Office of the
Saskatchewan Information
and Privacy Commissioner

REVIEW REPORT 333-2025

Regina Police Service

November 20, 2026

Summary: The Applicant submitted an access to information request to the Regina Police Service (RPS) for records regarding incidents involving themself. The Applicant specifically requested an audio recording of a 911 call and any video of an incident that involved the security office at the Cornwall Centre. The RPS responded by providing the Applicant with some records but refused the Applicant access to other records pursuant to sections 14(1)(c) (interfere with or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation), 14(1)(j) (facilitate the commission of an offence or impede the detection of an offence), 14(1)(k) (interfere with or disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter) and 28(1) (third party personal information) of *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (*LA FOIP*).

The RPS further indicated to the Applicant that any video of the incident at the Cornwall Centre was under the control of the Cornwall Centre security office, and not with the RPS. The Applicant requested a review by the Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner found that:

(1) The RPS properly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the records, except for portions of two pages of the paginated records and portions of an audio recording of a 911 call;

(2) The RPS properly applied section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*;

(3) The RPS properly applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*; and

(4) OIPC is satisfied that the RPS does not have body cam video in its possession or control of the incident that occurred on September 30, 2024 at the Cornwall Centre.

The Commissioner recommended that:

(1) RPS submitted it was no longer relying on section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to a portion of a sentence at the bottom of page 34 of the paginated records. The RPS should release the portion of a sentence at the bottom of page 34 it had originally withheld pursuant to section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to the Applicant within 30 days of the issuance of this Report.

(2) The RPS continue to withhold the portions of the paginated records to which it applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* except for certain portions of pages 33 and 36 that the RPS should release to the Applicant within 30 days of this Report being issued;

(3) The RPS continue to withhold access to the non-paginated Occurrence Reports pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*;

(4) The RPS release certain portions of the second 911 Call to the Applicant within 30 days of this Report being issued;

(5) The RPS continue to withhold the portions of the paginated records containing the *900 Codes* and *10 Codes* pursuant to section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*.

(6) The RPS continue to withhold the portion of page 57 described as *Special Address Comment* pursuant to section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*.

(7) The RPS take no further action regarding the search for body cam video of the incident that occurred on September 30, 2024 at the Cornwall Centre.

I BACKGROUND

[1] On July 10, 2025, the Regina Police Service (RPS) received the following access to information request from the Applicant:

1) Call to 911 (spring 2025) made by another person in distress, incident on 13th Ave about excessive speeding. Looking for the audio call (doesn't want names of people). Everything under this incident.

2) Wants complete "profile" of incidents under [their] name, calls made about [them] from as early as we have in our database

3) Cornwall incident Sept 30/24, asking for any video from security office (body cams?). Incident occurred around 11:45 am

Names of security officers:

[Name 1]
[Name 2]
[Name 3] (boss)
[Name 4] (GM of Cornwall center)
306-[redacted phone number] [email address]

- Was told [they] would need to get bodycam footage of security officials from RPS.

[2] The RPS waived the $20 application fee requirement.

[3] In a letter dated August 6, 2025, the RPS informed the Applicant that it was extending the 30-day response period set out in section 7 by an additional 30 days pursuant to section 12(1)(b) of *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (*LA FOIP*)[1].

[4] The RPS issued two section 7 decision letters to the Applicant. The first section 7 decision letter was dated September 8, 2025 and in it:

- The RPS refused access to 20 pages of the responsive record in full pursuant to sections 14(1)(c) and 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.
- The RPS provided access to other pages in the responsive record in part with reliance on the exemptions in sections 14(1)(c), (j), (k), (k.2) and 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.
- The RPS directed the Applicant to page 57 of the responsive record because it was the only record with respect to the incident at the Cornwall Centre. The RPS released a portion of this page.
- The RPS indicated that if there was body camera footage of the incident at the Cornwall Centre, it was in the possession and control of the Cornwall Centre security office, not the RPS.
- The RPS indicated that some of the requested records did not exist.

[1] *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, SS 1990-91, c L-27.1, as amended.

[5] The second section 7 decision letter was dated November 4, 2025 and provided further information for the Applicant:

- The RPS offered the Applicant an opportunity to come down to the police station and listen to the audio of two 911 calls pursuant to section 10(3)(c) of *LA FOIP*.
- The RPS redacted portions of the two 911 calls pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* but released the rest.

[6] The Applicant requested a review by the Office of Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) on November 17, 2025.

[7] OIPC notified the RPS and the Applicant that a review would commence on May 29, 2026.

[8] The RPS provided its index of records (index) and the entire record to OIPC on July 9, 2026.

[9] The RPS sent a letter to the Applicant indicating that it was no longer relying on section 14(1)(k.2) of *LA FOIP* on August 6, 2026.

[10] The RPS provided OIPC with a submission on August 6, 2026 with the stipulation that the submission could not be shared with the Applicant.

[11] The Applicant did not provide a written submission.

II RECORDS AT ISSUE

a. Paginated records

[12] The RPS provided the Applicant with a paginated record consisting of 63 pages. Portions of pages 5, 12, 14, 15, 20 to 23, 26 to 28, 30, 32 to 41, 46 to 48, 50, 55, 57, 59 to 62 were redacted pursuant to sections 14(1)(c), 14(1)(j), 14(1)(k), and/or 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

[13] In the course of the OIPC review, the RPS indicated that it was no longer relying on the application of the exemption in section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to a portion of a sentence at the bottom of page 34.

b. Non-paginated Occurrence Reports

[14] The RPS indicated in its letter dated September 8, 2026, that it was refusing the Applicant access to 20 pages in full. Based on the materials provided to OIPC, it appears that the access was refused to 21 pages in full pursuant to sections 14(1)(c) and 28(1) of *LA FOIP*. We describe these non-paginated records as follows:

- Occurrence Report 1 – 2 pages
- Occurrence Report 2 – 9 pages
- Occurrence Report 3 – 4 pages
- Occurrence Report 4 – 2 pages
- Occurrence Report 5 – 4 pages

c. Audio recordings of two 911 calls

[15] Finally, the RPS allowed the Applicant the opportunity to listen to audio recordings of two 911 calls. The first audio recording is 2 minutes and 25 seconds while the second one is 5 minutes and 23 seconds. Portions of each recording were redacted pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

III DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Jurisdiction

[16] The RPS qualifies as a "local authority" pursuant to section 2(1)(f)(viii.1) of *LA FOIP*. Therefore, OIPC has jurisdiction and is undertaking a review of this matter pursuant to PART VI of *LA FOIP*.

2. The application of section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*

[17] The RPS applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the following:

Paginated records	Portions of pages 5, 12, 14, 15, 20 to 23, 26 to 28, 30, 32 to 41, 46 to 48, 50, 55, 57, 59 to 62
Non-paginated Occurrence Reports	The following were withheld in full: • Occurrence Report 1 – 2 pages • Occurrence Report 2 – 9 pages • Occurrence Report 3 – 4 pages • Occurrence Report 4 – 2 pages • Occurrence Report 5 – 4 pages

[18] The RPS also applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to redact portions of both 911 calls.

[19] Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* prohibits the disclosure of personal information of individuals unless the individual about whom the information pertains consents to its disclosure. Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* provides:

> **Disclosure of personal information**
> 28(1) No local authority shall disclose personal information in its possession or under its control without the consent, given in the prescribed manner, of the individual to whom the information relates except in accordance with this section or section 29.

[20] Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* is a mandatory exemption to an individual's right of access. Prior to a consideration of section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*, the first determination must be whether the information qualifies as "personal information" as defined by section 23(1) of *LA FOIP*. For information to be "personal information", it must be: (1) about an identifiable individual; and (2) personal in nature. Information is about an identifiable individual if:[2]

- The individual can be identified from the information (e.g., name, where they live, etc.); or

[2] OIPC Review Report 339-2025 at paragraph [13].

- The information, when combined with information otherwise available, could reasonably be expected to allow the individual to be identified.

[21] Section 23(1) of *LA FOIP* provides a list of what constitutes personal information but is not exhaustive. Sections 23(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (h), and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP* are relevant to this analysis:

> **Interpretation**
> **23**(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), **"personal information"** means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:
>
> (a) information that relates to the race, creed, religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, family status or marital status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry or place of origin of the individual;
>
> (b) information that relates to the education or the criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved;
>
> (c) information that relates to health care that has been received by the individual or to the health history of the individual;
>
> ...
> (e) the home or business address, home or business telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual;
>
> (f) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they are about another individual;
>
> ...
> (h) the views or opinions of another individual with respect to the individual;
>
> ...
> (k) the name of the individual where:
>
> (i) it appears with other personal information that relates to the individual;

[22] If the redacted information qualifies as "personal information" of a third party individual as defined by section 23(1) of *LA FOIP*, the RPS must refuse the Applicant access to such

information pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* unless consent was obtained for the release of the information. No consent was obtained in this matter.

a. Paginated records

[23] In its submission, RPS indicated it applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the following types of information:

Types of information	Page numbers
Names of third party individuals	5, 12, 14, 15, 20 to 23, 26 to 28, 30, 32 to 39, 41, 46, 47, 59, 61, 62
Telephone numbers of third party individuals	27, 30, 40, 41, 46, 47, 59, 61
Addresses of third party individuals	20, 22, 26, 28, 30, 38, 40, 41, 47, 59, 61
Medical history and health information of third party individuals	12, 28
Personal statement by third party individuals that contains information about other third party individuals	14, 21, 23, 27, 62
Criminal history of a third party individual	32, 33

[24] OIPC agrees that the portions redacted on the pages set out in the above table qualify as personal information of third party individuals as defined by sections 23(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP* and should be redacted pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*, with two exceptions: pages 33 and 36.

