



REVIEW REPORT 203-2024

Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety

December 19, 2024

Summary:

The Applicant submitted an access to information request to the Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety (LRWS). LRWS refused the Applicant access to records, citing subsections 15(1)(c), (k), and 19(1)(b) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FOIP) as its reasons. The Applicant requested a review by the A/Commissioner. In the course of the review, LRWS released some records to the Applicant but continued refusing access to other records. In its index of records, LRWS identified the records it was withholding pursuant to subsection 15(1)(c) and 19(1)(b) of FOIP. However, LRWS did not identify on which records it was applying subsection 15(1)(k) of FOIP. Therefore, the A/Commissioner was able to only consider LRWS' application of subsection 15(1)(c) and 19(1)(b) of FOIP in this review. He also considered subsection 29(1) of FOIP. The A/Commissioner found that LRWS did not demonstrate it properly applied subsections 15(1)(c) and 19(1)(b) of FOIP. The A/Commissioner also found that LRWS did not properly apply the mandatory exemption subsection 29(1) of FOIP. The A/Commissioner recommended that LRWS release some of the records in full to the Applicant within 30 days. He also recommended that LRWS redact the personal information of third party individuals in one of the records and release the remainder to the Applicant, within 30 days of issuance of this Report.

I BACKGROUND

[1] On January 15, 2024, the Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety (LRWS) received the following access to information request from the Applicant:

Any & all communications and / or correspondance [sic] by interview (& notes taken thereof), postage paid mail, courier, voice telephone interview & message *& notes taken thereof), email transmission, social media message and / or text message arising

out of complaint that I filed by email transmission to OH&S offices on November 1, 2023, so identified as “[file number]”

This includes any documents or folder contents held as is noted above by an individual, party, or entity not limited to KGS Group or its representative(s), MLT Aikens LLP or its representatives, [Name 1], and /or Officers of the OH&S at Saskatchewan LRWS including, but not limited to [Name 2], [Name 3] & [Name 4].

[2] On February 1, 2024, LRWS responded to the access request. LRWS said:

Access to the records you have requested is denied pursuant to sections 15(1)(c), (k) and 19(1)(b) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. **The release of these records would impact an active and ongoing review of your complaint** and reveal confidential labour relations information of a third party.

[Emphasis added]

[3] On July 1, 2024, the Applicant submitted another access request to follow-up on their initial access request:

My request for access to records or information on February 1, 2024 was “denied pursuant to sections 15(1)(c),(k) and 19(1)(b) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. The release of these records would impact an **active and ongoing review** of your complaint and reveal confidential labour relations information of a third party.” [Emphasis in original]

I note that my complaint has been reviewed and a decision has been produced and sent to me. As there is no longer “an active and ongoing review”, I believe I am entitled to a FOIP provision pursuant to the enclosed request. I have therefore enclosed such request for all material to the date of receipt of this transmission.

I look forward to this production.

[4] In a letter dated July 25, 2024, LRWS responded to the Applicant. LRWS said:

We have been advised that you have appealed the decision made by Occupational Health and Safety and that it is still under review. Due to the current status of the file, access to the records you have requested is denied pursuant to sections 15(1)(c), (k) and 19(1)(b) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. The release of these records would impact an active and ongoing review of your complaint and reveal confidential labour relations information of a third party.

[5] On August 26, 2024, the Applicant requested a review by my office.

- [6] In the course of my office's intake process, LRWS identified Kontzamanis Graumann Smith MacMillan Inc. (KGS) as the third party in this review.
- [7] On September 23, 2024, my office notified LRWS, the Applicant, and KGS that my office would be undertaking a review.
- [8] On November 1, 2024, LRWS emailed the Applicant indicating it identified a number of responsive records that it will be releasing to the Applicant.
- [9] In a letter dated November 1, 2024 to the Applicant, LRWS indicated that although it was releasing responsive records to the Applicant, it was still withholding portions pursuant to subsection 29(1) of FOIP. Further, LRWS was still withholding records, in full, from the Applicant pursuant to subsections 15(1)(e) and 19(1) of FOIP.
- [10] On November 4, 2024 and November 15, 2024, the Applicant provided my office with their submission.
- [11] LRWS did not provide my office with a submission to my office, nor did the third party.

