Office of the
Saskatchewan Information
and Privacy Commissioner

REVIEW REPORT 191-2026

Saskatoon Police Service

November 20, 2026

Summary: The Applicant sought records from the Saskatoon Police Service (SPS), and was denied access to portions of the record under the following sections of *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (LA FOIP)*:

- 13(1)(a) (record obtained in confidence from Government of Canada);
- 13(2) (record obtained in confidence from another local authority);
- 14(1)(c) (interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation);
- 14(1)(j) (facilitate the commission of an offence or tend to impede the detection of an offence);
- 14(1)(k) (interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter); and
- 28(1) (third party personal information)

The SPS claimed that some records were not subject to *LA FOIP* as per section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP*.

The SPS later dropped its reliance on section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP*.

The Applicant was not satisfied with the application of exemptions by the SPS and asked the Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner to undertake a review.

The Commissioner found that some parts of the record were not subject to *LA FOIP* because the records were outside the statutory jurisdiction of the access to information scheme within *LA FOIP* and that the SPS properly applied sections 14(1)(c), (k) and 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the remaining portions of the record.

The Commissioner recommended that: (1) the SPS refer the Applicant to the Courts of Saskatchewan to seek access to the records not subject to *LA FOIP*; and (2) the SPS continue to withhold the remaining portions of the record under the exemptions applied.

I BACKGROUND

[1] The Saskatoon Police Service (SPS) received the following request for records from the Applicant along with the $20 application fee on March 31, 2026:

> I am requesting the information that the S.P.S had and leading to my arrest on September 26, 2023. The arresting officer was [name withheld][1]. I was charged with two offences, one count of sexual assault and one count of aggravated sexual assault. I was found not guilty of both charges in Court of King's Bench on March 26 2025. The information number is [information number withheld]. The Occurence number is [occurrence number withheld]. Should additional information be requested from me, please do not hesitate to contact me at the information provided

[2] The SPS provided its section 7 decision to the Applicant by letter dated May 14, 2026. The SPS notified the Applicant it was withholding parts of the record pursuant to the exemptions in sections 13(1)(a), 13(2), 14(1)(c), (j), (k) and 28(1) of *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (*LA FOIP*).[2]

[3] The Applicant asked the Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) to review the decision by the SPS on May 20, 2026.

[4] OIPC notified the Applicant and the SPS that a review of the application of the above exemptions would proceed on August 14, 2026.

[1] The use of square brackets is to minimize the disclosure of the identities of any individuals connected to this review.

[2] *The Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, SS 1990-91, c L27.1, as amended.

[5] The SPS provided OIPC with its index of records (index) and the record on September 9, 2026. The SPS advised that the index could be shared with the Applicant. OIPC effected this on October 15, 2026.

[6] The SPS provided OIPC its submission on October 7, 2026, with the stipulation that the SPS submission was not to be shared with the Applicant. The Applicant provided a submission, in the form of reasons for why they believe they should have access to the records. These reasons were attached to the original request for an OIPC review.

II RECORDS AT ISSUE

[7] The record consists of 161 pages, eight of which were released in full to the Applicant leaving 153 pages subject to this review. All the pages include a header that was released to the Applicant that describes all pages as a "GENERAL OCCURRENCE HARDCOPY" (*General Occurrence Hardcopy*). We have included a description of what information was withheld by the SPS in our review of each exemption.

[8] The SPS withheld pages 67, 68, 78 to 83, and 88 to 160, of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*. This information included an Undertaking, an Information, an *Order of Acquittal*, an Indictment and a Court of King's Bench *Ruling*. The SPS submitted that all these items were withheld because they are not subject to *LA FOIP* because of a strict reading of section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP*. We agree with this conclusion and discuss this issue in depth in our review below.

[9] The record also consisted of six audio/video recordings, all withheld in full by the SPS.

[10] The SPS confirmed with OIPC that section 14(1)(j) of *LA FOIP* was not intended to be included in its section 7 decision. This exemption is not part of this review.

III DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Jurisdiction

[11] The SPS is a local authority under section 2(1)(f)(viii.1) of *LA FOIP*. OIPC has jurisdiction to undertake this review under PART VI of *LA FOIP*.

2. Access to a historic police file pursuant to the provisions of *LA FOIP*

[12] The Applicant indicated that because of past involvement in this matter, they are well aware of the case that the Crown made against them. The Applicant's position is that because this matter went to trial and was resolved in the form of an *Order of Acquittal*, they were present for the entire matter, had access to the police file at one time and, as a result, the redactions have no foundation in law. This is a common and inaccurate theory raised by many applicants who request access to police records as former accused people, so it warrants further discussion. We draw attention to section 4(c) of *LA FOIP*, which reads:

> **Existing rights preserved**
> **4** This Act:
>
> ...
> (c) does not limit the information otherwise available by law to a party to litigation;

[13] Section 4(c) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*[3] *(FOIP),* is a mirror provision and it was considered in OIPC Review Report 025-2026 :

> [20] Section 4(c) of *FOIP* outlines that an individual engaged in litigation can gain access to documents through legal mechanisms, such as those afforded by *The King's Bench Rules*[4] or pursuant to the criminal disclosure process as outlined in *R v Stinchcombe.*[5] These methods of dissemination operate independently of the *FOIP* scheme. *FOIP does not limit or replace* any such

[3] *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, SS 1990-91, c F-22.01, as amended.

[4] *The King's Bench Rules*.

[5] *R. v. Stinchcombe*, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.

> access to documents required for litigation. For this reason, a review commenced under *FOIP* cannot serve as a substitute for gaining access to records required for civil or criminal litigation. OIPC operates as a separate, parallel process from litigation. OIPC does not exist to "disclose" documents. Our office reviews the application of exemptions as applied by a government or local authority head...
>
> [Emphasis added]

[14] When an access request is made to a local authority police service for records under *LA FOIP*, the local authority police service is required to respond pursuant to the provisions in *LA FOIP*. While records or information may have been made available to an applicant, or to their lawyer, pursuant to the disclosure rules of a criminal proceeding, it does not automatically mean that the same records or information are available through the *LA FOIP* process. Our review of the application of exemptions in this matter is based on the application of exemptions as applied by the head of the local authority police service. In this case, the head of the SPS.

3. The application of section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP*

[15] Section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP* is not an exemption. The SPS used section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP* to justify a wholesale severance of the 81 pages of the record as listed in the table below on the grounds that these pages are outside the statutory jurisdiction of *LA FOIP* and therefore, not releasable within the access to information process. The SPS also applied other exemptions to these pages in the event that OIPC did not agree that section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP* justified the shielding of this material:

Page Numbers	Description
67, 68, 79 to 83	Three duplicate copies of the same Undertaking (Form 10)
78	Information (Form 2)
88	*Order of Acquittal*
89, 90	Indictment
91 to 94	Information (Form 2) and attachments
95 to 160	Court of King's Bench *Ruling*

[16] Section 3(1)(b) of *LA FOIP* provides:

> **Application**
> **3**(1) This Act does not apply to:
>
> ...
> (b) material that is a matter of public record;

[17] A "public record" is a record that a government unit is required by law to keep, and that is generally open to view by the public.[6] In the case of court records, the courts in Saskatchewan allow for access to these records but the access is closely supervised and controlled pursuant to *Criminal Practice Directive #12* for matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the Saskatchewan Kings' Bench Court, which is the case here.[7] So while the court maintains a strict control over these documents, they are technically available to the media and therefore the public. We find that the records listed in the table in paragraph [15] of this Report are technically matters of public record such that they are beyond the jurisdiction of *LA FOIP*.