[25] Page 33 is a "General Report" of an incident involving the Applicant and another individual. While most of the redacted portions of this page contain personal information of the other individual, the bottom of page 33 features four bullet points. The first, third and fourth bullet points contain the other individual's descriptions of actions taken by the Applicant. As such, this information constitutes the Applicant's own personal information pursuant to section 23(1)(h) of *LA FOIP*. The RPS should release the Applicant's personal

information that appears in the first, third and fourth bullet that appears at the bottom of page 33.

[26] Page 36 is a "Supplementary Occurrence Report" of an incident involving the Applicant and another individual. Most redacted portions on this page contain the personal information of the other individual as well as another civilian witness. However, the bottom of the page contains seven bullets. The first, third, fourth and fifth bullets contain the other individual's descriptions of actions taken by the Applicant. As such, this information constitutes the Applicant's own personal information pursuant to section 23(1)(h) of *LA FOIP*. RPS should release the Applicant's personal information that appears in the first, third, fourth and fifth bullet at the bottom of page 36.

b. Non-paginated Occurrence Reports

[27] The RPS withheld the non-paginated Occurrence Reports, in full, pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

[28] The RPS submitted that the Occurrence Reports contain the personal information of third party individuals, and not that of the Applicant. The OIPC review reveals that the RPS assessment is correct for these reasons:

Non-paginated Occurrence Reports	**Description**
Occurrence Report 1 – 2 pages	Details of a matter between two individuals, neither of whom are the Applicant.
Occurrence Report 2 – 9 pages	Details of a matter between three individuals, none of whom are the Applicant.
Occurrence Report 3 – 4 pages	Details of a criminal offence committed by an individual – not the Applicant.
Occurrence Report 4 – 2 pages	Details of an individual – not the Applicant.
Occurrence Report 5 – 4 pages	Information with respect to an individual – not the Applicant.

[29] Therefore, the five non-paginated Occurrence Reports all contain personal information of individuals who are not the Applicant. This information includes the names, addresses, dates of births, and charges against these individuals and descriptions of the individuals. All of this information constitutes the personal information of these other individuals as defined by sections 23(1)(a), (b), (e) and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP*.

[30] RPS properly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to portions of the non-paginated Occurrence Reports.

c. Audio recordings of two 911 calls

[31] The RPS permitted the Applicant to listen to the audio recordings of two 911 calls. The RPS redacted the 911 calls at the point they contained the personal information of the callers. Below are the timestamps of where each call was redacted under section 29(1) of *LA FOIP*:

Call 1		
Redaction #	**Timestamp**	**Description**
1	4 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
2	1 minute and 54 second mark to 1 minute and 59 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
3	2 minute and 4 second mark to 2 minute and 7 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
4	2 minute and 10 second mark to 2 minute and 15 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.

Call 2		
Redaction #	**Timestamp**	**Description**
1	4 second mark to 11 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
2	16 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.

3	27 second mark to 29 second mark	Description of the Applicant.
4	1 minute and 6 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
5	1 minute and 23 second mark to 1 minute and 27 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
6	1 minute and 29 second mark to 1 minute 35 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
7	1 minute and 53 second mark to 1 minute and 58 second mark	Description of caller's concerns that may identify the caller.
8	2 minute and 39 second mark	Description of the Applicant.
9	2 minute and 40 second mark to 2 minute and 43 second mark	Caller describing themself.
10	2 minute and 50 second mark to 2 minute and 55 second mark	Description of caller's concerns that may identify the caller.
11	3 minute and 13 second mark	Description of caller's concerns that may identify the caller.
12	3 minute and 33 second mark to 3 minute and 34 second mark	Caller describing themself.
13	3 minute and 35 second mark	Description of the Applicant
14	3 minute and 42 second mark to 3 minute and 48 second mark	Description of the Applicant
15	4 minute and 6 second mark to 4 minute and 13 second mark	Description of the Applicant.
16	4 minute and 16 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.
17	4 minute and 42 second mark to 4 minute and 48 second mark	Caller describing themself.
18	5 minute and 5 second mark	Identifiable information about the caller.

[32] The above redactions qualify as personal information of third party individuals as defined by sections 23(1)(e), (f) and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP* and were properly redacted pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* save for Call 2: redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15.

[33] Redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 of Call 2 are a third party's description of the Applicant. Such information qualifies as the Applicant's own personal information pursuant to section 23(1)(h) of *LA FOIP*. RPS should release these redactions to the Applicant.

[34] OIPC notes that the RPS provided the Applicant access to Call 2 in a redacted format pursuant to section 10(3)(c) of *LA FOIP*. That is, RPS invited the Applicant to come to its headquarters to listen to the redacted version of Call 2, instead of providing a copy of the record. Therefore, in order to release redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 of Call 2, the RPS may either invite the Applicant to listen to Call 2 with redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 re-inserted into the recording, or it can provide a transcription of redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 to the Applicant.

3. The application of section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*

[35] The RPS applied section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* to portions of pages 30, 46 to 48, 50, 55, 57, 59 to 61 of the paginated records. These portions involve reference to *900 Codes* and *10 Codes*.

[36] Section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* provides as follows:

> **Law enforcement and investigation**
> **14**(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:
>
> …
> (j) facilitate the commission of an offence or tend to impede the detection of an offence;

[37] Section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* uses the term "could" instead of the phrase "could reasonably be expected to" as in other provisions in *LA FOIP*. The threshold for "could" is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectation – the requirement being only that release of the

information "could" have a specified result. There does not need to be a likelihood of a happening but only an objective possibility, or a probability based on the facts.[3] The RPS is only obligated to show that it is objectively possible that disclosure of the record could cause the injury described in section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*.

[38] OIPC uses the following two-part test to determine if section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* applies. However, only one part needs to be answered in the affirmative in order for the exemption to apply:[4]

1. Could the release of the record facilitate the commission of an offence?
2. Could release of the record tend to impede the detection of an offence?

[39] The RPS submitted the following regarding the *900 Codes*:

- *900 Codes* are complaint codes and are used by the RPS to provide quality service and ensure the best utilization of our resources.
- If the public was to become aware of the *900 Codes*, and the associated priorities for those calls, this knowledge could be used to facilitate the commission of an offence and/or impede the detection of an offence by diverting calls for service.
- The RPS utilizes encryption for radio transmissions specifically to protect the *900 Codes*.

[40] The RPS also explained that *10 Codes* are interchangeable with *900 Codes*.

[41] OIPC has previously found that section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* applies to *900 Codes*.[5] OIPC finds that section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* applies to the *900 Codes* that appear on pages 30, 46 to 47, 50, 55, 57, 59, and 61 and to the *10 Codes* that appear on pages 48 and 60.

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[3] *Saskatchewan Government Insurance v Giesbrecht*, 2025 SKCA 10 at paragraphs [73] and [80]. In this ruling the Court of Appeal considered the word "could" within the context of section 38(1)(f) of *The Health Information Protection Act*, SS 1999, c. H-0.021, as amended, but the substance of the meaning is relevant to this analysis.

[4] *Supra*, footnote 2 at paragraph [19].

4. The application of section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*

[42] Page 57 is a Dispatch Report. The RPS applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* to a portion of page 57. RPS describes this portion of page 57 of the paginated records as a *Special Address Comment*.

[43] Section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* provides as follows:

> **Law enforcement and investigations**
> **14**(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:
>
> …
> (k) interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter;

[44] OIPC uses the following two-part test to determine if section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* applies:[6]

1. Is a law enforcement matter involved?
2. Does one of the following exist:
   (a) Could the release of information interfere with a law enforcement matter?
   (b) Could the release disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter?

Is a law enforcement matter involved?

[45] OIPC has defined "law enforcement" as follows:[7]

> **"law enforcement"** means:
>
> (a) policing, including criminal intelligence operations,

[5] *Ibid*, at paragraph [21].

[6] OIPC Review Report 373-2025 at paragraph [21].

[7] OIPC Review Report 063-2025 at paragraph [20].

(b) investigations that lead or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed, or

(c) proceedings that lead or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed.

[46] The RPS explained that officers were dispatched to investigate a matter involving the security of a building. The authority for this action is set out in section 36(2) of *The Police Act, 1990.* [8] This section of *The Police Act, 1990* allows officers broad powers to attend and investigate public places in order to preserve the peace and to prevent the commission of crime. The actions of the RPS officers in this matter involved a legitimate law enforcement matter.[9] The first part of the test is met.

Does one of the following exist:

(a) Could the release of information interfere with a law enforcement matter; or

(b) Could the release of information disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter?

[47] To meet the second part of the two-part test, the RPS must only demonstrate that the release of the information "could" have an objective possibility of a specified result.[10]

[48] In this case, the *Special Address Comment* severed from page 57 of the paginated record contained a detailed instruction on how police officer should conduct an investigation if certain fact circumstances exist. The release of the *Special Address Comment* is investigative policing at its highest and could definitely disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter. The second part of the two-part test is met. The RPS properly applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*.

[8] *The Police Act, 1990*, S.S. 1990-91, c. P-15.01, as amended.

[9] OIPC Review Report 098-2019 at paragraph [99]; OIPC Review Report 061-2024 at paragraph [33].

[10] OIPC Review Report 098-2019 at paragraph [100].

5. The RPS Search for Records

[49] The Applicant requested "any video from security office (body cams?)" regarding an incident that occurred on September 30, 2024 at the Cornwall Centre in downtown Regina. The RPS indicated that any video of this nature is under the control and possession of the Cornwall Centre security office and not the RPS. The Applicant was provided with the contact information for security services at the Cornwall Centre.

[50] When a local authority indicates that records do not exist, OIPC will review a local authority's efforts to search for records to determine if the efforts were reasonable.

[51] OIPC carefully reviewed the Dispatch Report that appears on pages 57 and 58 of the records provided to the Applicant. The Dispatch Report revealed that the call to the RPS had been cancelled by security at the Cornwall Centre. Clearly, no RPS officers attended the Cornwall Centre that day. OIPC is satisfied that the RPS does not have any records in its possession or under its control regarding the incident from September 30, 2024 other than the Dispatch Report on pages 57 and 58 that showed an earlier call for help had been cancelled.

[52] This is not to say that there is no body cam evidence in connection to this incident – just that OIPC is content that there is no RPS body cam evidence in connection to this matter from that date. The Applicant is free to pursue this matter with security services at the Cornwall Centre.

IV FINDINGS

[53] OIPC has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to PART VI of *LA FOIP*.

[54] The RPS properly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the paginated records except for portions of pages 33 and 36.

[55] The RPS properly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the non-paginated Occurrence Reports.

[56] Except for redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 of Call 2, the redactions to the audio of Call 1 and Call 2 qualify as personal information of third party individuals as defined by sections 23(1)(e), (f) and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP* and the RPS properly redacted the audio pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

[57] The RPS properly applied section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* to the 900 codes on pages 30, 46 to 47, 50, 55, 57, 59, and 61 and to the 10 codes on page 48 and 60.

[58] The RPS has properly applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* to the portion of page 57 described as "Special Address Comment".

[59] OIPC is satisfied that the RPS does not have any body cam video in its possession or control of the incident that occurred on September 30, 2024 at the Cornwall Centre in downtown Regina.

V RECOMMENDATIONS

[60] RPS indicated in its submission it was no longer relying on section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to withhold a portion of a sentence at the bottom of page 34 of the paginated records. The RPS should release the portion of a sentence at the bottom of page 34 it had originally withheld pursuant to section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to the Applicant within 30 days of the issuance of this Report.

[61] I recommend that the RPS continue to withhold the portions of the paginated records to which it applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* except for the following two matters which should be released to the Applicant within 30 days of this Report being issued:

- RPS should release the Applicant's personal information that appears in the first, third and fourth bullet at the bottom of page 33.

- RPS should release the Applicant's personal information that appears in the first, third, fourth and fifth bullet at the bottom of page 36.

[62] I recommend that the RPS continue to withhold the non-paginated Occurrence Reports as described in the table in paragraph [27] of this Report pursuant to section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

[63] I recommend that the RPS release redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 of the second 911 Call to the Applicant within 30 days of this Report being issued. RPS may either invite the Applicant to listen to Call 2 with redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 re-inserted into the recording. The other options is to provide a transcription of redactions 3, 8, and 13 to 15 to the Applicant within 30 days of the issuance of this Report.

[64] I recommend that the RPS continue to withhold the portions of the paginated records containing the *900 Codes* on pages 30, 46 to 47, 50, 55, 57, 59 and 61 and to the *10 Codes* on pages 48 and 60 pursuant to section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*.

[65] I recommend that the RPS continue to withhold the portion of page 57 described as "Special Address Comment" pursuant to section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*.

[66] I recommend that the RPS take no further action regarding the search for body cam video of the incident that occurred on September 30, 2024 at the Cornwall Centre in downtown Regina.

Dated at Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 20th day of November, 2026.

Grace Hession David
Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner