



Office of the
Saskatchewan Information
and Privacy Commissioner

INVESTIGATION REPORT 103-2018, 105-2019, 106-2019

**Roderick Amaya (Shoppers Drug Mart #2465)
Dr. Rajesh Karuthedath
Ministry of Health**

July 29, 2019

Summary:

A pharmacy at Shoppers Drug Mart #2465 confused a patient with another individual with the same first and last name. This confusion resulted in the other individual's personal health information being sent to Dr. Rajesh Karuthedath's office and to the Ministry of Health. This error was caught when the pharmacy contacted the other individual to pick up the prescription. After a decision by the Saskatchewan College of Pharmacy Professionals (SCPP), the pharmacy's manager reported this privacy breach to the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC). The IPC made a number of findings including a finding that the root cause of this privacy breach was the lack of verifying the patient's identity.

I BACKGROUND

- [1] On December 22, 2017, Dr. Rajesh Karuthedath (Dr. R. Karuthedath) issued a handwritten prescription to a patient. The only identifiable information on the prescription was the patient's first and last name.
- [2] On December 23, 2017, the patient's mother dropped off the prescription at the pharmacy at the Shoppers Drug Mart located at 100-1804 McOrmond Drive in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. This pharmacy will be referred to as Shoppers Drug Mart in this Report. The pharmacist, JP, neglected to seek a second identifying piece of information from the patient's mother. JP entered the prescription into the pharmacy's management system under another individual with the same first and last name as the patient's (herein referred

to as “incorrect individual”). Then, JP proceeded to send a prescription refill authorization request to Dr. R. Karuthedath. JP required such information to apply for exceptional drug status with the Ministry of Health (Health) so that the medication would be covered by the Saskatchewan Drug Plan. Contained within the prescription refill reauthorization request was the incorrect individual’s full name (first, middle, and last), health services number (HSN), date of birth, mailing address, and telephone number.

[3] Since Dr. R. Karuthedath’s office was closed from December 22, 2017 to January 2, 2018, Dr. R. Karuthedath did not receive the prescription refill authorization request from Shoppers Drug Mart until January 3, 2018.

[4] On January 3, 2018, Dr. R. Karuthedath’s office received the prescription refill authorization request from Shoppers Drug Mart. Neither Dr. R. Karuthedath, nor the office manager, took note of the incorrect individual’s middle name, which is different from the patient’s middle name. Dr. R. Karuthedath’s office manager retrieved the patient’s chart, attached the prescription refill authorization request to the chart, and provided the chart to Dr. R. Karuthedath.

[5] On that same day, Dr. R. Karuthedath wrote the patient’s diagnosis onto the prescription refill authorization request, signed and dated it. Then, the prescription refill authorization request form was faxed back to Shoppers Drug Mart.

[6] On January 4, 2018, at 8:59 a.m., the Client Services Unit (CSU) within the Drug Plan and Extended Benefits Branch at Health received an Exception Drug Status (EDS) request via telephone from Shoppers Drug Mart. Shoppers Drug Mart provided to Health the HSN for the incorrect individual. The EDS request was approved and Health entered the EDS approval into its computer system (referred to as the Drug Plan system).

[7] Soon after receiving the EDS approval, another pharmacist at Shoppers Drug Mart, SP, contacted the incorrect individual by telephone to let them know that the prescription was ready for pick-up. According to Shoppers Drug Mart, the incorrect individual informed SP that they had not been to that pharmacy in years. It was at that point that SP determined

that the prescription was entered under the wrong person. SP investigated the matter and realized the prescription was meant for the patient, who has the same first and last name as the incorrect individual.

[8] On January 4, 2018 at 11:22 a.m., Shoppers Drug Mart contacted the CSU within the Drug Plan and Extended Benefits Branch at Health to advise that the EDS request was for the incorrect HSN/patient. Shoppers Drug Mart provided the correct HSN. The assessor at Health deleted the entry that was entered into the Drug Plan system. Then, it entered the EDS approval under the correct HSN/patient.

[9] Also on January 4, 2018, Shoppers Drug Mart contacted Dr. R. Karuthedath's office to advise of the error. Shoppers Drug Mart requested that Dr. R. Karuthedath confirm the EDS for the correct patient. The following day, Dr. R. Karuthedath signed and dated the EDS for the correct patient and faxed the sheet back to Shoppers Drug Mart.

[10] Also on January 4, 2018, the incorrect individual submitted a complaint to the Saskatchewan College of Pharmacy Professionals (SCPP). SCPP's Complaints Committee first heard the complaint on March 14, 2018, and then investigated the complaint. On April 25, 2018, SCPP's Complaint Committee issued a decision. That decision indicated that the pharmacy manager, Roderick Amaya, was to notify my office of this privacy breach.

[11] On May 25, 2018, Roderick Amaya reported the privacy breach to my office.

II DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Does *The Health Information Protection Act (HIPA)* apply and do I have jurisdiction to investigate this matter?

[12] HIPA is engaged when three elements are present: 1) a trustee, 2) personal health information, and 3) the trustee has custody or control over the personal health information. Below, I will determine if the three elements are present in this case.

Element 1: Trustees

Roderick Amaya (Shoppers Drug Mart #2465)

[13] First, subsection 2(t)(xii) of HIPA defines “trustee” as follows:

2 In this Act:

...

(t) “trustee” means any of the following that have custody or control of personal health information:

...

(ix) a proprietor as defined in *The Pharmacy and Pharmacy Disciplines Act*;

...

(xii) a person, other than an employee of a trustee, who is:

(A) a health professional licensed or registered pursuant to an Act for which the minister is responsible;

[14] According to Information Services Corporation’s corporate registry, the proprietor of Shoppers Drug Mart #2465 is Amaya Enterprises Ltd. The majority shareholder of Amaya Enterprises Ltd is Roderick Amaya. Roderick Amaya, is also a pharmacist licensed pursuant to *The Pharmacy and Pharmacy Disciplines Act*. Therefore, Roderick Amaya qualifies as a trustee as defined by subsections 2(t)(ix) and 2(t)(xii)(A) of HIPA.

Ministry of Health

[15] Subsection 2(t)(i) of HIPA defines trustee as follows:

2 In this Act:

...

(t) “trustee” means any of the following that have custody or control of personal health information:

(i) a government institution;

[16] Subsection 2(1)(d)(i) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FOIP) defines “government institution” as follows:

2(1) In this Act:

...

(d) “government institution” means, subject to subsection (2):

(i) the office of Executive Council or any department, secretariat or other similar agency of the executive government of Saskatchewan;

[17] Based on the above, Health qualifies as a trustee pursuant to subsection 2(t)(i) of HIPA.

Dr. R. Karuthedath

[18] Dr. R. Karuthedath qualifies as a trustee pursuant to subsection 2(t)(xii)(A) of HIPA, which is quoted above.

Element 2: personal health information

[19] Information at issue in this case includes HSNs, date of birth, mailing address, telephone number, diagnosis, and prescription information. I find that such information qualifies as personal health information as defined by subsection 2(m) of HIPA, which provides:

2 In this Act:

...

(m) “personal health information” means, with respect to an individual, whether living or deceased:

(i) information with respect to the physical or mental health of the individual;

(ii) information with respect to any health service provided to the individual;

...

(iv) information that is collected:

(A) in the course of providing health services to the individual; or

(B) incidentally to the provision of health services to the individual;
or

(v) registration information;

Element 3: trustee(s) have custody or control over personal health information

[20] All three trustees in this case were involved in collecting, using, and/or disclosing the personal health information in question. Subsection 20(1) of HIPA provides as follows:

20(1) Where one trustee discloses personal health information to another trustee, the information may become a part of the records of the trustee to whom it is disclosed, while remaining part of the records of the trustee that makes the disclosure.

[21] Therefore, I find that all three trustees have custody or control over the personal health information.

[22] Based on the above, I find that HIPA is engaged.

[23] Subsection 52(d) of HIPA provides as follows:

52 The commissioner may:

...

(d) from time to time, carry out investigations with respect to personal health information in the custody or control of trustees to ensure compliance with this Act;

[24] Based on the above, I find that I have jurisdiction to investigate this matter.

2. Did privacy breaches occur?

[25] A privacy breach occurs when personal health information is collected, used, and/or disclosed without authority under HIPA. Privacy breaches can also occur when personal health information is not appropriately safeguarded, or collected or used in a way that is not accurate nor complete.

a. Accuracy and completeness

i. Shoppers Drug Mart

[26] Section 19 of HIPA provides as follows:

19 In collecting personal health information, a trustee must take reasonable steps to ensure that the information is accurate and complete.

[27] Furthermore, subsection 25(3) of HIPA provides as follows:

25(3) Where a trustee collects personal health information from anyone other than the subject individual, the trustee must take reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of the information.

[28] In this case, Shoppers Drug Mart indicated that the pharmacy's standards of practices requires that every pharmacy staff receiving a new prescription, obtain a second identifier such as a date of birth or HSN to confirm the identity of the patient. Shoppers Drug Mart provided my office with its intake procedure, which includes the following:

- ...
- Obtain/verify/document on the prescription the Date of Birth, Telephone Number and Provincial Health Card Number
- Obtain/verify the Provincial Health Card Number/Third Party/Insurance
- ...

[29] In this case, the pharmacist JP did not obtain a second identifier to confirm the identity of the patient. As a result, JP confused the patient with another individual that has the same first and last name. Therefore, a privacy breach occurred when the identity of the patient was not verified. The prescription was entered into the pharmacy's management system under the incorrect individual. The pharmacy should undertake when another individual is dropping off or picking up a prescription for the patient, establish whether or not that other individual has the authority to act on the patient's behalf. This is in accordance with section 56 of HIPA and SCPP's guidelines [*Patient Confidentiality and the Release of Confidential Records*](#) and the [*Release of Confidential Records of Minors to Parents/Guardians*](#).

[30] It should be noted that Shoppers Drug Mart's management system is linked in real-time to Health's Pharmaceutical Information Program (PIP). PIP is a centralized online system

that is updated when drugs are prescribed and/or dispensed to persons in Saskatchewan. Health care providers rely on the information available on PIP to make decisions about a patient's health care, including what medications to prescribe to avoid drug interactions. Inaccurate information in an individual's PIP profile could lead to harmful and even fatal decisions by health care providers. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information that is entered into PIP. Steps taken by Shoppers Drug Mart and Health to correct this error will be discussed later in this Report.

ii. Dr. R. Karuthedath

[31] Dr. R. Karuthedath's office received from Shoppers Drug Mart a prescription refill authorization request form with the incorrect individual's name (first, middle and last name), HSN, date of birth, mailing address, and telephone number. However, neither the office manager nor Dr. R. Karuthedath noticed the incorrect individual's middle name that appeared on the prescription refill authorization request form. Therefore, a privacy breach occurred when the patient's identity was again not verified. Presumably, had the incorrect individual's middle name been noted or if the date-of-birth on the prescription refill authorization form been checked against the date-of-birth in the patient's chart, then Dr. R. Karuthedath would have indicated to Shoppers Drug Mart that the incorrect individual is not Dr. R. Karuthedath's patient and therefore could not provide authorization for the prescription.

[32] Instead, the patient's diagnosis was recorded on the prescription refill authorization request form (which contained the incorrect individual's personal health information) and faxed it to Shoppers Drug Mart. Then, this erroneous prescription refill authorization request form was filed into the patient's chart. Steps taken by Dr. R. Karuthedath to correct this will be discussed later in this Report.

b. Disclosures

[33] The term "disclosure" means the sharing of personal health information with an entity that is separate from the trustee organization.

[34] HIPA provides authority for trustees to disclose personal health information in certain circumstances without consent. For example, subsection 27(2)(b) of HIPA is a provision that trustees may rely on for disclosing a patient's personal health information for specific circumstances. It provides as follows:

27(2) A subject individual is deemed to consent to the disclosure of personal health information:

...

(b) for the purpose of arranging, assessing the need for, providing, continuing, or supporting the provision of, a service requested or required by the subject individual;

[35] In this case, Shoppers Drug Mart disclosed the incorrect individual's personal health information (and not the patient's) to both Dr. R. Karuthedath and Health. Therefore, these disclosures by Shoppers Drug Mart are unauthorized under HIPA. I find that privacy breaches occurred.

3. Did the trustees respond to this privacy breach appropriately?

[36] My office suggests that trustees undertake the following five steps when responding to a privacy breach:

- Contain the breach;
- Notify affected individuals;
- Investigate the breach;
- Plan for prevention of similar breaches; and
- Write an investigation report.

Contain the breach

[37] Upon learning that a privacy breach has occurred, trustees should immediately take steps to contain the breach. To contain a privacy breach is to ensure that the personal health information is no longer at risk. This may include recovering the record(s), revoking access to personal health information, and/or stopping the unauthorized practice.

Shoppers Drug Mart

[38] In the course of my office's investigation, Shoppers Drug Mart advised my office of its efforts to correct the incorrect individual's personal health information in its own pharmacy management system and in PIP. It was able to correct the personal health information in its own system, but it was not able to correct the personal health information in PIP. In an email dated March 13, 2019 to my office, it explained how it corrected the affected individual's personal health information in PIP:

IT help didn't remove the prescription.... In collaboration with the SCPP to determine the best course of action. I discontinued the medication record out of his active file and entered a note explaining the error. This action, allow for [the incorrect individual's] PIP active prescription profile to be correct, and the erroneous prescription was in the inactive file.

[39] Another step Shoppers Drug Mart took to contain this privacy breach was contacting both Dr. R. Karuthedath's office and Health to advise of the error. This provided Dr. R. Karuthedath's office and Health the opportunity to correct their records. I find that Shoppers Drug Mart has contained the privacy breach.

[40] I note that the incorrect individual in this case expressed to my office that they want their personal health information to be deleted completely from Shoppers Drug Mart's computer system. I recommend that Shoppers Drug Mart determine if it can destroy the incorrect individual's personal health information in its system in accordance with its own retention and destruction schedules, the SCPP's regulatory bylaws, and applicable legislation. If it can, then I recommend that it do so.

Health

[41] Health reported to my office that once it was notified of the error by Shoppers Drug Mart, Health had deleted the EDS approval entry in the Drug Plan system under the incorrect individual's HSN. It explained that the deletion was possible because the error and the correction occurred in the same day (within 3 hours). It explained that the Drug Plan

system generates letters the day after EDS approvals are entered. However, in this case, since the error was caught on the same day as the entry, Health deleted the erroneous entry. It asserts that no letter was generated.

[42] In contrast, the incorrect individual advised my office that they received a letter from Health confirming the EDS approval. While the incorrect individual was unable to provide my office with a copy of the letter, they forwarded to my office an email dated January 16, 2018 that they had sent to the SCPP. The email was about the letter they had received from Health and a telephone call they had with Health. The email provided as follows:

F.Y.I.: I recieved [sic] a letter from the Ministry of Health confirming the EDS approval. I called them and advised that the prescription was not mine and that I had filed a report with your association. They are going to remove the drug from my profile and review the original prescription.

[43] In efforts to address this discrepancy, my office asked Health to search its records for a copy of the letter referenced by the incorrect individual. Health indicated to my office that letters for the EDS program are generated through a mail merge process by which information is taken from an active record in the Drug Plan system to generate a letter. Health asserts that the letters that are generated are not saved. Therefore, even if a letter was generated for the incorrect individual, Health would not have a copy of the letter. However, to be thorough, Health saves letters it sends to individuals regarding another program in its S-drive. Health searched its S-drive just in case the incorrect individual was referencing a letter regarding this other program. However, it did not locate a copy of the letter.

[44] Health provided my office with a screenshot of the original entry in the incorrect individual's profile in the Drug Plan system. The screenshot shows that while the EDS was approved and a letter was to be sent, it also shows that the entry was updated. One of the fields "UPD" (or "updated") features the letter "D". Health explained that the "D" stands for "deleted". The screenshot also shows the time the entry was made (08:59:26 on January 4, 2018) and the time the entry was updated to "D" (11:22:01 on January 4, 2018). Health asserts that letters for the EDS program are only generated for entries where there

is an active approval. In this case, there was no active approval because the entry had been updated to “D” on the same day the original entry was made. Therefore, it asserts that no letter would have been generated and sent to the incorrect individual.

[45] I am not entirely convinced that a letter was not sent to the incorrect individual. After all, it appears that a letter had prompted the incorrect individual to call Health and to email SCPP. However, since the incorrect individual is unable to provide my office with a copy of the letter, it is difficult to retrace the steps of how the letter was generated.

[46] Nevertheless, my office’s concern is that the incorrect individual’s personal health information is accurate and complete in Health’s Drug Plan system. Based on the screenshot, the incorrect individual’s personal health information appears accurate and complete in that the incorrect individual did not require EDS approval in this particular case. I find that Health has contained this privacy breach.

[47] I should note that Health did not actually delete the erroneous entry, instead it updated the entry to be “deleted”. This is a good practice as it leaves a trail that enables Health, regulatory bodies, and offices like mine to conduct investigations. It also shows how a record came to be and how it was updated and changed.

[48] I recommend Health investigate further if letters can be generated even when an entry is “deleted” in its Drug Plan system on the same day. This is to ensure that when errors occur, letters are not sent out.

Dr. R. Karuthedath

[49] Dr. R. Karuthedath’s office received a prescription refill authorization request with the incorrect individual’s personal health information by fax on January 3, 2018. Then, it received a fax cover sheet indicating that the previous authorization request was sent in error. The fax cover sheet contained the patient’s personal health information. Both faxes were filed in the patient’s file. In the course of this investigation, my office recommended that Dr. R. Karuthedath attach a notation to the prescription refill authorization request

containing the incorrect individual's personal health information. The notation should indicate that the personal health information in that record does not belong to the patient nor does it belong to a person who is Dr. R. Karuthedath's patient. In an email dated July 29, 2019, Dr. R. Karuthedath's office indicated to me that a notation has been attached to the prescription refill authorization request. The notation indicates the personal health information in that record does not belong to the patient nor does it belong to a person who is a patient of Dr. R. Karuthedath's. I find that Dr. R. Karuthedath has contained this privacy breach.

Notify affected individuals

- [50] It is important that trustees notify affected individuals when a privacy breach has occurred. Not only do the affected individuals have a right to know, they need to know, in order to protect themselves from any potential harm that may result from the privacy breach. Unless there is a compelling reason not to, trustees should always notify affected individuals.

- [51] None of the three trustees have provided notification to the affected individual. In this case, the affected individual was the incorrect individual. The only contact between Shoppers Drug Mart and the affected individual was when SP, a pharmacist and the designated Privacy Officer, contacted the affected individual advising that the prescription was ready to be pick up. It was at that point that the affected individual informed Shoppers Drug Mart of its error. SP apologized to the affected individual at that time.

- [52] Shoppers Drug Mart explained to my office that a reason for not providing written notification to the affected individual is because the affected individual was obviously aware and complained to the SCPP. At that point, the SCPP had instructed the pharmacy manager to direct any further communication through SCPP.

- [53] I recommend that Shoppers Drug Mart send a letter to the incorrect individual explaining what it has done to correct the incorrect individual's personal health information in its computer system and records. The letter should also explain the following:

- their right under HIPA to request access to their personal health information in the custody or control of trustees, including Shoppers Drug Mart,
- their right under HIPA to request correction of their personal health information in the custody or control of trustees, including Shoppers Drug Mart,
- instructions on how to request access and correction to their personal health information under HIPA,
- the incorrect individual's right to complain to my office if they are not satisfied with how Shoppers Drug Mart (or any other organization subject to HIPA) responds to their access to information request and/or request for correction of their personal health information, and my office's contact information, and
- recognition of the impacts of the breach along with an apology.

[54] Further, I recommend that Health send a letter to the incorrect individual. The letter should explain the privacy breach and what it has done to correct the affected individual's personal health information in the Drug Plan system. If, for some reason, there are future errors resulting from the erroneous entry into the Drug Plan system that impacts the incorrect individual somehow, this letter from Health can be used by the incorrect individual to explain why there is an error and to request amendments to their personal health information. This letter should also explain to the incorrect individual of their rights under HIPA, including the right to request access and/or request correction of their personal health information.

[55] Finally, I normally recommend that all trustees involved in a privacy breach send a letter to the affected individual(s). However, since the incorrect individual is not a patient of Dr. R. Karuthedath, then Dr. R. Karuthedath would not have the most current contact information for the incorrect individual. Therefore, Dr. Karuthedath cannot reasonably locate the incorrect individual to send a letter.

Investigate the breach

[56] Trustees should investigate privacy breaches with the goal of identifying the root causes and do so in a timely manner as close to the date of discovery as possible. Understanding the root causes enables trustees to develop and implement plans to prevent similar privacy breaches in the future.

[57] In this case, the lack of verifying the identity of the patient is the root cause of this privacy breach. First, Shoppers Drug Mart determined that the root cause of this privacy breach was that the pharmacist who received the prescription did not follow the intake procedure by verifying the identity of the patient. This led to it entering the prescription under the incorrect individual and then the incorrect individual's personal health information being sent to Dr. R. Karuthedath's office and to Health. Second, neither Dr. R. Karuthedath nor his staff paid attention to the middle name of the incorrect individual. While the incorrect individual's first and last name are the same as the patient's, the full middle name is different (the incorrect individual and the patient have the same middle initial). Had Dr. R. Karuthedath (or their staff) paid attention to the patient's full middle name on the prescription refill authorization request or even the date-of-birth, then Dr. R. Karuthedath would not have confused the incorrect individual for his patient.

Prevention of similar breaches in the future

[58] Once trustees have identified the root cause of a privacy breach, then they should develop and implement a plan to prevent a similar privacy breach from occurring.

[59] First, Shoppers Drug Mart reminded all pharmacy staff of the intake procedures for receiving a prescription. It also required all staff to sign an acknowledgement that they have reviewed all standards of practice for all duties in the pharmacy, including the standards of practice for workflow, customer service and privacy issues. In the course of this investigation, my office recommended that Shoppers Drug Mart require all staff review the standards of practice and sign the acknowledgement annually. In an email dated July 29, 2019, Shoppers Drug Mart advised my office its standards of practice is to have all pharmacy staff sign a form acknowledging that they have reviewed the standards of practice every year, due on the first quarter. It also makes the standards of practice available on its intra-web, which is easily accessible by its staff at any time.

[60] Second, Dr. R. Karuthedath updated the policy on faxing new prescription requests. The first two steps of the policy provides as follows:

When new prescriptions are received from the physician, the clerical staff will follow the attached checklist to ensure safeguards, policies and procedures are followed:

- retrieve requests from the clerical basket; and
- check name on the new prescription against the name on the chart pulled.

[61] The second step in the above policy requires staff to check the name of the new prescription against the name of the chart pulled. In the course of this investigation, my office recommended that the policy be amended so that staff use another piece of identifying information, in addition to the patient's first and last name, to verify the identity of the patient. This is because individuals often share the same name. In an email dated July 29, 2019, Dr. R. Karuthedath's office indicated that its staff will verify the identity of the patient before faxing the request by using the personal health information and date of birth in addition to the patient's first and last name.

[62] Third, Health indicated that the assessors in the Drug Plan and Extended Benefits branch have the following procedures when it receives EDS requests:

- Write down the HSN, patient first and last name.
- Look up the HSN on the Drug Plan system and verify it matched the pharmacist's request, patient name, address, and [date of birth].

[63] Then, Health indicated it would remind its assessors in the Drug Plan and Extended Benefits branch of the above procedure. I find that Health's efforts are reasonable.

Write an investigation report

[64] Documenting privacy breaches and trustees' investigations into the breaches are methods to ensure trustees follow through with plans to prevent similar breaches in the future.

[65] Each of the three trustees provided my office with its investigation reports that details how they responded to the privacy breaches and the steps they have taken to prevent similar privacy breaches in the future. I am satisfied with the content of the reports.

III FINDINGS

- [66] I find that HIPA is engaged.
- [67] I find that I have jurisdiction to investigate this matter.
- [68] I find that a privacy breach occurred when Shoppers Drug Mart did not verify the identity of the patient.
- [69] I find that a privacy breach occurred when Dr. R. Karuthedath did not verify the identity of the patient.
- [70] I find that privacy breaches occurred when Shoppers Drug Mart disclosed the incorrect individual's personal health information (and not the patient's) to both Dr. R. Karuthedath and Health.
- [71] I find that Shoppers Drug Mart has contained the privacy breach.
- [72] I find that Health has contained the privacy breach.
- [73] I find that Dr. R. Karuthedath has contained the privacy breach.
- [74] I find that the root cause of this privacy breach is the lack of verifying the patient's identity.

IV RECOMMENDATIONS

- [75] I recommend that Shoppers Drug Mart determine if it can destroy the incorrect individual's personal health information in its system in accordance with its own retention and destruction schedules, the SCPP's regulatory bylaws, and applicable legislation. If it can, then I recommend that it do so.

[76] I recommend Health investigate further if letters can be generated even when an entry is “deleted” in its Drug Plan system on the same day. This is to ensure that when errors occur, letters are not sent out.

[77] I recommend that Shoppers Drug Mart send a letter to the incorrect individual as described in paragraph [53].

[78] I recommend that Health send a letter to the incorrect individual as described at paragraph [54].

Dated at Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 30th day of July, 2019.

Ronald J. Kruzeniski, Q.C.
Saskatchewan Information and Privacy
Commissioner