II RECORDS AT ISSUE

- [12] Before I describe the records, I note that LRWS had originally cited subsections 15(1)(c), (k) and 19(1)(b) of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (FOIP) as its reasons for refusing the Applicant access to records. Then, in the course of the review, LRWS released some (but not all) records to the Applicant. LRWS withheld portions of the released records pursuant to subsections 15(1)(e) and 29(1) of FOIP.
- [13] Section 2-4(3) of my office's *Rules of Procedure* provides that my office will not consider any discretionary exemptions not raised in the head's decision. It says as follows:

2-4(3) The notice of review will indicate that the public body should in its representation (submission) address every exemption claimed in the head's decision. **Discretionary exemptions, not included in the head's decision under FOIP/LA FOIP, will not be considered by the commissioner's office unless there are exceptional circumstances.**

[Emphasis added]

[14] Since LRWS did not cite the discretionary exemption subsection 15(1)(e) of FOIP in its letter dated July 25, 2024 to the Applicant, I will not consider it in this review. I will, however, consider subsection 29(1) of FOIP since it is a mandatory exemption.

[15] I will continue now with the describing the records at issue.

[16] Record 1 is a Discriminatory Action Questionnaire (questionnaire). It is 8 pages long. According to its index of records (Index), LRWS withheld Record 1 in full pursuant to subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP.

[17] Record 2 is a completed version of the questionnaire. It is 8 pages long. According to its Index, LRWS withheld Record 2 in full pursuant to subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP.

[18] Record 3 is a letter to LRWS by MLT Aikins LLP on behalf of KGS. The letter included appendices. In total, the letter and appendices are 150 pages long. According to its Index, LRWS withheld Record 3 in full pursuant to subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP.

[19] Record 4 is a compilation of records consisting of emails and handwritten notes that LRWS did not include in its Index. It is 131 pages long. LRWS withheld portions pursuant to subsection 29(1) of FOIP.

III DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Do I have jurisdiction?

[20] LRWS qualifies as a “government institution” as defined by subsection 2(1)(d)(i) of FOIP. Further, KGS qualifies as a “third party” as defined by subsection 2(1)(j) of FOIP. Therefore, I find that I have jurisdiction to conduct this review.

2. Did LRWS properly apply subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP?

[21] LRWS applied subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP to Records 1 and 2 to withhold them both in full. Record 1 is a copy of the questionnaire. A questionnaire is given by LRWS to individuals (complainants) who are submitting a complaint regarding discriminatory action in the workplace. Through the questionnaire, complainants provide information such as their own contact information, their employer’s contact information, information about individuals whom the complainant alleges have discriminated against them, witness information, and information about the alleged discriminatory action taken against them. Record 1 is a copy of the questionnaire that was filled out by the Applicant. Record 2 is a duplication of the responses given by the Applicant in the questionnaire.

[22] Subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP provides:

15(1) A head may refuse to give access to a record, the release of which could:

...

(c) interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation;

[23] My office uses the following two-part test to determine if subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP applies:

1. Does the government institution’s activity qualify as a “lawful investigation”?
2. Does one of the following exist?
 - a. Could the release of the information interfere with a lawful investigation?
 - b. Could the release disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation?

(*Guide to FOIP*, Chapter 4: “Exemptions from the Right of Access” updated April 8, 2024 [*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4], p. 188)

1. Does the government institution's activity qualify as a "lawful investigation"?

[24] A "lawful investigation" is an investigation that is authorized or required and permitted by law. The government institution should identify the legislation under which the investigation is occurring. The investigation can be concluded, active and ongoing or be occurring in the future (*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, p. 53).

[25] LRWS did not provide a submission to my office. Therefore, it did not identify the legislation under which the lawful investigation is occurring (or had occurred). As such, I find that the first part of the two part test is not met. I find that LRWS has not demonstrated that it properly applied subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP to Records 1 and 2.

[26] Before I proceed, I should note that even if the two-part test is met, it would be an absurd result to refuse the Applicant access to Records 1 and 2. I explained the absurd result principle in [Review Report 047-2022](#) at [22] and [23] as follows:

[22] When determining if exemptions in FOIP and HIPA apply, government institutions should consider whether applying the exemption would give rise to an absurd result. This is based on a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. As set out in my office's *Guide to FOIP*, the presumption against absurdity was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (re)*, (1998) as follows:

[27] ...It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to [Pierre-Andre Cote, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (2nd ed. 1991)] an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to some interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, *Construction of Statutes* supra at p. 88)...

(*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, p. 4)

[23] Previous reports of my office (see for example, my office's Review Reports [215-2020](#), [171-2019](#), and [164-2021](#), and blogs [Absurd Result](#) and [Absurd Result II](#)) have found that the absurd result principle applies in the following circumstances:

- The requester provided the information to the government institution
- The requester was present when the information was presented to the public body and
- The information is clearly within the requester's knowledge.

[27] In this case, the Applicant had provided the information to LRWS in Records 1 and 2. The information is clearly within the requestor's knowledge. Therefore, I find that it is an absurd result to refuse the Applicant access to Records 1 and 2. I recommend that LRWS release Records 1 and 2 to the Applicant.

3. Did LRWS properly apply subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP?

[28] LRWS applied subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP to Record 3.

[29] Subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP provides:

19(1) Subject to Part V and this section, a head shall refuse to give access to a record that contains:

...

(b) financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information that is supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly, to a government institution by a third party;

[30] My office uses the following three-part test to determine if subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP applies:

1. Is the information financial, commercial, scientific, technical, or labour relations information of a third party?
2. Was the information supplied by the third party to a government institution?
3. Was the information supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly?

(*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, pp. 203-205)

1. *Is the information financial, commercial, scientific, technical, or labour relations information of a third party?*

[31] LRWS did not provide a submission to my office. Neither did the third party. Therefore, I must determine, on the face of the record, if the information qualifies as financial, commercial, scientific, technical or labour relations information of a third party.

[32] Record 3 is a letter to LRWS by MLT Aikins LLP on behalf of KGS. The content of the letter and the appendices appear to be about the Applicant, their employment at KGS, and provides details of the Applicant's relationship with other employees at KGS. Such information appears to be "labour relations" information of KGS. Page 204 of *Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, defines "labour relations information" as follows:

"Labour relations information" is information that relates to the management of personnel by a person or organization, whether or not the personnel are organized into bargaining units. **It includes relationships within and between workers, working groups, managers, employers and their organizations.** Labour relations information also includes collective relations between a public body and its employees. Common examples of labour relations information are hourly wage rates, personnel contracts, and information on negotiations regarding collective agreements.

[Emphasis added]

[33] The first part of the three-part test is met.

2. *Was the information supplied by the third party to a government institution?*

[34] Page 205 of the *Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, defines "supplied" as "provided or furnished. Information may qualify as "supplied" if it was directly supplied to a government institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.

[35] Based on a review, including the first page of Record 3, it is apparent that Record 3 was supplied by KGS to LRWS. The first page of Record 3 identifies it is MLT Aikins LLP

writing a response on behalf of KGS. The response is addressed to LRWS. The second part of the three-part test is met.

3. *Was the information supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly?*

[36] I already provided the definition of “supplied”.

[37] Pages 207 to 208 of the *Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 4, provide the following definitions:

- “In confidence” usually describes a situation of mutual trust in which private matters are relayed or reported. Information obtained in confidence means that the supplier of the information has stipulated how the information can be disseminated. In order for confidence to be found, there must be an implicit or explicit agreement or understanding of confidentiality on the part of both the government institution and the third party providing the information.
- “Implicitly” means that the confidentiality is understood even though there is no actual statement of confidentiality, agreement, or other physical evidence of the understanding that the information will be kept confidential.
- “Explicitly” means that the request for confidentiality has been clearly expressed, distinctly stated, or made definite. There may be documentary evidence that shows that the information was supplied on the understanding that it would be kept confidential.

[38] Without a submission from either LRWS or KGS, I do not have any context (such as an explanation of the LRWS’ complaint process) to consider if a person would reasonably regard the information in Record 3 as confidential. Further, without a submission, I do not know if there was an understanding between KGS and LRWS that Record 3 was supplied in confidence. Without a submission, I must determine on the face of the record if there is anything to suggest that the record was supplied in confidence, implicitly or explicitly. Based on a review, nothing in Record 3 suggests KGS supplied the Record 3 in confidence implicitly or explicitly to LRWS. For example, there is no explicit statement of confidentiality or any information that suggests that KGS supplied Record 3 in confidence to LRWS. As such, the third part of the three-part test is not met. I find that LRWS has not demonstrated that it properly applied subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP to Record 3.

[39] I note that Record 3 contains the Applicant’s personal information, including observations about the Applicant in the workplace. It also includes correspondence sent to and from the Applicant. However, it also contains the personal information about third party individuals. For example, Record 3 contains the personal opinion or views of the third party individuals, describing their experience of the workplace. Therefore, I recommend that LRWS redact the personal information of third party individuals in Record 3 pursuant to subsection 29(1) of FOIP and release the remainder to the Applicant.

4. Did LRWS properly apply subsection 29(1) of FOIP?

[40] LRWS applied subsection 29(1) of FOIP to portions of Record 4.

[41] Subsection 29(1) of FOIP provides:

29(1) No government institution shall disclose personal information in its possession or under its control without the consent, given in the prescribed manner, of the individual to whom the information relates except in accordance with this section or section 30.

[42] For subsection 29(1) of FOIP to be found to apply, the information must constitute “personal information” as defined by subsection 24(1) of FOIP.

[43] Subsections 24(1) of FOIP provides:

24(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), “**personal information**” means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:
...

[44] The list of what constitutes personal information is not exhaustive at subsection 24(1) of FOIP. Information can still qualify as personal information provided it has the following two elements:

- 1) It is about an identifiable individual; and
- 2) It is personal in nature.

(*Guide to FOIP*, Chapter 6: “Protection of Privacy,” updated February 27, 2023, [*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 6], p. 32).

[45] Information is about an “identifiable individual” if the individual can be identified from the information (e.g., their name is provided) or if the information, when combined with information otherwise available, could reasonably allow the individual to be identified (*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 6, pp. 32-33).

[46] To be “personal in nature” means the information provides something identifiable about the individual. “Personal” means of, affecting or belonging to a particular person; of or concerning a person’s private rather than professional life. Therefore, information that relates to an individual in a professional, official, or business capacity could only qualify if the information revealed something personal about the individual (*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 6, at pp. 32-33).

[47] Based on a review of Record 4, LRWS withheld the following categories of information:

- Category 1: Information provided by the Applicant (including names of third party individuals) (pages 8, 9, 11 of Record 4)
- Category 2: Information that is clearly within the Applicant’s knowledge (page 55, 56, 61, 62, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127 of Record 4)
- Category 3: Information that was supplied by LRWS to the Applicant (pages 32 to 36 of Record 4)
- Category 4: Business card information (page 31, 38, 67, 69, 88, 89, 90, 91 of Record 4)

[48] I have broken my analysis of LRWS’ application of subsection 29(1) of FOIP into the following two parts – absurd results and business card information.

a. Absurd result

[49] Earlier, I have already explained that it would be an absurd result to refuse the Applicant access to records that the Applicant provided to the LRWS, where the Applicant was

present when the information was presented to LRWS, and/or where the information is clearly within the Applicant's knowledge. Category 1 and 2 is information that was provided by the Applicant to LRWS or is information clearly within the Applicant's knowledge. Therefore, I find that it would be an absurd result to refuse the Applicant access to the information on the pages I have grouped into Category 1 and 2 as described at paragraph [47] of this Report. Before I make a recommendation, I will analyze the remaining categories of Record 4.

[50] Further, I note that Category 3, or pages 32 to 36 of Record 4, is a letter by LRWS to the Applicant. LRWS has already provided the information to the Applicant. Therefore, I find that it is an absurd result to now refuse the Applicant access to information to Category 3 or pages 32 to 36 of Record 4.

b. Business card information

[51] My office has consistently stated that business card information (contact information on a business card) does not constitute personal information because it is not personal in nature (*Guide to FOIP*, Ch. 6, p. 48). Rather, if the record is within the professional context, then business card information within the record is professional in nature. Business telephone numbers and addresses would qualify as personal information only if the record was personal in nature.

[52] Based on a review of the pages I have grouped into Category 4, the redacted information is business card information. This includes names and/or telephone numbers/email addresses of employees of MLT Aikins LLP and/or KGS. In my office's [Investigation Report 320-2023](#), I said the following about business card information:

[26] The *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 58, provides that LA FOIP should not be taken to say that names, addresses and telephone numbers of individuals in local authority record's must never be disclosed. Rather, it requires that such information must not be disclosed if the protection of privacy of an individual so requires. Individuals engaged in discharging public functions obviously do not have the same expectation of privacy when so doing as when they are going about their personal or private affairs.

[27] As per the *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 58, if “personal information” is claimed as an exemption it should not be just any information about an individual, it must be personal in the sense that it is private and that it is or should be treated as confidential so that disclosure would amount to an invasion of privacy or a breach of confidence. To qualify as personal information, the information must be about the individual in a personal capacity. As a general rule, information associated with an individual in a professional, official, or business capacity will not be considered to be “about” the individual.

[28] The *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 42, further states that my office has consistently found that certain information does not qualify as personal information in several reports. The *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 43, includes work product as information in this category and provides: Work product is information generated by or otherwise associated with an individual in the normal course of performing his or her professional or employment responsibilities, whether in a public or private setting. This is not considered personal information.

[29] Again, page 43 of the *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6, lists business card information as another category of information in the category identified above. The *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 43, defines business card information as the type of information found on a business card (name, job title, work address, work telephone numbers and work email address). This type of information is generally not personal in nature and therefore would not be considered personal information. This is considered “business contact information” and not personal information.

[30] It is provided on page 58 of the *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6, that my office has previously relied on the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) to support the interpretation that contact information for individuals in commercial business or private industry is not personal information. PIPEDA applies to every organization that collects, uses, or discloses personal information during “commercial activities”.

[31] Importantly, the *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at pages 58 and 59, elaborates that section 4.01 of PIPEDA carves out business contact information from the type of personal information that requires protection. Subsection 2.1 of PIPEDA defines “business contact information” as, “information that is used for the purpose of communicating or facilitating communication with an individual in relation to their employment, business, or profession” such as the individual’s name, position name or title, work address, work telephone number, work fax number or work electronic address. This further supports my office’s approach to its interpretation of LA FOIP in that business card information is not meant to be personal information.

[32] Finally, my office’s *Guide to LA FOIP*, Ch. 6 at page 60, provides that in Review Report 082-2017, my office found that the contact information for an individual acting in their professional capacity (a former employee’s post office box number, town,

province and postal code, telephone number, fax number and email address) was “business card information” and was not personal information.

[33] In my office’s Review Report 277-2016 at paragraph [40], I found that:

[40] For the third party’s cell phone number, it belongs to one of the owners of Royalty Developments. He is also the president of that company... The cell phone number is included with other business card information that was released to the Applicant. The context of the emails pertains to a business transaction. It is clear that the cell phone is being used for business purposes. As such, it does not qualify as personal information.

[34] Further, in my office’s Review Report 186-2019 at paragraphs [26], [27] and [30], I stated:

[26] Business card information is the type of information found on a business card (name, job title, work address, work phone numbers and work email address). This type of information is generally not personal in nature and therefore would not be considered personal information. Further, in Review 149-2019, 191-2019, I noted that business card information does not qualify as personal information when found with work product. Work product is information generated by or otherwise associated with an individual in the normal course of performing his or her professional or employment responsibilities, whether in a public or private setting. Work product is also not considered personal information.

[27] In this case, the cellular telephone number is in the signature line of an email, which contains work product of an employee of a third-party business.

...

[30] The cellular telephone number, therefore, constitutes business card information and does not qualify as personal information in this instance. I recommend that the Ministry release it to the Applicant.

...

[38] I take the same approach here as set out in my office’s *Guide to LA FOIP* and past Review Reports reproduced in paragraphs [26] to [34] above. In the present instance, **the Complainant’s cell phone number and their office telephone number provided on their business card and as they appear with their name, job title, work address, and work email address cannot be considered personal information for purposes of PART IV of LA FOIP.** Again, by including the cell phone number, together with other business contact information, in the signature line of an email which was used to communicate work product, this number cannot be regarded as personal information. Additionally, it appears that this cell phone number and office telephone number have been presented in the public domain beyond that which the Complainant described to my office.

[Emphasis added]

[53] Similar to my approach to business card information in Investigation Report 320-2023, I find that business card information does not qualify as personal information. I find that LRWS did not properly apply subsection 29(1) to the pages in Category 4 in Record 4, as described at paragraph [47].

[54] Since I have found that LRWS has not properly applied subsection 29(1) of FOIP to Record 4, I recommend that LRWS release Record 4 to the Applicant within 30 days of issuance of this Report.

IV FINDINGS

[55] I find that I have jurisdiction to conduct this review.

[56] I find that LRWS has not demonstrated that it properly applied subsection 15(1)(c) of FOIP to Records 1 and 2.

[57] I find that it is an absurd result to refuse the Applicant access to Records 1 and 2.

[58] I find that LRWS has not demonstrated that it properly applied subsection 19(1)(b) of FOIP to Record 3.

[59] I find that it would be an absurd to result to refuse the Applicant access to the information on the pages I have grouped into Category 1 and 2 as described at paragraph [47].

[60] I find that it is an absurd result to now refuse the Applicant access to information to Category 3, or pages 32 to 36 of Record 4.

[61] I find that LRWS did not properly apply subsection 29(1) of FOIP to the pages in Category 4 in Record 4, as described at paragraph [47].

V RECOMMENDATIONS

[62] I recommend that LRWS release Records 1 and 2 to the Applicant within 30 days of issuance of this Report.

[63] I recommend that LRWS redact the personal information of third party individuals in Record 3 pursuant to subsection 29(1) of FOIP and release the remainder to the Applicant within 30 days of issuance of this Report.

[64] I recommend that LRWS release Record 4 to the Applicant within 30 days of issuance of this Report.

Dated at Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 19th day of December, 2024.

Ronald J. Kruzeniski, K.C.
A/Saskatchewan Information and Privacy
Commissioner