[18] For example, an Undertaking (*Criminal Code*[8] - *Form 10*) is sworn by an accused person before a releasing police officer. An Information (*Criminal Code* - *Form 2*) is sworn by a police officer before a Justice of the Peace. Both documents are placed before the court by crown counsel when criminal proceedings are initiated. These two records become part of the court file as a matter proceeds on its way to a trial and a resolution by means of a guilty plea, a finding of guilt or an acquittal. The Court of King's Bench *Ruling* has a publication ban imposed by the trial judge pursuant to a provision in the *Criminal Code*. These are records that do not fall within the statutory jurisdiction of *LA FOIP* and for which we cannot issue an opinion on release one way or the other. The SPS was correct to sever these

[6] *Black's Law Dictionary, 12th Edition*. St. Paul, Minn., Thomson Reuters (2024) at p. 1529.

[7] Saskatchewan Law Courts website, *Criminal Practice Directive #12* (effective February 1, 2024). For criminal matters subject to the jurisdiction of the provincial court see *Public Access to Court Records in Saskatchewan: Guidelines for the Media and the Public*, (February 2024), at page 21.

[8] *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985, c. C-46, as amended.

records but the Applicant must be directed to the Kings' Bench Court in order to inquire as to release.

[19] Further, because *LA FOIP* does not apply to the pages of the record listed in the table in paragraph [15] of this Report, the *LA FOIP* exemptions cannot be relied on to withhold these documents in the alternative.

[20] With respect to all the pages of the record listed in the table in paragraph [15], the SPS should refer the Applicant to the Courts of Saskatchewan to request and seek access to this record pursuant to *Criminal Practice Directive #12*.

4. The application of section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP*

[21] The SPS applied section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* in full to audio/video recordings 1 through 6 as referenced in this Report in paragraph [9]:

Record	Length	*LA FOIP* Exemptions Applied by the SPS	Description
1	43 minutes, 9 seconds	13(1)(a), 14(1)(c), 28(1)	Audio interview
2	49 minutes, 57 seconds	13(1)(a), 14(1)(c), 28(1)	Audio/video interview
3	12 minutes, 46 seconds	14(1)(c)	Audio/video interview (of the Applicant)
4	13 minutes, 38 seconds	14(1)(c), 28(1)	Audio/video interview
5	10 minutes, 16 seconds	14(1)(c), 28(1)	Audio/video interview
6	3 minutes, 19 seconds	14(1)(c), 28(1)	Audio/video interview

[22] The SPS also applied section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* in part to the following pages of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*:

Page Numbers	Description
6, 8 to 23, 25, 26, 43 to 50, and 57 to 66	Summaries and/ or witness statements
30 to 33	Notes of discussions with witnesses
35, 36, 38 to 41, 72 to 77, 84, 86 and 87	Background police investigation notes and documentation

[23] The SPS also applied individual exemptions, including section 28(1) of *LA FOIP,* to various data elements such as names embedded within some portions of the record where section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* was applied. If section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* is found to have been properly relied upon by the SPS, there is no need to review the individual exemptions.

[24] Section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* is a discretionary exemption that provides:

> **Law enforcement and investigations**
> **14**(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:
>
> ...
> (c) interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation;

[25] OIPC observes the following two-part test to determine if the exemption applies:[9]

1. Does the local authority's activity qualify as a "lawful investigation"?
2. Does one of the following exist:
   (a) Could release of the information interfere with a lawful investigation?
   (b) Could release disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation?

[9] OIPC Review Report 373-2025 at paragraph [31].

Does the local authority's activity qualify as a "lawful investigation"?

[26] A "lawful investigation" is one authorized, required or permitted by law.[10] As such, the SPS must identify the legislation that specifies the jurisdiction for its investigation. The investigation can be concluded, active and ongoing or occurring in the future.

[27] Police powers of investigation are drawn from *The Police Act, 1990*[11] and various provisions within the *Criminal Code.* The SPS submitted that these records were created in response to an allegation of historic sexual assault. Charges were laid pursuant to sections 271 and 151 of the *Criminal Code*. The matter was tried before a judge of the Saskatchewan King's Bench Court. The SPS submitted that the steps taken by officers to investigate the allegation fall squarely within the definition of a lawful investigation. Our review of the records supports that this is clearly the case.

Does one of the following exist:

(a) Could release of the information interfere with a lawful investigation?

(b) Could release disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation?

[28] Section 14 of *LA FOIP* features the word "could" as opposed to "could reasonably be expected to" used in other provisions of *LA FOIP*. The threshold for "could" is somewhat lower than a reasonable expectation – the requirement being only that release of the information "could" have a specified result. There does not need to be a likelihood of a happening but only an objective possibility, or a probability based on the facts.[12] "With

[10] *Ibid,* at paragraph [32].

[11] *The Police Act, 1990*, SS 1990-91, c P-15.01, as amended.

[12] *Saskatchewan Government Insurance v Giesbrecht*, 2025 SKCA 10 at paragraphs [73] and [80]. In this ruling the Court of Appeal considered the word "could" within the context of section 38(1)(f) of *The Health Information Protection Act*, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021, as amended, but the substance of the meaning is relevant to this analysis.

respect to" are words of the widest possible scope, or the widest expression intended to convey a connection between two related subject matters.[13]

[29] The SPS was correct in invoking the exemption in section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to audio/video recordings 1, 2, 4 to 6 listed in the table in paragraph [21]. It is evident that these recordings contain interviews or conversations with individuals who were consulted pursuant to the investigation. Disclosure of this information could reveal written and verbal witness statements, the identities of witnesses and the investigative steps taken by the police officers connected to the matter. The release of this information would disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation that is now concluded. The second part of the test is met and these recordings should continue to be withheld under this exemption.

[30] One of the items listed in the table in paragraph [21] was the audio/video interview of the Applicant – item #3. The SPS correctly submitted:

> ... It is understood that the applicant was found not guilty of the charges against [them], and [they] would have been privy to much of the records during the criminal proceedings. However, the criminal disclosure procedure is separate and distinct and is guided by different principles from disclosure made following a request under *LA FOIP*, therefore any previous disclosure through the criminal proceeding bears no impact on the SPS's decision. This is consistent with various decisions of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner, as stated in Order MO-2114[14] involving the York Regional Police Services Board:
>
> With respect to the obligations of an institution under the *Act*, the former Assistant Commissioner stated:
>
> > The obligations of an institution in responding to a request under the *Act* operate independently of any disclosure obligations in the context of litigation. When an institution receives a request under the *Act* for access to records which are in its custody or control, it must respond in accordance with its statutory obligations. The fact that an institution or a requester may be involved in litigation does not remove or reduce these obligations.

[13] *Supra,* footnote 9 at paragraph [26].

[14] Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario Order MO-2114 (November 6, 2006).

> The Police are an institution under the *Act*, and have both custody and control of records such as Occurrence Hardcopies. Therefore, they are required to process requests and determine whether access should be granted, bearing in mind the stated principle that exemptions from the general right of access should be limited and specific. The fact that there may exist other means for the production of the same documents has no bearing on these statutory obligations.

[31] The SPS maintains that even though the Applicant's video interview was released into the custody of defence counsel at one time through a separate disclosure process, this has no relevance to the application of exemptions pursuant to the statutory obligations within the *LA FOIP* scheme. We agree. OIPC is satisfied that section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* applies to the audio/video recording #3 of the Applicant's interview with the police. The SPS should continue to withhold all the audio/video recordings listed in paragraph [21] of this Report pursuant to this exemption.

[32] The SPS submitted that the release of the redacted portions of the information listed in the table in paragraph [22] of this Report could disclose information regarding a lawful investigation. Our review of these materials reveals that the second part of the test is also met as the release of this information would indeed disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation that is now concluded. These pages should continue to be withheld as well under section 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP*.

[33] This finding eliminates the need to review sections 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of *LA FOIP* as applied by the SPS to audio/video recordings 1 to 6 or to the pages discussed above from the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*.

5. The application of section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP*

[34] The SPS applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* to pages 27, 28 and 85 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*. This exemption provides:

> **Law enforcement and investigations**
> **14**(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

> ...
> (k) interfere with a law enforcement matter or disclose information respecting a law enforcement matter;

[35] OIPC employs the following two-part test to determine if this exemption applies:[15]

1. Is a law enforcement matter involved?
2. Does one of the following exist:
   (a) Could release of the information interfere with a law enforcement matter?
   (b) Could release disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter?

Is a law enforcement matter involved?

[36] The terms "law enforcement" may include: (a) policing, including criminal intelligence operations; (b) investigations that could lead to a penalty or sanctions being imposed; or (c) proceedings that lead or could lead to a penalty or sanction being imposed.[16]

[37] The SPS submitted that pages 27, 28 and 85 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy* consist of information surrounding the submission of information to the Saskatchewan Provincial ViCLAS Centre database.[17] ViCLAS is a national crime database managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that captures, collates and compares violent crimes. The SPS added that according to Public Safety Canada, the system allows specially trained investigators to "monitor, analyze and compare known and unknown offenders".[18]

[15] *Supra,* footnote 9 at paragraph [21].

[16] *Ibid,* at paragraph [22].

[17] Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System.

[18] Government of Canada website: Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System Policy (Details).

[38] An investigator completes a questionnaire that enters information into the ViCLAS system when a reportable case occurs. Disclosure of this sensitive information can be injurious to the investigative techniques used in future crime analysis.[19]

[39] The allegations made against the Applicant were entered into ViCLAS pursuant to section 36(2)(a) of *The Police Act, 1990* as part of the police duty to perform criminal intelligence obligations:

> **Members**
> **36**(2) Unless otherwise indicated in his or her appointment, a member has the power and the responsibility to:
>
> (a) perform all duties that are assigned to constables or peace officers in relation to:
>
> (i) the preservation of peace;
>
> (ii) the prevention of crime and offences against the laws in force in the municipality; and
>
> (iii) the apprehension of criminals, offenders and others who may lawfully be taken into custody;

[40] The gathering of "criminal intelligence" on the part of police anticipates, prevents or monitors possible criminal activity.[20] Intelligence gathering is sometimes a separate activity from the conduct of specific investigations and may be used for future investigations, for activities aimed at prevention the commission of future offences, or to ensure the security of individuals or organizations.

[41] Our review of pages 27, 28 and 85 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy* confirms that these pages are all connected to the ViCLAS scheme and part of the broader gathering of data for the purposes of criminal intelligence analysis. Pages 27, 28 and 85 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy* constitute law enforcement matters.

[19] RCMP website: Violent Crime Linkage System (ViCLAS)

[20] OIPC Review Report 220-2020 at paragraph [41].

Does one of the following exist:

(a) Could release of the information interfere with a law enforcement matter?

(b) Could release disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter?

[42] As noted, the threshold for "could" is an objective possibility of a happening. The SPS submitted that release of the information on pages 27, 28 and 85 "could" disclose information with respect to a law enforcement matter.

[43] Release of these pages could disclose information related to the law enforcement matter. As the second part of the test is met, section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* was properly applied by the SPS to pages 27, 28 and 85 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*. The SPS should continue to withhold this information under this exemption.

6. The application of section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*

[44] We are left to review section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to data elements on pages 1 to 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 to 20, 22 to 26, 29, 37, 38, 42 to 44, 46, 47, 52, 55 to 58, 70 and 75 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy*.

[45] Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* prohibits the disclosure of personal information of individuals unless the individual about whom the information pertains consents to its disclosure. Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* provides:

> **Disclosure of personal information**
> 28(1) No local authority shall disclose personal information in its possession or under its control without the consent, given in the prescribed manner, of the individual to whom the information relates except in accordance with this section or section 29.

[46] Section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* is a mandatory exemption. Prior to a consideration of section 28(1) of *LA FOIP*, the first determination must be whether the information qualifies as "personal information" as defined by section 23(1) of *LA FOIP*. For information to be

"personal information", it must: 1) be about an identifiable individual; and 2) be personal in nature.[21]

[47] The types of data elements that the SPS applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to:

- Middle names[22] of the SPS investigators on pages: 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 to 20, 22 to 26, 29, 52, and 70;
- Sex, race/ethnicity, age/date of birth and contact information (e.g., phone numbers, addresses) of third party individuals[23] (and not of the Applicant) on pages: 2 to 4, 7, 14, 15, 43, 44, 57 and 58;
- School (e.g., grade level)[24] or employment information (e.g., status of employment)[25] of third party individuals (and not of the Applicant) on pages: 9, 13, 25, 38, 43, 55, 57 and 75; and
- Information where disclosure of name plus information that is personal in nature is the personal information of that individual (e.g., information on dates someone was interviewed) on pages: 16, 26, 37, 42, 46, 47, 55, 56 and 75.

[48] This information qualifies as personal information subject to section 23(1)(a), (b), (e) and (k)(i) of *LA FOIP*:

> **Interpretation**
> **23**(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), **"personal information"** means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:

[21] *Supra,* footnote 9 at paragraph [40].

[22] *Ibid,* at paragraph [47]. Middle names that are not publicly available or known qualify as person information.

[23] In OIPC Review Report 353-2019 at paragraphs [11] to [13] it was found that sex, ethnicity and age/date of birth qualify as personal information. In OIPC Review Report 108-2025 at paragraph [35] it was found that contact information of a third party individual qualifies as personal information.

[24] In OIPC Investigation Report 003-2025 at paragraphs [19] to [21] it was found that a grade level qualifies as personal information.

[25] In OIPC Review Report 108-2025 at paragraphs [31] to [34] it was found that a person's employment status qualifies as their personal information.

> (a) information that relates to the race, creed, religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, family status or marital status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry or place of origin of the individual;
>
> (b) information that relates to the education or the criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved;
> ...
> (e) the home or business address, home or business telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual;
>
> ...
> (k) the name of the individual where:
>
> (i) it appears with other personal information that relates to the individual; or

[49] The SPS correctly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the data elements on pages 1 to 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 to 20, 22 to 26, 29, 37, 38, 42 to 44, 46, 47, 52, 55 to 58, 70 and 75 of the *General Occurrence Hardcopy.* This information constitutes third party personal information and should continue to be withheld.

IV FINDINGS

[50] OIPC has jurisdiction and is undertaking this review pursuant to PART VI of *LA FOIP*.

[51] *LA FOIP* does not apply to the pages of the record listed in the table at paragraph [15] of this Report. These pages of the record are outside the jurisdiction of the access to information scheme within *LA FOIP*.

[52] The SPS properly applied sections 14(1)(c) of *LA FOIP* to audio/video recordings 1 to 6 listed in the table at paragraph [21] of this Report as well as the pages listed in the table in paragraph [22] of this Report. .

[53] The SPS properly applied section 14(1)(k) of *LA FOIP* to the *General Occurrence Hardcopy* on pages 27, 28 and 85 of the record.

[54] The SPS properly applied section 28(1) of *LA FOIP* to the data elements on the *General Occurrence Hardcopy* at pages 1 to 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 to 20, 22 to 26, 29, 37, 38, 42 to 44, 46, 47, 52, 55 to 58, 70 and 75.

V RECOMMENDATIONS

[55] I recommend that the SPS refer the Applicant to the King's Bench Court of Saskatchewan to request access to the records identified at paragraph [15] of this Report.

[56] I recommend that the SPS continue to withhold the remaining portions of the record pursuant to the exemption in sections 14(1)(c), (k) and 28(1) of *LA FOIP*.

Dated at Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 20th day of November, 2026.

Grace Hession David
Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner