshold cannot be achieved based on unfounded, unsubstantiated allegations.872

      The government institution should be able to detail what the harm is and to whom the harm threatens if the information were released.

      To threaten means to possibly injure; be a source of harm or danger to.873 It means to create the possibility or risk of harm or jeopardize an individual’s safety or mental or physical well-being.874

      Safety means the state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; freedom from danger.875

      Physical health refers to the well-being of an individual’s physical body.876 Determination of the effect of a release of information on an individual’s physical health must consider the current or normal state of health of persons who may be affected by the release of information, as well as the decline in health that is expected to occur if the information is disclosed to the applicant.877

      Mental health means the condition of a person in respect of the functioning of the mind.878 It means the ability of a person’s mind to function in its normal state. Determination of the effect of a release of information on a person’s mental health must, where practicable, be based on a subjective evaluation made on a case-by-case basis.879

      The exemption can apply where the nature of the applicant is the reason harm may occur. For example:

      Mental healthwhere the applicant has a history of mental or emotional difficulties and disclosure of the information could worsen or aggravate his/her condition to the point that he/she could harm someone.

      Violent behaviorwhere the applicant has a history of violent behavior and disclosure of the identity of informants who assisted the government in its case against the applicant could endanger the safety of the informants.880

      It is fair then to look at the probable effect of disclosure from the perspective of the applicant – i.e., what use might this specific applicant make of the requested information? What, in view of what is known about the applicant, might the applicant do to themselves or someone else if the information is disclosed?881

      For example, the mental or physical health of a person would be threatened if information were disclosed to an applicant that would cause severe stress such as suicidal ideation or that could result in verbal or physical harassment or stalking. Individual safety could be threatened if information were released that allowed someone who had threatened to kill or injure the individual to locate them. Examples of individuals whose safety might be threatened would include an individual fleeing from a violent spouse, a victim of harassment or a witness to harassment, or an employee who has been threatened.882

      If the information is already available elsewhere to the public, there may be no need for the exemption.883

      IPC Findings

      In Evenson v Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority, (2012), Justice Zarzeczny considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, (section 20). Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority (KTRHA) had denied an applicant access to certain hospital records including the names of nurses that were on duty at the Melfort Hospital during a specific time. Justice Zarzeczny ruled that KTRHA had not established that the exemption applied. Further, that the concerns about the applicant raised by KTRHA did not have any basis or foundation in fact. Nor were they supported by any circumstances which were established in the materials that were presented to the Commissioner in Review Report LA-2012-002.

      In Consumers’ Co-Operative Refineries Limited v. Regina (City), (2016), Justice Keene ruled that a Major Hazard Risk Assessment Report (MHRAR) qualified for the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, (section 20). In making this decision, Justice Keene considered that the MHRAR revealed specific parts of a refinery where the worst possible accidents could occur. Over disclosure of the information could be harmful to the public (i.e., nondisclosure of records can actually promote public safety in certain circumstances). Facilities such as nuclear power plants and refining complexes could be the target of attack, which could pose a public safety risk. As such, the provision was found to apply in the greater sense of the protection of the public.

      Section 22: Solicitor-Client Privilege

      Solicitor-client privilege

      22 A head may refuse to give access to a record that:

      (a) contains any information that is subject to any privilege that is available at law, including solicitor-client privilege;

      (b) was prepared by or for an agent of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or legal counsel for a government institution in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel; or

      (c) contains correspondence between an agent of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or legal counsel for a government institution and any other person in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel.

      Section 22 of FOIP is a discretionary class-based provision. It is intended to protect records that contain:

      • Information subject to any privilege available at law, including solicitor-client privilege (22(a));
      • Information that relates to the provision of legal advice or services and was prepared for specified individuals (22(b)); or
      • Information relating to the provision of legal advice or services contained in correspondence between specified individuals (22(c)).

      Subsection 22(a)

      Solicitor-client privilege

      22 A head may refuse to give access to a record that:

      (a) contains any information that is subject to any privilege that is available at law, including solicitor-client privilege;

      Subsection 22(a) of FOIP is a discretionary, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains information that is subject to any legal privilege, including solicitor-client privilege.

      Including means that the list of information that follows is not complete (non-exhaustive). The example in the provision is the type of information that could be presumed to qualify as a “privilege available at law”.884

      Amendments were made to this subsection effective January 1, 2018. The change was the inclusion of the phrase “any privilege that is available at law”. The exemption previously only considered solicitor-client privilege.

      Privilege is a special right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons.885

      There are several types of privilege. The exemption can include, but is not limited to:886

      • Solicitor-client privilege (see below).
      • Litigation privilege (see below).
      • Legislative privilege (see below).
      • Case-by-case privilege (see below).
      • Common interest privilege: a privilege that exists when records are provided among parties where several parties have a common interest in anticipated litigation.887
      • Informer privilege: historically known as ‘police informer privilege,’888 means the qualified privilege that a government can invoke to prevent disclosure of the identity and communications of its informants.889
      • Labour relations privilege: is a privilege in the labour relations context. Four conditions should be satisfied in order for the privilege to be claimed for communications made within a confidential relationship:
        1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
        2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the parties.
        3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
        4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.890
      • Settlement privilege: a privilege that applies to the discussions leading up to a resolution of a dispute in the face of litigation. It promotes the settlement of lawsuits.891 The existence of the privilege is determined by a three-part test:
        1. The existence or contemplation of a litigious dispute;
        2. Communications that are made with the intention they remain confidential if negotiations failed; and
          • The purpose of the communications was to achieve a settlement.892
      • Mediation privilege: is closely related to settlement privilege. Settlement relates, in the main, to discussions and negotiations leading up to the settlement of a dispute which culminate in a final settlement agreement. Mediation privilege, on the other hand, relates to steps taken to resolve a dispute, typically, outside a traditional court or other adjudicative process. Generally speaking, participation in mediation is voluntary, and this reality underlies the public policy rationale for maintaining confidentiality over mediation processes.893
      • Statutory privilege: a legal privilege established by an act or by a regulation.894
      Solicitor-client privilege

      The purpose of solicitor-client privilege is to assure clients of confidentiality and enable them to speak honestly and candidly with their legal representatives.895 The privilege has long been recognized as “fundamental to the proper functioning of our legal system”896 and a cornerstone of access to justice. It has evolved from a rule of evidence to a substantive rule that is more nuanced than simply any communications between lawyer and client.

      In Solosky v. The Queen, (1980), Justice Dickson regarded the rule of solicitor-client privilege as a “fundamental civil and legal right” that guaranteed clients a right to privacy in their communications with their lawyers. Furthermore, that solicitor-client privilege must be claimed document by document, and that each document must meet the three-part test.

      The following three-part test can be applied:897

      1. Is the record a communication between solicitor and client?

      In Descoteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, (1982), Justice Lamer outlined a very liberal approach to the scope of the privilege by extending it to include all communications made “within the framework of the solicitor-client relationship.” The protection is very strong, as long as the person claiming the privilege is within the framework.

      communication is the process of bringing an idea to another’s perception; the message or ideas so expressed or exchanged; the interchange of messages or ideas by speech, writing, gestures or conduct.898

      The government institution should make it clear who the solicitor is and who the client is.

      Solicitor means a lawyer who is duly admitted as a member and whose right to practice is not suspended.899 Lawyer means a member of the Law Society and includes a law student registered in the Society’s pre-call training program.900

      Client means a person who:

      • Consults a lawyer and on whose behalf the lawyer renders or agrees to render legal services; or
      • Having consulted the lawyer, reasonably concludes that the lawyer has agreed to render legal services on his or her behalf;

      and includes a client of the law firm of which the lawyer is a partner or associate, whether or not the lawyer handles the client’s work.901

      This provision ensures that a government institution, as the client, has the same protection for its legal documents as persons in the private sector.

      Whether a solicitor-client relationship exists is a fact driven and multifaceted analysis. Sometimes, it will be readily apparent that a retainer exists. Other times, a careful examination of the facts must be undertaken.902 It is not necessary that a person formally retain a lawyer by way of letter or other document before a solicitor-client relationship can be found. Nor is it necessary that an account be rendered by the lawyer or that an account be paid. There are certain indicia that may or may not determine that such a relationship exists. These include:

      • A contract or retainer.
      • A file opened by the lawyer.
      • Meetings between the lawyer and the party.
      • Correspondence between the lawyer and the party.
      • A bill rendered by the lawyer to the party.
      • A bill paid by the party.
      • Instructions given by the party to the lawyer.
      • The lawyer acting on the instructions given.
      • Statements made by the lawyer that the lawyer is acting for the party.
      • A reasonable expectation by the party about the lawyer’s role.
      • Legal advice given.
      • Any legal documents created for the party.903

      The client can be an individual, corporation or government institution.

      The Ministry of Justice can act as legal advisors for all departments of government.904

      Solicitor-client privilege can apply in the context of an in-house government lawyer providing legal advice to the government.905 However, owing to the nature of the work of in-house counsel (i.e., having both legal and non-legal responsibilities), each situation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine if the privilege arises in the circumstances.906

      Communications can be written or verbal.907

      The privilege does not necessarily apply to attachments to documents (e.g., attachments to emails) even those attached to genuine legal advice. On the other hand, an attachment that is an integral part of a legal opinion in the covering email or document could be privileged. For example, if the attachment would provide some basis for a reader to determine some or all of the opinion or advice. The party claiming privilege over an attachment must provide some basis for the claim. The point is that it is the content of the communication and who is communicating, not the form of the communication that determines privilege and confidentiality. Furthermore, it makes no practical sense to parse the contents of attachments in order to sever the parts that are privileged from the parts that are not. If some of the attachment is part of the legal advice, then all of it is protected by solicitor-client privilege.908

      Written communications between officials or employees of a government institution, quoting the legal advice given orally by the government institution’s solicitor, or employee’s notes documenting the legal advice given orally by the solicitor could qualify. This includes notes “to file” in which legal advice is quoted or discussed.909

      The privilege does not attach to advice provided by someone who is not a lawyer; the advice must be sought from a professional legal advisor in his or her capacity as such.910

      Where the communication itself, between client and solicitor, constitutes a criminal act, or counsels someone to commit a crime, the privilege will not apply.911

      2. Does the communication entail the seeking or giving of legal advice?

      The scope of solicitor-client privilege is broad. It applies to all communications made with a view of obtaining legal advice.912 If a communication falls somewhere within the continuum of that necessary exchange of information, the object of which is the giving or receiving of legal advice, it is protected by solicitor-client privilege.913

      Legal advice means a legal opinion about a legal issue, and a recommended course of action, based on legal considerations, regarding a matter with legal implications.914

      The second part of the test is satisfied where the person seeking advice has a reasonable concern that a particular decision or course of action may have legal implications and turns to their legal advisor to determine what those legal implications might be.915

      The privilege applies not only to the records that actually give the legal advice but also to those that seek it and that provide factual information relative to which the advice is sought.916

      Background information can be included as part of the definition of legal advice because it forms part of the “continuum of communication” between a solicitor and his or her client.917

      Statements of fact are not themselves privileged. It is the communication of those facts between a client and a lawyer that is privileged.918

      The privilege applies to records that quote or discuss the legal advice. For example, information in written communications between officials or employees of a government institution in which the officials or employees quote or discuss the legal advice given by the government institution’s solicitor.919

      Business or policy advice provided by a lawyer will not attract the privilege. The Supreme Court of Canada in Campbell recognized this:

      It is, of course, not everything done by a government (or other) lawyer that attracts solicitor-client privilege. While some of what government lawyers do is indistinguishable from the work of private practitioners, they may and frequently do have multiple responsibilities including, for example, participation in various operating committees of their respective departments. Government lawyers who have spent years with a particular client department may be called upon to offer policy advice that has nothing to do with their legal training or expertise, but draws on departmental know-how. Advice given by lawyers on matters outside the solicitor-client relationship is not protected…Whether or not solicitor-client privilege attaches in any of these situations depends on the nature of the relationship, the subject matter of the advice and the circumstances in which it is sought and rendered.920

      Not all communications between a lawyer and his or her client are privileged. For example, provision of purely business advice by in-house counsel or purely social interactions between counsel and their clients will not constitute privileged communications.921

      Documents that are provided to a lawyer or “which simply come into the possession of a lawyer that are not related to the provision of legal advice are not privileged”.922 Documents do not become subject to solicitor-client privilege simply because they were provided to a lawyer.923

      Not every record dropped off, funneled through or otherwise given to a government institution’s solicitor has been given in confidence for the purpose of giving or seeking legal advice. Just because a solicitor may have been involved is not enough to find that privilege applies to records.924 For example, copying the solicitor in emails does not automatically make them subject to solicitor-client privilege.

      3. Did the parties intend for the communication to be treated confidentially?

      There must be an expectation on the part of the government institution that the communication will be confidential. “Not every aspect of relations between a lawyer and a client is necessarily confidential”.925 Conduct which is inconsistent with an expectation of confidentiality can constitute a waiver of privilege. Confidentiality is the sine qua non of privilege.926 Without confidentiality there can be no privilege and when confidentiality ends so too should the privilege.927

      As a general rule, the client (usually a government institution) must not have disclosed the legal advice (either verbally or in writing) to parties who are outside of the solicitor-client relationship.928

      Intended confidentiality, though necessary, is not sufficient to attach protection to communications between a lawyer and the government institution – legal advice must be involved.929 This distinction was emphasized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Straka v. Humber River Regional Hospital, where the Court states “[it] has long been established that confidentiality alone, no matter how earnestly desired and clearly expressed, does not make a communication privileged from disclosure.”930

      Wide circulation of internal communications by in-house counsel or communications with in-house counsel that do not clearly reflect an intention that those communications be kept confidential will not be protected by privilege.931

      While solicitor-client privilege started out as a rule of evidence, it is now unquestionably a rule of substance.932 In Descoteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, (1982), Justice Lamer set out the substantive rule as follows:

      1. The confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client may be raised in any circumstances where such communications are likely to be disclosed without the client’s consent.
      2. Unless the law provides otherwise, when and to the extent that the legitimate exercise of a right would interfere with another person’s right to have his communications with his lawyer kept confidential, the resulting conflict should be resolved in favour of protecting the confidentiality.
      3. When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation.
      4. Acts providing otherwise in situations under paragraph 2 and enabling legislation referred to in paragraph 3 must be interpreted restrictively.933

      By the nature of the records themselves, implicit confidentiality could be intended.934

      Express statements of an intention of confidentiality on records may qualify. For example, email confidentiality clauses if they are specific to the communication (i.e., wording and content). Standard confidentiality clauses in the headers or footers of emails would not apply.935

      Communications made in order to facilitate the commission of a crime or fraud will not be confidential, regardless of whether or not the lawyer is acting in good faith.936

      An applicant is entitled to general identifying information, such as the description of the document (for example, the “memorandum” heading and internal file identification), the name, title and address of the person to whom the communication was directed, the subject line, the generally innocuous opening words and closing words of the communication and the signature block.937

      A lawyer’s bill of accounts and itemized disbursements are protected including: the terms and amount of the retainer; the arrangements with respect to payment; the type of services rendered and their cost – all these matters are central to the solicitor-client relationship.938

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 052-2013, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Village of Buena Vista (the Village) for copies of records that detail the funds charged to the Village on behalf of certain council members, repayment plans and the legal fees paid by the Village on the Mayor’s behalf. The Village responded to the applicant indicating that some records did not exist and that the invoices were being withheld pursuant to subsections 18(1) and 21(a) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Village pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision Maranda v. Richer, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193, 2003 SCC 67. In that decision, the SCC determined that there was a presumption of privilege for lawyers’ bills of account as a whole. The Commissioner found that the presumption of privilege could be rebutted if an applicant could provide persuasive argument that the disclosure of information could not result in the applicant learning of information subject to solicitor-client privilege. The Commissioner relied on the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision, Ontario (Ministry of Attorney General) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] OJ No 941 where the court summarized the approach as follows:

      1. Is there any reasonable possibility that disclosure of the amount of the fees paid will directly or indirectly reveal any communication protected by the privilege? and
      2. Could an assiduous inquirer, aware of background information, use the information requested to deduce or otherwise acquire privileged communications?

      (School District No. 49 (Central Coast) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2012 BCSC 427)

      After considering the submission from the Applicant, the Commissioner was not persuaded that release of information, namely the fees detailed in the invoices, was neutral information and that the presumption of privilege was rebutted. The Commissioner found that subsection 21(a) of LA FOIP applies to the invoices in their entirety. The Commissioner took a similar approach in Review Reports 280-2016 & 281-2016 and 003-2017.

      Waiver of Privilege

      Confidentiality is the sine qua non of privilege.939 Without confidentiality there can be no privilege and when confidentiality ends, so too should the privilege.940

      Where a client authorizes the solicitor to reveal a solicitor-client communication, either it was never made with the intention of confidentiality, or the client has waived the right to confidentiality. In either case, there is no intention of confidentiality and no privilege attaches. For example, it has been held that documents prepared with the intention that they would be communicated to a third party, or where on their face they are addressed to a third party, are not privileged.941

      Waiver of privilege means the voluntary relinquishing of a right, exemption or immunity.942 Solicitor-client privilege belongs to the client and persists unless it is waived by the client.

      To constitute a valid waiver, two essential prerequisites are generally necessary:

        1. The client knows of the existence of the privilege; and
        2. The client demonstrates a clear intention to forego the privilege.943

      Waiver of privilege can be express, inadvertent, by implication or where fairness requires. There must be an intention manifested from either the client’s voluntary disclosure of confidential information or from objective consideration of the client’s conduct.944

      Disclosing that legal advice was received and relied on, or revealing the mere gist, summary or conclusion of that advice (i.e., public announcements) is not sufficient to imply a waiver over the whole of the privileged communications absent any unfairness. Furthermore, this approach reflects the fundamental purposes of freedom of information legislation because it recognizes the need for accountability on the part of public bodies without impinging on their right to maintain confidentiality over privileged communications.945

      Communication of privileged information between ministries or departments is not a waiver.946

      FOIP does not provide for a burden of proof when waiver is claimed. Where an applicant has asserted that solicitor-client privilege has been waived, the applicant bears the burden of proving the privilege has been waived.947

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2005-002, the Commissioner considered whether solicitor-client privilege had been waived. The Commissioner found that even where a government institution releases some documents, dissemination of some information related to a litigation does not constitute a waiver by the government institution’s privilege. As such, the Commissioner found that the Saskatchewan government had not waived its privilege.

      Process During a Review by IPC

      In the wake of The University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34, the IPC revised its procedures in relation to government institutions asserting solicitor-client privilege over responsive records.

      For more on the procedures see, Part 9: Solicitor-Client or Litigation Privilege in The Rules of Procedures. In addition, see the Commissioner’s blog, Solicitor-Client Privilege/Litigation Privilege.

      Ordering Production of Solicitor-Client Privileged Records

      Powers of commissioner

      54(1) Notwithstanding any other Act or any privilege that is available at law, the commissioner may, in a review:

      (a) require to be produced and examine any record that is in the possession or under the control of a government institution; and

      (b) enter and inspect any premises occupied by a government institution.

      (2) For the purposes of conducting a review, the commissioner may summon and enforce the appearance of persons before the commissioner and compel them:

      (a) to give oral or written evidence on oath or affirmation; and

      (b) to produce any document or things;

      that the commissioner considers necessary for a full review, in the same manner and to the same extent as the court.

      (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the commissioner may administer an oath or affirmation.

      In Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 860, Lamer J., on behalf of a unanimous Court, formulated four substantive rules to apply when communications between solicitor and client are likely to be disclosed without the client’s consent. The third substantive rule is relevant for the topic of production of solicitor-client or litigation records in an IPC Review. Rule number three reads as follows:

      3. When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation.

      What this means is that the Commissioner will not interfere with the confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client “except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation [i.e., FOIP]”.

      While the courts have said that solicitor-client privilege must remain as close to absolute as possible, it is not absolute. It can be limited or abrogated by statute. A statute purporting to limit or abrogate the privilege must be interpreted restrictively.

      The Commissioner has the power, under section 54 of FOIP, to order production of records over which solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege is claimed.948 The Commissioner exercises this authority cautiously and with restraint given the clear direction by the courts that a reviewing body’s decision to examine privileged documents must never be made lightly or as a matter of course.949

      Therefore, given the importance of solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege, and to minimally infringe on these privileges, the Commissioner will only order production of records being withheld under solicitor-client or litigation privilege pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP when it is absolutely necessary to decide the issues in dispute.

      Absolutely necessary is as restrictive a test as may be formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case.950

      As to when it would be appropriate to order production of records withheld under the solicitor-client or litigation privilege provision at subsection 22(a) of FOIP, the Commissioner will exercise discretion in the following circumstances:

      • Where there is some evidence that the party claiming privilege has done so ‘falsely” or inappropriately.951
      • When the party claiming privilege fails to respond to a reasonable request by the Commissioner for additional information.952

      A naked “trust me” that the records in dispute are subject to solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege is not sufficient from the government institution when making the case that subsection 22(a) of FOIP applies.953

      In a review, the Commissioner requests copies of records in order to conduct the review and determine whether exemptions have been appropriately applied. This includes requesting records which a government institution may have claimed solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege over pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP. The government institution may choose to make a “prima facie” case of solicitor-client or litigation privilege for those records pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP. If it does so, it must still meet the “burden of proof” in demonstrating that subsection 22(a) of FOIP applies as required by section 60 of FOIP (see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2: “Administration of FOIP” for more on the burden of proof).

      Prima facie means at first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information. A ‘prima facie case’ is where a party produces enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor..954

      prima facie case can be made to the Commissioner without providing a copy of the records but only for records that may be subject to solicitor-client and litigation privilege. All other records must be provided in the course of a review.

      If making a prima facie case, the Commissioner will need the following from the government institution if claiming solicitor-client privilege for subsection 22(a) of FOIP:

      • An affidavit of documents which includes an Index of Records (Schedule) that includes:
        • Sufficient detail to identify the document and allow the Commissioner to determine whether a prima facie case for the claim of solicitor-client privilege has been made. It should include:
          • The date of the record.
          • Whether the record is a letter, memo, fax, and so forth.
          • The author of the record.
          • The recipient of the record.
          • Whether the record is an original or copy.955

      For more on what the Commissioner requires, see Part 9: Solicitor-Client or Litigation Privilege in the Rules of Procedure.

      If the government institution provides less than what is needed for a prima facie case to be met, the Commissioner may request additional details. If the government institution fails to provide the additional details, the Commissioner may do one or both of the following, pursuant to subsection 54(2) of FOIP:

      • Summon and enforce the appearance of any person, including employees of a government institution, before the Commissioner and compel them to give oral and/or written evidence under oath or affirmation and produce any documents required.
      • Seek an order from the Court of King’s Bench for production of the records from the government institution.
      Case-by-Case Privilege

      Case-by-case privilege is a privilege found by a decision-maker to exist for information in a particular case.956 In each case, the decision-maker must determine whether the public interest favours disclosure or non-disclosure of the record.957

      In order to determine if case-by-case privilege applies, the government institution must determine if the records at issue are “private records” or “Crown records”. If the records at issue are “private records, one must apply the Wigmore test to determine if the case-by-case privilege applies. If the records at issue are “Crown records”, then one must apply the criteria for public interest immunity.958

      Private records are third party records not in the hands of the Crown.959

      Crown records are records containing information relating to government activities or operations, and decisions at the highest level of government.960

      When determining whether records are private records or Crown records, what matters is whose information it is, not necessarily who is in possession of the records.961 Wigmore test is a four-part test set out by Wigmore in Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 8 (McNaughton rev.) (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1961), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Slavutych v. Baker et al., 1975 CanLII 5 (SCC), [1976] 1 SCR 254. If the records are private records, the Wigmore test should be applied. The four fundamental conditions necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications are:

      1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
      2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
      3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
      4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.962

      Public interest immunity – If the records are Crown records, the criteria for public interest immunity should be applied. The Crown must put forth a proper claim based on the criteria for public interest immunity. The criteria are as follows:

      1. The nature of the policy concerned
      2. The particular contents of the documents
      3. The level of the decision-making process
      4. The time when a document or information is to be revealed
      5. The importance of producing the documents in the administration of justice, with particular consideration to:
        • The importance of the case.
        • The need or desirability of producing the documents to ensure that it can be adequately and fairly represented.
        • The ability to ensure that only the particular facts relating to the case are revealed.

      6. Any allegation of improper conduct by the executive branch towards a citizen.963

      Common Interest Privilege

      Common interest privilege is a privilege that exists when records are provided among parties where several parties have a common interest in anticipated litigation;964

      Disclosure of privileged information to outsiders generally constitutes as a waiver of privilege. However, if there is a sharing of information between parties where the parties have a sufficient “common interest”, then the privilege is preserved (or not waived).

      The following two-part test can be applied when determining if common interest privilege applies:965

      1. Does the record contain information that is subject to any privilege that is available at law?

      The information at issue must be inherently privileged in that it must have arisen in such a way that it meets the definition of solicitor-client privilege under subsection 22(a) of FOIP.

      2. Do the parties who share the information have a “common interest”, but not necessarily an identical interest, in the information?

      In Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer (No. 3), [1980 3 All E.R. 475 (C.A), Lord Denning provided that “common interest” privilege is a type of litigation privilege. Lord Denning said:

      There is a privilege which may be called a “common interest” privilege. That is a privilege in aid of anticipated litigation in which several persons have a common interest. It often happens in litigation that a plaintiff or defendant has other persons standing alongside him – who have the self-same interest as he – and who have consulted lawyers on the self-same points as he – but these others have not been made parties to the action. Maybe for economy or for simplicity or what you will. All exchange counsel’s opinions. All collect information for the purpose of litigation. All make copies. All await the outcome with the same anxious anticipation – because it affects each as much as it does the others. Instances come readily to mind. Owners of adjoining houses complain of a nuisance which affects them both equally. Both take legal advice. Both exchange relevant documents. But only one is a plaintiff. An author writes a book and gets it published. It is said to contain a libel or to be an infringement of copyright. Both author and publisher take legal advice. Both exchange documents. But only one is made a defendant.

      In all such cases I think the courts should – for the purposes of discovery – treat all the persons interested as if they were partners in a single firm or departments in a single company. Each can avail himself of the privilege in aid of litigation. Each can collect information for the use of his or the other’s legal adviser. Each can hold originals and each make copies. And so forth. All are the subject of the privilege in aid of anticipated litigation, even though it should transpire that, when the litigation is afterwards commenced, only one of them is made a party to it. No matter that one has the originals and the other has the copies. All are privileged.

      In contrast, in Maximum Ventures Inc. V. De Graaf, 2007 BCCA 510 (CanLII), the British Columbia Court of Appeal provided that common interest privilege may exist even where there is no litigation in existence or contemplated.

      [14] Recent jurisprudence has generally placed an increased emphasis on the protection from disclosure of solicitor-client communications, including those shared in furtherance of a common commercial interest. In the instant case the McEwan draft was produced within the recognized solicitor-client privileged relationship. The common interest privilege issues arise in response to a plea of waiver of that privilege. The common interest privilege is an extension of the privilege attached to that relationship. The issue turns on whether the disclosures were intended to be in confidence and the third parties involved had a sufficient common interest with the client to support extension of the privilege to disclosure to them. In my view, the ambit of the common interest privilege is aptly summarized in the Sopinka on evidence 2d ed., Supp. of 2004 @ p. 133 which cites the case of Pitney Bowes of Canada Ltd. V. Canada (2003), 225 D.LR. (4th) 747, 2003 FCT 214 quoted by the chambers judge at para. 31 of his reasons. Where legal opinions are shared by parties with mutual interests in commercial transactions, there is a sufficient interest in common to extend the common interest privilege to disclosure of opinions obtained by one of them to the others within the group, even in circumstances where no litigation is in existence or contemplated.

      [Emphasis added]

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 298-2019, the Commissioner considered common interest privilege. The Saskatoon Board of Police Commissioners (Board) asserted that common interest privilege applied. Upon review, the Commissioner established the two-part test and found that there was a common interest privilege between the Board and the Saskatoon Police Service members. Furthermore, that the sharing of the records did not constitute a waiver of the solicitor-client privilege that applied to the records.

      Legislative Privilege

      Legislative privilege (also known as parliamentary privilege) is a unique class privilege that extends to members of the Legislative Assembly immunity to do their legislative work.966 It has been defined as “the sum of the privileges, immunities and powers enjoyed by the Senate, the House of Commons and provincial legislative assemblies, and by each member individually, without which they could not discharge their functions.”967

      Legislative bodies in Canada have inherent parliamentary privileges which flow from their nature and function in a Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. By shielding some areas of legislative activity from external review, parliamentary privilege helps preserve the separation of powers. It grants the legislative branch of government the autonomy it requires to perform its constitutional functions. Parliamentary privilege also plays an important role in our democratic tradition because it ensures that elected representatives have the freedom to vigorously debate laws and to hold the executive to account. However, inherent privileges are limited to those which are necessary for legislative bodies to fulfill their constitutional functions.968

      The reach of inherent privilege extends only so far as is “necessary to protect legislators in the discharge of their legislative and deliberative functions, and the legislative assembly’s work in holding the government to account for the conduct of the country’s business”.969

      In order to fall within the scope of legislative privilege, the matter at issue must meet the necessity test. The test requires that to qualify it must be “so closely and directly connected with the fulfillment by the assembly or its members of their functions as a legislative and deliberative body…that outside interference would undermine the level of autonomy required to enable the assembly and its members to do their work with dignity and efficiency”.970

      Examples of areas previously considered subject to legislative privilege include:

      • Immunity of members of the legislative assembly for their speech insofar as it relates to their mandate.
      • The legislative assembly’s autonomy in controlling its debates or proceedings.
      • Its power to exclude strangers from proceedings.
      • Immunity of members from subpoenas during a legislative session.
      • Its authority to discipline its members as well as non-members who interfere with the discharge of legislative duties.971

      The party seeking to rely on legislative privilege bears the burden of proof in establishing its necessity. It must demonstrate that the scope of the protection it claims is necessary in light of the purposes of legislative privilege.972

      ‌Legislative privilege does not apply to the management of security guards. The privilege to exclude strangers does not protect the decision to dismiss employees.973

      ‌Litigation Privilege

      Litigation privilege is the non-disclosure protection imposed on documents and/or records, which come into existence after litigation commenced or in contemplation, and where they have been made with a view to such litigation.974

      The purpose of litigation privilege is to create a “zone of privacy” in relation to pending or apprehended litigation.975 To achieve its purpose, parties to litigation, represented or not, must be left to prepare their contending positions in private, without adversarial interference and without fear of premature disclosure.976

      Conceptually distinct from solicitor-client privilege, litigation privilege differs in at least three respects:

      1. Solicitor-client privilege protects a relationship, litigation privilege protects the efficacy of the adversarial process;
      2. Solicitor-client privilege is permanent; litigation privilege is time-limited and expires with the end of the litigation in question; and
      3. Unlike solicitor-client privilege, litigation privilege applies to unrepresented parties and non-confidential documents.977

      Litigation privilege aims to facilitate a process (namely, the adversary process), while solicitor-client privilege aims to protect a relationship (namely, the confidential relationship between a lawyer and a client).978

      The following two-part test can be applied:979

      1. Has the record or information been prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation?

      Litigation privilege attaches to documents created for the dominant purpose of litigation.980

      The dominant purpose for creating or obtaining the record must be to decide whether to initiate, or to prepare for, litigation. It cannot be standard operational procedure to prepare such records for various reasons, only one of which is to prepare for litigation.981

      A self-represented litigant is no less in need of, and therefore entitled to, a “zone” or “chamber” of privacy.982

      Papers and materials created or obtained especially for the lawyer’s brief for litigation, whether existing or contemplated are privileged.983

      A claim of litigation privilege will not be made out simply because litigation support is one of the purposes of a document’s preparation, even if it is a substantial purpose. Litigation must be the dominant purpose in order for litigation privilege to exist.984

      Litigation privilege is a class privilege. Documents which fall into that class (i.e., those whose dominant purpose is preparation for litigation) will be protected by immunity from disclosure unless an exception applies. The exceptions include those which apply to solicitor-client privilege (i.e., criminal communications, innocence of an accused person, and public safety).985

      Examples of litigation privilege records include:

      • Correspondence between counsel and the client(s).
      • Documents relevant to the issues pleaded in the lawsuit that were produced by the parties.
      • Witness statements.
      • Letters retaining experts or commenting on their reports.
      • Research memoranda and legal authorities.
      • Annotations on records written by the litigator.
      • Miscellaneous public documents such as newspaper clippings, press releases and investigator’s reports.986

      2. Is the litigation ongoing or anticipated?

      Litigation must be ongoing, or there must be a reasonable expectation of litigation (e.g., the litigator has been notified that he or she will be served with notification of litigation). The litigation cannot be a mere vague anticipation or possibility.987

      Once the litigation has ended, the privilege to which it gave rise has lost its specific and concrete purpose – and therefore its justification.988 The privilege may retain its purpose and its effect where the litigation that gave rise to the privilege has ended, but related litigation remains pending or may reasonably be apprehended. This enlarged definition of litigation includes separate proceedings that involve the same or related parties and arise from the same or a related cause of action or juridical source. Proceedings that raise issues common to the initial action and share its essential purpose would qualify as well.989

      The point in time a grievance is filed, “litigation” has commenced for the purposes of litigation privilege. Grievance arbitration proceedings qualify as litigation. They are adversarial in nature. Litigation encompasses the continuum from the filing of the grievance to the arbitration hearing.990

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 005-2017, 214-2015 – Part II, the Commissioner considered litigation privilege. The Saskatchewan Health Authority (SHA) asserted that litigation privilege applied to some of the records requested. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records were prepared for the purpose of litigation and that litigation was ongoing between the SHA and the applicant.

      Process During a Review by IPC

      In the wake of The University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34, the IPC revised its procedures in relation to government institutions asserting litigation privilege over responsive records.

      For more on the procedures see, Part 9: Solicitor-Client or Litigation Privilege in The Rules of Procedures. In addition, see the Commissioner’s blog, Solicitor-Client Privilege/Litigation Privilege.

      Ordering Production of Litigation Privileged Records

      Powers of commissioner

      54(1) Notwithstanding any other Act or any privilege that is available at law, the commissioner may, in a review:

      (a) require to be produced and examine any record that is in the possession or under the control of a government institution; and

      (b) enter and inspect any premises occupied by a government institution.

      (2) For the purposes of conducting a review, the commissioner may summon and enforce the appearance of persons before the commissioner and compel them:

      (a) to give oral or written evidence on oath or affirmation; and

      (b) to produce any document or things;

      that the commissioner considers necessary for a full review, in the same manner and to the same extent as the court.

      (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the commissioner may administer an oath or affirmation.

      In Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 860, Lamer J., on behalf of a unanimous Court, formulated four substantive rules to apply when communications between solicitor and client are likely to be disclosed without the client’s consent. The third substantive rule is relevant for the topic of production of solicitor-client or litigation records in an IPC Review. Rule number three reads as follows:

      3. When the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the circumstances of the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the decision to do so and the choice of means of exercising that authority should be determined with a view to not interfering with it except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation.

      What this means is that the Commissioner will not interfere with the confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client “except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation [i.e., FOIP]”.

      While the courts have said that solicitor-client privilege must remain as close to absolute as possible, it is not absolute. It can be limited or abrogated by statute. A statute purporting to limit or abrogate the privilege must be interpreted restrictively.

      The Commissioner has the power, under section 54 of FOIP, to order production of records over which solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege is claimed.991 The Commissioner exercises this authority cautiously and with restraint given the clear direction by the courts that a reviewing body’s decision to examine privileged documents must never be made lightly or as a matter of course.992

      Therefore, given the importance of solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege, and to minimally infringe on these privileges, the Commissioner will only order production of records being withheld under solicitor-client or litigation privilege pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP when it is absolutely necessary to decide the issues in dispute. Absolutely necessary is as restrictive a test as may be formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case.993

      As to when it would be appropriate to order production of records withheld under the solicitor-client or litigation privilege provision at subsection 22(a) of FOIP, the Commissioner will exercise discretion in the following circumstances:

      • Where there is some evidence that the party claiming privilege has done so ‘falsely” or inappropriately.994
      • When the party claiming privilege fails to respond to a reasonable request by the Commissioner for additional information.995

      A naked “trust me” that the records in dispute are subject to solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege is not sufficient from the government institution when making the case that subsection 22(a) of FOIP applies.996In a review, the Commissioner requests copies of records in order to conduct the review and determine whether exemptions have been appropriately applied. This includes requesting records which a government institution may have claimed solicitor-client privilege or litigation privilege over pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP. The government institution may choose to make a “prima facie” case of solicitor-client or litigation privilege for those records pursuant to subsection 22(a) of FOIP. If it does so, it must still meet the “burden of proof” in demonstrating that subsection 22(a) of FOIP applies as required by section 60 of FOIP (see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 2, “Administration of FOIP” for more on the burden of proof).

      Prima facie means at first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information. A ‘prima facie case’ is where a party produces enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor .997 prima facie case can be made to the Commissioner without providing a copy of the records but only for records that may be subject to solicitor-client and litigation privilege. All other records must be provided in the course of a review. If making a prima facie case, the Commissioner will need the following from the government institution if claiming litigation privilege for subsection 22(a) of FOIP:

      • An affidavit of documents which includes an Index of Records (Schedule) that includes:
        • Sufficient detail to identify the document and allow the Commissioner to determine whether a prima facie case for the claim of litigation privilege has been made. It should include:
          • A description of the litigation.
          • The dates of the litigation.
          • A description of the party to whom the correspondence is written to, or received from, or at least a description of the role of the party (such as medical expert, potential witness, client).
          • A description of an enclosure where relevant.
          • Some particulars as to the purpose of the document.998

      For more on what the Commissioner requires, see Part 9: Solicitor-Client or Litigation Privilege in the Rules of Procedure.

      If the government institution provides less than what is needed for a prima facie case to be met, the Commissioner may request additional details. If the government institution fails to provide the additional details, the Commissioner may do one or both of the following, pursuant to subsection 54(2) of FOIP:

      • Summon and enforce the appearance of any person, including employees of a government institution, before the Commissioner and compel them to give oral and/or written evidence under oath or affirmation and produce any documents required.
      • ‌Seek an order from the Court of King’s Bench for production of the records from the government institution.
      Settlement Privilege

      Settlement privilege is privilege that applies to the discussions leading up to a resolution of a dispute in the face of litigation. It promotes the settlement of lawsuits.999

      The purpose of settlement privilege is to promote settlement by allowing parties to negotiate without fear that the concessions they offer, and the information they provide, will be used against them in subsequent proceedings.1000

      The rule is that communications and documents exchanged by parties as they try to settle a dispute cannot be used in subsequent proceedings, whether or not a settlement is reached. The privilege applies not only to communications involving offers of settlement, but also to communications that are reasonably connected to the parties’ negotiations.1001

      If settlement privilege is established, it belongs to both parties and cannot be unilaterally waived.1002

      The existence of the privilege is determined by the following three-part test:1003

      1. Is there the existence or contemplation of a litigious dispute?

      The litigious dispute requirement is satisfied where parties are in a dispute or negotiation, even if they have not commenced legal proceedings.1004

      However, settlement privilege does not apply where parties are simply negotiating the terms of a commercial contract. This because, without having entered into a contract, there are no legal obligations between the parties that could form the basis for a litigious dispute.1005

      2. Were the communications made with the intention they remain confidential if negotiations failed?

      The context and the substance of the communications can assist in this determination.

      3. Was the purpose of the communications to achieve a settlement?

      The context and the substance of the communications can assist in this determination.

      Subsection 22(b)

      Solicitor-client privilege

      22 A head may refuse to give access to a record that:

      (b) was prepared by or for an agent of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or legal counsel for a government institution in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel;

      Subsection 22(b) is a discretionary, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record was prepared by or for legal counsel (or an agent of the Attorney General) for a government institution in relation to the provision of advice or services by legal counsel (or an agent of the Attorney General). This provision is broader in scope than subsection 22(a).

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Were the records “prepared by or for” an agent or legal counsel for a government institution?

      The record must be “prepared”, as the term is understood, in relation to the advice or services or compiled or created for the purpose of providing the advice or services.

      Prepared means to be made ready for use or consideration.1006

      By or for means the person preparing the record must be either the person providing the legal advice or legal service or a person who is preparing the record in question on behalf of, or, for the use of, the provider of legal advice or legal related services.1007

      An agent of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan can include public prosecutions at the Ministry of Justice.1008

      Attorney General, in this context, is the chief law officer of Saskatchewan responsible for advising the government on legal matters and representing it in litigation.1009

      For FOIP, a government institution can capture any government institution and not just the one applying the exemption (i.e. by the use of “a” government institution rather than “the”).

      2. Were the records prepared in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel?

      In relation to has been found to have a similar meaning as “in respect of”. It was considered in Nowegijick v. The Queen:

      The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as “in relation to”, “with reference to” or “in connection with”. The phrase “in respect of” is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject-matters.1010

      Legal advice includes a legal opinion about a legal issue, and a recommended course of action, based on legal considerations, regarding a matter with legal implications.1011

      Legal service includes any law-related service performed by a person engaged by a government institution and who is licenced to practice law.1012

      The government institution should explain how the record relates to a matter involving legal advice or legal services provided by its legal counsel.

      Subsection 22(c)

      Solicitor-client privilege

      22 A head may refuse to give access to a record that:

      (c) contains correspondence between an agent of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan or legal counsel for a government institution and any other person in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel.

      Subsection 22(c) of FOIP is a discretionary class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains correspondence between the government institution’s legal counsel (or an agent of the Attorney General) and any other person in relation to a matter that involves the provision of advice or services by legal counsel (or an agent of the Attorney General). This provision is broader in scope than subsection 22(a) of FOIP.

      Subsection 22(c) of FOIP is intended to allow parties to correspond freely in relation to matters about which they need to speak in order to allow the lawyer’s advice or services to be provided.1013

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record a correspondence between the government institution’s legal counsel (or an agent of the Attorney General) and any other person?

      Correspondence means letters sent or received.1014 It is an interchange of written communication.1015

      A memorandum or note from one employee of a government institution to another summarizing a conversation between that employee and the government institution’s lawyer may meet the criteria for this provision.1016

      Agent means someone who is authorized to act for or in place of another.1017

      Attorney General, in this context, is the chief law officer of Saskatchewan responsible for advising the government on legal matters and representing it in litigation.1018

      Any other person was an intentional and inclusive phrase to capture just that – any other person. The government institution must make it sufficiently clear, as to what the nature of that other person’s role in the correspondence was.1019

      2. Does the correspondence relate to a matter that involves the provision of advice or other services by the agent or legal counsel?

      In relation to has been found to have a similar meaning as “in respect of”. It was considered in Nowegijick v. The Queen:

      The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as “in relation to”, “with reference to” or “in connection with”. The phrase “in respect of” is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject-matters.1020

      Legal advice includes a legal opinion about a legal issue, and a recommended course of action, based on legal considerations, regarding a matter with legal implications.1021

      Legal service includes any law-related service performed by a person engaged by a government institution and who is licensed to practice law.1022

      The government institution should explain how the correspondence relates to a matter involving advice or other services provided by legal counsel.

      Subsection 23: Confidentiality Provisions in Other Enactments

      The situation can arise that the council of a municipality may commission a report from a third party to investigate and report on a matter. As long as that report is not with respect to a legal issue from a lawyer retained by the board, section 117 of the Municipalities Act, S.S. 2005, c.M-36.1, as amended, provides that report is a public report. Section 117 provides as follows:

      Inspection of municipal documents

      117(1) Any person is entitled at any time during regular business hours to inspect and obtain copies of:

      (a) any report of any consultant engaged by or of any employee of the municipality, or of any committee or other body established by a council, after the report has been submitted to the council, except any opinion or report of a lawyer;

      If a council contracts with a third party consultant to investigate and report on a “code of ethics” investigation involving an allegation of unethical conduct on the part of the mayor, access to that report is informed by section 117(1) of the Municipalities Act, and sections 15, 16, 21, and 22 of LA FOIP are inapplicable, as long as the third party consultant is not a solicitor giving legal advice.1023 The report must be severed appropriately, however, in order to respect provision of s.29(1) of FOIP so that the personal information of any contributors to the report, including their names, are appropriately severed.

      Subsection 29(1): Disclosure of Personal Information

      Disclosure of Personal Information

      29(1) No government institution shall disclose personal information in its possession or under its control without the consent, given in the prescribed manner, of the individual to whom the information relates except in accordance with this section or section 30.

      Subsection 29(1) of FOIP protects the privacy of individuals whose personal information may be contained within records responsive to an access to information request made by someone else.

      Subsection 29(1) of FOIP requires a government institution to have the consent of the individual whose personal information is in the record prior to disclosing it.

      When dealing with information in a record that appears to be personal information, the first step is to confirm the information indeed qualifies as personal information pursuant to section 24 of FOIP. For more on what constitutes personal information, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy” for a detailed explanation of section 24 of FOIP and the definition of personal information.

      Once confirmed as personal information, the government institution needs to determine if getting consent from the individual is reasonable. There may be circumstances where getting consent is possible. However, in some circumstances it may not be reasonable to do so. For example, in a general ledger statement there may be some entries that relate to individuals including their names along with a listing of credit or debit amounts. This information would reveal the financial history of these individuals and as such, would be covered by subsection 23(1)(j) of LA FOIP and properly withheld pursuant to section 29(1).1024

      Reasonable means what is fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; sensible.1025

      The consent must be in writing pursuant to section 18 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations (FOIP Regulations). Section 18 of the FOIP Regulations has a number of requirements in terms of the consent gathered. This includes that the consent:

      • Relate to the purpose for which the information is required;
      • Be informed;
      • Be given voluntarily; and
      • Not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or coercion.

      Without consent, personal information cannot be released unless one of the provisions under subsection 29(2) of FOIP applies. For more on subsection 29(2) of FOIP, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”. Releasing personal information without proper authority could constitute a breach of privacy.

      Section 30: Personal Information of Deceased Individual

      Personal information of deceased individual

      30(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to any other Act, the personal information of a deceased individual shall not be disclosed until 25 years after the death of the individual.

      (2) Where, in the opinion of the head, disclosure of the personal information of a deceased individual to the individual’s next of kin would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy, the head may disclose that personal information before 25 years have elapsed after the individual’s death.

      Subsection 30(1)

      Personal information of deceased individual

      30(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to any other Act, the personal information of a deceased individual shall not be disclosed until 25 years after the death of the individual.

      Subsection 30(1) of FOIP provides that the personal information of a deceased individual cannot be disclosed until 25 years after the death of the individual.

      When considering the application of this provision, government institutions should also consider whether section 59 of FOIP (Exercise of rights by other persons) has any application in the circumstances. In some instances, personal representatives may be exercising a right or power as it relates to the administration of the individual’s estate. Furthermore, there may be written authorization from the individual prior to death (see subsection 59(e) of FOIP). For more on section 59 of FOIP, see Exercise of Rights by Authorized Representatives in the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records”.1026

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 098-2015, the Commissioner considered section 30(1) of FOIP. An applicant had requested records from Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) related to a son’s auto claim file. The son was deceased. SGI responded to the applicant providing partial access to records and withholding others pursuant to several provisions in FOIP including section 30. Upon review, the Commissioner found that based on evidence provided by the applicant, the applicant was the duly appointed administrator of the son’s estate. As such, the applicant qualified as the personal representative for purposes of subsection 59(a) of FOIP. In order for the personal representative to access the personal information, it must relate to the administration of the estate. The Commissioner found that the information related to the administration of the son’s estate because the information appeared to relate to the adjudication of the son’s auto claim. The Commissioner recommended the personal information of the applicant’s son be released to the applicant.

      Subsection 30(2)

      Personal information of deceased individual

      30(2) Where, in the opinion of the head, disclosure of the personal information of a deceased individual to the individual’s next of kin would not constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy, the head may disclose that personal information before 25 years have elapsed after the individual’s death.

      Subsection 30(2) of FOIP provides discretion on the head to disclose the personal information of a deceased individual before 25 years after death to the individual’s next of kin where it is deemed not to constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy.

      Next of kin is a person’s nearest relative by blood or marriage which could include: a cousin, grandparent, niece or nephew, who has close ties to the individual who is deceased. For example:

      • Spouse, parent, child
      • Cousins brought up together as siblings
      • A grandchild brought up by grandparents1027

      FOIP does not define what constitutes an “unreasonable invasion of privacy”. However, other jurisdictions in Canada have what constitutes an unreasonable invasion of privacy built into its privacy legislation.

      Section 31: Access to Personal Information

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(1) Subject to Part III and subsection (2), an individual whose personal information is contained in a record in the possession or under the control of a government institution has a right to, and:

      (a) on an application made in accordance with Part II; and

      (b) on giving sufficient proof of his or her identity; shall be given access to the record.

      (2) A head may refuse to disclose to an individual personal information that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of government contracts and other benefits, where the information is provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence.

      This section can also be found in the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records” and Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy.” It is reproduced here for ease of access.

      Subsection 31(1)

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(1) Subject to Part III and subsection (2), an individual whose personal information is contained in a record in the possession or under the control of a government institution has a right to, and:

      (a) on an application made in accordance with Part II; and

      (b) on giving sufficient proof of his or her identity; shall be given access to the record.

      Subsection 31(1) of FOIP provides that upon application an individual is entitled to their own personal information contained within a record unless an exemption applies under Part III or subsection 31(2) of FOIP applies.

      Government institutions should interpret the exemptions to this right to personal information with a view to giving an individual as much access as possible.

      Records containing personal information may be very sensitive in nature, so care must be taken to ensure that proper safeguards are in place when these types of records are released. When providing an applicant with access to personal information, a government institution must be satisfied that the individual receiving the information is indeed the individual that the information is about or a duly appointed representative of that person.1028 For more on duly appointed representatives, see the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3, “Access to Records”, at Exercise of Rights by Authorized Representatives.1029

      For more information on verifying the identity of the applicant, the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch issued the resource, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant. It provides helpful direction on steps to take to verify identity.

      Subsection 31(2)

      Individual’s access to personal information

      31(2) A head may refuse to disclose to an individual personal information that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of governmen contracts and other benefits, where the information is provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence.

      Subsection 31(2) of FOIP enables the head to refuse to disclose to individuals, personal information that is evaluative or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of government contracts and other benefits.

      The provision attempts to address two competing interests: the right of an individual to have access to his or her personal information and the need to protect the flow of frank information to government institutions so that appropriate decisions can be made respecting the awarding of jobs, contracts and other benefits.1030

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1.Is the information personal information that is evaluative or opinion material?

      To qualify as personal information, the information must be about an identifiable individual and must be personal in nature. Some examples are provided in subsection 24(1) of FOIP. See Section 24 in the Guide to FOIP, Chapter 6, “Protection of Privacy”.

      Evaluative means to have assessed, appraised, to have found or to have stated the number of.1031

      Opinion material is a belief or assessment based on grounds short of proof; a view held as probable for example, a belief that a person would be a suitable employee, based on that person’s employment history. An opinion is subjective in nature and may or may not be based on facts.1032

      2. Was the personal information compiled solely for one of the enumerated purposes?

      Compiled means that the information was drawn from several sources or extracted, extrapolated, calculated or in some other way manipulated.1033

      The enumerated purposes are:

      • For determining the individual’s suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for employment.
      • For the awarding of contracts with the government institution.
      • For awarding other benefits.

      Suitability means right or appropriate for a particular person, purpose or situation.1034

      Eligibility means fit and proper to be selected or to receive a benefit; legally qualified for an office, privilege or status.1035

      Qualifications means the possession of qualities or properties inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for apposition or office, or to perform a public duty or function.1036

      Employment means the selection for a position as an employee of a government institution.1037

      Employment reference means personal information that is evaluative, or opinion material compiled solely for the purpose of describing an individual’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment.1038

      Award means to give or to order to be given as a payment, compensation or prize; to grant; to assign.1039

      Benefit means a favourable or helpful factor or circumstance; advantage, profit.1040 Other benefits refer to benefits conferred by a government institution through an evaluative process. The term includes research grants, scholarships and prizes. It also includes appointments required for employment in a particular job or profession such as a bailiff or special constable.1041

      Employee of a government institution means an individual employed by a government institution and includes an individual retained under a contract to perform services for the government institution.1042

      The personal information must have been compiled solely for one of the enumerated purposes to qualify.

      3. Was the personal information provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence?

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information provided in confidence means that the supplier of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.1043 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the party providing the information.1044

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.1045

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was provided on the understanding that it would be kept confidential.1046

      Factors considered when determining whether a document was provided in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the party providing it or by the government institution.1047
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the party providing it and the government institution from the point at which it was provided until the present time.1048
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.1049
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records or information such as that in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence. Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the party providing it both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was provided. If one party intended the information to be kept confidential but the other did not, the information is not considered to have been provided in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist.1050

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was provided implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.1051

      Factors to consider when determining if a document was provided in confidence explicitlyinclude (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the party providing it.1052
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be provided in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions to the party prior to the information being provided.1053

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      Two cases came before the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan dealing with the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [see s. 30(2)]. Those two cases are as follows:

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report LA-2004-001, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The review involved Lloydminster Public School Division (Division). An applicant requested access to records related to the applicant’s suitability for volunteering in after-school sport activities. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the evaluative or opinion material was not compiled for the purpose of determining the applicant’s suitability, eligibility or qualifications for employment or for the awarding of a contract or other benefit. It was compiled for the purpose of determining the suitability of a volunteer to engage in “volunteer” activity in an after-hours sports program. The Commissioner found that a volunteer does not meet the definition of “employee” of a local authority. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 30(2) of LA FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 258-2016, the Commissioner found that the name of the individual giving the opinion was also captured by the provision. The purpose and intent of the provision is to allow individuals to provide frank feedback where there is an evaluation process occurring. In addition, evaluating suitability for employment can take place not only during the hiring process but also during an employee’s tenure. Furthermore, the provision can include unsolicited records such as letters of concern or complaint (Fogal v. Regina School Division No. 4, (2002)).

      In Review Report 010-2018, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The review involved the South East Cornerstone Public School Division #209 (Cornerstone). An applicant was seeking parental complaints and witness statements regarding an incident. Cornerstone withheld the records pursuant to several provisions in LA FOIP including subsection 30(2) of LA FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records contained personal information that was evaluative or opinion material. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the personal information was compiled solely for the purpose of determining the applicant’s suitability for employment. Finally, the Commissioner found that the interview notes were provided explicitly in confidence. However, the written complaints were not provided implicitly or explicitly in confidence. The Commissioner recommended that Cornerstone sever the opinions and other personal information of individuals other than the applicant and release the rest.

      In Review Report 142-2022, the Commissioner considered a denial of access involving the Ministry of Social Services (Social Services). Social Services withheld portions of the record totaling 255 pages. It applied subsection 31(2) of FOIP to portions of the records. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the assessment information collected on the applicant was for the enumerated purpose of determining eligibility to an income program offered by Social Services. The assessment information contained the comments of the assessor. However, the Commissioner found that Social Services did not demonstrate that the scores on the assessment were provided explicitly or implicitly in confidence. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 31(2) of FOIP did not apply.

       


      1 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [17]. See also section 2-10 of The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2.

      2 Driedger, E. 1983 Construction of Statutes, 2nd Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann at p. 105.

      ‌3 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at subsection 2-10.

      4 Singleton v. Canada, [2002] 2 SCR 1046, 2001 SCC 61 (CanLII) at [68]. Also see Northern Thunderbird Air Ltd. v. Royal Oak & Kemess Mines Inc., 2002 BCCA 58 (CanLII) at [19].

      5 Merck Frosst Canada (Minister of National Health), 2000 CanLII 16042 (FC) at [13].

      6 Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at [27].

      7 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [95] and Corporate Express Canada Inc. v Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2015 NLCA 52 (CanLII) at [20]. 8 General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance [1993] S.J. No. 601 at [11], Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC) Review Report F-2006-001 at [11].

      9 Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy in Canadian Democracy, May 5, 2009, also cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-002 at [44].

      10 Also cited in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [18].

      11 Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018, May 21, 2019 at [15].

      12 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Resource, Strengthening the Access to Information Act, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/atia-lai/p5.html, accessed June 7, 2019.

      13 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Resource, Strengthening the Access to Information Act, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/atia-lai/p5.html, accessed June 7, 2019.

      14 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Resource, Strengthening the Access to Information Act, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/atia-lai/p5.html, accessed June 7, 2019. 15 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Resource, Strengthening the Access to Information Act, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/atia-lai/p5.html, accessed June 7, 2019. 16 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-30.

      17 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-30.

      18 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [52]. Cited in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2007-001 at [58].

      19 Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23 at [66].

      20 SK OIPC Resource, Dictionary: Terms & Phrases in FOIP, LA FOIP & HIPA at p. 15.

      21 Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23 at [46].

      ‌22 SK OIPC Review Report 305-2016 at [35], Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Resource, Access to Information and Privacy, Process and Compliance Manual at pp. 62 and 63.

      ‌23 SK OIPC Investigation Report LA-2010-001 at [36], SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-001 at [69], F-2014-001 at [66].

      ‌24 Referenced in SK OIPC Review Report 305-2016 at [36].

      25 Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23 at [71], referenced in SK OIPC Review Report 305-2016 at [37]. The Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioners of British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario have also relied on these four factors.

      26 Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23 at [68] to [74]. Referenced in the Office of the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BC IPC) Decision F10-08 at [41].

      ‌27 SK OIPC Review Report 305-2016 at [38].

      28 Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Resource, Strengthening the Access to Information Act, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/atip-aiprp/atia-lai/p5.html, accessed June 7, 2019. 29 Office of the Newfoundland and Labrador Information and Privacy Commissioner (NFLD IPC), Resource, Guidelines for Public Interest Override at pp. 2 and 3.

      30 NFLD IPC Resource, Guidelines for Public Interest Override at pp. 2 and 3.

      ‌31 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [23] and [32].

      32 Originated from Campbell Black, Henry, 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West GroupAdopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      33 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [46] and [47].

      34 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 727, (Oxford University Press), Cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      35 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104, SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌36 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌37 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49]; ON IPC Orders PO-

      2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      38 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [25].

      ‌39 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-

      2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌40 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; Office of the Nova Scotia Information and Privacy Commissioner (NS IPC) Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; Office of the Prince Edward Island Information and Privacy Commissioner (PEI IPC) Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌41 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌42 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      43 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌44 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      45 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌46 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order

      03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌47 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      ‌48 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      49 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 380.

      50 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1301, relied on in part in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII) at [69] and [72]; cited in part in SK OIPC Investigation Report LA-2012-001 at [14] to [17].

      51 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 208.

      52 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 164.

      53 Originated from Campbell Black, Henry, 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West GroupAdopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      54 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [46] and [47].

      55 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed. at p. 727, (Oxford University Press), Cited in Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      56 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      57 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌58 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49]; ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      59 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [25].

      ‌60 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌61 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌62 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌63 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      64Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌65 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      66 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌67 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌68 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25]. 

      69 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      70 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 380.

      71 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1301, relied on in part in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII) at [69] and [72], cited in part in Investigation Report LA-2012-001 at [14] to [17].

      72 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 208.

      73 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 164.

      74 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 162.

      75 Originated from Campbell Black, Henry, 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West GroupAdopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      76 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [46] and [47].

      77 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 727, (Oxford University Press); Cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      78 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌79 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌80 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49]; ON IPC Orders PO-

      2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      81 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [25].

      ‌82 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-

      2013-002 at [49] and F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌83 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌84 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌85 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌86Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌87 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      88 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌89 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌90 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      ‌91 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      92 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 380.

      93 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1301. Relied on in part in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII) at [69] and [72], cited in part in Investigation Report LA-2012-001 at [14] to [17].

      94 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 208.

      95 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 164.

      96 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 727, (Oxford University Press), Cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      97 Originated from Campbell Black, Henry, 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West GroupAdopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      98 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 162.

      99 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [46] and [47].

      100 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌101 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌102 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49]; ON IPC Orders PO-

      ‌2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      103 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [25].

      ‌104 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌105 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌106 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌107 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌108Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌109 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      110 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌111 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌112 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      ‌113 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      114 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 380.

      115 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2004. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1301, relied on in part in Germain v. Automobile Injury Appeal Commission, 2009 SKQB 106 (CanLII) at [69] and [72], cited in part in Investigation Report LA-2012-001 at [14] to [17].

      116 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 208.

      117 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 164.

      118 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 727, (Oxford University Press), Cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      119 Originated from Campbell Black, Henry, 1990. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West GroupAdopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      120 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [46] and [47].

      121 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌122 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌123 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49]; ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌124 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌125 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌126 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌127 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      128 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌129 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      130 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌131 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order ‌03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24] and 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌132 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25]. 133 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      134 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 938.

      135 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      136 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 192.

      137 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford English Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 19, (Oxford University Press).

      138 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 162.

      139 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      140 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      141 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 192.

      142 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford English Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 19, (Oxford University Press).

      143 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      144 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 162.

      145 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      146 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      147 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      148 Stated in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [22].

      ‌149 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], F-2014-001 at [149].

      ‌150 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      151 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      152 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      153 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford English Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 19, (Oxford University Press).

      154 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 543.

      155 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      156 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      157 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      158 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      159 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      160 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      161 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1380.

      162 ON IPC Order PO-3424-I at [27].

      163 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1250.

      164 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 155.

      165 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      166 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      167 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, resource Access to Information: Policy and Procedures Manual, October 2017 at p. 130.

      168 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 154. Defines “Persons lawfully detained”.

      169 Government of Ontario, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Manual, Chapter 5: Exemptions and Exclusions, Law Enforcement. Available at https://www.ontario.ca/document/freedom-information-and-protection-privacy-manual/chapter-5-exemptions-and-exclusions. Accessed October 8, 2019.

      ‌170 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      171 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      172 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      173 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford English Dictionary10th Ed. at p. 19, (Oxford University Press).

      174 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 543.

      175 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      176 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      177 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      178 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      179 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      180 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 146.

      181 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1380.

      182 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1260.

      183 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, Subsection 83.01(b)(i)(A).

      184 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the ATIA, https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-16-law-enforcement-investigations-security, accessed on June 14, 2019. Definition relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [127].

      185 See subsection 2-29 of The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2.

      186 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the ATIA, https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-16-law-enforcement-investigations-security, accessed on June 14, 2019. Definition relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [127].

      187 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 645.

      ‌188 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      189 Adapted from definition of ‘harm’ in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 148.

      ‌190 First defined in SK OIPC Review Report 93/021 at p. 6. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-006 at [26] and F-2014-001 at [160].

      191 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [24].

      192 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [25].

      ‌193 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      194 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      195 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [24].

      196 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      ‌197SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      ‌198 SK OIPC Review Report 223-2016 at [36] to [37].

      199 Canada Evidence Act, RSC, 1985, c C-5, s. 30(12), Relied on in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [46].

      200 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Appendix 1: Definitions at p. 376, Part of the definition comes from Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1458, First adopted by SK OIPC in Review Report LA-2013-001 at [25] and [27], Affirmed in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [44] and [49].

      201 Park v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 306 at [65], Relied on in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [47], Also found in Review Reports LA-2013-001 at [23] to [31], LA-2014-004 at [15].

      202 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [58].

      203 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition, Revised, 2002, USA: Oxford University Press at p. 56.

      204 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      205 Adapted from definition of ‘harm’ in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 148.

      ‌206 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-001 at [32].

      ‌207 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-001 at [48].

      ‌208 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [121], 145-2015 at [13], 153-2015 at [61], 223-2015 and 224-2015 at [19].

      ‌209 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2014-004 at [15] and 153-2015 at [64].

      210 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [61], [66] and [68].

      211 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 57.

      212 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150, quoted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [183].

      213 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150, first adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [186].

      ‌214 SK OIPC Review Reports 2002/041 at [10] to [15], F-2014-001 at [187] and [196].

      ‌215 SK OIPC Review Reports 95/021 at p. 6, F-2014-001 at [190], [191] and [196]; NFLD IPC Review Report A-2008-005 at [33].

      216 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150, first adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [183] and [196], consistent with ON IPC Order P-999 at pp. 2 and 3. 217 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150.

      218 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1113.

      219 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150.

      220 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150.

      ‌221 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      222 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      ‌223 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      224 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150.

      225 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 150. See also British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌226 SK OIPC Review Reports 93/021 at pp. 7 and 8, 95/012 at p. 4, 2000/028 at [13], F-2014-001 at [218].

      ‌227 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      228 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      ‌229 First defined in SK OIPC Review Report 93/021 at p. 6. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-006 at [26] and F-2014-001 at [160].

      230 Definition from Newfoundland and Labrador’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1 at subsection 2(i), similar definition in Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter F.31 at subsection 2(1)(b), similar definition in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      231 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      232 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 145 and 151.

      233 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      234 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 950.

      235 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1458.

      236 Dukelow, Daphne A., The Dictionary of Canadian Law4th Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. 2011) at p. 1158.

      237 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      238 Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII) at [44].

      239 See Duke v. The Queen, [1972] SCR 917 CanLII 16 (SCC) at p. 921.

      240 Correctional Service of Canada, Canadian Bill of Rights 1960, at https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rht-drt/03-eng.shtml, accessed June 20, 2019.

      241 British Columbia and Ontario have similar provisions in their FOIP legislation.

      242 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      243 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1812.

      244 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 52.

      245 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 153.

      246 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 153.

      ‌247SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      248 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      249 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 743. Similar definition relied on in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at

      ‌p. 153.

      250 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

       

      251 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 153.

      252 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 901.

      253 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 SCR 835, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) at p. 841.

      254 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 SCR 835, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) at pp. 875 and 880. Also cited and relied on in ON IPC Order P-948 at p. 5. It is important to note that Ontario’s FOIP Act uses “could reasonably be expected to” for its equivalent provision (subsection 14(1)(f)). That threshold is higher than Saskatchewan’s subsection 15(1)(g) of FOIP.

      255 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 SCR 835, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) at p. 950. Also cited and relied on in ON IPC Order P-948 at p. 5. It is important to note that Ontario’s FOIP Act uses “could reasonably be expected to” for its equivalent provision (subsection 14(1)(f)). That threshold is higher than Saskatchewan’s subsection 15(1)(g) of FOIP.

      256 R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 SCR 670, 1988 CanLII 80 (SCC) at p. 693. Similar statements were made in Ex parte Telegraph Plc., [1993] 2 All E.R. 971 (C.A.) at p. 978 and Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 SCR 835, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) at p. 322 and R. V. MacDonnell, 1996 CanLII 5560 (NA CA) at p.3.

      257 Alberta’s FOIP Act has a similarly worded provision (subsection 20(1)(j)), however, it uses the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” which is a higher threshold than Saskatchewan’s subsection 15(1)(h). 258 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, resource Access to Information: Policy and Procedures Manual, October 2017 at p. 130.

      ‌259 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      260 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 734.

      261 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 685.

      262 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 154.

      263 Definition from Newfoundland and Labrador’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1 at subsection 2(i), similar definition in Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter F.31 at subsection 2(1)(b), similar definition in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      264 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      265 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 145 and 151.

      266 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      267 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 950.

      268 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1458.

      269 Dukelow, Daphne A., The Dictionary of Canadian Law4th Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. 2011) at p. 1158.

      270 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      271 Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII) at [44].

      ‌272 ON IPC Orders M-202 at p. 11, P-650 at p. 3, P-1492 at p. 5, NFLD IPC Review Report A-2009-003 at [31].

      ‌273 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      274 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      ‌275 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      276 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 734.

      277 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      278 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 154.

      ‌279 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      280 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1770.

      281 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 711.

      282 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 563.

      283 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1300.

      284 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 154.

      285 SK OIPC first considered this provision in Review Report F-2012-006. The matter was later appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench in Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII). In later reports, the SK OIPC adjusted the test from three to two parts. The test still encompasses the same questions.

      286 Definition from Newfoundland and Labrador’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c A-1.1 at subsection 2(i), similar definition in Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter F.31 at subsection 2(1)(b), similar definition used in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      287 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      288 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 145 and 151.

      289 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      290 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 950.

      291 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1458.

      292 Dukelow, Daphne A., The Dictionary of Canadian Law4th Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. 2011) at p. 1158.

      293 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 145.

      294 Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII) at [44].

      295 Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII) at [40].

      296 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [25].

      ‌297 SK OIPC Review Reports 1993-021 at p. 7, F-2012-006 at [89] and 139-2017 at [50].

      ‌298 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      299 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      300 Evenson v Saskatchewan (Ministry of Justice), 2013 SKQB 296 (CanLII) at [40] to [45].

      ‌301 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      302 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      303 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1058.

      304 The Legislation Act, S.S 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      ‌305 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      306 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 667.

      307 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 861.

      308 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador resource, Access to Information: Policy and Procedures Manual, October 2017 at p. 128.

      309 Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] 3 SCR 372, 2002 SCC 65 (CanLII) at [3] and [32]. See also SK

      ‌OIPC Review Report 220-2020 at [12] to [26].

      310 SK OIPC Review Report 004-2020 at [43].

      311 Sullivan, R. Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes 4th Edition (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) at p. 47.

      312 Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] 3 SCR 372, 2002 SCC 65 (CanLII) at [66].

      313 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 718.

      314 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 p. 153.

      315 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1302 and 1303.

      316 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      317 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      318 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      319 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 p. 153.

      320 AB IPC Order F2007-021 at [51]. Referenced in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 p. 153.

      ‌321 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      322 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      ‌323 AB IPC Order F2007-021 at [47].

      324 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(i).

      325 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1631.

      326 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1058.

      327 See subsection 2-29 of The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2.

      328 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the ATIA, https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-16-law-enforcement-investigations-security, accessed on June 14, 2019. Definition relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [127].

      ‌329 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      330 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      ‌331 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      332 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      333 SK OPIC definition accepted by Justice Keene in Consumers Co-operative Refineries Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SK B 335 (CanLII) at [20]. Same definition is used for third party exemption at subsection 19(1)(b) of this Guide.

      334 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      335 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      336 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      337 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1908.

      338 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1413.

      339 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019. Definition of “including” as included in SK OIPC Guide to FOIPChapter 4 – Exemptions from the Right of Access, for subsections 16(1), 17(1)(g), 22(a) and 24(1) of FOIP.

      ‌340 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      341 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      342 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 155.

      343 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      ‌344 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      345 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1224.

      346 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 155.

      347 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1721.

      348 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1142.

      349 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 158.

      350 First stated in SK OIPC Review Report 021-2015 at [20]. Consistent with British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at
      https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      351 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      352 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 26, 2019. Also referenced in the Office of the Information Commissioner resource, The Access to Information Act and Cabinet confidence: A Discussion of New Approaches, 1996 at p. 5.

      353 Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 2 SCR 3, 2002 SCC 57 (CanLII) at [18]. Also cited in Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      354 Report of the Honourable E. M. Culliton, Former Chief Justice of Saskatchewan on the Matter of Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy in the Province of Saskatchewan (Regina: Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan Library, 1981), p. 85. SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-004 at [55].

      ‌355 SK OIPC Review Reports 016-2015, 017-2015, 018-2015, 019-2015, 020-2015, 021-2015, 022-2015, 023-2015, 032-2015 and 033-2015.

      356 Federal Access to Information and Privacy Legislation Annotated 2015 (Canada: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2014) at page 1-644.4.

      357 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      358 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 67.

      359 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 166 and 179. The SK OIPC relied on this definition for the first time in Review Report LA-2010-001 at [28]. Also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [282].

      360 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      361 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [47]. Relied on in ON IPC Order PO-3470-R at [21].

      362 College of Physicians of B.C. v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002 BCCA 665 (CanLII) at [113] to [114].

      363 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26] and [47]. Relied on in ON IPC Order PO-3799 at [29]. It should be noted that this is based on Ontario’s FOIP subsection 13(1), which does not include “policy options” in its wording. Saskatchewan’s FOIP includes ‘policy options’ in its wording as a separate type of information.

      364 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22] and [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      365 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      366 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      367 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1526.

      368 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      369 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [23]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      370 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 166 and 179. The SK OIPC relied on this definition for the first time in Review Report LA-2010-001 at [28]. Also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [282]. The term “substance” was added to the definition following SK IPC Review Report 019-2017 at [21].

      371 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      372 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1474.

      373 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 47.

      374 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26]. Relied on by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [30].

      375 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [27]. Relied on by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [30].

      376 ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      377 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 26, 2019. This approach was adopted in SK OIPC Review Report 023-2014 at [16].

      378 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      379 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      380 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      381 The Executive Government Administration Act, S.S. 2014, Chapter E-13.1 at subsection 6(1)(a).

      382 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      383 The Executive Government Administration Act, SS 2014, c E-13.1 at section 6.

      ‌384 SK OIPC Review Reports 041-2015 at [8], 050-2015 at [12] and 051-2015 at [12].

      ‌385 SK OIPC Review Report 079-2013 at [21].

      386 Federal Access to Information and Privacy Legislation Annotated 2015 (Canada: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2014) at page 1-644.4.

      387 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      388 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 78.

      389 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1194.

      390 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      391 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      392 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      393 The Executive Government Administration Act, S.S. 2014, Chapter E-13.1 at subsection 6(1)(a).

      394 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      ‌395 SK OIPC Review Reports 041-2015 at [8], 050-2015 at [12] and 051-2015 at [12].

      ‌396 SK OIPC Review Report 079-2013 at [21].

      397 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 27, 2019.

      398 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1527.

      399 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Toronto Port Authority, 2016 FC 683 (CanLII) at [85]. The Federal Court of Canada relied on the definitions found in the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Access to Information Manual which were based on the ordinary meaning of these words. The manual can be found at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11. Definition consistent with The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p.

      409. Similar definition used in R. v. McDonald, 2003 NSPC 34 (CanLII) at p. 3 and Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of the Environment), [2007] 3 FCR 125, 2006 FC 1235 (CanLII) at [65]

      and [66].

      400 AB IPC Order 96-006 at p. 10. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 180. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-001 at [12].

      ‌401 Originated from ON IPC Order M-184 at p. 3. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report 187-2015 at [19].

      402 Ontario (Attorney Genera) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 SCC 4 at [62].

      403 Alberta Energy v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2024 ABKB 198, varied by 2025 ABCA 163 but on an unrelated issue.

      404 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 511.

      405 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      406 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      407 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      408 The Executive Government Administration Act, S.S. 2014, Chapter E-13.1 at subsection 6(1)(a).

      409 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      ‌410 SK OIPC Review Reports 041-2015 at [8], 050-2015 at [12] and 051-2015 at [12].

      ‌411 SK OIPC Review Report 079-2013 at [21].

      412 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019. Similar list in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 168.

      413 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 27, 2019.

      414 Federal Access to Information and Privacy Legislation Annotated 2015 (Canada: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2014) at page 1-644.4.

      415 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      416 Adapted from definition used for “consultation” for subsection 17(1)(b) of this Guide. Original definition came from AB IPC Order F2003-016 at [20]. Adopted by SK OIPC for interpretation of subsection 17(1)(b) in Review Report F-2004-001 at [11] and [12].

      417 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      418 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      419 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      420 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      421 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      422 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      423 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 511.

      424 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 557.

      425 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1401.

      426 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1203.

      427 Adapted from definition used for “consultation” for subsection 17(1)(b) of this Guide. Original definition came from AB IPC Order F2003-016 at [20]. Adopted by SK OIPC for interpretation of subsection 17(1)(b) in Review Report F-2004-001 at [11] and [12].

      428 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      429 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      430 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      431 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      432 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      433 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      434 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 511.

      435 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 557.

      436 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1401.

      437 Federal Access to Information and Privacy Legislation Annotated 2015 (Canada: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2014) at page 1-644.4.

      438 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      439 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, The Access to Information Act and Cabinet confidence: A Discussion of New Approaches, 1996 at p. 11.

      440 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 174.

      441 Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39].

      ‌442 ON IPC Orders P-22 at p. 5 and P-40 at p. 11. Adopted in SK Review Report 021-2015 at [19].

      443 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1474.

      444 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1147.

      445 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      446 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      447 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      448 The Executive Government Administration Act, S.S. 2014, Chapter E-13.1 at subsection 6(1)(a).

      449 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      ‌450 SK OIPC Review Reports 041-2015 at [8], 050-2015 at [12] and 051-2015 at [12].

      ‌451 SK OIPC Review Report 079-2013 at [21].

      452 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 27, 2019.

      453 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 174.

      454 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      455 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      456 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      457 Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39].

      458 Adapted from definition used for “consultation” for subsection 17(1)(b) of this Guide. Original definition came from AB IPC Order F2003-016 at [20]. Adopted by SK OIPC for interpretation of subsection 17(1)(b) in Review Report F-2004-001 at [11] and [12].

      459 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 511.

      460 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 557.

      461 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1401.

      462 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences)https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/privacy/confidences-queen-privy-council-canada-cabinet-confidences.html. Accessed June 27, 2019.

      463 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, The Access to Information Act and Cabinet confidence: A Discussion of New Approaches, 1996 at p. 11.

      464 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      ‌465 ON IPC Orders PO-2542 at p. 5, P-1390 at p. 5, PO-2122 at 5. Ontario’s subsection 12(2)(b) of the Ontario FOIP Act is similarly worded as Saskatchewan’s subsection 16(2)(b) of FOIP.

      ‌466 ON IPC Orders P-24 at p. 12, PO-2122 at p. 6.

      467 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [43] to [46]. Also relied on by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [31].

      468 College of Physicians of B.C. v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002 BCCA 665 (CanLII) at [105]. Also noted in BC IPC Order F14-57 at [10].

      469 Canada Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 1999 CanLII 8293 (FC), [1999] 4 F.C. 245 at [32].

      470 Between June and October 2019, the Commissioner modified the original three-part test and the definitions associated with subsection 17(1)(a) in consideration of two court decisions, Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 and Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 May 21, 2019. The first report where the Commissioner brought forward both the new two-part test and the modified definitions was SK OIPC Review Report 244-2018.

      471 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 67.

      472 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 166 and 179. The SK OIPC relied on this definition for the first time in Review Report LA-2010-001 at [28]. Also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [282].

      473 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      474 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [47]. Relied on in ON IPC Order PO-3470-R at [21].

      475 College of Physicians of B.C. v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002 BCCA 665 (CanLII) at [113] to [114].

      476 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26] and [47]. Relied on in ON IPC Order PO-3799 at [29]. It should be noted that this is based on Ontario’s FOIP subsection 13(1), which does not include “policy options” in its wording. Saskatchewan’s FOIP includes ‘policy options’ in its wording as a separate type of information.

      477 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22] and [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      478 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77].

      479 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      480 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1526.

      481 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [22]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      482 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [23]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      483 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 166 and 179. The SK OIPC relied on this definition for the first time in Review Report LA-2010-001 at [28]. Also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [282]. The term “substance” was added to the definition following SK IPC Review Report 019-2017 at [21].

      484 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [24]. Relied on by Justice Danyliuk in Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [77] and Justice Gabrielson in Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 at [41].

      485 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1474.

      486 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 47.

      487 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [26]. Relied on by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [30].

      488 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [27]. Relied on by Justice Kalmakoff in Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [30].

      489 This is because the provision uses “a” rather than “the” government institution.

      490 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      491 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      492 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      493 AB IPC Order 2000-021 at [35]. See also British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-advice-recommendations. Accessed July 7, 2019.

      ‌494 AB IPC Order F2008-008 at [41] to [42]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2010-001 at [30] to [31].

      ‌495 Criteria originated from AB IPC Order 96-006 at pp. 9 and 10 for Alberta’s equivalent provision. Alberta’s subsection 23(1)(a) is substantially similar to Saskatchewan’s subsection 17(1)(a). Criteria were adopted in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2010-001 at [81] and LA-2010-001 at [28] for subsections 17(1)(a) of FOIP and 16(1)(a) of LA FOIP.

      ‌496 AB IPC Order F2008-008 at [42] to [44]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2010-001 at [81] and LA-2011-001 at [66].

      497 Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Mitchinson, 2004 CanLII 15009 (ON SCDC) at [56].

      Justice Dunnet found that inclusion of this word changed the meaning in the federal and British Columbia legislation compared to Ontario’s FOIP legislation that did not include this word.

      498 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [48] to [51].

      499 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [48] to [51].

      ‌500 Originated from AB IPC Order 96-006 at p. 10. Relied on in Office of the Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner (NU IPC) Review Report 17-131 at p. 6; Office of the Northwest Territories Information and Privacy Commissioner (NWT IPC) Review Report 06-055 at p. 7. Also relied on in SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [54], LA-2011-001 at [58] and F-2014-001 at [279].

      501 3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry), [2002] 1 FC 421, 2001 FCA 254 (CanLII) at [55]. Also see AB IPC Order 99-001 and Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 179.

      502 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-

      ‌503 Originated from AB IPC Review Report F2004-026 at [65] and [71]. Adopted in NWT IPC Review Report 17-163 at pp. 9 and 10. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-004 at [27] to [30] and F-2014-001 at [280].

      504 Saskatchewan (Ministry of Health) v West, 2022 SKCA 18 at [56]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 244-2018 at [40] and NS IPC Review Report 18-02 at [21].

      ‌505 AB IPC Order F2004-026 at [65].

      506 “There may be cases where some of the foregoing items reveal the content of the advice. However, that must be demonstrated for every case for which it is claimed”. See AB IPC Order F2004-026 at [71]. 507 ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      ‌508 AB IPC Orders 96-006 at p. 10 and F2004-026 at p. 16. Alberta’s subsection 24(1)(b) of Alberta’s FOIP is substantially similar to Saskatchewan’s subsection 17(1)(b) of FOIP.

      509 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Toronto Port Authority, 2016 FC 683 (CanLII) at [85]. The Federal Court of Canada relied on the definitions found in the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Access to Information Manual, which were based on the ordinary meaning of these words. The manual can be found at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11. Definition consistent with The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p.

      409. Similar definition used in R. v. McDonald, 2003 NSPC 34 (CanLII) at p. 3 and Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of the Environment), [2007] 3 FCR 125, 2006 FC 1235 (CanLII) at [65] and [66].

      ‌510 Definition originated from AB IPC Orders 96-006 at p. 10 and F2003-016 at [20]. Adopted by SK OIPC in Review Report F-2004-001 at [11] and [12].

      511 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 at [88] to [89] and Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 May 21, 2019 at [48] and [49].

      512 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Toronto Port Authority, 2016 FC 683 (CanLII) at [85]. The Federal Court of Canada relied on the definitions found in the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Access to Information Manual which were based on the ordinary meaning of these words. The manual can be found at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11. Definition consistent with The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 409. Similar definition used in R. v. McDonald, 2003 NSPC 34 (CanLII) at p. 3 and Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of the Environment), [2007] 3 FCR 125, 2006 FC 1235 (CanLII) at [65] and [66].

      513 AB IPC Order 96-006 at p. 10. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 180. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2004-001 at [12].

      ‌514 Originated from ON IPC Order M-184 at p. 3. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report 187-2015 at [19].

      515 T1T2 Limited Partnership v. Canada, 1994 CanLII 7368 (ON SC) at p. 17.

      ‌516 Hande v University of Saskatchewan, QBG 1222 of 2018 May 21, 2019 at [49].

      517 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(b.i).

      518 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      519 Government of Saskatchewan, Cabinet Secretariat, Executive Council, Executive Government Processes and Procedures in Saskatchewan: A Procedures Manual, 2007, at p. 16.

      520 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      521 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of the Environment), [2007] 3 FCR 125, 2006

      FC 1235 (CanLII) at [67]. AB IPC Order 96-006 at p. 10.

      522 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-advice-recommendations. Accessed July 5, 2019.

      ‌523 AB IPC Order F2004-026 at [65] [71] and [76]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-004 at [33]. Similar position in BC IPC Orders 01-25 at p. 8 and 193-1997 at p. 8.

      ‌524 AB IPC Order F2004-026 at [65].

      525 “There may be cases where some of the foregoing items reveal the content of the advice. However, that must be demonstrated for every case for which it is claimed”. See AB IPC Order F2004-026 at [71]. 526 ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      ‌527 SK OIPC Review Report 119-2022 at [23] to [24].

      528 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181.

      529 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed May 9, 2023.

      530 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1116.

      531 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      532 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-229 at p. 10, which drew the definition from the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2011-001 at [78]. Same definition used by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      533 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1092.

      534 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1139.

      535 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 473.

      536 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 734.

      537 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 391.

      538 Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Mitchinson, 2004 CanLII 15009 (ON SCDC) at [56]. Justice Dunnet found that inclusion of this word changed the meaning in the federal and British Columbia legislation compared to Ontario’s FOIP legislation that did not include this word for the advice/recommendations provision.

      539 Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 2, C to H, at p. F-133.

      540 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1248 and 1249. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      541 Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 (CanLII) at [107]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      542 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019. Also consistent with Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181.

      ‌543 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-001 at [51].

      ‌544 NU IPC Review Report 20-170 at p. 6.

      545 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [48] to [51].

      546 Encon Group Inc. v. Capo Construction Inc., 2015 BCSC 786 (CanLII) at [34].

      547 Conibear v. Dahling, 2010 BCSC 985 (CanLII) at [34].

      548 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 304. Same definition used by Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019.

      549 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019.

      550 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      551 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      552 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      553 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.6. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019.

      554 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-229 at p. 10, which drew the definition from the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2011-001 at [78]. Same definition used by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      555 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1092.

      556 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181. Similar definition in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      557 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181. Similar definition in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      558 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      559 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      560 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      561 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181.

      562 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      563 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 6th Edition, Volume 2. N-Z, (Oxford University Press) at p. 3693. Definition first used in SK OIPC Review Report 166-2018 at [29].

      564 Adapted from ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      ‌565 SK OIPC Review Report 086-2018 at [78]. Relied on AB IPC Orders F2004-026 and F2008-028.

      566 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 307.

      567 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 166. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report 086-2018 at [77] and [78].

      568 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      569 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1082.

      570 Driedger, E., The Canadian Bar Review, Subordinate Legislation, Vol. XXXVIII, March 1960, No. 1: Ottawa, at p. 2. See also SK OIPC Review Report 025-2020 at [92] where the Commissioner found that a draft zoning bylaw qualified as “subordinate legislation” for purposes of subsection 17(1)(e) of FOIP.

      571 Adapted from ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      572 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 78.

      573 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1194.

      574 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 182 and 183. Alberta’s subsection 24(1)(g) is substantially similar to Saskatchewan’s provision.

      575 This is because the provision uses “a” rather than “the” government institution.

      576 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 727. Cited in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [45].

      577 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019.

      578 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1474.

      579 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1147.

      580 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-229 at p. 10, which drew the definition from the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2011-001 at [78]. Same definition used by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      581 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1092.

      582 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1401.

      583 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1143.

      584 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1055.

      585 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1401.

      586 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 6th Edition, Volume 1. A-M, (Oxford University Press) at p. 304.

      587 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 6th Edition, Volume 1. A-M, (Oxford University Press) at p. 619.

      588 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 183.

      589 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      590 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      591 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      ‌592 AB IPC Order 98-014 at [16].

      593 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 586.

      594 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      595 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      596 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 184.

      597 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-advice-recommendations. Accessed July 5, 2019.

      598 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      599 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      600 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      601 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      602 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      603 Re Kitchener-Waterloo Real Estate Board Inc. and Regional Assessment Commissioner, Region No. 21 et al., 1986 CanLII 2660 (ON SC) at p. 8.

      604 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 185.

      605 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 186.

      606 The Evidence Act, SS 2006, c E-11.2 at subsection 10(1).

      607 The Evidence Act, SS 2006, c E-11.2 at subsection 10(1).

      609 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 188.

      610 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      611 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 188. Similar definition in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      612 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [109] to [112]. Definition relied on by Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [32].

      613 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 190. Similar requirement in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual.

      614 Adapted from ON IPC Orders PO-3470-R at [28], PO-2084 at p. 8 and PO-2028 at pp. 10 and 11, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2004] O.J. No. 163 (Div. Ct.), aff’d [2005] O.J. No. 4048 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 564. See also Order PO-1993 at p. 12, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Ministry of Transportation) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2005] O.J. No. 4047 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 563.

      615 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [23].

      616 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition relied on for first time in terms of this provision in SK OIPC F-2005-006 at [21].

      617 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌618 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [87].

      619 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌620 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [26].

      621 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1474.

      622 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 969. First relied on by SK OIPC in F-2005-006 at [11].

      623 Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 4, P to R at p. P-495.

      624 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1331.

      625 Ontario subsection 18(1)(a) of FOIP provides “A head may refuse to disclose a record that contains…trade secrets or financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that belongs to the Government of Ontario or an institution and has monetary value or potential monetary value”.

      ‌626 Quoted initially in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-006 at [12]. Later in SK OIPC Review Reports 184-2016 at [35], 215 to 217-2016 at [19], 056-2017 at [60] and 086-2018 at [94].

      627 Adapted from The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 2582.

      ‌628 ON IPC Order P-219 at p. 17. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-00 at [27].

      629 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191.

      630 ON IPC Order PO-3464-I at [51]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Reports 056-2017 at [62], 039-2018 at [21] and 086-2018 at [95].

      631 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Superior Propane Inc., 1996 CanLII 8 (CT) at [17].

      632 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

      633 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

       

      634 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.3. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      635 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.3. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      636 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌637 Definition originated from ON IPC including Order PO-1811. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [87].

      638 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      639 Definition originated from ON IPC including Order PO-1806-F. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [26]. Definition endorsed in Consumers’ Co-operative Refineries Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SKQB 335 (CanLII) at [20].

      640 Originated from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Adopted by AB IPC in Order 2000-021 at [26]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [58] and [59]. Also, found in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [39].

      641 ON IPC Order PO-2693 at pp. 7 and 8. Definition originates from Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) at section 2.

      642 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

      643 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.3. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      644 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      645 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      646 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      647 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(b.i).

      648 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1445.

       

      649 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      650 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1248 and 1249. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      651 Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 (CanLII) at [107]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      652 SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [27]. Equivalent provision in LA FOIP was being considered (subsection 17(1)(d)). Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107.

      653 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      654 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 19, 2019. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107.

      655 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      656 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      657 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      658 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      659 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204].

      660 Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c)&(d): Questions, available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      661 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181.

      662 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1116.

      663 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      664 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-229 at p. 10, which drew the definition from the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2011-001 at [78]. Same definition used by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 9, 2019.

      665 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1092.

      666 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1139.

      667 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 473.

      668 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 734.

      669 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 304. Same definition used by Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019.

      670 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019.

      671 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      672 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      673 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      674 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 391.

      675 Ontario (Ministry of Northern Development and Mines) v. Mitchinson, 2004 CanLII 15009 (ON SCDC) at [56]. Justice Dunnet found that inclusion of this word changed the meaning in the federal and British Columbia legislation compared to Ontario’s FOIP legislation that did not include this word for the advice/recommendations provision.

      676 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), [2014] 2 SCR 3, 2014 SCC 36 (CanLII) at [48] to [51].

      677 Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 2, C to H, at p. F-133.

      678 Encon Group Inc. v. Capo Construction Inc., 2015 BCSC 786 (CanLII) at [34].

      679 Conibear v. Dahling, 2010 BCSC 985 (CanLII) at [34].

      680 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1248 and 1249. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      681 Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 (CanLII) at [107]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      682 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.18.5. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_18. Accessed July 10, 2019. Also consistent with Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 181.

      ‌683 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2010-001 at [51].

      684 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      685 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      686 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [53].

      687 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 at [54].

      688 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      689 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 188. Similar definition in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      690 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 19, 2019. For more on this example, see SK OIPC Review Report 184-2016 at [63] and [64].

      691 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [55] to [57].

      692 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      693 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      694 Adapted from definition of ‘harm’ in Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 148.

      695 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 189. Similar definition in British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019. Similar definition in Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      696 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      697 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      698 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      699 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests . Accessed July 17, 2019.

      700 BC IPC Order 00-08 at p. 17. See also Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen (1957), 1957 CanLII 11 (SCC), 29 C.P.R. 6 (S.C.C.), at p. 425.

      ‌701 Adapted from BC IPC Order 00-41 at Appendix p. viii.

      702 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      703 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1132.

      704 The Legislation Act, S.S. 2019, Chapter L-10.2 at ss. 2-29.

      705 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      706 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 17, 2019.

      707 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

      708 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

      709 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 22, 2019.

      710 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 193.

      711 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(j).

      ‌712 SK OIPC Review Report 080-2018 at [51] and [52].

      ‌713 Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner (NU IPC) Review Report 03-08 at p. 7.

      714 Adapted from the Information Commissioner of Canada’s 2017-2018 Annual Report, Investigation HighlightsSection 20 – Third Party Information. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/2017-2018-investigation-highlights#h3. Accessed July 22, 2019.

      ‌715 NWT IPC Review Report 04-043 at p. 4.

      716 Quoted by Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [28].

      ‌717 ON IPC Order PO-3845 at [62].

      718 Intercontinental Packers Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (1987), 14 F.T.R. 142 (T.D.), affirmed (1988), 87 N.R. 99 (Fed. C.A.) at [145].

      719 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at p. 7. Definition relied on by Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [32].

      720 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed July 22, 2019.

      721 MCCreary J. used this three-part test in Seon v Board of Education of the Regina Roman Catholic School Division NO. 81, 2018 SKQB 166 at [9] for the equivalent provision (subsection 18(1)(b)) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP).

      722 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 103. Definition first relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [23].

      723 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 102.

      ‌724 BC IPC Order F05-09 at [9]. First cited in SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [35].

      725 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌726 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [87].

      727 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      728 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [26]. Definition endorsed in Consumers’ Co-operative Refineries Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SKQB 335 (CanLII) at [20].

      729 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 103. Definition first relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [37].

      730 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [141].

      731 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      ‌732 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17], F-2006-002 at [40].

      733 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [156] and [158].

      734 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [157].

      735 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [158].

      736 Halifax Developments Ltd. v. Minister of Public Works (994), F.C.J. No. 2035 (QL) (F.C.T.D.). Also in Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.3. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      737 Originated in 2002 ON IPC Order PO-2018. The language above is drawn from the most recent 2019 ON Order PO-3974 at [42]. First relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [17]. Several court decisions support this approach. See Boeing C. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), 2005 CanLII 24249 (ON SCDC), [2005] O.J. 2851, Canadian Medical Protective Association v. John Doe, 2008 CanLII 45005 (ON SCDC), [2008] O.J. No. 3475, Canadian Pacific Railway v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002 BCSC 603 (CanLII), Canada Post Corp. v. National Capital Commission,(2002), 2002 FCT 700 (CanLII), Halifax Development Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [1994] F.C.J. No. 2035. Similar position taken by other IPC offices including BC, AB, NFLD and Labrador and PEI.

      ‌738 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17] to [19] and LA-2011-001 at [97].

      739 Base case was BC IPC Order 01-20 at [86]. This Order was later discussed in Canadian Pacific Railway v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) [2002] B.C.J. No. 848 at [72] to [79]. See also ON IPC Orders MO-1706 at p. 12, PO-2371 at pp. 6 to 9, PO-2528 at p. 12. Included for the first time in SK IPC Review Report 084-2015 at [22].

      740 An example of “inferred disclosure” can be found at [25] of Aventis Pasteur Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1371 (CanLII). See also BC IPC Order 01-20 at [86].

       

      741 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in Canadian Medical Protective Association v. Loukidelis, 2008 CanLII 45005 (ON SCDC) and [55], considered “immutability” as a factor in its determination that the information was not “supplied” by the third party.

      742 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      743 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104, SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌744 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌745 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      746 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌747 SK OIPC Review Reports 158-2016 at [37] and 203-2016 at [28].

      ‌748 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49], ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌749 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19]; NS IPC Review Reports 16-09 at [44], 17-03 at [34].

      ‌750 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌751 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      752 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40], SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8, BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌753 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      ‌754 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47], PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5, AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌755 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      756 Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Minister of Transport, (1989), 27 C.P.R. (3d) 180 (F.C.T.D.) at p.11. Stenotran Services v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), 2000 CanLII 15464 (FC) at [9] citing Air Atonabee. It is important to note that subsection 20(1)(b) of the federal ATIA places the focus on the confidential nature of the information itself. SK’s subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP places the focus on the confidential nature of the supply. However, Air Atonabee may still be instructive with interpreting SK’s subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP.

      757 Chesal v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) et al., 2003 NSCA 124 (CanLII) at [72] and [73] and Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1997] 2 FC 759, 1997 CanLII 4805 (FC) at p. 1. Also, see NS IPC Review Report 17-03 at [98] and SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-001 at [76] to [78].

      ‌758 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [78].

      759 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [146].

      760 Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., 2004 FCA 99 (CanLII) at [37] and [42].

      ‌761 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      762 Brewster Inc. v. Canada (Environment), 2016 FC 339 (CanLII) at [22].

      763 St. Joseph Corp. v. Canada (Public Works & Government Services) [2002] FCT 274 at [53] and [54], Brookfield LePage Johnson Controls Facility Management Services v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [2003] FCT 254 at [16], SK OIPC Review Reports 159-2016 at [39], 052-2017 at [55] and Review Report 311-2017, 312-2017, 313-2017, 316-2017, 340-2017, 341-2017, 342-2017 at [63].

      764 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [36] to [39].

      765 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#undue_fin_gain. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      766 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#undue_fin_gain and Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 108.

      767 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [55] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [219].

      768 Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444 (CanLII) at [35].

      769 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      770 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      771 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204]. 772 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, FOIPPA Policy Definitions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      773 Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189 (CanLII) at [44] to [47].

      774 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      775 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-business-interests-third-party. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      776 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [55] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [219].

      777 Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444 (CanLII) at [35].

      ‌778 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy

      779 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      780 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204]. 781 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c) & (d): Questions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      782 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1248 and 1249. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      783 Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 (CanLII) at [107]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      784 SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [27]. Equivalent provision in LA FOIP was being considered (subsection 17(1)(d)). Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107. 785 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      786 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 19, 2019. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107.

      787 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      788 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      789 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      790 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKQB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204].

      791 Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State), (April 27, 1994), T-1587-93, T-1588-93 (F.C.T.D.) at [10].

      792 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of External Affairs) (T.D.), [1990] 3 FC 665, 1990 CanLII 7951 (FC) at [24].

      793 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c) & (d): Questions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      794 Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c)&(d): Questions, available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      795 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      796 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      797 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1699. See also SK OIPC Review Report 305-2023 (May 22, 2024) at [15].

      798 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 3006.

      799 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 21.

      800 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 8.

      801 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 964.

      802 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      803 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      804 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      805 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      806 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 2620.

      807 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1643.

      808 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at subsection 2(1)(j).

      ‌809 SK OIPC Review Report 080-2018 at [51] and [52].

      810 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      811 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      812 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      813 Originated from NWT IPC Review Report 05-049 Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      813 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      814 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      815 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1440.

      816 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 64.

      817 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      818 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      ‌819 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17], F-2006-002 at [40].

      820 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [156] and [158].

      821 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [157].

      822 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [158].

      823 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.10. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed November 19, 2019.

      824 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.10. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      825 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.11. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      826 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      827 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      828 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      829 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 864.

      830 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador resource, Access to Information: Policy and Procedures Manual, October 2017 at p. 103.

      831 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1488.

      832 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌833 AB IPC Order 096-002 at p. 17.

      834 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(2), (5), (6): Questions – Disclosure Authorized in Public Interest. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-20256-questions-disclosure-authorized-public-interest. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      835 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 317.

      836 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.11. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      837 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1330.

      838 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(2), (5), (6): Questions – Disclosure Authorized in Public Interest. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-20256-questions-disclosure-authorized-public-interest. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      839 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 22: Testing or Audits. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-22-testing-or-audits. Accessed September 5, 2019.

      840 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      841 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      842 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      843 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1776.

      844 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 161.

      ‌845 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [97].

      846 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2355.

      847 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 3194.

      848 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.19. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_19. Accessed September 5, 2019

      849 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      850 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      851 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      852 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 195.

      853 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [102].

      854 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Ponts Jacques Cartier & Champlain Inc. (2000), 8 C.P.R. (4th) 536 (Fed. T.D.) at 543-545.

      855 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      856 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      857 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      858 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      859 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1776.

      860 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 161.

      ‌861 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [97].

      862 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.19. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_19. Accessed September 5, 2019

      863 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      864 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      865 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      866 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 195.

      867 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Ponts Jacques Cartier & Champlain Inc. (2000), 8 C.P.R. (4th) 536 (Fed. T.D.) at 543-545.

      868 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at pp. 1379 and 301.

      869 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1117.

      870 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1139.

      ‌871 SK OIPC Review Reports LA-2007-001 at [117], LA-2013-001 at [35], F-2014-001 at [149].

      ‌872 SK OIPC Review Reports H-2007-001 at [29] and LA-2012-002 at [45] and [102].

      873 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 3248.

      874 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      875 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 2647.

      876 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 137.

      877 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      878 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 1220.

      879 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      880 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 17: Safety of Individuals. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-17-safety-individuals. Accessed September 6, 2019.

      881 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 17: Safety of Individuals. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-17-safety-individuals. Accessed September 6, 2019.

      882 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 137.

      883 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 17: Safety of Individuals. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-17-safety-individuals. Accessed September 6, 2019.

      884 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019. Definition of “including” as included in SK OIPC Guide to FOIPChapter 4 – Exemptions from the Right of Access, for subsections 16(1), 17(1)(g) and 24(1) of FOIP.

      885 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1449.

      886 List of examples originates from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 197.

      887 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 199.

      ‌888 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [67].

      889 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1451.

      890 CB, HK & RD v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local No. 21, 2017 CanLII 68786 (SK LRB) at [40] to [42].

      891 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 201.

      892 CB, HK & RD v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local No. 21, 2017 CanLII 68786 (SK LRB) at [35].

      893 CB, HK & RD v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local No. 21, 2017 CanLII 68786 (SK LRB) at [43]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [110].

      894 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 201.

      895 Smith v Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455 at [46].

      896 Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] 2 SCR 574, 2008 SCC 44 (CanLII) at [9].

      897 Established by Justice Dickson in Solosky v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC) at [28]. This test has consistently been applied and the case has not been overturned or overtaken by subsequent jurisprudence.

      898 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 348.

      899 The Legal Profession Act, 1990, SS 1990-91, c L-10.1 at s. 87.

      900 Law Society of Saskatchewan, Code of Professional Conduct at p. 13, Definitions.

      901 Law Society of Saskatchewan, Code of Professional Conduct at p. 10, Definitions.

      902 Trillium Motor World Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Limited¸2015 ONSC 3824 (CanLII) at [417].

      903 Jeffers v. Calico Compression Systems, 2002 ABQB 72 (CanLII) at [8].

      904 SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-002 at [26]. For this interpretation, the Commissioner, relied on The Law of Evidence in Canada.

      905 R. v Campbell, [1999] 1 SCR 565.

      906 John Sopinka et al., The Law of Evidence in Canada, 5th Ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2018) at § 14.125.

      907 Susan Hosiery Limited v. Minister of National Revenue, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27, [1969] C.T.C. 353 at p. 33.

      908 British Columbia (Minister of Finance) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2021 BCSC 266 at [110] to [112].

      ‌909 AB IPC Order 99-013 at [62] to [66].

      910 Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC).

      911 Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1998] 4 FC 89, 1998 CanLII 9075 (FCA).

      912 Leo v. Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 (CanLII) at [67], Maranda v Richer, 2003 SCC 67, [2003] 3 CR 193.

      913 Leo v. Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2019 SKQB 150 (CanLII) at [67], Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Canada (Information Commissioner), 2013 FCA 104, 360 DLR (4th) 176; Redhead Equipment v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SKCA 115, 402 DLR (4th) 649.

      ‌914 Definition originated from ON Order P-210 at p. 18. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [97]. Definition also adopted by AB IPC in Order 96-017.

      915 AB IPC Order F2004-003 at [29].

      ‌916 AB IPC Order F2004-003 at [31].

      ‌917 AB IPC Order F2013-42 at [20].

      918 Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1984] 4 F.C. 89 (Fed. C.A.) at p. 109.

      919 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [133] to [134]. Consistent with Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1988], 28 C.P.C. (2D) 101 (Ont. H.C.).

      920 R. v Campbell, [1999] 1 SCR 565.

      921 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 877 (CanLII) at [17].

      922 Redhead Equipment v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SKCA 115 (CanLII) at [33], citing General Accident Assurance Company v. Chrusz, 1999 CanLII 7320 (ON CA).

      923 West v Saskatchewan (Health), 2020 SKQB 244 (CanLII) at [77].

      ‌924 AB IPC Order 2000-019 at [38] to [39].

      925 Foster Wheeler Power Co. v. Société intermunicipale de gestion et d’élimination des déchets (SIGED) inc., [2004] 1 SCR 456, 2004 SCC 18 (CanLII) at [37].

      926 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [32].

      927 Dodek, Adam, Solicitor-Client Privilege, 2014 (LexisNexis Canada Inc.: Markham, Ontario) at p. 189.

      928 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.21.1. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_21. Accessed September 18, 2019.

      929 Solosky v R. (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 821, 105 DLR (3d) 745 at [752]: “It is not every item of correspondence passing between a solicitor and client to which privilege attaches, for only those in which the client seeks the advice of counsel in his professional capacity, or in which counsel gives advice, are protected.”

      930 Straka v. Humber River Regional Hospital, (2000), 193 DLR (4th) 680 at [59].

      931 Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd., 1997 CanLII 12113 (ON SC).

      932 Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] 2 SCR 574, 2008 SCC 44 (CanLII) at [10].

      933 Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 860 at p. 16.

      ‌934 AB IPC Orders F2004-003 at [30] and F2007-008 at [14]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2014-001 at [264].

      ‌935 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [80] to [81]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 051-2024 at [93] to [95] and [97].

      936 Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 SCR 860, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC).

      937 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2005 FC 1551, at [49].

      938 Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1998] 4 FC 89, 1998 CanLII 9075 (FCA) and Maranda v. Richer, [2003] 3 SCR 193, 2003 SCC 67 (CanLII).

      939 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [32].

      940 Dodek, Adam, Solicitor-Client Privilege, 2014 (LexisNexis Canada Inc.: Markham, Ontario) at p. 189.

      941 Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister) (T.D.), 1997 CanLII 4805 (FC), [1997] 2 F.C. 759, p. 8.

      942 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1895.

      943 Western Canada Investment Company, Limited v. McDairmid, (1922), 15 Sask. L.R. 142 (QL) (Sask CA) at [146]. Drawn from Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canadian Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) at p. 187. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-002 at [40].

      ‌944 SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-002 at [41].

      945 BC IPC Order F15-09 at [20].

      946 Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1997] 2 FC 759, 1997 CanLII 4805 (FC).

      ‌947 SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-002 at [39].

      948 This has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [47].

      949 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [73], [76], and [83].

      950 Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), 2006 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2006] 2 SCR 32 at [20].

      951 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [53], [54] and [72].

      952 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [83].

      953 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [75].

      954 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1441.

      955 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [75], [76] and [82].

      ‌956 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [60].

      957 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 200.

      ‌958 SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [102] to [109].

      ‌959 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [74]. Cited in SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [106].

      ‌960 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [77]. Cited in SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [106].

      961 AB IPC Order 96-020 at [83]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [104].

      962 Slavutych v. Baker et al., 1975 CanLII 5 (SCC), [1976] 1 SCR 254 at p. 260. Cited in SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [103]. See also AB IPC Order 96-020 at [76].

      963 Leeds v. Alberta (Minister of the Environment), 1990 CanLII 5933 (AB QB) at [25]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 171-2019 at [103] and AB IPC Order 96-020 at [79].‌

      964 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 199.

      ‌965 SK OIPC Review Report 298-2019 at [53]. This test was adapted from AB IPC’s two-part test in Order 97-009 and ON IPC’s Order PO-3154.

      966 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 199.

      967 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [19].

      968 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [1] and [2].

      969 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [27] referencing Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 (CanLII), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 at [41].

      970 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [29] referencing Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 (CanLII), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 at [46].

      971 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [31] referencing Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 (CanLII), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 at [29(10)].

      972 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [32].

      973 Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] 2 SCR 687, 2018 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [51] and [57].

      974 Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, available at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/L-Page1.aspx. Accessed September 20, 2019.

      975 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [34].

      976 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [27].

      977 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 (CanLII) at [66], R v Husky Energy Inc., 2017 SKQB 383 at [22], Lizotte v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2016 SCC 52, [2016] 2 SCR 521, Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII). 

      978 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [28] referencing Sharpe J.A. in “Claiming Privilege in the Discovery Process”, in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (1984), 163, at pp. 164 and 165).

      979 Legal requirements or ‘the two-part test’ originates from Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.21.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_21. Accessed September 20, 2019.

      980 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at intro para. 3.

      981 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.21.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_21. Accessed September 20, 2019.

      982 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [32].

      983 Susan Hosiery Limited v. Minister of National Revenue, [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27, [1969] C.T.C. 353 at p. 33.

      984 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 (CanLII) at [66], R v Husky Energy Inc., 2017 SKQB 383 at [22], Lizotte v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2016 SCC 52, [2016] 2 SCR 521, Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII). 

      985 Britto v University of Saskatchewan, 2018 SKQB 92 (CanLII) at [66], R v Husky Energy Inc., 2017 SKQB 383 at [22], Lizotte v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2016 SCC 52, [2016] 2 SCR 521, Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII).

      986 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.21.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_21. Accessed September 20, 2019.

      987 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.21.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_21. Accessed September 20, 2019.

      988 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at [34].

      989 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2006] 2 SCR 319, 2006 SCC 39 (CanLII) at para. 1.

      ‌990 BC IPC Orders F11-29 at [13] to [14] and F15-12 at [52] to [53].

      991 This has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [47].

      992 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [73], [76], and [83].

      993 Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), 2006 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2006] 2 SCR 32 at [20].

      994 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [53], [54] and [72].

      995 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [83].

      996 University of Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 SKCA 34 (CanLII) at [75].

      997 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1441.

      998 Gichuru v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2014 BCCA 259 (CanLII) at [43].

      999 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 201.

      1000 Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35 at [3] and [31]; Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37 at [12]. See also BC IPC Order F20-21 at [57].

      1001 Middelkamp v. Fraser Valley Real Estate Board, 1992 CanLII 4039 (BC CA) at [20]; Union Carbidesupra note 830 at [31]; Sablesupra note 830 at [2] and [17]; Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. v. Penn West Petroleum Ltd., 2013 ABCA 10 at [26] and BC IPC Order F20-21 at [57].

      1002 Reum Holdings Ltd. v. 0893178 B.C. Ltd., 2015 BCSC 2022 at [56], citing Sinclair v. Roy, 1985 CanLII 559 (BC SC) at 222. See also BC IPC Order F20-21 at [59].

      1003 CB, HK & RD v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local No. 21, 2017 CanLII 68786 (SK LRB) at [35]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 051-2024 at [111] to[117].

      1004 Langley (Township) v. Witschel, 2015 BCSC 123 at [34] to [40], applying Belanger v. Gilbert, 1984 CanLII 355 (BC CA). See also BC IPC F20-21 at [65].

      1005 Maillet v. Thomas Corner Mini Mart & Deli Inc., 2017 BCSC 214 at [1] to [17]; Jeffrie v. Hendriksen, 2012 NSSC 335 at [25] to [40]. See also BC IPC Order F20-21 at [65].

      1006 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1129.

      ‌1007 Originated from AB IPC Order F2008-021 at [110] and [111]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report LA-2014-003 at [17].

      1008 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-006 at [111].

      1009 Modified from Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 154.

      1010 Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39].

      ‌1011 Definition originated from ON Order P-210 at p. 18. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [97]. Definition also adopted by AB IPC in Order 96-017.

      1012 Definition originated from AB IPC Order 96-017 at [37]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [96]Adjusted to include “engaged by a government institution” in Review Report 171-2019 at [119].

      ‌1013 AB IPC Interim Decision Order F2018-D-01/Order F2018-38 at [153].

      1014 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 320.

      ‌1015 Previous definition from SK OIPC Review Report 125-2015 at [35].

      ‌1016 Information contained in a “post-it” note was found to be “information in correspondence between…a public body and any other person in relation to a matter involving the provision of advice…by the lawyer” in AB IPC Order 96-019 at [113].

      1017 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 78. 1018 Modified from Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 154.

      ‌1019 AB IPC Interim Decision Order F2018-D-01/Order F2018-38 at [151].

      1020 Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39].

      ‌1021 Definition originated from ON Order P-210 at p. 18. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [97]. Definition also adopted by AB IPC in Order 96-017.

      1022 Definition originated from AB IPC Order 96-017 at [37]. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-003 at [96]Adjusted to include “engaged by a government institution” in Review Report 171-2019 at [119].

      ‌1023 SK OIPC Review Report 251-2023 (June 7, 2024)

      ‌1024 SK OIPC Review Report 305-2023 (May 27, 2024) at [22] to [26]

      1025 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1518.

      ‌1026 Also see section 59 (Exercise of rights by other persons) in FOIP.

      1027 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      1028 Government of Saskatchewan, Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch, Verifying the Identity of an Applicant, September 2017, at p. 2.

      ‌1029 Also see section 59 (Exercise of rights by other persons) in FOIP.

      ‌1030 Adapted from ON IPC Order P-773. Ontario has a similar provision at subsection 49(c) of its Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31.

      ‌1031 AB IPC Order 98-021 at p.4.

      ‌1032 AB IPC Order 98-021 at p.4.

      1033 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      1034 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1434.

      1035 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 657. 1036 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1497. 1037 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices, 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 141.

      1038 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations, c. F-22.01 Reg. 1, s. 2(1)(b).

      ‌1039 AB IPC, Order 98-021 at p.5.

      1040 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      1041 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices, 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 141.

      1042 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 as am], s. 2(1)(b.1).

      1043 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104, SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌1044 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌1045 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      1046 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌1047 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; NS IPC Review Reports 17-03 at [34], 16-09 at [44]; PEI IPC Order FI-16-006 at [19].

      ‌1048 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌1049 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      1050 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40]; SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59]; ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8; BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌1051 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      ‌1052 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌1053 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      Chapter 5: Third Party Information

      Guide to FOIP Chapter 5

      Guide to FOIP

      The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

      Chapter 5 

      Third Party Information

      Table of Contents

      Overview 1

      Quick Reference 1: Third party timelines 2

      Quick Reference 2: Contracting with government institutions 4

      Section 2: Definition of a third party 9

      Section 19: Third party information 11

      Subsection 19(1)(a) 14

      Subsection 19(1)(b) 16

      Subsection 19(1)(c) 28

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(i) 29

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(ii) 35

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(iii) 40

      Subsection 19(1)(d) 45

      Subsection 19(1)(e) 48

      Subsection 19(1)(f) 51

      Subsection 19(2) 55

      Subsection 19(3) 56

      Section 29: Disclosure of Personal Information 64

      Subsection 29(2)(o): Disclosure of personal information 64

      Subsection 29(2)(o)(i) 64

      Subsection 29(2)(o)(ii) 71

      Section 34: Notice to third party 76

      Subsection 34(1)(a) 77

      The absence of standing 79

      Subsection 34(1)(b) 82

      The absence of standing 83

      Subsection 34(2) 86

      Subsection 34(2)(a) 86

      Subsection 34(2)(b) 88

      Subsection 34(3) 91

      Subsection 34(4) 93

      Section 35: Waiver of notice 94

      Section 36: Right to make representations 94

      Subsection 36(1)(a) 95

      Subsection 36(1)(b) 96

      Subsection 36(2) 99

      Section 37: Decision 99

      Subsection 37(1)(a) 101

      Subsection 37(1)(b) 102

      Subsection 37(2) 104

      Subsection 37(2)(a) 105

      Subsection 37(2)(b) 107

      Subsection 37(3) 108

      Subsection 37(4) 110

      Section 49: Application for review 112

      Subsection 49(1) 113

      Subsection 49(2) 114

      Subsection 49(3) 116

      Subsection 49(4) 117

      Section 52: Notice of application for review 120

      Section 53: Conduct of review 121

      Section 55: Report of commissioner 123

      Section 56: Decision of head 125

      Section 57: Appeal to court 127

      Overview

      The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) provides a right of access to all records under the possession or control of government institutions, subject to limited and specific exemptions. Some of the records to which FOIP applies contain information of third parties, such as private-sector businesses or individuals. Applicants often ask government institutions for access to records that contain third party business and personal information.1

      The term “third party information” is generally used to refer to information the disclosure of which might particularly affect a person or organization, other than the government from which it is sought. That person or organization is called a ‘third party” because they are not involved directly in the request for information, either as the applicant or the government institution that must respond to the request.2 This Chapter explains the various provisions in FOIP that deal with third party information.

      What follows is non-binding guidance. Every matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is not intended to be an exhaustive authority on the interpretation of these provisions. Government institutions may wish to seek legal advice. Government institutions should keep section 61 of FOIP in mind. Section 61 places the burden of proof for establishing that access to a record may or must be refused on the government institution.

      For more on the burden of proof, see Chapter 2: Administration of FOIP. This is a guide.

      The tests, criteria and interpretations established in this Chapter reflect the precedents set by the current and/or former Information and Privacy Commissioners in Saskatchewan through the issuing of Review Reports. Court decisions from Saskatchewan affecting The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIP) will be followed. Where this office has not previously considered a section of FOIP, the Commissioner looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. This includes other Information and Privacy Commissioners’ Orders, Reports and/or other relevant resources. In addition, court decisions from across the country are relied upon where appropriate.

      This Chapter will be updated regularly to reflect any changes in precedent. This office will update the footer to reflect the last update. Using the electronic version directly from our website will ensure you are always using the most current version.

      Quick Reference 1: Third party timelines

      If the government institution does not intend to disclose third party information, third party notice is not required. However, if the government institution intends to disclose, notice is required to the third party.

      The following is a quick reference for the time limits involved with third party information.3

      For more detail on each section below, refer to that section in this Chapter.

      The timelines set out in subsections 34(2), 36(1)(b), 37(1), 37(2), 37(3), 49(2), 49(4), and sections 56, and 57 of FOIP are fixed and there is no mechanism established within FOIP to formally modify or extend them.

      Step

      Step Description

      Time Limit

      1.

      Notice to Third Party (section 34)

      Wavier of Notice (section 35)

      Extension of Time (section 12)

      As soon as possible, but at least within 30 days of receipt of the access to information request (unless time limit is extended by section 12).

      2.

      Right to Make Representations

      (section 36)

      Government institution must have received representation from the third party within 20 days after Notice to Third Party is sent.

      3.

      Notice of Decision (section 37)

      Within 30 days after Notice to Third Party is sent.

      (Can also be articulated as 10 days after

       

      expiry of the 20 days for third party representation)

      The section 7 decision to the applicant can be combined with the section 37 response for efficiency.

      4.

      Request for Review of Decision

      (subsections 37(2)(b), 49(3) & 49(4))

      Within 20 days after Notice of Decision for third party.

      Within one year after Notice of Decision for applicant.

      5.

      Access to the Record (subsection 37(3))

      20 days after Notice of Decision, if no request for review by third party, the records may be released to the applicant. Check with IPC to see if a request for review has been received by the IPC.

      6.

      Report of Commissioner (section 55)

      If a review is requested by the applicant, a Review Report by the Commissioner will be issued. This may take several months to be issued.

      7.

      Decision of Head (section 56)

      30 days after issuance of Commissioner’s Review Report.

      8.

      Appeal to Court (section 57)

      30 days after receipt of Decision of the Head.

      9.

      Access to the Record

      If no appeal to the Court of King’s Bench after 30 days of the Decision of the Head, the head can release the records to the applicant.

      Quick Reference 2: Contracting with government institutions

      Common types of records that arise in access to information requests involving third party information are contracts and tender/bidding or proposal documents. The following is a quick reference guide for the precedent set by the Commissioner and the courts regarding contracts and tender/bidding or proposal documents.

      Topic

      Precedent

      Tender/bidding or proposal documents

      • Entire proposal packages submitted by third parties to a government institution in response to a Request for Proposals (RFPs) could constitute commercial information and be supplied explicitly in confidence if the RFP included a confidentiality clause.4

      • Contractors setting out to win government contracts through a confidential bidding process should not expect that the monetary terms will remain confidential if the bid succeeds. The public’s right to know how government spends public funds as a means of holding government accountable for its expenditures is a fundamental notion of responsible government that is known to all.5

      Contracts

      • Third parties and businesses need to know when they deal with government institutions supported by tax

      dollars that their contract will probably be released. No confidentiality clause, however well drafted, can override the law (i.e., FOIP).6

      • An agreement where the government institution contributed significantly to its terms would not qualify under this exemption because it is the result of negotiation between the parties and was also largely based on the criteria set out by the government institution in its request for proposals.7

      Subsection 19(1)(a)

      In Canadian Bank Note Limited v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, (2016), Justice Zarzeczny found that unit prices in a contract between Saskatchewan Government Insurance and a third party did not qualify as a trade secret.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(ii)

      Asserting disclosure would create a more competitive environment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a material financial loss or prejudice to a third party’s competitive position.8

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(iii)

      • Once a contract is executed, negotiation is concluded. The exemption would generally not apply unless, for instance, the same negotiation strategy will be used again, and it has not been publicly disclosed.9

      • The Federal Court in Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State) (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 58, interpreted the equivalent provision in the federal Access to Information Act as requiring that “it must refer to an obstruction to those negotiations and not merely the heightening of competition for thethird party which might flow from disclosure”.10 Further, a distinction must be drawn between actual contractual negotiations and the daily business operations of a third party.11

       

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsections 19(1)(b) and (c). For subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP, the Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate, and estimated cost per consultant was the financial and commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant were not supplied by the third party because they were part of the contract between Central Services and the third party and the result of negotiation between the parties. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply and recommended the information be released. For subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant would result in a competitor having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts, which would cause the third party to experience a competitive disadvantage. However, neither Central Services nor the third party provided anything further to support this assertion. The Commissioner also stated that the winning contractor would have access to the internal cost estimates in question as it is part of the current contract and that keeping these figures from the public, including other future bidders, would jeopardize competitive bidding processes. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP was also not properly applied by Central Services.

      In Review Report 031-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for all records relating to a Request for Proposals (RFP). SGI responded to the applicant indicating that access was partially granted to some records, but others were withheld pursuant to several exemptions including subsection 19(1)(b). The records at issue under subsection 19(1)(b) were hundreds of pages that constituted the actual proposals submitted to SGI by two separate third parties. There were also 87 pages worth of emails. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records contained financial, commercial, scientific, technical and labour relations information of the third parties. The Commissioner further found that the entire proposal packages of the two third parties constituted commercial information because the proposals were related to the buying or selling of goods and services. This approach was consistent with other jurisdictions including British Columbia (Order F09-22) and Ontario (MO-3179). The Commissioner went on to find that all the records were supplied by the third parties, including emails sent to SGI by the third parties. Finally, the Commissioner found that the records were supplied explicitly in confidence. This was based on the submissions of all the parties which indicated all the parties agreed on this fact (mutual understanding). Furthermore, the RFP included a confidentiality clause. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was appropriately applied by SGI to the proposals and the severed information in the emails.

      In Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision, subsection 18(1)(b), in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). An applicant had made an access to information request to the City of Regina (City) for a tender and contract related to a street infrastructure project. The records involved were two documents titled, Form of Tender. The applicant was only interested in the unit prices and total prices severed from the two documents. The City withheld this information in part under subsection 18(1)(b) of LA FOIP. The City asserted that the unit prices disclosed pricing and pricing practices of the third parties involved in a competitive contract award process. The Commissioner found the unit prices and total prices constituted commercial and financial information of the third parties. The City asserted that the tender package supplied by the City to bidders contained a blank Form of Tender. Bidders entered their specific data in Schedule A of the form and returned it to the City as part of their bid package. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the third parties supplied the unit prices and total prices. The City asserted that clause 19 of the Instructions to Bidders issued by the City indicated that financial and commercial information supplied by bidders would be supplied in confidence. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the unit pricing and total prices were supplied explicitly in confidence. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(b) of LA FOIP was appropriately applied.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including withholding the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the hourly rates for contracted services qualified as commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the third party did not supply the hourly rates for contracted services because they were provisions of a contract that were mutually generated through negotiation. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply. For subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the hourly rates could result in competitors having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts and result in undue loss to Solvera Solutions and prejudice its competitive position. The Commissioner found that the bids were evaluated based on several criteria and laid out the three stages used by Central Services at paragraph [44] of the report. As such, the selection was not based on price alone. Finally, the Commissioner found that releasing costs would increase the chances that a public body would, in the future, obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) did not apply to the hourly rates.

      In Review Report 229-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for information related to a contract for Centralized Driver License and Identification Card Production and Facial Recognition Services including contract price, price per card components, lump sum price components and card volume and contract term. SGI responded to the applicant indicating that some of the information was being withheld pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(b). The Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices constituted the commercial information of the third party. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices were terms of the contract that had been agreed to by both the third party and SGI and as such were mutually generated as part of the negotiation process. The Commissioner distinguished this case from Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, where the unit prices were provided on a blank Form of Tender provided by the City of Regina to bidders. The Commissioner noted that unlike the other case, the bidding process was concluded, the successful bidder was selected and a contract was already awarded. The Commissioner found that the unit prices and lump sum prices were not supplied by the third party but were negotiated terms of the contract that both parties agreed to. As the second part of the test was not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was not appropriately applied. The third party appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Court of King’s Bench where Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, considered the facts and circumstances in the de novo appeal, agreed that the information was commercial information of the third party but found that the unit prices were supplied to SGI by the third party.12

      Section 2: Definition of a third party

      Third party information 2(1) In this Act:

      (j) “third party” means a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution.

      FOIP defines a third party as a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution.13 This definition is broad and can include an individual, private business (e.g., sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, unincorporated association, or organization), non-profit group, trade union, syndicate or trust.

      However, it does not include applicants or government institutions14 which are defined by subsections 2(1)(a) and (d) of FOIP which provide:

      2(1) In this Act:

      (a) “applicant” means a person who makes an application for access to a record pursuant to section 6;

      (d) “government institution” means, subject to subsection (2):

      (i) the office of Executive Council or any department, secretariat or other similar agency of the executive government of Saskatchewan; or

      (ii) any prescribed board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, or any prescribed portion of a board, commission, Crown corporation or other body, whose members or directors are appointed, in whole or in part:

      (A) by the Lieutenant Governor in Council;

      (B) by a member of the Executive Council; or

      (C) in the case of:

      (I) a board, commission or other body, by a Crown corporation; or

      (II) a Crown corporation, by another Crown corporation;

      The definition of a third party under FOIP can also include a “local authority”, as defined by subsection 2(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act for purposes of FOIP.15

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 080-2018, the Commissioner determined, for the first time, that the Saskatchewan Health Authority (a local authority as defined by subsection 2(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act) could qualify as a “third party” for purposes of FOIP.

      In Review Report 244-2018, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Health and the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA) qualified as third parties pursuant to subsection 2(1)(j) of FOIP. The Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health did not qualify as a third party because it was a government institution. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the pCPA did not qualify as a third party. This was in part because the Ministry of Health had some control over the governance of the pCPA. As a result, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply to the records at issue. In West v Saskatchewan (Health), 2020 SKQB 244 (CanLII), the court stated at paragraph [65] that “pCPA does not appear to be either a “government institution” nor a “third party”, as defined by s. 1 of the Act.” The court noted that the origin of the documents is still relevant when considering the application of section 13(1)(b) of FOIP.

      Section 19: Third party information

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (a) trade secrets of a third party;

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that is supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, to a government institution by a third party;

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of; a third party;

      (d) a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution;

      (e) a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution; or

      (f) information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Section 19 of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based and harm-based provision, meaning it contains both class and harm-based exemptions. As a mandatory provision, the government institution has no, or more limited, discretion regarding whether or not to apply the exemption. That is, if the information is covered by the exemption and the conditions for the exercise of discretion do not exist, then it must not be disclosed.

      The provision is intended to protect the business interests of third parties and to ensure that government institutions are able to maintain the confidentiality necessary to effectively carry-on business with the private sector.16

      The Government of Saskatchewan collects a wide range of information from third parties. This information may be submitted voluntarily, such as in a bid for a government contract, or submitted as required by law, such as for proof of regulatory compliance. There is a compelling need to protect information that is provided to the government by third parties if the information falls within one of the enumerated exemptions under section 19 of FOIP.17

      Some common examples where government institutions may have possession or control of third party records include:

      • Records that have been provided under legislated or regulatory requirements.
      • Records including the personal information of individuals applying for benefits or services.
      • Records collected as part of a procurement of products or services.
      • Records containing expert advice.
      • Records gathered during public consultations.
      • Records created through public-private sector partnerships.18

      Although government institutions need to be open and accountable, they also need to conduct business and enter into business relationships; in doing so, they must be able to assure their private sector partners that their trade secrets and commercial and financial secrets will not be readily disclosed to competitors and the public.19

      The leading case authority in terms of third party information is Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012). At paragraph [23], the court recognized that a balance must be struck between the private interests of third parties and the public interest in the disclosure of information. The court commented:

      [23] Nonetheless, when the information at stake is third party, confidential commercial and related information, the important goal of broad disclosure must be balanced with the legitimate private interests of third parties and the public interest in promoting innovation and development. The Act strikes this balance between the demands of openness and commercial confidentiality in two main ways. First, it affords substantive protection of the information by specifying that certain categories of third party information are exempt from disclosure. Second, it provides procedural protection. The third party whose information is being sought has the opportunity, before disclosure, to persuade the institution that exemptions to disclosure apply…20

      Third parties doing business with public institutions must understand that certain information detailing the expenditure of public funds might be disclosed.21

      Third parties should be aware that the right of access to information under government control is available to every member of the public and cannot be restricted by considerations of motive or occupation. The only way motivation could be relevant is to establish a reasonable expectation of harm to third parties [subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP].22

      The information below is reproduced for ease of reference from Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access.

      Subsection 19(1)(a)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (a) trade secrets of a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(a) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains the trade secrets of a third party.

      The following test can be applied:

      Does the record contain trade secrets of a third party

      Trade secret is defined as information, including a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound, which possesses each of the four following characteristics:

      i) The information must be secret in an absolute or relative sense (is known only by one or a relatively small number of people);

      ii) The possessor of the information must demonstrate he/she has acted with the intention to treat the information as secret;

      iii) The information must be capable of industrial or commercial application; and

      iv) The possessor must have an interest (e.g., an economic interest) worthy of legal protection.23

      The information must meet all the above criteria to be considered a trade secret.

      The types of information that could potentially fall in this class include the chemical composition of a product and the manufacturing processes used. However, not every process or test would fall into this class, particularly when the process or test is common in a particular industry.24

      If the government institution determines that the information qualifies as a trade secret and it intends to withhold it, it should ask the third party if it consents to the release of the information pursuant to subsection 19(2). Consent should be in writing.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety, or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see Subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      In Canadian Bank Note Limited v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance, (2016), Justice Zarzeczny found that unit prices in a contract between Saskatchewan Government Insurance and a third party (Veridos Canada Ltd.) did not qualify as a trade secret.

      Subsection 19(1)(b)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that is supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, to a government institution by a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that was supplied in confidence to a government institution by a third party.

      The following three-part test can be applied:25

      1. Is the information financial, commercial, scientific, technical, or labour relations information of a third party

      Financial information is information regarding monetary resources, such as financial capabilities, assets, and liabilities, past or present. Common examples are financial forecasts, investment strategies, budgets, and profit and loss statements. The financial information must be specific to a third party.26

      Commercial information is information relating to the buying, selling or exchange of merchandise or services. This can include third party associations, past history, references and insurance policies and pricing structures, market research, business plans, and customer records.27

      Types of information included in the definition of commercial information can include:

      • Offers of products and services a third party business proposes to supply or perform;
      • A third party business’ experiences in commercial activities where this information has commercial value;
      • Terms and conditions for providing services and products by a third party;
      • Lists of customers, suppliers or sub-contractors compiled by a third party business for its use in its commercial activities or enterprises – such lists may take time and effort to compile, if not skill;
      • Methods a third party business proposes to use to supply goods and services; and
      • Number of hours a third party business proposes to take to complete contracted work or tasks.28

      Scientific information is information exhibiting the principles or methods of science. The information could include designs for a product and testing procedures or methodologies.29 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge in the natural, biological, or social sciences or mathematics. In addition, for information to be characterized as scientific, it must relate to the observation and testing of specific hypothesis or conclusions and be undertaken by an expert in the field. Finally, scientific information must be given a meaning separate from technical information.30

      Technical information is information relating to a particular subject, craft or technique. Examples are system design specifications and the plans for an engineering project.31 It is information belonging to an organized field of knowledge which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts. Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering, or electronics. It will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment or thing. Finally, technical information must be given a meaning separate from scientific information.32

      Labour relations information is information that relates to the management of personnel by a person or organization, whether or not the personnel are organized into bargaining units. It includes relationships within and between workers, working groups and their organizations as well as managers, employers and their organizations. Labour relations information also includes collective relations between a public body and its employees.

      Common examples of labour relations information are hourly wage rates, personnel contracts, and information on negotiations regarding collective agreements.33

      In the decision Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that administrative details such as page and volume numbering, dates and location of information within records do not constitute financial, commercial, scientific or technical information.34

      2. Was the information supplied by the third party to a government institution

      Supplied means provided or furnished.35

      Information may qualify as “supplied” if it was directly supplied to a government institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.36

      Information gathered by government inspectors via their own observations does not qualify as information “supplied” to the government institution. Judgements or conclusions expressed by officials based on their own observations generally cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party.37

      Records can still be “supplied” even when they originate with the government institution (i.e., the records still may contain or repeat information extracted from documents supplied by the third party). However, the third party objecting to disclosure will have to prove that the information originated with it and that it is confidential.38

      Whether confidential information has been “supplied” to a government institution by a third party is a question of fact. The content rather than the form of the information must be considered: the mere fact that the information appears in a government document does not, on its own, resolve the issue.39

      The following are examples of information not supplied by a third party:

      • Information that reflects the viewpoints, opinions or comments of government officials;
      • Reports resulting from factual observations made by government inspectors; and
      • The terms of a lease negotiated between a third party and a government institution.40

      The contents of a contract involving a government institution and a third party will not normally qualify as having been supplied by a third party. The provisions of a contract, in general, have been treated as mutually generated, rather than “supplied” by the third party, even where the contract is preceded by little or no negotiation or where the final agreement reflects information that originated from a single party.41

      An agreement where the government institution contributed significantly to its terms would not qualify under this exemption because it is the result of negotiation between the parties and was also largely based on the criteria set out by the government institution in its request for proposals.42

      There are two exceptions to the general rule of “mutually generated” information in contracts.43 If one of these exceptions apply, the information in a contract could be found to have been supplied by the third party:

      i) Inferred disclosure – where disclosure of the information in a contract would permit accurate inferences to be made with respect to underlying non-negotiated confidential information supplied by the third party to the public body;44 and

      ii) Immutability – information the third party provided that is immutable or not open or susceptible to change and was incorporated into the contract without change, such as the operating philosophy of a business, or a sample of its products.45

      3. Was the information supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly

      Supplied means provided or furnished.46

      In confidence usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the supplier of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated.47 In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the third party providing the information.48

      Implicitly means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement, or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.49

      Explicitly means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was supplied on the understanding that it would be kept confidential.50

      In order for subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP to apply, a government institution must show that both parties intended the information be held in confidence at the time the information was supplied.51

      The expectation of confidentiality must be reasonable and must have an objective basis.52 Whether the information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes and the circumstances in which it was compiled or communicated (Corporate Express Canada, Inc. v. The President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Gary Kachanoski, (2014)).

      Factors considered when determining whether a document was supplied in confidence implicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • What is the nature of the information. Would a reasonable person regard it as confidential. Would it ordinarily be kept confidential by the third party or the government institution.53
      • Was the information treated consistently in a manner that indicated a concern for its protection by the third party and the government institution from the point at which it was supplied until the present time.54
      • Is the information available from sources to which the public has access.55
      • Does the government institution have any internal policies or procedures that speak to how records such as the one in question are to be handled confidentially.
      • Was there a mutual understanding that the information would be held in confidence.

      Mutual understanding means that the government institution and the third party both had the same understanding regarding the confidentiality of the information at the time it was supplied. If one party intends the information to be kept confidential but the other does not, the information is not considered to have been supplied in confidence. However, mutual understanding alone is not sufficient. Additional factors must exist in addition.56

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments. The bare assertion that the information was supplied implicitly in confidence would not be sufficient.57

      Factors to consider when determining if a document was supplied in confidence explicitly include (not exhaustive):

      • The existence of an express condition of confidentiality between the government institution and the third party;58
      • The fact that the government institution requested the information be supplied in a sealed envelope and/or outlined its confidentiality intentions to the third party prior to the information being supplied.59

      The preceding factors are not a test but rather guidance on factors to consider. It is not an exhaustive list. Each case will require different supporting arguments.

      The Federal Court has summarized the following in terms of what is considered confidential:

      • It is an objective standard (based on facts).
      • It is not sufficient that the third party state, without further evidence, that the information is confidential.
      • Information has not been held to be confidential even if the third party considered it so, where it has been available to the public from other sources or where it has been available at an earlier time or in another form from government.
      • Information is not confidential where it could be obtained by observation albeit with more effort by the applicant.60

      Compulsory supply means there is a compulsory legislative requirement to supply information. Where supply is compulsory, it will not ordinarily be confidential. In some cases, there may be indications in the legislation relevant to the compulsory supply that establish confidentiality. The relevant legislation may even expressly state that such information is deemed to have been supplied in confidence.61 Where information is required to be provided, unless otherwise provided by statute, confidentiality cannot be built in by agreement, informally or formally.62

      Example: In Review Report 043-2015, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply because the third party was required to provide the information in question to the Ministry of Environment pursuant to The Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002, The Water Regulations and The Clean Air Act. As such, this constituted compulsory supply. In addition, these statutes did not have any confidentiality provisions related to the types of information in question.

      In the decision Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), (2012), the Supreme Court of Canada established that information is not confidential if it is in the public domain, including being publicly available through another source. To be confidential, the information must not be available from sources otherwise accessible by the public or obtainable by observation or independent study by a member of the public acting on his or her own. Information that has been published is not confidential. Further, information, which merely reveals the existence of publicly available information, cannot generally be confidential.63

      Contractors setting out to win government contracts through a confidential bidding process should not expect that the monetary terms will remain confidential if the bid succeeds. The public’s right to know how government spends public funds as a means of holding government accountable for its expenditures is a fundamental notion of responsible government that is known to all.64

      Simply labelling documents as “confidential” does not, on its own, make the documents confidential (i.e., confidentiality stamps or standard automatic confidentiality statements at the end of emails). It is just one factor that we consider when determining whether the information was explicitly supplied in confidence.65 The typical bottom of email “confidentiality” note is not sufficient to establish that information was supplied in confidence. Such notes are largely format and platitudes.66

      Government institutions cannot be relieved of their responsibilities under FOIP merely by agreeing via a confidentiality clause in a contract/agreement to keep matters confidential.67 Since a government institution cannot guarantee confidentiality if FOIP mandates disclosure, it should frame any contract provisions, representations or policies accordingly so third parties are informed prior to providing information to the government institution. This includes tenders, requests for proposals and other processes.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(b). The Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant was the financial and commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant were not supplied by the third party because they were part of the contract between Central Services and the third party and the result of negotiation between the parties. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 031-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for all records relating to a Request for Proposals. SGI responded to the applicant indicating that access was partially granted to some records, but others were withheld pursuant to several exemptions including subsection 19(1)(b). The records at issue under subsection 19(1)(b) were hundreds of pages that constituted the actual proposals submitted by two separate third parties to SGI. There were also 87 pages worth of emails. Upon review, the Commissioner found that the records contained financial, commercial, scientific, technical and labour relations information. The Commissioner further found that the entire proposal packages of the two third parties constituted commercial information because the proposals related to the buying or selling of goods and services. This approach was consistent with other jurisdictions including British Columbia (Order F09-22) and Ontario (MO-3179). The Commissioner went on to find that all the records were supplied by the third parties, including emails sent to SGI by the third parties. Finally, the Commissioner found that the records were supplied explicitly in confidence. This was based on the submissions of all the parties which indicated all the parties agreed on this fact (mutual understanding). Furthermore, the RFP included a confidentiality clause. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was appropriately applied by SGI to the proposals and the severed information in the emails.

      In Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision, subsection 18(1)(b), in LA FOIP. An applicant had made an access to information request to the City of Regina (City) for a tender and contract related to a street infrastructure project. The records involved were two documents titled, Form of Tender. The applicant was only interested in the unit prices and total prices severed from the two documents. The City withheld this information in part under subsection 18(1)(b). The City asserted that the unit prices disclosed pricing and pricing practices of the third parties involved in a competitive contract award process. The Commissioner found the unit prices and total prices constituted commercial and financial information of the third parties. The City asserted that the tender package supplied by the City to bidders contained a blank Form of Tender. Bidders entered their specific data in Schedule A of the form and returned it to the City as part of their bid package. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the third parties supplied the unit prices and total prices. The City asserted that clause 19 of the Instructions to Bidders issued by the City indicated that financial and commercial information supplied by bidders would be supplied in confidence. Based on this, the Commissioner found that the unit pricing and total prices were supplied explicitly in confidence. As all three parts of the test were met, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(b) of LA FOIP was appropriately applied.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including withholding the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(b). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the hourly rates for contracted services qualified as commercial information of the third party. However, the Commissioner found that the third party did not supply the hourly rates for contracted services because they were provisions of a contract that were mutually generated through negotiation. As all three parts of the test were not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply.

      In Review Report 229-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) for information related to a contract for Centralized Driver License and Identification Card Production and Facial Recognition Services including contract price, price per card components, lump sum price components and card volume and contract term. SGI responded to the applicant indicating that some of the information was being withheld pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(b). The Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices constituted the commercial information of the third party. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the price per unit and lump sum prices were terms of the contract that had been agreed to by both the third party and SGI and as such were mutually generated as part of the negotiation process. The Commissioner distinguished this case from Review Report 054-2015 and 055-2015, where the unit prices were provided on a blank Form of Tender provided by the City of Regina to bidders. The Commissioner noted that unlike the other case, the bidding process was concluded, the successful bidder was selected and a contract was already awarded. The Commissioner found that the unit prices and lump sum prices were not supplied by the third party but were negotiated terms of the contract that both parties agreed to. As the second part of the test was not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP was not appropriately applied. The third party appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Court of King’s Bench where Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, considered the facts and circumstances in the de novo appeal, agreed that the information was commercial information of the third party but found that the unit prices were supplied to SGI by the third party.68

      In Review Report 052-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b). An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) for a copy of an appraisal related to SaskPower’s purchase of land from the Global Transportation Hub. SaskPower responded to the applicant denying access to the appraisal citing subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP. The third party responsible for developing the appraisal provided a submission to the Commissioner for consideration. The third party asserted, in part, that release of the appraisal would infringe on the third party’s copyright to the integrity of its work in accordance with the Copyright Act, RSC 1985 c. C-42. The Commissioner did not agree with this line of reasoning. The Commissioner referred to subsection 32.1(1)(a) of the Copyright Act which provided that disclosing under access to information legislation is not an infringement of copyright. The Commissioner could not find that the information was technical information as asserted by the third party as insufficient evidence was provided. As the first part of the test was not met, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP did not apply to the appraisal.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based provision. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in the harms outlined at subsections 19(1)(c)(i), (ii) and (iii) of FOIP.

      Government institutions and third parties should not assume that the harms are self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(i)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (i) result in financial loss or gain to;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(i) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to result in financial loss or gain to a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. What is the financial loss or gain being claimed

      Financial loss or gain must be monetary, have a monetary equivalent or value (e.g., loss of revenue or loss of corporate reputation).69

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to result in financial loss or gain to a third party

      For this exemption to apply there must be objective grounds for believing that disclosing the information could result in loss or gain to a third party measured in monetary terms (e.g., loss of revenue).70

      The disclosure of information that is not already in the public domain that is shown to give competitors a head start in developing competing products, or to give them a competitive advantage in future transactions may, in principle, meet the requirements. The evidence would have to demonstrate that there is a direct link between the disclosure and the apprehended harm and that the harm could reasonably be expected to ensue from disclosure.71 However, asserting disclosure would create a more competitive environment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a material financial loss or prejudice to a third party’s competitive position.72

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could result in financial loss or gain to a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…73

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.74

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted based on fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…75

      Some relevant questions that may assist are:76

      • What kind of harm is expected from disclosure.
      • How will the loss or gain specifically occur.
      • How much money is involved.
      • Will the loss or gain affect the financial performance of the third party? How? To what degree.
      • How old is the information. If the information is not current, why would disclosure still adversely affect the third party.
      • Has similar information about the third party been made public in the past. If so, what was the impact. Was the impact quantifiable (e.g., lost sales or revenues).
      • Is information of this nature available about competitors of the third party.
      • Are there examples in other businesses where disclosure of similar information led to material financial loss or gain. If so, describe and quantify the financial loss or gain. Why is the situation parallel to that of this third party.
      • What actions could the third party take to counteract potential financial loss or gain knowing the information would be disclosed.

      In Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), the Federal Court stated that proof of harm for the equivalent provisions in the federal Access to Information Act, required reasonable speculation because “in many circumstances a party cannot rely on harm from past disclosures as evidence of reasonably expected harm because past disclosures of that type of evidence may never have occurred”. Nonetheless, the party seeking to exempt the information must put forward something more than internally held beliefs and fears. Forecasting evidence, expert evidence and evidence of treatment of similar elements of proof or similar situations are frequently accepted as a logical basis for the expectation of harm.77

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c). An applicant had made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). During the review, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant would result in a competitor having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts, which would cause the third party to experience a competitive disadvantage. However, neither Central Services nor the third party provided anything further to support this assertion. The Commissioner also stated that the winning contractor would have access to the internal cost estimates in question as it is part of the current contract and that keeping these figures from the public, including other future bidders, would jeopardize competitive bidding processes. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP was not properly applied by Central Services.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions that were over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). Specifically, Central Services withheld the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(c). Upon review, both Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the hourly rates could result in competitors having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts and result in undue loss to Solvera Solutions and prejudice its competitive position. The Commissioner found that the bids were evaluated based on several criteria and laid out the three stages used by Central Services at paragraph [44] of the report. As such, the selection was not based on price alone. Finally, the Commissioner found that releasing costs would increase the chances that a public body would, in the future, obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) did not apply to the hourly rates.

      In Review Report 236-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Water Security Agency (WSA) for copies of a report of the standing of each firm who submitted quotes to WSA in response to a Request for Quotes. Upon review, the WSA asserted that if the quotes were released to the applicant, it would result in financial loss for the third parties and result in a competitive advantage. Relying on Review Reports 007-2015 and 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner found that the risk of being underbid by competitors for future contracts did not meet the threshold for this provision. Releasing costs would increase the chances that the public body would obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(ii)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (ii) prejudice the competitive position of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(ii) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. What is the prejudice to a third party’s competitive position that is being claimed

      Prejudice in this context refers to detriment to the competitive position of a third party.78

      Competitive position means the information must be capable of use by an existing or potential business competitor, whether or not that competitor currently competes for the same market share. For example:

      • Information that discloses the profit margin on a private company’s operations;
      • Marketing plans, including market research surveys, polls; or
      • Information that reveals the internal workings of a private company.79

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to result in the prejudice

      The disclosure of information that is not already in the public domain that is shown to give competitors a head start in developing competing products, or to give them a competitive advantage in future transactions may, in principle, meet the requirements. The evidence would have to demonstrate that there is a direct link between the disclosure and the harm. Further, that the harm could reasonably be expected to ensue from disclosure.80 However, asserting disclosure would create a more competitive environment does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of a material financial loss or prejudice to a third party’s competitive position.81

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could prejudice the competitive position of a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…82

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.83

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted on the basis of fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…84

      Some relevant questions that may assist are: 85

      • Does the third party perceive that disclosure would likely prejudice its competitive position.
      • How would disclosure impact on the competitive position of the third party.‌
      • Would it have an adverse effect on sales or marketing. How.
      • Would disclosure reveal plans or strategy. If so, what kind of plans or strategy.
        • Product launch
        • Product approvals
        • Marketing plans
        • Business acquisitions
        • Asset acquisitions
        • Others
      • How would knowledge of these plans specifically prejudice the third party’s competitive position.
      • Is there an indication of how a competitor could use the information to its advantage, i.e., by developing competing pricing strategies.
      • Has the information or same subject matter been disclosed elsewhere.
        • Publications
        • In applications to government that are public
        • In the press
        • In annual reports, government filings
        • In public registries
      • How old is the information. If the information is not current, why would disclosure still adversely affect the third party.
      • Has similar information about the third party been made public in the past. If so, what was the impact. Was the impact quantifiable (e.g., lost sales or revenues).
      • Is information of this nature available about competitors of the third party.
      • Are there examples in other businesses where disclosure of similar information led to competitive prejudice. If so, describe and quantify the financial loss or gain. Why is the situation parallel to that of this third party.
      • What actions could the third party take to counteract potential competitive prejudice knowing the information would be disclosed.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety, or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) of later in this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 007-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c). An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for the Statement of Work attached to Information Technology Consulting Services Agreement ITO-12023. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that it was withholding portions of the Statement of Work pursuant to several provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). During the review, Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the estimated hours, hourly rate and estimated cost per consultant would result in a competitor having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts, which would cause the third party to experience a competitive disadvantage. However, neither Central Services nor the third party provided anything further to support this assertion. The Commissioner also stated that the winning contractor would have access to the internal cost estimates in question as it is part of the current contract and that keeping these figures from the public, including other future bidders, would jeopardize competitive bidding processes. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP was not properly applied by Central Services.

      In Review Report 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made two access to information requests to the Ministry of Central Services (Central Services) for all current active information technology service contracts with a maximum value of over $1 million and any between Central Services and Solvera Solutions that were over $1 million. Central Services responded to the applicant advising that some of the information in the contracts was being withheld under various provisions of FOIP including subsection 19(1)(c). Specifically, Central Services withheld the hourly rates for contracted services pursuant to subsection 19(1)(c). Upon review, both Central Services and the third party asserted that releasing the hourly rates could result in competitors having the ability to provide a lower rate for future contracts and result in undue loss to Solvera Solutions and prejudice its competitive position. The Commissioner found that the bids were evaluated based on several criteria and laid out the three stages used by Central Services at paragraph [44] of the report. As such, the selection was not based on price alone. Finally, the Commissioner found that releasing costs would increase the chances that a public body would, in the future, obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process. The Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) did not apply to the hourly rates.

      In Review Report 236-2017, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the Water Security Agency (WSA) for copies of a report of the standing of each firm who submitted quotes to WSA in response to a Request for Quotes. Upon review, the WSA asserted that if the quotes were released to the applicant, it would result in financial loss for the third parties and result in a competitive advantage. Relying on Review Reports 007-2015 and 195-2015 and 196-2015, the Commissioner found that the risk of being underbid by competitors for future contracts did not meet the threshold for this provision. Releasing costs would increase the chances that the public body would obtain fair bids and a competitive bidding process.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(iii)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (c) information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to:

      (iii) interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(c)(iii) of FOIP is a mandatory, harm-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Are there contractual or other negotiations occurring involving a third party

      A negotiation is a consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter. It can also be defined as dealings conducted between two or more parties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.86 It connotes a more robust relationship than “consultation”. It signifies a measure of bargaining power and a process of back-and-forth, give-and-take discussion.87

      Prospective or future negotiations could be included within this exemption, if they are foreseeable.88 It may be applied even though negotiations have not yet started at the time of the access to information request, including when there has not been any direct contact with the other party or their agent. However, a vague possibility of future negotiations is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable fact-based expectation that the future negotiations will take place.89

      Once a contract is executed, negotiation is concluded. The exemption would generally not apply unless, for instance, the same strategy will be used again, and it has not been publicly disclosed.90

      2. Could release of the record reasonably be expected to interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party

      Interfere means to hinder or hamper.91

      “Could reasonably be expected to” means there must be a reasonable expectation that disclosure could interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the standard of proof for harms-based provisions as follows:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…92

      The government institution and third party do not have to prove that a harm is probable but need to show that there is a “reasonable expectation of harm” if any of the information were to be released. In British Columbia (Minister of Citizens’ Service) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2012), Bracken J. confirmed it is the release of the information itself that must give rise to a reasonable expectation of harm.

      Government institutions and third parties should not assume that the harm is self-evident. The harm must be described in a precise and specific way to support the application of the provision.

      The expectation of harm must be reasonable, but it need not be a certainty. The evidence of harm must:

      • Show how the disclosure of the information would cause harm;
      • Indicate the extent of harm that would result; and
      • Provide facts to support the assertions made.93

      Exemption from disclosure should not be granted based on fear of harm that is fanciful, imaginary or contrived. Such fears of harm are not reasonable because they are not based on reason…the words “could reasonably be expected” “refer to an expectation for which real and substantial grounds exist when looked at objectively”…94

      The Federal Court in Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State) (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 58, interpreted the equivalent provision in the federal Access to Information Act as requiring that “it must refer to an obstruction to those negotiations and not merely the heightening of competition for the third party which might flow from disclosure”.95 Furthermore, a distinction must be drawn between actual contractual negotiations and the daily business operations of a third party.96

      When determining whether disclosure could interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party, the following questions can be asked to assist:97

      • What negotiations would be affected by disclosure.
      • Are these negotiations ongoing.
      • Have the negotiations been concluded.
      • What stage are the negotiations at.
      • How long have they been going on.
      • What is the subject matter of the negotiations.
      • How would disclosure specifically interfere with the negotiations.
      • Does the information relate to an outstanding issue in the negotiations. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations on this issue.
      • Does the information relate to issues already resolved in the negotiations.
      • Would disclosure cause the issue to be reopened. Why.
      • Would it otherwise interfere with negotiations. How.
      • Is the information current. How old is the information.
      • Does it relate to events prior to the negotiations.
      • Does the other side of the negotiations already have this information. If not, have they asked for it.
      • Is the information commonly known in the industry.
      • Is the information reasonably available elsewhere. If so, how would disclosure interfere with negotiations.98

      Examples of information to which this exemption may apply include negotiating positions, options, instructions, pricing criteria and points used in negotiations.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) later in this Chapter.

      Subsection 19(1)(d)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (d) a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution;

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(d) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services from a government institution.

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for accounts for routine services rendered by a government institution to a third party.99 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, has a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record a statement of a financial account relating to a third party with respect to the provision of routine services

      A statement is a formal written or oral account, setting down facts, a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.100

      A “statement of a financial account” is not defined in FOIP. However, the following is helpful in interpreting what the Legislative Assembly intended by this phrase:

      A statement of account is a report issued periodically (usually monthly) by a creditor to a customer, providing certain information on the customer’s account, including the amounts billed, credits given, and the balance due;101 a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.102

      An accounting means a detailed statement of the debits and credits between parties to a contract or to a fiduciary relationship; a reckoning of monetary dealings.103

      An account means a record of financial expenditure and receipts; a bill taking the form of such a record.104

      Financial means of or pertaining to revenue or money matters.105

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.106 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.107Relating to” requires some connection between the information and the provision of routine services.108

      With respect to are words of the widest possible scope; the phrase is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters.109

      Routine means a regular course of procedure; an unvarying performance of certain acts; regular or unvarying procedure or performance.110

      Services means labour performed in the interest or under the direction of others; the performance of some useful act or series of acts for the benefit of another, usually for a fee; an intangible commodity in the form of human effort, such as labour, skill or advice.111

      FOIP defines a third party as a person, including an unincorporated entity, other than an applicant or a government institution.112 A “local authority”, as defined under subsection 2(f) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, can also qualify as a third party for purposes of FOIP.113

      2. Is the statement from a government institution

      FOIP defines a government institution at subsection 2(1)(d).

      The statement must be from the government institution to meet the second part of the test.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) later in this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 020-2016, the Commissioner considered the equivalent provision in LA FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to the City of Lloydminster (City) for a copy of a proposal submitted by a third party for waste disposal services. The City withheld the proposal in full citing several provisions of LA FOIP including subsection 18(1)(d). Upon review, the Commissioner found that the portions being considered under subsection 18(1)(d) of LA FOIP was background information about the third party. The information did not relate to a specific financial account and did not appear to be a statement of any kind. Therefore, the Commissioner found that subsection 18(1)(d) of LA FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(1)(e)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (e) a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution; or

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party.

      Subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP is a mandatory, class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution.

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for statements of financial assistance from a prescribed Crown corporation to a third party.114 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, have a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Is the record a statement of financial assistance

      A statement is a formal written or oral account, setting down facts, a document setting out the items of debit and credit between two parties.115

      Financial assistance means any economic benefit, such as a scholarship or stipend, given by one person or entity to another.116

      The exemption does not include records that merely list a company as having received a loan. It must include other details such as credits and debits to meet the definition of a statement of financial assistance.117

      2. Was the statement provided to a third party by a prescribed Crown corporation that is a government institution

      See the Appendix, Part I of the FOIP Regulations for prescribed Crown corporations.

      When considering subsection 19(1)(e), section 11 of the FOIP Regulations should be considered. Section 11 of the FOIP Regulations provides:

      Third party statements

      11 For the purposes of clause 19(1)(e) of the Act, the Agricultural Credit Corporation is prescribed as a Crown corporation the head of which is required to refuse to give access to a record that contains a statement of financial assistance provided to a third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP for the first time. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Agriculture for records related to the planning, share purchase and takeover of two businesses by Agri-Food Equity Fund in 1998. The Ministry responded to the applicant advising that the records were being withheld in full citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 19(1)(e). Upon review, the Ministry asserted that the correspondence and documents related to the provision of financial assistance to a business through the sale of the AgriFood Equity Fund (AFEF) shares. Furthermore, that the AFEF was part of the Agricultural Corporation of Saskatchewan (ACS), which was a prescribed Crown corporation under FOIP at the time. Finally, that the records detailed proposed shares for debt transactions, as well as the loans owed AFEF by two third parties. The Commissioner found that although some of the records qualified as a statement of financial assistance, the Ministry did not identify which third party benefited from the financial assistance. As such, the Commissioner found that the Ministry had not met the burden of proof in demonstrating that subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP applied to the records.

      In Review Report F-2014-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC) for cultivated and seeded acres claimed by tenants on the applicant’s land between 2001 and 2010 SCIC responded to the applicant indicating that the information was being withheld citing several provisions including subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP. Upon review, the SCIC asserted that the SCIC was a prescribed Crown corporation. Furthermore, the information related to financial assistance provided by SCIC to an Operator. The Commissioner found that no portion of the Seeded Acreage Reports appeared to be a statement of financial assistance. As such, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(e) of FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(1)(f)

      Third party information

      19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

      (f) information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      (2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      (3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of; a third party;

      Subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP is a mandatory class-based exemption. It permits refusal of access in situations where a record contains information supplied by a third party to support an application for financial assistance mentioned in clause (e).

      FOIP contains a unique exemption for applications for financial assistance from a prescribed Crown corporation to a third party.118 Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c-20, have a similarly worded provision.

      The following two-part test can be applied:

      1. Was the information to support an application for financial assistance

      The provision is intended to protect information that a third party provides to a Crown corporation, which supports its application for financial assistance.

      Support means to corroborate.119

      Application means a formal request to an authority.120

      Financial assistance means any economic benefit, such as a scholarship or stipend, given by one person or entity to another.121

      2. Was the information supplied by a third party

      Supplied means provided or furnished.122

      Information may qualify as “supplied” if it was directly supplied to a government institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.123

      Information gathered by government inspectors via their own observations does not qualify as information “supplied” to the government institution. Judgements or conclusions expressed by officials based on their own observations generally cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party.124

      Records can still be “supplied” even when they originate with the government institution (i.e., the records still may contain or repeat information extracted from documents supplied by the third party). However, the third party objecting to disclosure will have to prove that the information originated with it and that it is confidential.125

      Whether confidential information has been “supplied” to a government institution by a third party is a question of fact. The content rather than the form of the information must be considered; the mere fact that the information appears in a government document does not, on its own, resolve the issue.126

      Pursuant to subsection 19(2) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it with the written consent of the third party.

      Pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP, where a record contains third party information, the government institution can release it if disclosure is in the public interest and the information relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment. In addition, the public interest clearly outweighs in importance any financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or interference with contractual negotiations of the third party. For further guidance, see subsection 19(3) of this Chapter.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP for the first time. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Agriculture for records related to the planning, share purchase and takeover of two businesses by Agri-Food Equity Fund in 1998. The Ministry responded to the applicant advising that the records were being withheld in full citing several provisions under FOIP including subsection 19(1)(f). Upon review, the Ministry asserted that subsection 19(1)(f) applied to the project submissions provided by the third party which outlined proposals, plans, amount of debt, marketing plans, financial analysis statements etc. Furthermore, that the third party supplied sales figures, sales projections, losses incurred by the third party, projected losses, as well as information related to inspections and improvements. The Ministry asserted that this information was provided to request additional investment in the third party by AgriFood Equity Fund (AFEF). The Ministry asserted that the AFEF was part of the Agricultural Corporation of Saskatchewan (ACS), which was a prescribed Crown corporation under FOIP at the time. The Commissioner found that although the Ministry claimed the records were provided by the third party, it appeared the record was created by AFEF. Furthermore, that the record appeared to be commenting and making recommendations with respect to the third party’s need for financial assistance. AFEF was apparently a business unit of the Crown corporation. The Commissioner found that the record was supplied to the Ministry by another government institution. As such, the Commissioner found that the burden of proof was not met in establishing that subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP applied.

      In Review Report F-2014-002, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP. An applicant made an access to information request to Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC) for cultivated and seeded acres claimed by tenants on the applicant’s land between 2001 and 2010. SCIC responded to the applicant indicating that the information was being withheld citing several provisions including subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP. Upon review, the SCIC asserted that the SCIC was a prescribed Crown corporation. Furthermore, the information related to financial assistance provided by SCIC to an Operator. The Commissioner found that SCIC did not offer any evidence that the third party supplied the information in the Seeded Acreage Reports for the purposes of financial assistance. Due to the lack of persuasive argument and lack of evidence offered, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(f) of FOIP did not apply.

      Subsection 19(2)

      Third party information

      19(2) A head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) with the written consent of the third party to whom the information relates.

      Subsection 19(2) of FOIP provides that the government institution may give access to a record that contains third party information if the third party consents in writing to disclosure. The provision is intended to prevent situations where the government institution would be under an obligation to withhold a record when the third party agreed to disclosure.127

      If the government institution determines that the information qualifies as third party information, it should make a reasonable effort to seek the consent of the third party to disclose the requested information.128

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 133-2020, the Commissioner considered subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP. The Ministry of Highways and Infrastructure (Highways) withheld third party information from the applicant pursuant to this provision. The third party had indicated to Highways that it objected to the release of the information. However, upon review, the third party indicted to the Commissioner that it had “reviewed the records and [did] not object to the release of the records.” The Commissioner cited section 19(2) of FOIP, and recommended Highways release specific records related to that third party.

      Subsection 19(3)

      Third party information

      19(3) Subject to Part V, a head may give access to a record that contains information described in subsection (1) if:

      (a) disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment; and

      (b) the public interest in disclosure could reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh in importance any:

      (i) financial loss or gain to;

      (ii) prejudice to the competitive position of; or

      (iii) interference with contractual or other negotiations of;

      a third party.

      Subsection 19(3) of FOIP is a discretionary provision for the release of third party information in circumstances where the head of the government institution forms the opinion that disclosure “could reasonably be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection of the environment”.

      A government institution should consider subsection 19(3) when dealing with third party information. A government institution should first determine that the information is indeed third party information pursuant to one of the subsections outlined at subsection 19(1) of FOIP. If it is, then consider subsection 19(3).

      To properly apply the provision, government institutions should do the following:129

      i) Determine whether the information qualifies or might qualify for exemption pursuant to subsection 19(1).

      The public interest “override” comes into play only when all or part of a record falls within one or more of the classes of records described in subsection 19(1).

      ii) Determine whether the record is related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment.

      When undertaking the initial review of records, consider immediately whether a public interest “override” may come into play.

      iii) Consider whether disclosure of the record related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment may be in the public interest.

      iv) Send a notice to the third party pursuant to section 34 of FOIP.

      If the records are related to public health, public safety or protection of the environment, government institutions should ask the third party to provide not only representations as to why they consider the information to be exempted from disclosure, but also reasons why disclosure in the public interest should not outweigh in importance the injury involved. The government institution should be very clear about the type of information needed from the third party to decide.

      v) Analyze the representations of the third party.

      Once the representations have been received, government institutions should thoroughly analyze the arguments presented by the third party to justify subsection 19(1) exemptions.

      If the government institution accepts the third party’s representations as substantiating an exemption under subsection 19(1) of FOIP, it must then consider the representations made against disclosure in the public interest.

      Once a decision is made, the government institution should provide notification procedures as set out in section 37 of FOIP.

      The following three-part test can be applied:

      1. Does the information relate to public health, public safety or protection of the environment

      Relates to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.130 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.131Relating to” requires some connection between the information and public health, public safety or protection of the environment.132

      Public health means the health of the community at large, the healthful or sanitary condition of the general body of people or the community collectively; especially the methods of maintaining the health of the community, as by preventative medicine an organized care for the sick.133 Public health refers to the well-being of the public at large. This may include physical, mental or emotional health.134

      Public safety means the welfare and protection of the general public, usually expressed as a governmental responsibility.135

      Protection of the environment refers to guarding or defending natural surroundings, i.e., plants and animals. For example, it may be necessary to disclose the information of an industrial plant that is discharging toxic wastes into a waterway.136

      2. Could disclosure of the information reasonably be expected to be in the public interest

      There must be a public interest in disclosure of the information, not a private interest.

      Public interest is not black and white; it is a matter of degree. There is always a balance to be struck.137 In determining if there is a public interest, the following can be considered:138

      • Whose interests would be affected by disclosure other than the third party.
        • Individual
        • General
        • Describe affected group
      • Does the information concern an event/proposal/incident/condition involving health, safety or protection of the environment.
        • If so, what group in the public is affected by the event/proposal/incident/condition.
      • Is the event/proposal/incident/condition one which requires government approval.
      • Did it result in government enforcement activity or investigation.
      • Did it involve contravention or violation of standards in health, safety, and environmental protection.
        • Describe the extent of the danger or risk.
        • Who is affected by the danger or risk.
      • Has the danger or risk been alleviated.
        • To what extent.
        • When.
        • What was the degree of exposure to the danger or risk before it was alleviated.
        • For how long.
      • What was the impact of any past event/incident described in the record.
        • Describe the degree or extent.
      • What are the remaining effects or impacts.
      • Are people, animals or environment currently exposed to the dangers or risks arising from the event described in the information.
        • To what degree.
      • Have the issues described in the information been publicly examined elsewhere.
        • In an ongoing process.
      • Will the process likely result in disclosure of the information to the public or in public discussion of the information.
      • What are the dangers, if any, that would be caused by disclosure (aside from 19(1) harm).
        • What are they.
        • Why would they arise.

      Subsection 19(3) includes the requirement that the information could reasonably be expected to be in the public interest. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014). Although this part of the provision does not contemplate harm, the threshold proposed by the Supreme Court is instructive:

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      3. Could the public interest in disclosure reasonably be expected to clearly outweigh the importance of the financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive positions or interference with contractual relationships relating to a third party

      Clear means free from doubt; sure; unambiguous.139

      Use of the word “clearly” means the test is rigorous, limiting the applicability of the public interest “override”.140

      Outweigh means to be of more importance or value than something else.141

      In determining if the public interest clearly outweighs in importance the financial loss or gain, competitive prejudice, or interference in negotiations of a third party, the following can be considered:142

      • Quantify the financial loss or gain, prejudice to competitive position or degree of interference in negotiations of the third party.
      • In the case of information described in subsection 19(1), what degree of importance is attached to keeping the information confidential.
      • What is the nature of the relationship between the government institution and the third party, i.e., why did the third party supply the information to the government.
        • Voluntary
          • If so, what were the circumstances
        • Mandatory
      • Describe any chilling effect of disclosure, if any.
      • Describe any impact on the government relationship or duty to third party to maintain information in a confidential fashion.
      • What factors did the government institution consider in assessing whether subsection 19(3) applies.
      • Why did the government institution decide not to disclose pursuant to subsection 19(3).
      • Did the government institution consider the purposes of FOIP in its decision. For example, that it:
        • Provides for the right of access;
        • Government information should be available to the public; and
        • Necessary exemptions should be limited and specific.
      • Did the government institution consider:
        • The value of public education with respect to the subject matter of the information;
        • Public confidence in regulatory, enforcement or investigatory systems;
        • Need for public awareness of successes or failures of regulatory enforcement or investigatory systems; and
        • The need for public awareness of legislative or regulatory gaps or inadequacies in the areas of public health, safety, or environmental protection.
      • Were the interests of all groups interested in disclosure of the information considered.
        • How
      • What is the danger of further disclosure.
      • Was the decision not to apply subsection 19(3) based in part on a fear of public confusion.
        • If so, what would give rise to or cause the confusion.
      • Could the government institution take measures to reduce or eliminate the dangers.
        • Are there public relations measures.
        • Are there explanations that can be given.
        • Why could no other measures be taken.
      • Could the third party take measures (with respect to subsection 19(1) information) that could reduce the impact on them of disclosure.
        • What measures.
        • Why could no measures be taken.
      • Was the government’s own performance an issue in the consideration leading to a decision to not apply subsection 19(3).
      • Have there been any allegations of impropriety, negligence, cover-up or inadequacy about the government institution arising from the matters described in the records.
      • Has the government institution responded to these allegations.

      Subsection 19(3) includes the requirement that the public interest in disclosure “could reasonably be expected” to clearly outweigh in importance the harms listed. The meaning of the phrase “could reasonably be expected to” in terms of harm-based exemptions was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Service) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), (2014):

      This Court in Merck Frosst adopted the “reasonable expectation of probable harm” formulation and it should be used wherever the “could reasonably be expected to” language is used in access to information statutes. As the Court in Merck Frosst emphasized, the statute tries to mark out a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible. An institution must provide evidence “well beyond” or “considerably above” a mere possibility of harm in order to reach that middle ground: paras. 197 and 199. This inquiry of course is contextual and how much evidence and the quality of evidence needed to meet this standard will ultimately depend on the nature of the issue and “inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences”…

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered subsection 19(3) of FOIP in Review Report 043-2015. An applicant made an access to information request to the Ministry of Environment for the “2012 and 2013 Water and Air Quality Compliance Reports”. The Ministry withheld portions of the two reports citing subsections 19(1)(b) and (c) of FOIP (third party information). Upon review, the Commissioner found that subsection 19(1)(c) of FOIP applied to portions of the reports. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the public interest resulting from disclosure of the information would outweigh in importance, any financial loss or prejudice to the competitive position of the third party. As such, the Commissioner recommended the reports be released pursuant to subsection 19(3) of FOIP.

      Section 29: Disclosure of Personal Information

      Subsection 29(2)(o): Disclosure of personal information

      Disclosure of personal information

      29(2) Subject to any other Act or regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution may be disclosed:

      (o) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head:

      (i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure; or

      (ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates;

      Subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP is a discretionary provision for the release of personal information without consent in circumstances where the head of the government institution forms the opinion that the public interest “clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy” or where disclosure would “clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.”

      The provision provides government institutions with a tool to help them effectively balance an individual’s right to privacy with other important contextual interests.

      This provision is relevant for this Chapter as subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP provides that notice must be given to a third party individual where their personal information is being released pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP.

      Subsection 29(2)(o)(i)

      Disclosure of personal information

      29(2) Subject to any other Act or regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution may be disclosed:

      (o) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head:

      (i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure; or

      The head can disclose personal information in a record without the consent of the individual to whom it relates when it is deemed to be in the public interest to do so, more specifically, where the public interest in releasing outweighs any invasion of privacy.

      All three parts of the following test must be met:

      1. Is the information ‘personal information’

      In order for subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP to be engaged, there must be “personal information” involved as defined by subsection 24(1) of FOIP. Subsection 24(1) of FOIP starts with the following:

      24(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), “personal information” means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:

      Including means that the list of information that follows is incomplete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to qualify as personal information.143 As the provision uses the word “including”, the list of examples provided for at subsection 24(1) of FOIP (i.e., (a) through (k)) are not meant to be exhaustive. This means there can be other types of information that could qualify as personal information.

      So more broadly, to constitute personal information, two elements must be present:

      i. The information must be about an identifiable individual; and

      ii. The information must be personal in nature.144

      Information is about an identifiable individual if:

      • The individual can be identified from the information (e.g., name, where they live); or
      • The information, when combined with information otherwise available, could reasonably be expected to allow the individual to be identified.145

      About means on the subject of or concerning.146 About an identifiable individual means the information is not just the subject of something but also relates to or concerns the subject.147

      Identifiable means that it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information were disclosed.148 The information must reasonably be capable of identifying particular individuals because it either directly identifies a person or enables an accurate inference to be made as to their identity when combined with other available sources of information (data linking) or due to the context of the information in the record.149

      FOIP uses the words “person” and “individual” in various sections of the Act. Each word has different meanings. Subsection 24(1) of FOIP uses “individual”.

      Individual means natural persons (human beings).150 Use of the word individual in this provision makes it clear that the protection provided relates only to a natural person or human being.151 Therefore, a business or corporation would not constitute an “individual” for purposes of subsection 24(1) of FOIP.

      Person is the broader term and means individual but also includes a corporation and their heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person.152

      Personal in nature means of, affecting or belonging to a particular person; of or concerning a person’s private rather than professional life.153

      For more on what constitutes personal information, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for a detailed breakdown of subsections 24(1)(a) through (k) of FOIP.

      2. Is there a public interest in the information

      Public Interest – the government institution should first ask – is there a relationship between the record and the Act’s central purpose of shedding light on the operations of government? Consider whether the information in the record serves the purpose of informing or enlightening the citizenry about the activities of their government or its agencies, adding in some way to the information it has to make effective use of when expressing public opinion or making political choices.154

      Some further things to consider regarding public interest:

      • Is there another public process or forum established to address public interest considerations.155
      • Has a significant amount of information already been disclosed, and it is adequate to address any public interest considerations.156
      • Is there already wide public coverage or debate of the issue and disclosing the records would not shed further light on the matter.157

      A public interest does not exist where the interests being advanced are essentially private in nature. However, where a private interest in disclosure raises issues of more general application, a public interest may be found to exist.158

      A public interest may not exist where a court process provides an alternative disclosure mechanism, and the reason for the request is to obtain records for a civil or criminal proceeding.159

      A public interest is not automatically established where the applicant is a member of the media.160

      The government institution should be able to clearly identify what the public interest would be.

      3. Does the public interest clearly outweigh any invasion of privacy

      Public interest is not black and white; it is a matter of degree. There is always a balance to be struck.161

      If a public interest is found to exist, the government institution must weigh that public interest against the personal privacy interests of the individuals whose personal information appears in the record. The public interest must be found to “clearly outweigh” any invasion of privacy that would result from disclosure.

      Clear means free from doubt; sure; unambiguous.162

      Clearly outweigh: If a public interest is established, it must then be balanced against the purpose of the exemption that has been found to apply to determine whether it clearly outweighs that purpose. The public interest override provision recognizes that while exemptions serve to protect valid interests, they must occasionally yield to an overriding public interest to access the information that has been requested.163

      An important consideration when determining whether the public interest in releasing the information clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption is the extent to which denying access to the information in the circumstances would be consistent with the very purpose of the exemption.164

      Some things to consider regarding any invasion of privacy:

      • Consider the representations made by the affected individuals arguing against disclosure.
      • Should the affected individuals’ privacy rights be given preference over the public interest that exists in disclosing the record.

      The federal Privacy Act has a substantially similar provision. Subsection 8(2)(m)(i) of the Privacy Act also considers whether “the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy”. The federal Privacy Commissioner established an invasion of privacy test. Government institutions can apply this test to determine the level of privacy risk in the disclosure.165 The test involves three interrelated risk factors that will help government institutions determine whether the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy:

      a. Sensitivity of the information

        • Consider whether the type of information is of a detailed (e.g., name and address) or highly personal (e.g., health information) nature.
        • Evaluate the context in which the information was collected and determine whether any contextual sensitivities apply to the information. For example, a list of public servants may not be considered particularly sensitive, but that same list, if collected to identify employees having a specific illness would be considered sensitive based on the context.

      b. Expectations of the individual

        • Evaluate the conditions under which the personal information was collected and consider what expectations the collecting institution may have established for its confidentiality, including whether the possibility of disclosure is conveyed in an applicable Privacy Notice Statement.
        • Consider the reasonable expectations of privacy that apply to the context in which the information was collected. To determine what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts will look at the totality of circumstances. This could include location of collection (e.g., in a private conversation as compared to a public town hall), context of collection (e.g., in a routine application for services as compared to a letter sent to several government ministers), etc.

      c. Probability and degree of injury

        • Consider the probability and degree or gravity of injury relative to the benefits of the disclosure to the public. This could include personal or physical injury, or damage to the reputation of an individual or others, which causes adverse consequences (e.g., any harm or embarrassment that negatively affects an individual’s career, reputation, financial position, safety, health or well-being).
        • Determine the potential of injury if the receiving party wrongfully disclosed the information further.166

      If disclosing under this provision, government institutions should be careful not to disclose more personal information than is necessary for the purpose (i.e., abide by the data minimization principle, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for more information).

      Where the government institution intends to rely on this provision to release personal information in response to an access to information request, notification is required to the individual(s) pursuant to the third party notification requirements outlined at section 34 of FOIP. See Section 34: Notice to third party later in this Chapter for more on notification requirements.

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered the equivalent subsection in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) in Investigation Report 092-2015 to 095-2015. The investigation involved the collection and disclosure of a care aide’s personal information. The Commissioner found that there was a public interest in the release of the information and that the public interest outweighed any invasion of privacy.

      In Review Report LA-2013-001, the Commissioner considered whether opinion evidence that was integral to an overall record of a harassment investigation should be released to the applicant. The record included opinions of individuals other than the applicant and the applicant was the alleged harasser. The Commissioner, bound by the decision in Liick v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Health), 1994 CanLII 4934 (SK QB), found that the personal information of the other individuals in the investigation record should be released to the applicant because release would clearly benefit the applicant and the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighed any invasion of privacy that could result from disclosure. The Commissioner recommended release of the entire record with the exception of the personal health information of other individuals and information subject to subsection 14(1)(d) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      Subsection 29(2)(o)(ii)

      Disclosure of personal information

      29(2) Subject to any other Act or regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution may be disclosed:

      (o) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head:

      (ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates;

      The head can disclose personal information in a record without the consent of the individual to whom it relates when it is deemed disclosure would clearly benefit the individual.

      All three parts of the following test must be met:

      1. Is the information ‘personal information’

      In order for subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP to be engaged, there must be “personal information” involved as defined by subsection 24(1) of FOIP. Subsection 24(1) of FOIP starts with the following:

      24(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), “personal information” means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:

      Including means that the list of information that follows is incomplete (non-exhaustive). The examples in the provision are the types of information that could be presumed to qualify as personal information.167 As the provision uses the word “including”, the list of examples provided for at subsection 24(1) of FOIP (i.e., (a) through (k)) are not meant to be exhaustive. This means there can be other types of information that could qualify as personal information.

      So more broadly, to constitute personal information, two elements must be present:168

      i. The information must be about an identifiable individual; and

      ii. The information must be personal in nature.

      Information is about an identifiable individual if:

      • The individual can be identified from the information (e.g., name, where they live); or
      • The information, when combined with information otherwise available, could reasonably be expected to allow the individual to be identified.169

      About means on the subject of or concerning.170 About an identifiable individual means the information is not just the subject of something but also relates to or concerns the subject.171

      Identifiable means that it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information were disclosed.172 The information must reasonably be capable of identifying particular individuals because it either directly identifies a person or enables an accurate inference to be made as to their identity when combined with other available sources of information (data linking) or due to the context of the information in the record.173

      FOIP uses the words “person” and “individual” in various sections of the Act. Each word has different meanings. Subsection 24(1) of FOIP uses “individual”.

      Individual means natural persons (human beings).174 Use of the word individual in this provision makes it clear that the protection provided relates only to a natural person or human being.175 Therefore, a business or corporation would not constitute an individual for purposes of subsection 24(1) of FOIP.

      Person is the broader term and means individual but also includes a corporation and their heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person.176

      Personal in nature means of, affecting or belonging to a particular person; of or concerning a person’s private rather than professional life.177

      For more on what constitutes personal information, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for a detailed breakdown of subsections 24(1)(a) through (k) of FOIP.

      2. Does the personal information relate to the individual

      To relate to means connected in some way; having relationship to or with something else.178

      Relating to should be given a plain but expansive meaning.179 The phrase should be read in its grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements (such as “substantial connection”) for its application, which would be inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.180To whom the information relates” requires some connection between the individual and the personal information in the record.181

      Generally, the information at issue would be the personal information of the individual for it to relate to them under Part IV of FOIP.

      3. Would disclosure clearly benefit the individual Clear means free from doubt; sure; unambiguous.182

      Benefit means a favourable or helpful factor or circumstance; advantage, profit.183

      Government institutions should be careful not to disclose more personal information than is necessary for the purpose (i.e., abide by the data minimization principle, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for more information).

      Where a government institution intends to rely on this provision to release personal information, notification is required to the individual to whom the information relates pursuant to the third party notification requirements outlined at subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP.

      IPC Findings

      The Commissioner considered the equivalent subsection in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP) in Investigation Report 092-2015 to 095-2015. The investigation involved the collection and disclosure of a care aide’s personal information. The Commissioner found that there was a public interest in the release of the information and that the public interest outweighed any invasion of privacy.

      In Review Report LA-2013-001, the Commissioner considered whether opinion evidence that was integral to an overall record of a harassment investigation should be released to the applicant. The record included opinions of individuals other than the applicant and the applicant was the alleged harasser. The Commissioner, bound by the decision in Liick v.

      Saskatchewan (Minister of Health), 1994 CanLII 4934 (SK QB), found that the personal information of the other individuals in the investigation record should be released to the applicant because release would clearly benefit the applicant and the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighed any invasion of privacy that could result from disclosure. The Commissioner recommended release of the entire record with the exception of the personal health information of other individuals and information subject to subsection 14(1)(d) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      Section 34: Notice to third party

      Notice to third party

      34(1) Where a head intends to give access to a record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (a) information described in subsection 19(1) that affects the interest of a third party; or

      (b) personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to clause 29(2)(o) and that relates to a third party;

      and in the opinion of the head, the third party can reasonably be located, the head shall give written notice to the third party in accordance with subsection (2).

      (2) The notice mentioned in subsection (1):

      (a) is to include:

      (i) a statement that:

      (A) an application for access to a record described in subsection (1) has been made; and

      (B) the head intends to give access to the record or to part of it;

      (ii) a description of the record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (A) information described in subsection 19(1) that affects the interest of the third party; or

      (B) personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to clause 29(2)(o) and that relates to the third party; and

      (iii) a statement that the third party may, within 20 days after the notice is given, make representations to the head as to why access to the record or part of the record should not be given; and

      (b) subject to subsection (3), is to be given within 30 days after the application is made.

      (3) Section 12 applies, with any necessary modification, to the extension of the period set out in clause (2)(b).

      (4) Where, in the opinion of the head, it is not reasonable to provide a notice to a third party pursuant to subsection (1), the head may dispense with the giving of notice.

      When reviewing a responsive record, government institutions may encounter information that appears to be about a third party. This includes third party information as described in subsection 19(1) of FOIP and personal information the government institution intends to disclose pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP.

      Section 34 of FOIP lays out who should receive notice and what the notice should include.

      In Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2012] 1 SCR 23, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the requirement to provide notice and the nature of the review to be performed by the head of a government institution. In that case, the Court was considering the third party notice provision in the federal Access to Information Act (s. 27(1)) which has similar wording to section 34 of FOIP. In the court’s view, the head must conduct a sufficient review of the requested material in order to decide if the threshold for notice has been met:

      [84] To sum up my conclusions on s. 27(1):

      (i) With respect to third party information, the institutional head has equally important duties to disclose and not to disclose and must take both duties equally seriously.

      (ii) The institutional head:

          • should disclose third party information without notice only where the information is clearly subject to disclosure, that is, there is no reason to believe that it is exempt;
          • should refuse to disclose third party information without notice where the information is clearly exempt, that is, where there is no reason to believe that the information is subject to disclosure.

      (iii) The institutional head must give notice if he or she:

          • Is in doubt about whether the information is exempt, in other words if the case does not fall under the situations set out in point (ii);
          • Intends to disclose exempted material to serve the public interest pursuant to s. 20(6) [disclosure in the public interest]; or
          • Intends to disclose severed material pursuant to s. 25 [severability].184

      Subsection 34(1)(a)

      Notice to third party

      34(1) Where a head intends to give access to a record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (a) information described in subsection 19(1) that affects the interest of a third party;

            or

      and in the opinion of the head, the third party can reasonably be located, the head shall give written notice to the third party in accordance with subsection (2).

      Subsection 34(1)(a) of FOIP requires that where a government institution intends to release information that might constitute third party information pursuant to subsection 19(1) of FOIP, the third party must be informed if the third party can reasonably be located.

      It is important to note that if the government institution does not intend to release the third party information, no notice is required to the third party. If the government institution intends to withhold, then it is inappropriate practice to give third party notice as it causes unnecessary delay in the process.

      The following steps can be taken for subsection 34(1)(a) of FOIP:

      1.Is the information third party information

      Determine if the information at issue constitutes third party information pursuant to subsection 19(1) of FOIP. For assistance with section 19, see Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access for more information on the interpretation and tests to apply for subsections 19(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of FOIP.

      a. No, it is not third party information…

      Where the head of the institution concludes that the information at issue does not fit the circumstances in subsection 19(1) of FOIP, notice to a third party is not required and the information can be released or considered for exemption under another provision of FOIP. A third party would not have a right to apply to the Commissioner for review under subsection

      49(3) of FOIP where the head of the government institution determined the information at issue was not third party information under subsection 19(1) of FOIP.185

      The absence of standing

      If a government institution concludes that a particular request is not likely to involve third party information, it is not required to give notice to anyone before deciding in favour of disclosure. A person potentially affected by the release of the requested information might maintain:

      • That the institution was wrong in its preliminary conclusion about the nature of the information, and
      • That the decision to disclose was in error.

      However, that person, for lack of third party status, will usually be without standing to obtain a review of any determination made by the government institution. The institution may have erred in not recognizing a third party interest, yet there is no statutory remedy in those circumstances. Review is generally open only to someone whom the institution was prepared to treat as a third party entitled to make representations in the context of its consideration of the request for information.186

      b. Yes (or maybe), it is third party information…

      If subsection 19(1) of FOIP appears to apply, the head of the government institution must decide whether to release the third party information or withhold it from release. It may not have a decision made yet on whether it will release, or it may not be sure it is third party information so it may want to hear from the third party first (i.e., representations as per s. 36).

      Make sure to identify all potential third parties. If the records engage the interests of multiple third parties, the most practical method of working with the time limits is to ensure that all third parties have been identified before beginning the notification process, then to send out all the notices at the same time.187

      If releasing, notice to the third party is required

      • Additional time for third party notice may be permitted under subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP where the government institution intends to release the third party information. Applicants must be advised of this extension within the initial 30-day period pursuant to subsection 12(2) of FOIP and the entire process must be completed within a maximum of 60 days from the date the access to information request was received (i.e., the section 7 decision and/or section 37 decision to the applicant must be sent by the 60th day at the latest). For more information on extensions of time for third party notice, see Chapter 3: Access to Records at section 12.
      • Consider whether subsection 19(2) of FOIP can be relied upon for release. In other words, does the government institution have written consent from the third party to release the information? A request for consent should be included when drafting the notice to the third party. See subsection 34(2) below for more information on what to include in the notice. The third party may consent to release of the information, or it may wish to make representations to the government institution pursuant to section 36 of FOIP on why the information should be withheld.
      • Consider if subsection 19(3) of FOIP has any application. Subsection 19(3) of FOIP provides that third party information can be released if the circumstances described in subsections 19(3)(a) and (b) of FOIP apply. The notice to the third party can include notice that subsection 19(3)(a) and (b) of FOIP has been found to apply. The third party may consent to release of the information, or it may wish to make representations to the government institution pursuant to section 36 of FOIP on why the information should be withheld. See below for more on section 36 of FOIP.

      To receive notice, the third party must be able to be located with reasonable effort by the government institution. A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person. What is reasonable depends on the information at issue and related circumstances. 188fIf the individual cannot reasonably be located; the government institution may dispense with giving notice pursuant to subsection 34(4) of FOIP. See below for more information on subsection 34(4) of FOIP.

      A government institution is expected to use only its own records and publicly available resources to locate an address for a third party.189

      If there is any doubt as to the third party’s contact information, the government institution may need to adapt its notification process to ensure there is no breach of privacy or confidentiality during the notification process.190

      Government institutions should choose a delivery method that is expeditious and convenient for the third party, but which is also efficient and cost effective for the government institution. Regular mail is not recommended. Government institutions should consider sending notice and a copy of the third party information at issue via courier or priority post. Prompt delivery will allow the third party as much time as possible to respond. If sending notice and records by fax or email, care should be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosure of third party personal information.191

      Government institutions should let the applicant know that third party notification is required pursuant to section 34 of FOIP. The letter to the applicant should advise them of the timelines involved. For a sample model letter see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample titled, 12 Advising Applicant of Third Party Notification – Response Records May Contain Third Party Information.

      If withholding the third party information, no notice is required

      Subsection 34(1)(b)

      Notice to third party

      34(1) Where a head intends to give access to a record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (b) personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to clause 29(2)(o) and that relates to a third party;

      and in the opinion of the head, the third party can reasonably be located, the head shall give written notice to the third party in accordance with subsection (2).

      Subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP requires that where a government institution intends to disclose personal information that relates to a third party individual (someone other than the applicant) under subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP, the third party individual must be informed if they can reasonably be located. Subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP provides as follows:

      29(2) Subject to any other Act or regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government institution may be disclosed:

      (o) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head:

      (i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure; or

      (ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates;

      The following steps can be taken for subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP:

      1. Is the information third party personal information

      Determine if the information at issue constitutes third party (someone other than the applicant) “personal information” as defined by subsection 24(1) of FOIP. For assistance with subsection 24(1) of FOIP, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for the interpretation of and tests to apply for subsection 24(1) of FOIP.

      a. No, it is not third party personal information…

      Where the head of the government institution concludes that the information at issue does not qualify as the personal information of a third party individual, subsection 34(1)(b) of FOIP does not apply. The information can be released or considered for exemption under another provision of FOIP. A third party would not have a right to apply to the Commissioner for review under subsection 49(3) of FOIP where the head of the government institution determined the information at issue was not third party personal information under subsection 24(1) of FOIP.192

      The absence of standing

      If a government institution concludes that a particular request is not likely to involve third party personal information, it is not required to give notice to anyone before deciding in favour of disclosure. A person potentially affected by the release of the requested information might maintain:

      • That the institution was wrong in its preliminary conclusion about the nature of the information, and
      • That the decision to disclose was in error.

      However, that person, for lack of third party status, will usually be without standing to obtain a review of any determination made by the government institution. The institution may have erred in not recognizing a third party interest, yet there is no statutory remedy in those circumstances. Review is generally open only to someone whom the institution was prepared to treat as a third party entitled to make representations in the context of its consideration of the request for information.193

      b. Yes, it is third party personal information…

      If the information is found to constitute the personal information of a third party individual (someone other than the applicant), the government institution can consider whether to disclose it pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP.

      Make sure to identify all potential third parties. If the records engage the interests of multiple third parties, the most practical method of working with the time limits is to ensure that all third parties have been identified before beginning the notification process, then to send out all the notices at the same time.194

      Subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP permits disclosure of personal information without the consent of the individual where the government institution has determined it is in the public interest to do so and the public interest outweighs any invasion of the individual’s privacy or where the government institution has determined that disclosure of the information would benefit the individual whom the information relates. For assistance with subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP, see Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy for the interpretation of and tests to apply for subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP.

      If subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP applies and the government institution intends to disclose the personal information, notice to the individual is required

      • Consider whether obtaining written consent from the individual is possible for the release of the information. With the written consent of the individual, personal information can be released without the need for reliance on subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP. It also reduces the likelihood of a review by the Commissioner.

      A request for consent could be included when drafting the notice to the individual. See subsection 34(2) below for more information on what to include in the notice. The individual may consent to release of the personal information, or they may wish to make representations to the government institution pursuant to section 36 of FOIP on why the personal information should be withheld. See below for more on section 36. Any consent received should be compliant with section 18 of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations.

      To receive notice, the individual must be able to be located with reasonable effort by the government institution. A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person. What is reasonable depends on the information at issue and related circumstances. 195fIf the individual cannot reasonably be located; the government institution may dispense with giving notice pursuant to subsection 34(4) of FOIP. See below for more information on subsection 34(4) of FOIP.

      Government institutions should choose a delivery method that is expeditious and convenient for the third party, but which is also efficient and cost effective for the government institution. Regular mail is not recommended. Government institutions should consider sending notice and a copy of the third party information at issue via courier or priority post. Prompt delivery will allow the third party as much time as possible to respond. If sending notice and records by fax, care should be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosure of third party personal information.196

      If withholding the third party personal information, no notice is required

      • In other words, if the government institution has decided it will not disclose the personal information pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP, no notice is required to be provided to the individual.

      It should be noted that withholding an applicant’s own personal information can produce an absurd result 197and is contrary to subsection 31(1) of FOIP. There are limited circumstances where this type of information can be withheld (see subsection 31(2) of FOIP). For assistance with section 31, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      Subsection 34(2)

      Notice to third party

      34(2) The notice mentioned in subsection (1):

      (a) is to include:

      (i) a statement that:

      (A) an application for access to a record described in subsection (1) has been made; and

      (B) the head intends to give access to the record or to part of it;

      (ii) a description of the record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (A) information described in subsection 19(1) that affects the interest of the third party; or

      (B) personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to clause 29(2)(o) and that relates to the third party; and

      (iii) a statement that the third party may, within 20 days after the notice is given, make representations to the head as to why access to the record or part of the record should not be given; and

      (b) subject to subsection (3), is to be given within 30 days after the application is made.

      Subsection 34(2) of FOIP provides that the notice provided to third parties must contain specific elements and the timeline that the notice must be provided by. This is broken down further below.

      Subsection 34(2)(a)

      Notice to third party

      34(2) The notice mentioned in subsection (1):

      (a) is to include:

      (i) a statement that:

      (A) an application for access to a record described in subsection (1) has been made; and

      (B) the head intends to give access to the record or to part of it;

      (ii) a description of the record that the head has reason to believe may contain:

      (A) information described in subsection 19(1) that affects the interest of the third party; or

      (B) personal information that may be disclosed pursuant to clause 29(2)(o) and that relates to the third party; and

      (iii) a statement that the third party may, within 20 days after the notice is given, make representations to the head as to why access to the record or part of the record should not be given; and

      Where notice is required under subsection 34(1) of FOIP, the notice should be in writing and contain the elements outlined at subsection 34(2)(a) of FOIP. This includes the following elements:

      1. A statement advising the third party that an application for access has been made. This provides some context for a third party as to why it is receiving the notice (s. 34(2)(a)(i)(A)).

      2. A statement advising the third party that the government institution intends to give access to the information (s. 34(2)(a)(i)(B)). This tells the third party what the government institution’s intentions are.

      3. A description of the record containing the third party information (s. 34(2)(a)(ii)(A) or the third party personal information (s. 34(2)(a)(ii)(B)). This tells the third party what information pertains to them.

      Although FOIP requires a description of the record, the IPC recommends the government institution provide a copy of the records containing the third party information. This is considered best practice and would make it easier for a third party to understand what information is at issue and what decision it should make in terms of consent to release. If a record that is the subject of a third party notice contains personal information of other third parties, it may be best to simply describe the record in the notice. If a government institution sends a third party a record that contains personal information of other third parties, the government institution risks the unintentional and unauthorized disclosure of that personal information.198

      4. A statement that the third party may, within 20 days, make representations (arguments) to the government institution as to why access to the information should not be given (s 34(2)(a)(iii) of FOIP. This tells the third party what it can do if it does not agree with the government institution’s intentions.

      5. The government institution should include a sentence requesting the third party advise it if it consents to the release of the information or personal information. If the third party does decide to consent to release, this saves the government institution from waiting for 20 days to see if representations arrive. NOTE: this is not required by subsection 34(2) of FOIP. However, it is efficient and a good practice to cover subsections 19(2) (third party information) and 29(1) (personal information) of FOIP.

      For a sample model letter199 see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample titled, 14 Notification under Section 34 to Third Party Regarding Section 19 [ss 19(3)] – Records Contain Third Party Information.

      For release of personal information pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP, see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample letter titled, 15 Notification under Section 34 to Third Party Regarding Disclosure of Personal Information under Clause 29(2)(o).

      The identity of the applicant should never be revealed to a third party.200

      Subsection 34(2)(b)

      Notice to third party

      34(2) The notice mentioned in subsection (1):

      (b) subject to subsection (3), is to be given within 30 days after the application is made.

      Unless an extension is applied pursuant to section 12 of FOIP, a government institution must provide notice to the third party within 30 days of receiving an access to information request. See subsection 34(3) of FOIP below for more information or Chapter 3: Access to Records for more on section 12.

      The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.201

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “within 30 days after the application is made” under FOIP:

      • The first day the access request is received is excluded in the calculation of time [s 2-28(2)];
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s 2-28(5)];
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s 2-28(6)]; and
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 30 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 202

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 171-2018, 189-2018, the Commissioner considered whether eHealth Saskatchewan met its timelines when providing notice to the third party pursuant to section 34 of FOIP. The Commissioner found that as eHealth had missed providing the notice within the initial 30 days following receipt of the access to information request, it should not have provided third party notification.

      In Review Report 021-2021, 022-2021, 023-2021, the Commissioner considered the extension provision at subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP which permits up to an additional 30 days to provide a response to applicants where a section 34 notice to third parties is required. The Ministry of Highways (Highways) applied the time extension citing subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner found that the extension was not authorized as Highways did not provide any arguments regarding third parties or that it required time to notify them. As well, Highways did not indicate in its initial response to the Commissioner and the applicant that any third parties were even involved. The Commissioner recommended that within 15 days of the issuance of the Review Report, Highways complete processing of the applicant’s three access to information requests, provide properly executed section 7 responses and refund the deposits already paid by the applicant.

      Subsection 34(3)

      Notice to third party

      34(3) Section 12 applies, with any necessary modification, to the extension of the period set out in clause (2)(b).

      Subsection 34(3) of FOIP provides further clarification for subsection 34(2)(b) of FOIP above.

      If an extension is authorized by section 12 of FOIP, the notice to the third party must be provided within the extension period (a total of 60 days from date access to information request was received). This is consistent with subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP. For more on section 12, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      For assistance on calculating the initial 30 days, see The Legislation Act which establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.203

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating the initial 30 days under FOIP:

      • The first day the access request is received is excluded in the calculation of time [s 2-28(3)];
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s 2-28(5)];
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s 2-28(6)]; and
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 30 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 204

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 171-2018, 189-2018, the Commissioner considered whether eHealth Saskatchewan met its timelines when providing notice to the third party pursuant to section 34 of FOIP. The Commissioner found that as eHealth had missed providing the notice within the initial 30 days following receipt of the access to information request, it should not have provided third party notification.

      In Review Report 112-2021, the Commissioner found that the extension of the response deadline applied by the Ministry of Highways (Highways) pursuant to subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP did not satisfy the criteria set out in section 12 of FOIP. This finding was partly due to third party notice being provided to the third party 84 days after Highways received the applicant’s access to information request.

      In Review Report 021-2021, 022-2021, 023-2021, the Commissioner considered the extension provision at subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP which permits up to an additional 30 days to provide a response to applicants where a section 34 notice to third parties is required. The Ministry of Highways (Highways) applied the time extension citing subsection 12(1)(c) of FOIP. However, the Commissioner found that the extension was not authorized as Highways did not provide any arguments regarding third parties or that it required time to notify them. As well, Highways did not indicate in its initial response to the Commissioner and the applicant that any third parties were even involved. The Commissioner recommended that within 15 days of the issuance of the Review Report, Highways complete processing of the applicant’s three access to information requests, provide properly executed section 7 responses and refund the deposits already paid by the applicant.

      Subsection 34(4)

      Notice to third party

      34(4) Where, in the opinion of the head, it is not reasonable to provide a notice to a third party pursuant to subsection (1), the head may dispense with the giving of notice.

      To receive notice, the third party must be able to be located with reasonable effort by the government institution.

      A reasonable effort is the level of effort you would expect of any fair, sensible person. What is reasonable depends on the information at issue and related circumstances. 205

      If the third party cannot reasonably be located, the government institution may dispense with giving notice pursuant to subsection 34(4) of FOIP.

      A government institution is expected to use only its own records and publicly available resources to locate an address for a third party.206

      If there is any doubt as to the third party’s contact information, the government institution may need to adapt its notification process to ensure there is no breach of privacy or confidentiality during the notification process.207

      Section 35: Waiver of notice

      Waiver of notice

      35(1) A third party to whom a notice is required to be given pursuant to subsection 34(1) may waive the requirement for notice.

      (2) A third party who consents to the giving of access to a record containing information described in subsection 34(1) is deemed to have waived the requirement for notice.

      Subsection 35(1) of FOIP provides that a third party that would receive notice under subsection 34(1) of FOIP, can waive the requirement for notice.

      Subsection 35(2) of FOIP provides that a third party that has consented to the release of the third party information is deemed to have waived the requirement to receive notice.

      No response to the notice by the 21st day after the notice is given does not imply that the third party has consented to the disclosure of the information. The government institution should document its efforts to contact the third party. This is helpful in the event of a review by the Commissioner.208

      Section 36: Right to make representations

      Right to make representations

      36(1) A third party who is given notice pursuant to subsection 34(1):

      (a) is entitled to make representations to the head as to why access to the record or part of the record should not be given; and

      (b) within 20 days after the notice is given, shall be given the opportunity to make those representations.

      (2) Representations made by a third party pursuant to clause (1)(b) shall be made in writing unless the head waives that requirement, in which case they may be made orally.

      Subsection 36(1)(a)

      Right to make representations

      36(1) A third party who is given notice pursuant to subsection 34(1):

      (a) is entitled to make representations to the head as to why access to the record or part of the record should not be given; and

      A third party that has received notice from the government institution has the right to make representations to the government institution. The government institution will take into consideration written representations received from third parties when deciding whether to withhold or release information from records.

      Representation means the documents, other evidence and/statements or affidavits provided by a party setting out its position with respect to the information at issue and often referred to as a submission.209

      A submission informs the government institution of the third party’s main arguments and presents supporting information to make its case.210

      Written submissions may be made in the form of a letter, fax, email or other written communication submitted to the government institution in which the third party clearly states:

      • What specific information the third party considers to be subject to section 19 of FOIP.
      • Which specific subsection of section 19 of FOIP applies (i.e., (a) through (f)).
      • Why that subsection applies (provide any supporting evidence).

      OR

      • That it does not oppose release of the information.

      The submissions must be in writing unless the head of the government institution waives that requirement in certain circumstances as per subsection 36(2) of FOIP – see below.

      The fact that a third party has objected to the release of information is not sufficient grounds for information to be withheld under FOIP. The purpose of third party representations is to assist the government institution by providing additional information and context to aid the government institution’s decision-making.211

      The IPC has issued several guides, blogs, and other resources on how to prepare an effective submission:

      Third parties should focus their arguments and supporting information on how section 19 applies or why personal information should not be released pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP. The discretion to apply other discretionary exemptions under Part III of FOIP is reserved for the “head” 212 of the government institution only.213

      Subsection 36(1)(b)

      Right to make representations

      36(1) A third party who is given notice pursuant to subsection 34(1):

      (b) within 20 days after the notice is given, shall be given the opportunity to make those representations

      The third party must submit its arguments and supporting information to the government institution within 20 days of receiving notice. The 20-day time period allowed for a third party to provide representations begins on the day after the third party notice is given (i.e., the day after the government institution sends the notice), not the date the third party receives it. The date on which the notice is sent should be marked on the notice indicating posting or electronic transmission (e.g., the postmark for regular mail, the transmission date for email or facsimile). Government institutions should choose a delivery method that ensures that notice is given promptly.214 Contacting a third party prior to giving written notice is a good practice. It enables the government institution to explain the process, the importance of responding, the consequences of not responding and the timelines.215

      There is no provision within FOIP that permits an extension of the 20-day deadline on third parties to provide representations. However, if the third party requests a few extra days to respond and the government institution agrees, these additional days would be subtracted from the 10 days remaining which the government institution has to issue its notice of decision pursuant to section 37 of FOIP.216 See Overview of third party timelines earlier in this Chapter.

      Government institutions are not required to accept a late submission from a third party (i.e., outside of the 20-day window contemplated by subsection 36(1)(b) of FOIP), but they may elect to do so, if the government institution is still able to make its decision within the 30 days allowed by subsection 37(1) of FOIP.217

      No response to the notice by the 21st day after the notice is given does not imply that the third party has consented to the disclosure of the information. It is good practice to contact the third party prior to sending the section 34 notice to the third party to ensure the third party understands the process and consequences of not responding. The government institution should document its efforts to contact the third party. This is helpful in the event of a review by the Commissioner.218

      For calculating “20 days of receiving notice”, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.219

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “within 20 days after the notice is given” under FOIP:

      • The first day the notice is given is excluded in the calculation of time [s 2-28(2)];
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s 2-28(5)];
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s 2-28(6)]; and
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 20 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 220

      Subsection 36(2)

      Right to make representations

      36(2) Representations made by a third party pursuant to clause (1)(b) shall be made in writing unless the head waives that requirement, in which case they may be made orally.

      A third party’s representations to the government institution must be in writing. There is good reason for this. In the interest of transparency, government institutions should have a written record of a decision-making process.

      There are unique situations where the “head”221 may waive the requirement and accept oral representations. A government institution may choose to record the oral representation which can be transcribed afterward or take detailed notes.

      Section 37: Decision

      Decision

      37(1) After a third party has been given an opportunity to make representations pursuant to clause 36(1)(b), the head shall, within 30 days after notice is given:

      (a) decide whether or not to give access to the record or part of the record; and

      (b) give written notice of the decision to the third party and the applicant.

      (2) A notice given pursuant to clause (1)(b) is to include:

      (a) a statement that the third party and applicant are entitled to request a review pursuant to section 49 within 20 days after the notice is given; and

      (b) in the case of a decision to give access, a statement that the application will be given access to the record or to the part of it specified unless, within 20 days after the notice is given, the third party requests a review pursuant to section 49.

      (3) Where, pursuant to clause (1)(a), the head decides to give access to the record or a specified part of it, the head shall give the applicant access to the record or the specified part unless, within 20 days after a notice is given pursuant to clause (1)(b), a third party requests a review pursuant to section 49.

      (4) A head who fails to give notice pursuant to clause (1)(b) is deemed to have given notice, on the last day of the period set out in subsection (1), of a decision to refuse to give access to the record.

      Government institutions are required to decide whether or not to give access to all or part of the third party information within 30 days after the section 34 notice to the third party was given. The section 37 notice of decision is to be given to both the third party and the applicant.

      Government institutions are not required to accept a late submission from a third party (i.e., outside of the 20-day window contemplated by subsection 36(1)(b) of FOIP), but they may elect to do so, if the government institution is still able to make its decision within the 30 days allowed by subsection 37(1) of FOIP.222

      Generally, there are three types of third party responses:

      • No Response: If no response is received within 20 days after the notice to the third party is given, the government institution decides, based on the information available, whether to release the information or not.
      • Consent to disclosure of information: If the third party responds by consenting in writing to disclosure of information, the government institution should disclose the information unless another one of the Act’s exemptions applies.
      • Representations about why information should not be disclosed: If the third party makes representations on why the information should not be disclosed, the government institution shall consider these representations in reaching a decision on access.
        • The third party’s representations may address only issues related to the applicability of section 19 or subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP. Representations related to other exemptions must not be considered by the head in reaching a decision on access.223

      Government institutions can combine a section 7 decision with the section 37 notice to an applicant.224 This is an efficient way to meet the timelines imposed by FOIP. For more on section 7 responses, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      Subsection 37(1)(a)

      Decision

      37(1) After a third party has been given an opportunity to make representations pursuant to clause 36(1)(b), the head shall, within 30 days after notice is given:

      (a) decide whether or not to give access to the record or part of the record; and

      The government institution must decide whether to withhold or release the third party information within 30 days of having given its section 34 notice to the third party.

      However, if a third party consented to disclosure of the third party information, the information or record should not be withheld unless another exemption applies to it.

      The government institution should consider all exemptions to disclosure within the Act, not just section 19(1) of FOIP.

      The fact that a third party has objected to the release of information is not sufficient grounds for information to be withheld under FOIP. The purpose of third party representations is to assist the government institution by providing additional information and context to aid the government institution’s decision-making.225 The decision to withhold information must always be in accordance with the Act and the government institution has the burden of proof in demonstrating to the Commissioner that the exemption applies (see section 61 of FOIP or Chapter 2: Administration of FOIP under the heading Burden of Proof for more guidance).

      Subsection 37(1)(b)

      Decision

      37(1) After a third party has been given an opportunity to make representations pursuant to clause 36(1)(b), the head shall, within 30 days after notice is given:

      (b) give written notice of the decision to the third party and the applicant.

      Notice of the decision must be given to both the third party and the applicant that has requested the information.

      Third parties should not be told who the applicant is at any point in the process. 226

      Government institutions can combine a section 7 decision with the section 37 notice to an applicant.227 This is an efficient way to meet the timelines imposed by FOIP. For more on section 7 responses, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      When determining the 30-day timeline for sending the section 37 notice of decision, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.228

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “within 30 days after the notice is given” under FOIP:

        • The first day the notice is sent is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)].
        • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)].
        • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)].
        • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 30 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness.151F 229

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 082-2019, 083-2019, the Commissioner considered whether the Ministry of Health (Health) met the timelines required by subsection 37(1) of FOIP. The Commissioner noted that the section 37 notice was provided past the extended 60-day deadline. The section 7 decision should have already been provided to the applicant by the time the section 37 notice was issued. However, the section 37 notice issued by Health to the applicant appeared to contain all the required elements for a section 7 decision. The Commissioner determined that there was nothing in FOIP that prevented a government institution from combining its section 7 decision with its section 37 response. The Commissioner indicated that procedurally, this process makes sense as the applicant can end up requesting a review within 20 days, as the applicant did in this case, before the final section 7 decision is issued.

      Subsection 37(2)

      Decision

      37(2) A notice given pursuant to clause (1)(b) is to include:

      (a) a statement that the third party and applicant are entitled to request a review pursuant to section 49 within 20 days after the notice is given; and

      (b) in the case of a decision to give access, a statement that the applicant will be given access to the record or to the part of it specified unless, within 20 days after the notice is given, the third party requests a review pursuant to section 49.

      When the government institution has made the decision on access to the record, written notice is sent to both the applicant and the third party and should contain the following:

      1) Government institution decides to deny access. The notices must:

        • State that the government institution has decided to deny access to the record in full or in part.
        • Include information about the applicant’s right to request a review by the Commissioner within one year of the notice of decision being given pursuant to section 49 of FOIP.

      2) Government institution decides to give full or partial access. The notices must:

        • State that the government institution has decided to grant full or partial access to the record.
        • Include information about the third party’s right to request a review by the Commissioner within 20 days of the notice of decision being given pursuant to section 49 of FOIP.
        • State that the applicant will be given access within 20 days from when the notice of decision is given unless a review is requested by the third party.230

      For a sample model letter231 see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample titled, 16 Notification to Third Party under Sec 37 – Decision of Government Institution and 17 Notification to Applicant under section 37 – Decision of Government Institution.

      Third parties should not be told who the applicant is at any point in the process.232

      Subsection 37(2)(a)

      Decision

      37(2) A notice given pursuant to clause(1)(b) is to include:

      (a) a statement that the third party and applicant are entitled to request a review pursuant to section 49 within 20 days after the notice is given; and

      The notice of decision should contain the following elements:

      1. A statement that the third party and the applicant are entitled to request a review by the Commissioner pursuant to section 49 of FOIP within 20 days after the notice of decision is given (s 37(2)(a)); and

      For a sample model letter233 see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample titled, 16 Notification to Third Party under Sec 37 – Decision of Government Institution and 17 Notification to Applicant under section 37 – Decision of Government Institution.

      If the head of the government institution concerned, having considered the representations, decides to release the information requested, the third party may apply to the IPC for a review of that decision.234 The 20-day timeline on third parties to request a review is a requirement as subsection 49(4) of FOIP reiterates the 20-day timeline on third parties. If the 20-day timeline is missed, a review will not be commenced.

      If the head of the government institution concerned decides to withhold the third party information requested, the applicant may apply to the IPC for a review of that decision. However, the 20-day timeline to request a review noted at subsection 37(2)(a) of FOIP is not a requirement of applicants, but rather an option – applicants are “entitled” to request the review – it is a right. Unlike third parties, applicants have one year to request a review of a section 37 decision of a government institution pursuant to subsection 49(2) of FOIP. If the one-year timeline is missed, a review will not be commenced.

      Section 49 of FOIP provides the circumstances under which an applicant or third party can request a review by the Commissioner.

      Third parties and applicants who wish to make a request for review can do so using Form B found in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s section 37 notice of decision. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests for review that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      For more, see section 49 later in this Chapter.

      Subsection 37(2)(b)

      Decision

      37(2) A notice given pursuant to clause (1)(b) is to include:

      (b) in the case of a decision to give access, a statement that the applicant will be given access to the record or to the part of it specified unless, within 20 days after the notice is given, the third party requests a review pursuant to section 49.

      The notice of decision should contain the following elements:

      1. where the decision is to permit access, a statement that the applicant will be given access (and what portions will be given) within 20 days after the notice of decision is given, unless the third party requests a review by the Commissioner pursuant to section 49 of FOIP (s 37(2)(b)).

      The 20-day time period for a government institution to release the third party information begins on the day after the section 37 notice of decision is sent (i.e., the day after the government institution sends the notice, the clock starts), not the date the third party receives it. The date on which the notice of decision is sent should be marked on the notice indicating posting or electronic transmission (e.g., the postmark for regular mail, the transmission date for email or facsimile). Government institutions should choose a delivery method that ensures that notice is given promptly (e.g., courier, email, or priority post).235

      If the third party has consented to the release of the third party information, the government institution should release the information unless another exemption in the Act applies to it.

      For a sample model letter236 see the Ministry of Justice, Access and Privacy Branch’s sample titled, 16 Notification to Third Party under Sec 37 – Decision of Government Institution and 17 Notification to Applicant under section 37 – Decision of Government Institution.

      Subsection 37(3)

      Decision

      37(3) Where, pursuant to clause (1)(a), the head decides to give access to the record or a specified part of it, the head shall give the applicant access to the record or the specified part unless, within 20 days after a notice is given pursuant to clause (1)(b), a third party requests a review pursuant to section 49.

      Subsection 37(3) of FOIP provides that if the government institution decides to give access to the record, it must do so within 20 days after notice is given unless the third party requests a review pursuant to section 49 of FOIP.

      The government institution should contact the IPC to determine whether a request for review has been submitted. Contact intake@oipc.sk.ca to request this information.

      If the review requested by a third party affects only some of the records proposed for disclosure, the government institution should release the remainder of the records to the applicant, unless they are subject to other exemptions at which point the applicant may want a review of those exemptions also.237

      For calculating “20 days after a notice is given”, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.238

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “20 days after a notice is given” under FOIP:

      • The first day the notice is given is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)];
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)];
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)]; and
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 20 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 239

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 012-2018, the Commissioner considered whether a third party met the 20-day timeline to request a review under subsection 36(3) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The Commissioner received the third party’s request for review seven days past the 20-day deadline. In its representations to the Commissioner, the third party asserted that there was confusion on how to request a review by the Commissioner. However, upon review, the Commissioner found that the City of Regina’s notice of decision to the third party instructed it on how and where to request a review by the Commissioner. As a result, the Commissioner found that the City of Regina met its duty to assist under section 5.1 of LA FOIP. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the third party did not request a review within the legislated timeline of 20 days after receiving the City’s notice pursuant to section 36 of LA FOIP. Since subsection 36(3) of LA FOIP provides that the head of the City of Regina “shall” provide access to a record (or specified part of it), after 20 days, the Commissioner recommended the City of Regina release the record to the applicant.

      Subsection 37(4)

      Decision

      37(4) A head who fails to give notice pursuant to clause (1)(b) is deemed to have given notice, on the last day of the period set out in subsection (1), of a decision to refuse to give access to the record.

      Subsection 37(4) of FOIP provides that where a government institution has failed to give notice to an applicant (or third party) that access to the third party information is denied is deemed to have given notice of this decision on the 30th day after the section 34 notice is sent.

      This provision is similar to subsection 7(5) of FOIP and has similar intent. The IPC refers to this lack of response or notice as a “deemed refusal”. In the absence of providing notice, the government institution is deemed to have refused access.

      Government institutions should be aware that a subsection 7(2) decision for an access to information request is still required and exemptions applied to other information (besides the third party information) must be addressed in the subsection 7(2) decision.

      Applicants who have failed to receive a section 37 notice that access to the third party information is denied, can proceed to request a review by the Commissioner pursuant to section 49 of FOIP. In addition, applicants who have failed to receive a subsection 7(2) decision, can proceed to request a review by the Commissioner pursuant to section 49 of FOIP. Applicants have up to one year to request a review (see section 49 later in this Chapter).

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 066-2019, the Commissioner considered subsection 7(5) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The Northern Village of Pinehouse (Village) failed to provide a section 7 response to the applicant within the 30-day deadline. Therefore, it is deemed to have responded on the 30th day with a refusal to provide access pursuant to subsection 7(5) of LA FOIP. The Commissioner stated that this is referred to as a “deemed refusal”. The Village was then required to account for responsive records in its possession and/or control and only deny access to all or part of the records if permitted by the limited and specific exemptions in LA FOIP. As the Village failed to inform the applicant and the Commissioner of what exemptions it was relying on to withhold the records, the Commissioner found there was not authority to withhold them and recommended the records be released to the applicant.

      In Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 1999 CanLII 7857 (FCA), the Federal Court of Appeal found that the federal Information Commissioner may use his power of subpoena to require a government institution to respond to a request by a date set by the Commissioner. Specifically, the Court found that once a request is deemed to have been refused, the Commissioner has the power to compel the head of the government institution (or delegate) to specify the exemptions used to justify refusal of the record and to defend the applicability of those exemptions. This decision is in relation to the Access to Information Act. There has not been a similar case before the courts in Saskatchewan yet.

      In the decision, Statham v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2010 FCA 315 (CanLII), the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that there was no distinction between a true refusal and a deemed refusal. This decision is in relation to the Access to Information Act. There has not been a similar case before the courts in Saskatchewan yet.

      Section 49: Application for review

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a) an applicant is not satisfied with the decision of a head pursuant to section 7, 12 or 37;

      (a.1) an applicant is not satisfied that a reasonable fee was estimated pursuant to subsection 9(2);

      (a.2) an applicant believes that all or part of the fee estimated should be waived pursuant to subsection 9(5);

      (a.3) an applicant believes that an application was transferred to another government institution pursuant to subsection 11(1) and that government institution did not have a greater interest;

      (a.4) an individual believes that his or her personal information has not been collected, used or disclosed in accordance with this Act or the regulations;

      (b) a head fails to respond to an application for access to a record within the required time; or

      (c) an applicant requests a correction of personal information pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) and the correction is not made;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      (2) An applicant or individual may make an application pursuant to subsection (1) within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head or of the expiration of the time mentioned in clause (1)(b).

      (3) A third party may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of a decision pursuant to section 37 to give access to a record that affects the interest of the third party.

      (4) A third party may make an application pursuant to subsection (3) within 20 days after being given notice of the decision.

      Section 49 of FOIP provides the circumstances under which an applicant or third party can request a review by the Commissioner.

      The Commissioner is an independent Officer of the Legislative Assembly. The Commissioner has oversight over FOIP and jurisdiction to review compliance of FOIP by all government institutions in Saskatchewan subject to it.

      The Commissioner is neutral and does not represent a government institution, an applicant or a third party in a review.

      The Commissioner prepares a report on the completion of a review, which includes findings and recommendations for the government institution. The government institution has a responsibility to respond to the Commissioner’s report under section 56 of FOIP indicating whether it will comply with the recommendations. If not satisfied with the response from the government institution, an applicant or third party can pursue an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan. The Court of King’s Bench will determine the matter de novo.

      A hearing de novo means a review of a matter anew, as if the original hearing had not taken place. 240

      For more on the IPC review process, see The Rules of Procedure.

      For more on the role of the Commissioner, see Information and Privacy Commissioner – Roles and Responsibilities in Chapter 2.

      For more on section 49, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      Subsection 49(1)

      Application for review

      49(1) Where:

      (a) an applicant is not satisfied with the decision of a head pursuant to section 7, 12 or 37;

      (a.1) an applicant is not satisfied that a reasonable fee was estimated pursuant to subsection 9(2);

      (a.2) an applicant believes that all or part of the fee estimated should be waived pursuant to subsection 9(5);

      (a.3) an applicant believes that an application was transferred to another government institution pursuant to subsection 11(1) and that government institution did not have a greater interest;

      (a.4) an individual believes that his or her personal information has not been collected, used or disclosed in accordance with this Act or the regulations;

      (b) a head fails to respond to an application for access to a record within the required time; or

      (c) an applicant requests a correction of personal information pursuant to clause 32(1)(a) and the correction is not made;

      the applicant or individual may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of the matter.

      Subsection 49(1) of FOIP provides that an applicant can request a review by the Commissioner under several circumstances including when they are not satisfied with the decisions of the government institution in sections 7, 12 or 37 notices or responses.

      Therefore, if applicants receive a section 37 decision from the government institution that denies access to the third party information, applicants have a right to request a review by the Commissioner of that decision.

      For more on subsection 49(1), see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      Subsection 49(2)

      Application for review

      49(2) An applicant or individual may make an application pursuant to subsection (1) within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head or of the expiration of the time mentioned in clause (1)(b).

      Subsection 49(2) of FOIP provides that applicants may make a request for review to the Commissioner within one year after being given written notice of the decision of the government institution (i.e., after receiving the section 37 notice).

      For calculating “one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head” or of the deemed refusal, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.

      (8) A period expressed as one or more consecutive years beginning or ending on, at, with, before, after or from a specified day is counted to the same date as the specified day in the last or first year of the period, as the case requires.

      (9) If a period would end on a date in a month that has no date numerically corresponding to the first date in the period, the period ends on the first day of the next month.241

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “one year after being given written notice of the decision of the head” or of the deemed refusal:

      • The first day the notice is given is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)].
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)].
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)].
      • As FOIP expresses the time as one year, this is interpreted as 365 calendar days, not business days [s. 2-28(8)].

      If an applicant did not receive a response from the government institution, the applicant still has one year from the 30th day under which the government institution was deemed to have responded.242 The same rules around the computation of time noted above from The Legislation Act apply in this circumstance also.

      Subsection 49(3)

      Application for review

      49(3) A third party may apply in the prescribed form and manner to the commissioner for a review of a decision pursuant to section 37 to give access to a record that affects the interest of the third party.

      Subsection 49(3) of FOIP provides that a third party can request a review by the Commissioner.

      Third parties can request a review pursuant to subsection 49(3) of FOIP when they are not satisfied with the government institution’s section 37 notice of decision. For example, the government institution provides notice that it has decided to release the third party information. This request for review must be made within 20 days after being given the section 37 notice of decision from the government institution.

      Third parties who wish to make a request for review can do so using Form B found in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s section 37 notice of decision. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests for review that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      If the third party requests a review, government institutions should release any portions of the records that are not in dispute. Apply relevant severing to any information in dispute, and to any information that attracts any other exemptions to disclosure, but the remainder should be released to the applicant while the IPC review is pending.243

      For more on section 49, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      Subsection 49(4)

      Application for review

      49(4) A third party may make an application pursuant to subsection (3) within 20 days after being given notice of the decision.

      Subsection 49(4) of FOIP provides that where a third party requests the Commissioner review the decision of the government institution, it must make that request within 20 days after being given the government institution’s decision.

      For calculating “20 days after being given” the government institution’s decision, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business. 244

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “20 days after being given” the government institution’s decision under FOIP:

      • The first day the notice is given is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)].
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)].
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)].
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 20 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 245

      Third parties who wish to make a request for review can do so using Form B found in The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Regulations. The form should be completed and provided to the IPC along with a copy of the government institution’s section 37 notice of decision. Any other relevant information, such as other communications with the government institution, can also be attached. The IPC will also accept requests for review that are not on Form B provided the request is in writing and contains the same elements of information as Form B.

      For more on section 49, see Chapter 3: Access to Records.

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report 012-2018, the Commissioner considered whether a third party met the 20-day timeline to request a review under subsection 36(3) of The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP). The Commissioner received the third party’s request for review 7 days past the 20-day deadline. In its representations to the Commissioner, the third party asserted that there was confusion on how to request a review by the Commissioner. However, upon review, the Commissioner found that the City of Regina’s notice of decision to the third party instructed it on how and where to request a review by the Commissioner. As a result, the Commissioner found that the City of Regina met its duty to assist under section 5.1 of LA FOIP. Furthermore, the Commissioner found that the third party did not request a review within the legislated timeline of 20 days after receiving the City’s notice of decision pursuant to section 36 of LA FOIP. Since subsection 36(3) of LA FOIP provides that the head of the City of Regina “shall” provide access to a record (or specified part of it), after 20 days, the Commissioner recommended the City of Regina release the record to the applicant.

      Section 52: Notice of application for review

      Notice of application for review

      52(1) A head who has refused an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of review pursuant to section 49, give written notice of the review to any third party that the head:

      (a) has notified pursuant to subsection 34(1); or

      (b) would have notified pursuant to subsection 34(1) if the head had intended to give access to the record or part of the record.

      (2) A head shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of review pursuant to section 49 by a third party, give written notice of the review to the applicant.

      It is a requirement of the Act that government institutions notify third parties that an application for a review has been made as per section 52 of FOIP. The IPC will invite third parties to provide representations to the Commissioner’s office once a review has been commenced so this notice by the government institution is important.

      If a government institution has applied section 19(1) of FOIP to information in records but has failed to provide notice pursuant to section 52 and is unable to identify third parties for the Commissioner, the burden of proof will not be met, and section 19(1) of FOIP may be found to not apply.246

      Third parties should not be told who the applicant is at any point in the process. To do so, may constitute a breach of the applicant’s privacy pursuant to Part IV of FOIP.247

      IPC Findings

      In Review Report F-2013-003, the Commissioner considered the Ministry of Agriculture’s (Agriculture) failure to provide a section 52 notice of application for review to third parties with apparent interests in the records at issue. When the Commissioner’s office requested the contact information for the third parties so they could be informed of the review and invited to provide representations to the Commissioner regarding the application of section 19 of FOIP, Agriculture was unable to provide contact information. Failure to provide a section 52 notice to the third parties and inability to identify the third parties factored into the Commissioner’s decision that Agriculture did not meet the burden of proof in demonstrating that section 19 applied to the records. By not providing notice, the Commissioner stated, it prejudices the rights of both the third parties and the applicant in the review. The third parties were not afforded the opportunity to make representations. If the third parties were notified and indicated they did not object to release, the failure to notify prejudices the applicant in such a scenario. Given that section 19 was a mandatory exemption, the Commissioner still considered the application of the exemption and attempted to identify the third parties. However, partly due to the lack of supporting arguments from Agriculture, the Commissioner found that subsections 19(a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of FOIP did not apply and recommended release of the records.

      Section 53: Conduct of review

      Conduct of review

      53(1) The commissioner shall conduct every review in private.

      (2) The:

      (a) person who applies for a review;

      (b) third party or applicant who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 52; and

      (c) head whose decision is the subject of a review;

      are entitled to make representations to the commissioner in the course of the review.

      (3) No one is entitled as of right:

      (a) to be present during a review; or

      (b) before or after a review:

      (i) to have access to; or

      (ii) to comment on;

      representations made to the commissioner by any other person.

      Subsection 53(1) of FOIP provides that third parties (and applicants and government institutions) that are a party in a review by the Commissioner have a right to make representations to the Commissioner on the matter. This is an entitlement or a right and not a requirement. If a third party does not wish to make representation to the Commissioner, the review will continue without it.

      At the beginning of a review, the IPC will request the contact information for the third party from the government institution. The IPC will then send a notification to the third party inviting them to provide representations for section 19 of FOIP (or subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP if applicable in the circumstances). The third party will generally be given 30 days to provide its representations to the Commissioner.248

      Representation means the documents, other evidence and/statements or affidavits provided by a party setting out its position with respect to the information at issue and often referred to as a submission.249

      A submission informs the Commissioner of the third party’s main arguments and presents supporting information to make its case.250

      The IPC has issued several guides, blogs, and other resources on how to prepare an effective submission:

      Third parties should focus their arguments and supporting information on how section 19 applies (or why personal information should not be released pursuant to subsection 29(2)(o) of FOIP if that is the issue subject to review). The discretion to apply other discretionary exemptions under Part III of FOIP is reserved for the “head” of the government institution only.251 As such, the Commissioner will not consider other discretionary exemptions unless raised by the government institution.252

      Subsection 53(3) of FOIP provides that no one is entitled, as of right, to be present during the Commissioner’s review or to have access to, or comment on, representations made to the Commissioner by any other person. The Commissioner issued The Rules of Procedure which set out the process for reviews. The Rules of Procedure state that representations made to the Commissioner will not be disclosed to another party unless the party submitting the representation agrees that the representation, or a portion thereof, can be shared with another party. Third parties should indicate in their representations whether they consent to the sharing of the representation amongst the parties to the review (applicant and government institution).

      Section 55: Report of commissioner

      Report of commissioner

      55(1) On completing a review or investigation, the commissioner may prepare a written report setting out the commissioner’s recommendations with respect to the matter and the reasons for those recommendations.

      (2) If a report is prepared pursuant to subsection (1), the commissioner shall forward a copy of the report to the head and, if the matter was referred to the commissioner by:

      (a) an applicant or individual, to the applicant or individual and to any third party notified by the head pursuant to section 52; and

      (b) a third party, to the third party and to the applicant.

      (3) In the report mentioned in subsection (1), the commissioner may make any recommendations with respect to the matter under review or investigation that the commissioner considers appropriate.

      Upon completion of a review, the Commissioner may issue a report. The report will include the Commissioner’s findings and recommendations.

      If the Commissioner completes a report, it is provided to each party to the review prior to the report becoming publicly available via posting to the Commissioner’s website.

      All reports are generally posted to the Commissioner’s website seven days after the report is provided to the parties. Reports may be posted to the website sooner where the Commissioner considers it appropriate. For example, where media coverage is going to occur before the report is generally made available to the public on the website. There are also limited circumstances where the Commissioner will not post a report to the website. For example, where the matters are extremely sensitive, an individual may be identified or where the circumstances of a case require additional measures be taken to protect individuals.

      Government institutions are required, pursuant to section 56 of FOIP, to respond to a report of the Commissioner within 30 days indicating whether it will comply with the Commissioner’s recommendations or any other decision the head considers appropriate. The head’s response should be provided to the other parties to the review and to the Commissioner. The response should be in writing.

      Once an applicant, individual or third party receives the head’s section 56 response, if not satisfied, it has 30 days to make an application to the Court of King’s Bench if not satisfied pursuant to section 57 of FOIP. For more information on the Court of King’s Bench see Courts of Saskatchewan.

      In the recent Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), the court clarified the de novo nature of an appeal pursuant to section 57 of FOIP. Part VII of FOIP does not in any way contemplate that, on an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, parties can raise any and all provisions of the Act that bear on the question of whether the record in issue may be released. The system of the Act offers no room for a direct appeal to the Court of King’s Bench from the decision of a head, i.e., an appeal that circumvents the application to the Commissioner for a review.253

      For more on the IPC’s procedures for reviews, investigations and issuing reports, see Rules of Procedure. See also Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee.

      Section 56: Decision of head

      Decision of head

      56(1) Within 30 days after receiving a report of the commissioner pursuant to subsection 55(1), a head shall:

      (a) make a decision to follow the recommendation of the commissioner or any other decision that the head considers appropriate; and

      (b) give written notice of the decision to the commissioner and the persons mentioned in subsection 55(2).

      Section 56 of FOIP provides that 30 days after receiving the Commissioner’s report, the government institution will provide its decision regarding the Commissioner’s recommendations (or any other decision it intends to make) to the Commissioner, applicant, and third parties involved in the review.

      For calculating “within 30 days after receiving a report of the commissioner”, The Legislation Act establishes general rules that govern the interpretation of all statutory instruments in the province of Saskatchewan. Section 2-28 of The Legislation Act provides the following for the computation of time:

      2-28(1) A period expressed in days and described as beginning or ending on, at or with a specified day, or continuing to or until a specified day, includes the specified day.

      (2) A period expressed in days and described as occurring before, after or from a specified day excludes the specified day.

      (3) A period described by reference to a number of days between two events excludes the day on which the first event happens and includes the day on which the second event happens.

      (4) In the calculation of time expressed as a number of clear days, weeks, months or years or as “at least” or “not less than” a number of days, weeks, months or years, the first and last days are excluded.

      (5) A time limit for the doing of anything that falls or expires on a holiday is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday.

      (6) A time limit for registering or filing documents or for doing anything else that falls or expires on a day on which the place for doing so is not open during its regular hours of business is extended to include the next day the place is open during its regular hours of business.254

      Based on this, the following can be applied for calculating “within 30 days after receiving a report of the commissioner” under FOIP:

      • The first day the report is received is excluded in the calculation of time [s. 2-28(2)].
      • If the due date falls on a holiday, the time is extended to the next day that is not a holiday [s. 2-28(5)].
      • If the due date falls on a weekend, the time is extended to the next day the office is open [s. 2-28(6)].
      • As FOIP expresses the time in a number of days, this is interpreted as 30 calendar days, not business days.

      The Legislation Act does not allow for additional time for personal holidays, scheduled days off or if staff are away from the office due to illness. 255

      Section 57: Appeal to court

      Appeal to courts

      57(1) Within 30 days after receiving a decision of the head pursuant to section 56, an applicant or individual or a third party may appeal that decision to the court.

      (2) A head who has refused an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by an applicant, give written notice of the appeal to any third party that the head:

      (a) has notified pursuant to subsection 34(1); or

      (b) would have notified pursuant to subsection 34(1) if the head had intended to give access to the record or part of the record.

      (3) A head who has granted an application for access to a record or part of a record shall, immediately on receipt of a notice of appeal by a third party, give written notice of the appeal to the applicant.

      (4) A third party who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (2) or an applicant or individual who has been given notice of an appeal pursuant to subsection (3) may appear as a party to the appeal.

      (5) The commissioner shall not be a party to an appeal.

      Section 57 of FOIP provides that within 30 days of receiving a decision of the head, an applicant or third party can appeal the decision of the head to the court if not satisfied with the decision.

      The levels of an appeal follow a hierarchical model as follows:

      1. Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan;
      2. Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan; and
      3. Supreme Court of Canada. 256

      The Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan consists of a Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and currently 36 257 other judges. Each King’s Bench judge is assigned to a specific judicial centre, but because the Court is an itinerant 258 court, the judges also travel to and sit in other judicial centres. 259

      In Saskatchewan, there are court locations in:

      • Battleford
      • Estevan
      • La Ronge
      • Meadow Lake
      • Melfort
      • Moose Jaw
      • Prince Albert
      • Regina
      • Saskatoon
      • Swift Current
      • Weyburn
      • Yorkton

      The steps for making an appeal are as follows: 260

      1. The Commissioner issues report with recommendations.
      2. The head of the government institution has 30 days from the date of the Commissioner’s report to make a decision in regard to the Commissioner’s recommendations or any other decision the head decides. The head’s decision must be sent to the applicant (if an access matter), the individual (if a privacy matter), the third party (if applicable) and the Commissioner within those 30 days of the Commissioner’s report.
      3. Once received, the applicant, individual or third party can launch an appeal of the head’s decision to the Court of King’s Bench. The application form is called an Originating Application (Form 3-49). It should be filed at the Local Registrar’s office. There is a fee involved for filing the application. It is around $200. A sample of an Originating Application for an access to information appeal can be found at Appendix A of IPC resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee.
      4. The applicant, individual or third party that launches the appeal is responsible for serving the government institution with the Originating Application once filed with the court.
      5. Once the Originating Application is filed and served, the parties are embarking on a two-step procedure:

      i.     The first step involves determining whether the parties can agree or whether the court will have to decide what is filed sealed and what is argued in camera         or in open court. Because of the nature of the appeal, the government institution will have filed sealed records (both unredacted and redacted) which                    means they are not seen by the other parties to the appeal.

              If the parties agree that submissions need not be filed sealed and the representations can be made in open court, the parties can proceed directly to argue          the appeal.

              If the parties cannot agree, a court application will have to be made to determine the procedure to be used, what is filed sealed, what is argued in camera           and what is argued in open court. The court will determine this procedure and issue an order.

              In camera, in private or in the judge’s private chambers. 261

      ii.     The second step will be the actual argument by the parties as has been previously directed by the judge or agreed by the parties. 262

      In the recent Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII), the court clarified the de novo nature of an appeal pursuant to section 57 of FOIP. Part VII of FOIP does not in any way contemplate that, on an appeal to the Court of King’s Bench, parties can raise any and all provisions of the Act that bear on the question of whether the record in issue may be released. The system of the Act offers no room for a direct appeal to the Court of King’s Bench from the decision of a head, i.e., an appeal that circumvents the application to the Commissioner for a review.263 Although heard de novo, as a fresh application to be decided anew, the scope of the appeal is confined to those exemptions considered by the Commissioner on his review.264


      ‌1 Service Alberta, FOIP Bulletin No. 10: Third Party Notice at p. 1.

      ‌2 Government Information Access and Privacy, McNairn and Woodbury, Carswell, 2008, at p. 4-1.

      3 The above table was adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022. For a more detailed reference document on timelines and procedures, see the Access and Privacy Branch, Ministry of Justice resource, Help with FOIP!!, Access Request Checklist, Third Party Notification Required.

      ‌4 Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (SK OIPC) Review Reports 031-2015 at [10] to [28], 020-2016 at [4] to [12].

      ‌5 Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., 2004 FCA 99 (CanLII) at [37] and [42].

      ‌6 SK OIPC blog by Commissioner Kruzeniski, Confidentiality Clauses in Contracts, September 5, 2017.

      ‌7 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17] to [19] and LA-2011-001 at [97].

      ‌8 Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444 (CanLII) at [35]. See also SK OIPC Review Report 020-2016 at [19] to [22].

      9 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 19, 2019. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107.

      ‌10 Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State), (April 27, 1994), T-1587-93, T-1588-93 (F.C.T.D.) at [10].

      ‌11 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of External Affairs) (T.D.), [1990] 3 FC 665, 1990 CanLII 7951 (FC) at [24].

      ‌12 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [36] to [39].

      ‌13 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at section 2(1)(j).

      ‌14 In SK OIPC Review Report 244-2018 at [94], the Commissioner found that the Ministry of Health was a government institution so could not be a third party for purposes of FOIP.

      15 SK OIPC Review Report 080-2018 at [51] and [52]. In addition, see SK OIPC blog, Can Public Bodies be a Third Party?. This replaces earlier interpretations by the SK OIPC that government institutions and local authorities could not qualify as third parties under FOIP and The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act – for old precedent see SK OIPC F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [40] to [53].

      ‌16 Office of the Nunavut Information and Privacy Commissioner (NU IPC) Review Report 03-08 at p. 7.

      17 Adapted from the Information Commissioner of Canada’s 2017-2018 Annual Report, Investigation Highlights, Section 20 – Third Party Information. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/2017-2018-investigation-highlights#h3. Accessed July 22, 2019.

      18 Ontario Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery resource, Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Manual at Chapter 4: Access Fundamentals, Records of Third Parties. Accessed Sept. 6, 2022.

      ‌19 Office of the Northwest Territories Information and Privacy Commissioner (NWT IPC) Review Report 04-043 at p. 4.

      ‌20 Quoted by Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [28].

      ‌21 Office of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (ON IPC) Order PO-3845 at [62].

      ‌22 Intercontinental Packers Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (1987), 14 F.T.R. 142 (T.D.), affirmed (1988), 87 N.R. 99 (Fed. C.A.) at [145].

      23 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at p. 7. Definition relied on by Justice Zarzeczny in Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [32].

      24 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed July 22, 2019.

      25 MCCreary J. used this three-part test in Seon v Board of Education of the Regina Roman Catholic School Division NO. 81, 2018 SKKB 166 at [9] for the equivalent provision (subsection 18(1)(b)) in The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP).

      ‌26 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 103. Definition first relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [23].

      ‌27 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 102.

      ‌28 Office of the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner (BC IPC) Order F05-09 at [9]. First cited in SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [35].

      ‌29 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌30 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [87].

      ‌31 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 191. Definition first relied on for third party exemption in SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-002 at [85].

      ‌32 Definition originated from ON IPC Order P-454 at p. 4. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [26]. Definition endorsed in Consumers’ Co-operative Refineries Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SKKB 335 (CanLII) at [20].

      ‌33 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 103. Definition first relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [37].

      ‌34 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [141].

      35 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      ‌36 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17], F-2006-002 at [40].

      ‌37 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [156] and [158].

      ‌38 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [157].

      ‌39 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [158].

       

      40 Halifax Developments Ltd. v. Minister of Public Works (994), F.C.J. No. 2035 (QL) (F.C.T.D.). Also, in Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.3. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      41 Originated in 2002 ON IPC Order PO-2018. The language above is drawn from the most recent 2019 ON Order PO-3974 at [42]. First relied on in SK OIPC Review Report F-2005-003 at [17]. Several court decisions support this approach. See Boeing C. v. Ontario (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade), 2005 CanLII 24249 (ON SCDC), [2005] O.J. 2851, Canadian Medical Protective Association v. John Doe, 2008 CanLII 45005 (ON SCDC), [2008] O.J. No. 3475, Canadian Pacific Railway v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2002 BCSC 603 (CanLII), Canada Post Corp. v. National Capital Commission,(2002), 2002 FCT 700 (CanLII), Halifax Development Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [1994] F.C.J. No. 2035. Similar position taken by other IPC offices including BC, AB, NFLD and Labrador and PEI.

      ‌42 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17] to [19] and LA-2011-001 at [97].

      ‌43 Base case was BC IPC Order 01-20 at [86]. This Order was later discussed in Canadian Pacific Railway v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) [2002] B.C.J. No. 848 at [72] to [79]. See also ON IPC Orders MO-1706 at p. 12, PO-2371 at pp. 6 to 9, PO-2528 at p. 12. Included for the first time in SK IPC Review Report 084-2015 at [22].

      ‌44 An example of “inferred disclosure” can be found at [25] of Aventis Pasteur Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1371 (CanLII). See also BC IPC Order 01-20 at [86].

       

      ‌45 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in Canadian Medical Protective Association v. Loukidelis, 2008 CanLII 45005 (ON SCDC) and [55], considered “immutability” as a factor in its determination that the information was not “supplied” by the third party.

      46 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      ‌47 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 104, SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [51], H-2008-002 at [73], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌48 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [57], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8.

      ‌49 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [57], F-2009-001 at [62], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA- 2013-002 at [49], F-2014-002 at [47].

      ‌50 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at pp. 104 and 105.

      ‌51 SK OIPC Review Reports 158-2016 at [37] and 203-2016 at [28].

      ‌52 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [32], LA-2013-002 at [49], ON IPC Orders PO-

      2273 at p. 7 and PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌53 BC IPC Orders 331-1999 at [8], F13-01 at [23]; Office of the Prince Edward Island Information and Privacy Commissioner (PEI IPC) Order FI-16-006 at [19]; Office of the Nova Scotia Information and Privacy Commissioner (NS IPC) Review Reports 16-09 at [44], 17-03 at [34].

      ‌54 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌55 ON IPC Orders PO-2273 at p. 8, PO-2283 at p. 10.

      ‌56 Jacques Whitford Environment Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2001 FCT 556 at [40], SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [52], LA-2013-002 at [58] to [59], ON IPC Order MO-1896 at p. 8, BC IPC Order F-11-08 at [32].

      ‌57 SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-002 at [60].

      ‌58 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47], PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5, Office of the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner (AB IPC) Orders 97-013 at [23] to [24], 2001-008 at [54].

      ‌59 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-002 at [56], F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [29], LA-2013-002 at [49], LA-2013-003 at [113], F-2014-002 at [47]; PEI IPC Order 03-006 at p. 5; AB IPC Order 97-013 at [25].

      60 Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Minister of Transport, (1989), 27 C.P.R. (3d) 180 (F.C.T.D.) at p.11. Stenotran Services v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), 2000 CanLII 15464 (FC) at [9] citing Air Atonabee. It is important to note that subsection 20(1)(b) of the federal ATIA places the focus on the confidential nature of the information itself. SK’s subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP places the focus on the confidential nature of the supply. However, Air Atonabee may still be instructive with interpreting SK’s subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP.

      61 Chesal v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) et al., 2003 NSCA 124 (CanLII) at [72] and [73] and Stevens v. Canada (Prime Minister), [1997] 2 FC 759, 1997 CanLII 4805 (FC) at p. 1. Also, see NS IPC Review Report 17-03 at [98] and SK OIPC Review Reports F-2006-001 at [76] to [78].

      ‌62 SK OIPC Review Report F-2006-001 at [78].

      ‌63 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [146].

      ‌64 Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services) v. Hi-Rise Group Inc., 2004 FCA 99 (CanLII) at [37] and [42].

      ‌65 SK OIPC Review Report F-2012-001/LA-2012-001 at [43].

      ‌66 Brewster Inc. v. Canada (Environment), 2016 FC 339 (CanLII) at [22].

      67 St. Joseph Corp. v. Canada (Public Works & Government Services) [2002] FCT 274 at [53] and [54], Brookfield LePage Johnson Controls Facility Management Services v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [2003] FCT 254 at [16], SK OIPC Review Reports 159-2016 at [39], 052-2017 at [55] and Review Report 311-2017, 312-2017, 313-2017, 316-2017, 340-2017, 341-2017, 342-2017 at [63].

      69 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#undue_fin_gain. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      70 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#undue_fin_gain and Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 108.

      71 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [55] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [219].

      ‌72 Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444 (CanLII) at [35].

      ‌73 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      74 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      75 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204]. 76 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, FOIPPA Policy Definitions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      ‌77 Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2005 FC 189 (CanLII) at [44] to [47].

      ‌78 Adapted from Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 149.

      79 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-business-interests-third party. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      80 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [55] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [219]. 81 Canadian Pacific Hotels Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 444 (CanLII) at [35].

      ‌82 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      83 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      84 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204]. 85 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c) & (d): Questions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 28, 2019.

      86 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 1248 and 1249. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      ‌87 Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 (CanLII) at [107]. Relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 112-2018 at [37].

      88 SK OIPC Review Report 019-2014 at [27]. Equivalent provision in LA FOIP was being considered (subsection 17(1)(d)). Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107. 89 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.11.2. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_11. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      90 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/disclosure-harmful-economic-interests. Accessed July 19, 2019. Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 107.

      ‌91 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 4 at p. 152.

      ‌92 Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2014] 1 SCR 674, 2014 SCC 31 (CanLII) at [54].

      93 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.4. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      94 Canadian Bank Note Limited v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2016 SKKB 362 (CanLII) at [49] relying on Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [204]. 95 Société Gamma Inc. v. Canada (Department of the Secretary of State), (April 27, 1994), T-1587-93, T-1588-93 (F.C.T.D.) at [10].

      ‌96 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of External Affairs) (T.D.), [1990] 3 FC 665, 1990 CanLII 7951 (FC) at [24].

      97 Adapted from Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c) & (d): Questions. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed August 29, 2019.

      98 Information Commissioner of Canada, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(1)(c)&(d): Questions, available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-201cd-questions. Accessed July 19, 2019.

      ‌99 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      ‌100 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      101 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1699.

      ‌102 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 2 at p. 3006.

      103 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 21.

      104 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 8.

      ‌105 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 964.

      ‌106 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

       

      ‌107 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      ‌108 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      109 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) established the meaning of the phrase “in respect of” in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 29, 1983 CanLII 18 (SCC) at [39]. The SCC later applied the same interpretation to the phrase “with respect to” in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC) at [15] to [17]. Summary of this can be found in Gardner, J., and Gardner K. (2016) Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 5, S to Z at p. w-97.

      ‌110 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 2620.

      111 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1643.

      ‌112 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01 at section 2(1)(j).

      ‌113 SK OIPC Review Report 080-2018 at [51] and [52].

      ‌114 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      ‌115 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      116 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      ‌117 Originated from NWT IPC Review Report 05-049 Dictionary on Historical Principles, Oxford University Press 1973, Volume 1 at p. 3006.

      117 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      117 Originated from NWT IPC Review Report 05-049. Adopted in SK OIPC Review Report F-2013-003 at [56] and [57].

      ‌118 McNairn, C., Woodbury, C., 2009, Government Information: Access and Privacy, Carswell: Toronto, p. 4-17.

      119 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1440.

      120 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 64.

      121 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 774.

      122 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions#supplied. Accessed August 21, 2019.

      ‌123 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2005-003 at [17], F-2006-002 at [40].

      ‌124 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [156] and [158].

      ‌125 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [157].

      ‌126 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR 23, 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII) at [158].

      127 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.10. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed November 19, 2019.

      ‌128 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.10. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      ‌129 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.11. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      ‌130 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      ‌131 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45].

      ‌132 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      133 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 864.

      ‌134 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador resource, Access to Information: Policy and Procedures Manual, October 2017 at p. 103.

      135 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1488.

      136 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌137 AB IPC Order 096-002 at p. 17.

      138 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(2), (5), (6): Questions – Disclosure Authorized in Public Interest. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-20256-questions-disclosure-authorized-public-interest. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      139 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 317.

      140 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, Chapter 11.14.11. Available at https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/access-information/access-information-manual.html#cha11_14. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      141 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1330.

      142 Information Commissioner of Canada resource, Investigator’s Guide to Interpreting the Act, Section 20(2), (5), (6): Questions – Disclosure Authorized in Public Interest. Available at https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/investigators-guide-interpreting-act/section-20256-questions-disclosure-authorized-public-interest. Accessed September 4, 2019.

      143 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019. Definition of “including” same as SK OIPC Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access, for subsections 16(1), 17(1)(g) and 22(a) of FOIP.

      ‌144 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [118] to [128].

      145 Adapted from Government of Manitoba, FIPPA for Public Bodies – Resource Manual, Chapter 2, Scope of FIPPA – Who and What Falls under FIPPA at p. 44. Available at https://www.gov.mb.ca/fippa/public_bodies/resource_manual/pdfs/chap_2.pdf. Accessed on April 24, 2020.

      146 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed. at p. 4, (Oxford University Press).

      147 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board), 2006 FCA 157 (CanLII), [2007] 1 FCR 203. Also see the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada resource, PIPEDA Interpretation Bulletin: Personal Information, 2013, available at https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/the-personal-information-protection-and-electronic-documents-act-pipeda/pipeda-compliance-help/pipeda-interpretation-bulletins/interpretations_02/.

      ‌148 ON IPC Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.). See also SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-001 at [57].

      ‌149 Originated and adapted from BC IPC Order P14-03 at [16].

      150 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 924, 1238 and 1378.

      151 ON IPC Order 16 at p. 19. See also Government of Manitoba, FIPPA for Public Bodies – Resource Manual, Chapter 2, Scope of FIPPA – Who and What Falls under FIPPA at p. 44. Available at https://www.gov.mb.ca/fippa/public_bodies/resource_manual/pdfs/chap_2.pdf. Accessed on April 24, 2020.

      ‌152 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s 2-29.

      153 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1065. This definition was also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 082-2019, 083-2019 at [94].

      ‌154 ON IPC resource, Public Interest Disclosure, September 2021, at p. 5. Also cited in SK OIPC Review Report 082-2017 at [29].

      ‌155 ON IPC Orders P-123/124, P-391 at p. 7, M-539 at p. 6 and PO-2472 at p. 10.

      ‌156 ON IPC Orders P-532 at p. 10, P-568 at p. 5, PO-2626 at p. 19 and PO-2614 at p. 24.

      ‌157 ON IPC Order P-613 at p. 9.

      ‌158 Gombu v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 773. See also ON IPC Orders PO-4277 at [86] and PO-2472 at p. 10.

      ‌159 ON IPC Orders PO-2626 at p. 17 and PO-2472 at p. 10.

      ‌160 ON IPC Orders M-773 at p. 7 and PO-4277 at [87].

      161 Originated from AB IPC Order 096-002 at p. 17. Also cited in SK OIPC resource, Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access for section 19(3) at p. 235.

      162 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 317.

      ‌163 ON IPC resource, Public Interest Disclosure, September 2021, at p. 6.

      ‌164 ON IPC resource, Public Interest Disclosure, September 2021, at p. 7.

      ‌165 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Public interest disclosures by federal institutions under the Privacy Act, June 2022, available http://Public interest disclosures by federal institutions under the Privacy Act – Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌166 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Public interest disclosures by federal institutions under the Privacy Act, June 2022, available http://Public interest disclosures by federal institutions under the Privacy Act – Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      167 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/cabinet-local-public-body-confidences. Accessed June 26, 2019. Definition of “including” as included in SK OIPC Guide to FOIP, Chapter 4: Exemptions from the Right of Access, for subsections 16(1) and 17(1)(g) of FOIP.

      ‌168 SK OIPC Review Report F-2010-001 at [118] to [128].

      169 Adapted from Government of Manitoba, FIPPA for Public Bodies – Resource Manual, Chapter 2, Scope of FIPPA – Who and What Falls under FIPPA at p. 44. Available at https://www.gov.mb.ca/fippa/public_bodies/resource_manual/pdfs/chap_2.pdf. Accessed on April 24, 2020.

      170 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed. at p. 4, (Oxford University Press).

      171 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board), 2006 FCA 157 (CanLII), [2007] 1 FCR 203. Also see the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada resource, PIPEDA Interpretation Bulletin: Personal Information, 2013, available at https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/the-personal-information-protection-and-electronic-documents-act-pipeda/pipeda-compliance-help/pipeda-interpretation-bulletins/interpretations_02/.

      ‌172 ON IPC Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.). See also SK OIPC Review Report LA-2013-001 at [57].

      173 Originated and adapted from BC IPC Order P14-03 at [16].

      174 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at pp. 924, 1238 and 1378.

      175 ON IPC Order 16 at p. 19. See also Government of Manitoba, FIPPA for Public Bodies – Resource Manual, Chapter 2, Scope of FIPPA – Who and What Falls under FIPPA at p. 44. Available at https://www.gov.mb.ca/fippa/public_bodies/resource_manual/pdfs/chap_2.pdf. Accessed on April 24, 2020.

      ‌176 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s 2-29.

      177 Pearsall, Judy, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed., (Oxford University Press) at p. 1065. This definition was also relied on in SK OIPC Review Report 082-2019, 083-2019 at [94].

      178 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 1541.

      ‌179 Gertner v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2011 ONSC 6121 (CanLII) at [32].

      ‌180 Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [45]. This case dealt specifically with an appeal regarding Ontario’s FOIP legislation.

      ‌181 Adapted from Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII) at [43].

      182 Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 317.

      183 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy Definitions at https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/services-for-government/policies-procedures/foippa-manual/policy-definitions. Accessed April 23, 2020.

      ‌184 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3 (CanLII), [2012] 1 SCR 23 at [84].

      185 See Sawridge Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) (1987), 10 F.T.R. 48, aff’d sub nom and Twinn v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1987), 80 N.R. 263 (F.C.A.) at p. 373. These decisions dealt with the federal Access to Information Act but are relevant for FOIP. The court held that the right to seek a review was not available to the third party because notice was not required because the information was not deemed third party information.

      ‌186 Government Information Access and Privacy, McNairn and Woodbury, Carswell, 2008, at pp. 6-15 to 6-16. See also SK OIPC Review Report LA-2009-001 at [101].

      ‌187 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 216.

      188 See SK IPC resource, Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3: Access to Records under heading “Search for Records” – definition for a “reasonable search” has been relied upon and modified for what is considered reasonable effort for locating a third party. A “reasonable search” was defined in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌189 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at pp. 214 to 215.

      ‌190 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 215.

      ‌191 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 217.

      192 See Sawridge Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) (1987), 10 F.T.R. 48, aff’d sub nom and Twinn v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1987), 80 N.R. 263 (F.C.A.) at p. 373. These decisions dealt with the federal Access to Information Act but are relevant for FOIP. The court held that the right to seek a review was not available to the third party because notice was not required because the information was not deemed third party information.

      ‌193 Government Information Access and Privacy, McNairn and Woodbury, Carswell, 2008, at pp. 6-15 to 6-16. See also SK OIPC Review Report LA-2009-001 at [101].

      ‌194 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 216.

      195 See SK IPC resource, Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3: Access to Records under heading “Search for Records” – definition for a “reasonable search” has been relied upon and modified for what is considered reasonable effort for locating a third party. A “reasonable search” was defined in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌196 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 217.

      197 It is a principle of statutory interpretation that “interpretations that result in a lack of fit between conduct and consequences may be rejected as absurd.” In this context an “absurd” result signifies “a result that is so unreasonable, as to be unacceptable.” From Sangan’s Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases Legal Maxims, Canada, 5th Edition, Volume 1, A – B at p. A-36. Originates from Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002), at p. 247. See also SK OIPC Review Reports 027-2016 at [14], 044-2017 at [19] 059-2017 at [40], 176-2019, 177- 2019, 262-2019, 263-2019 at [38], and 187-2019 at [39].

      ‌198 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 218.

      ‌199 For other samples of model letters by the Access and Privacy Branch, Ministry of Justice see publications. Saskatchewan.ca/#/categories/340.

      ‌200 Les Viandes du Breton Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2006 FC 1075 (CanLII) at [13] and [19].

      ‌201 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      202 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      ‌203 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      204 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      205 See SK OIPC resource, Guide to FOIP, Chapter 3: Access to Records, under heading “Search for Records” – definition for a “reasonable search” has been relied upon and modified for what is considered reasonable effort for locating a third party. A “reasonable search” was defined in SK OIPC Review Reports F-2008-001 at [38] and F-2012-002 at [26].

      ‌206 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at pp. 214 to 215.

      ‌207 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 215.

      ‌208 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 220.

      ‌209 SK OIPC Rules of Procedure at p. 3.

      ‌210 SK OIPC resource, What to Expect During a Review with the IPC at p. 8.

      211 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌212 The “head” is defined at section 2(1)(e) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      ‌213 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2014-006 at [41] to [43], 205-2019, 255-2019 at [11]. See also SNC Lavalin Inc. v. Canada (Minister for International Cooperation), 2003 FCT 681 (CanLII), [2003] 4 FC 900 at [19] to [24].

      ‌214 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 216.

      ‌215 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 216.

      ‌216 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 220.

      217 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌218 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 220.

      ‌219 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      220 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Actreplaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      ‌221 The “head” is defined at section 2(1)(e) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      222 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      223 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌224 SK OIPC Review Report 082-201-, 083-2019 at [12] to [17] and [121].

      225 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌226 Les Viandes du Breton Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2006 FC 1075 (CanLII) at [13] and [19].

      ‌227 SK OIPC Review Report 082-201-, 083-2019 at [12] to [17] and [121].

      228 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      229 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      230 Adapted from British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌231 For other samples of model letters by the Access and Privacy Branch, Ministry of Justice see publications. Saskatchewan.ca/#/categories/340.

      ‌232 Les Viandes du Breton Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2006 FC 1075 (CanLII) at [13] and [19].

      ‌233 For other samples of model letters by the Access and Privacy Branch, Ministry of Justice see publications. Saskatchewan.ca/#/categories/340.

      ‌234 Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1989] F.C.J. No. 453 at p. 2.

      ‌235 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 216.

      ‌236 For other samples of model letters by the Access and Privacy Branch, Ministry of Justice see publications. Saskatchewan.ca/#/categories/340.

      237 Service Alberta, FOIP Guidelines and Practices: 2009 Edition, Chapter 5: Third Party Notice at p. 222.

      ‌238 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      239 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      240 Garner, Bryan A., 2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, Deluxe 10th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 837.

      ‌241 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      ‌242 Section 49(2) of FOIP provides that the one year also includes the date as of which the government institution is deemed to have responded – see sections 7(5) and 37(4) of FOIP.

      243 British Columbia Government Services, FOIPPA Policy and Procedures Manual at Section 24 – Time limit and notice of decision – Province of British Columbia (gov.bc.ca). Accessed Sept. 1, 2022.

      ‌244 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      245 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      ‌246 SK OIPC Review Report F-2013-003 at [19], [25], [26] and [67] to [73].

      ‌247 Les Viandes du Breton Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2006 FC 1075 (CanLII) at [13] and [19].

      ‌248 SK OIPC resource, The Rules of Procedure at sections 2-5 and 2-6.

      ‌249 SK OIPC Rules of Procedure at p. 3.

      ‌250 SK OIPC resource, What to Expect During a Review with the IPC at p. 8.

      ‌251 The “head” is defined at section 2(1)(e) of The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

      ‌252 SK OIPC Review Reports F-2014-006 at [41] to [43], 205-2019, 255-2019 at [11]. See also SNC Lavalin Inc. v. Canada (Minister for International Cooperation), 2003 FCT 681 (CanLII), [2003] 4 FC 900 at [19] to [24].

      ‌253 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [41] and [47].

      ‌254 The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2 at s. 2-28.

      255 SK OIPC Blog, The Interpretation Act, 1995 – Things to Know, June 7, 2017. The Legislation Act replaced The Interpretation Act, 1995. It came into force on May 15, 2019.

      256 Courts of Saskatchewan, Resources, Court Structure. Available at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/resources/learn-about-the-courts-resources/court-structure. 257 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. Accessed February 21, 2023.

      258 Itinerate” (of a judge) means to travel on a circuit for the purpose of holding court – Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 997.

      259 Courts of Saskatchewan at https://sasklawcourts.ca/index.php/home/court-of-queen-s-bench/judges. See also The Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, RSS c Q-1.01 at s. 4.

      ‌260 Modified from SK OIPC Resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee. Available at https://oipc.sk.ca/assets/guide-to-appealing-to-the-decision-of-a-head.pdf.

      261 Adapted from Garner, Bryan A., 2019. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group at p. 909.

      ‌262 SK OIPC Resource, Guide to Appealing the Decision of a Head of a Government Institution, or a Local Authority, or a Health Trustee at p. 10.

      ‌263 Leo v Global Transportation Hub Authority, 2020 SKCA 91 (CanLII) at [41] and [47].

      ‌264 West v Saskatchewan (Health), 2020 SKKB 244 (CanLII) at [13].

      Chapter 6: Protection of Privacy

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